Transparent and Mutual Restraining Electronic Voting
thesisposted on 17.01.2019, 14:55 by Huian Li
Many e-voting techniques have been proposed but not widely used in reality. One of the problems associated with most of existing e-voting techniques is the lack of transparency, leading to a failure to deliver voter assurance. In this work, we propose a transparent, auditable, end-to-end verifiable, and mutual restraining e-voting protocol that exploits the existing multi-party political dynamics such as in the US. The new e-voting protocol consists of three original technical contributions -- universal verifiable voting vector, forward and backward mutual lock voting, and in-process check and enforcement -- that, along with a public real time bulletin board, resolves the apparent conflicts in voting such as anonymity vs. accountability and privacy vs. verifiability. Especially, the trust is split equally among tallying authorities who have conflicting interests and will technically restrain each other. The voting and tallying processes are transparent to voters and any third party, which allow any voter to verify that his vote is indeed counted and also allow any third party to audit the tally. For the environment requiring receipt-freeness and coercion-resistance, we introduce additional approaches to counter vote-selling and voter-coercion issues. Our interactive voting protocol is suitable for small number of voters like boardroom voting where interaction between voters is encouraged and self-tallying is necessary; while our non-interactive protocol is for the scenario of large number of voters where interaction is prohibitively expensive. Equipped with a hierarchical voting structure, our protocols can enable open and fair elections at any scale.