

**SABOTAGE: WHEN MOTHERLANDS RUIN FOREIGN
DEMOCRATIZATION EFFORTS**


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To my love, Amy,
To my soul, Orion,
To my light, Arabella,
To my heart, Avisena

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ABSTRACT

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Title: Sabotage: When Motherlands Ruin Foreign Democratization Efforts

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Why do some international efforts to promote democracy abroad fail? A few conventional answers: the target country lacks the necessary institutions; leadership is incapable of making the changes required; and third-parties have insufficient influence needed to motivate a new system. My research, however, suggests something else entirely: democratization efforts fail when nearby ethno-nationalist homelands, or *motherlands*, interfere in the democratization processes of their neighbors as they seek to contest the political borders of the states with whom they share transnational ethnic kin. Democratization is seen as a barrier to promoting the convergence between ethnic and political boundaries. Building on the theory of peace spoilers, I contend that a motherland can opt for a variety of strategies to challenge the democratization of a target state. Strategies can range from helpful to harmful to democratization of a target state. Their level of effectiveness at spoiling democratization efforts is a function of the intensity and frequency of events (conflict or cooperative) that a motherland initiates against a target state. Relying on new datasets from Varieties of Democracy, Ethnic Power Relations and Phoenix Events Data, and different statistical models, my research shows through a large-N study and a case study that the level of democracy of a target country is lower when a motherland displays high levels of intensity and frequency of conflictual. Also, democratization emerges as an ethno-national homeland exhibits low levels of motivation and opportunity to contest the borders. My findings show that motherlands can act as spoilers when they are a non-democratic regime that has recently lost territories populated by ethnic kin to a nearby state; and enablers of democratization when they are a democracy and were separated from kin long ago.

CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION

Why are some external democratization efforts successful, while others fail? For example, why were the United States and its allies successful in bringing about democracy in post-War Germany and Japan, but not in Afghanistan, Iraq, or the former Yugoslavia in the aftermath of the Cold War? Why did some countries of Central and Eastern Europe (e.g. Baltic republics) democratize after the fall of communism, even in the aftermath of armed conflict (e.g. Croatia), but others have not? The strategies have changed little, with military intervention, state-building and political decentralization efforts aimed at engineering internal political arrangements of target countries, the standard *modus operandi* of democracy promotion. Indeed, the latter set of countries received even more such targeted assistance, measured in terms of dollars spent per one thousand citizens and troop deployment (Dobbins, 2003), than their earlier counterparts. Yet, one set of countries democratized, while the other set did not. Moreover, since the end of the Cold War, an accounting of Western democratization efforts in certain parts of the world shows a range of outcomes. Some countries such as Poland and Slovenia became consolidated democracies; countries like Iraq and Belarus remain autocratic, and other countries such as Bosnia and Ukraine stalled in their democratization process and are now entrenched semi-democracies. What accounts for this divergence in outcomes?

The scholarship has traditionally, and policymakers more recently have held that external democracy promotion fails for two major reasons. First, democracy cannot be imposed by third parties as democratization is a function of domestic politics—structures and/or agents (Bouchet, 2015; Downes, 2010; Downes & Monten, 2013; Greig & Enterline, 2014; Walt, 2016). Second, democratization efforts fail because the interveners seek the imposition of policy agendas and political structures that serve their national interests (Bueno De Mesquita & Downs, 2006; Lake & Fariss, 2014; Peceny, 1999a). While this is certainly part of the story, this pessimism premised on domestic and external factors may be misplaced. The overwhelming emphasis on democratization as a dyadic relationship between democracy promoters and target countries misses the fact, that in many parts of the world, this relationship involves a third wheel in the form of an ethnonational motherland. A *motherland* is defined as the traditional national homeland of a particular ethnic group that is split across two or more contiguous countries as a result of arbitrary border redrawing, which often occurs with the rise and fall of empires and multiethnic states (King,

2010; Vogt, 2018). Roger Brubaker, the noted sociologist of ethnicity, asserts that a state becomes a motherland¹ “for its ethnic diaspora when political or cultural elites define ethnonational kin in other states as members of one and the same nation, claim that they ‘belong,’ in some sense, to the state” (1995, p. 110).

I argue that the actions undertaken by a motherland in target countries where it shares kin are a frequently overlooked, but significant, aspect of international involvement. In such cases, democratization success frequently hinges on the efforts of ethno-nationalist motherlands to sabotage democratization efforts in countries with whom they share transnational ethnic kin. I contend that the motherland(s) are often in competition with Western countries over the direction of political transitions in target countries. This is particularly the case when an ethnic group with transnational kinship ties controls the state apparatus of the motherland. In these instances, the motherland often claims it has the right and the obligation to protect and promote the interests of its transnational ethnic kin (Brubaker, 1995; King & Melvin, 1999). However, the existence of a motherland while necessary for the transnational relationship to be meaningful, is not sufficient. The kin outside the motherland must also identify with it “by virtue of an historic association and origin” (A. D. Smith, 1981, p. 188) and identifies² with the motherland (Connor, 1994) more than with the state in which they are found (i.e. target state). Such an obligation may be at odds with democratically selected policies intended to benefit a target country’s citizenship as a whole. This may lead to the democratization processes of neighboring countries being spoiled by these transnational kin relationships.

My sense that the behavior of motherlands was important grew out of my experiences growing up in Kosovo during the Yugoslav Wars. During that time, regional countries with transnational ethnic kin sought to expand their political borders to match their ethnic boundaries. This was no accident. Nearby motherlands with illiberal political regimes that have recently experienced a territorial separation of kin are more likely to spoil external efforts at democracy promotion and consolidation. In contrast, motherlands with liberal political regimes that were separated from kin long ago are inclined to support external democratization efforts in neighboring countries.

¹ The term used is “external national homeland.”

² The links must be mutually recognized. For example, whereas the Russians of Ukraine recognize Russia as their motherland and hope for, or strive for reunification, the people of Quebec, while French, do not seek or hope to join France.

This finding, which is supported in both large- N statistical analyses and qualitative research detailing Croatia's challenges with democratization as Serbia sought to expand its borders at Croatia's expense, speaks directly to the global challenges facing liberal western policymakers. After a period of optimism, in which members of the international community expressed the belief that outside forces could advance democratization around the world, modern leaders increasingly argue that democratization or nation (state)-building is doomed to fail. My research, however, suggests that foreign distrust of democratization, promoted via state-building is too simplistic. Foreign efforts to promote democracy can succeed provided regional spoilers are not primed to sabotage these democratization efforts.

1.1 Brief Background

The meddling by motherlands in the affairs of the neighboring states are not new. A cursory review of history going back a hundred years yields many such cases, including Germany invading France to take over Alsace-Lorraine (Eckhardt, 1918); Somalia intervening in Ethiopia over Ogaden region in 1977; and numerous Pakistan-India conflicts over Kashmir since 1948 (Lake & Rothchild, 1998). In the post-1945 period, motherland involvement became a non-issue in Europe as population exchanges (e.g. the expulsion of Germans, Greeks, Turks) brought about the homogenization of many countries (Halperin, 1998; Mead, 2015), with genocide and ethnic cleansing acting as a further force to bring about the realignment of ethnic borders to match political ones. In other parts of the world, ideological struggles between communism and democracy became the dominant divisive political issue, keeping the rise of nationalism at bay.

During the Cold War era, the ideological threat from the Soviet Union led the West to focus on containment first and democratization second, even though the democratization of Western Europe continued to be a priority. Yet, with the end of the Cold War, democratization became the number one priority of foreign policy for Western political leaders (Allison & Beschel, 1992; L. Diamond, 1992; Olsen, 2000). The end of the Cold War and the Western enthusiasm with "The End of History" (Fukuyama, 1992) led to a new grand strategy by the West— expansion of the democratic zone. The breakup of multiethnic states, however, left a significant number of ethnic minorities (tens of millions) outside the borders of their national homelands (Brubaker, 1995; Carment & James, 1995). This resulted in revisionist conflicts by several motherlands who sought the return of territories populated by its kin who found themselves overnight in newly independent

states, or that were lost in past wars. The proximity of some motherlands to its ethnic kin in neighboring countries made it easy for them to meddle in neighbors' affairs. This proximity also increased the likelihood and degree of conflict with the West as the two competing agendas clashed throughout many countries.

The Western grand strategy of expanding the democratic zone was spoiled by motherlands who felt that democratization undermined their interests, which was that of nostalgic revisionism³ - territorial expansion to bring about the convergence of political and ethnic borders. There were two potential avenues by which democratization in a target country could hamper a motherland's revisionism. On one hand, the existence of many countries where ethnic borders do not align with the political borders left many former ruling majorities (e.g. Russians, Serbs) as minorities in the newly independent states (e.g. Ukraine, Bosnia) and without the influence they once wielded. The democratization window opened up by the West brought to power (within the new states) the formerly marginalized ethnic groups. On the other hand, democratization could potentially empower the transnational kin and may take away the justification for the motherland to interfere in the target country's affairs. Therefore, the incorporation of territorial areas of target countries populated by ethnic kin, especially in cases where the division occurred within the recent memory of the population, became a high priority for certain motherland countries with transnational kin serving as the chief justification for involvement.

1.2 Theoretical Contribution

With the waning of ideological struggles at the end of the 1980s, the emergent nationalism provided a new impetus for countries seeking national congruence between the nation and the state⁴ (Cederman et al., 2010; A. D. Smith, 1981). This new window of opportunity for territorial revisionism provided the context for motherlands to engage in various schemes in spoiling the democratization processes of target countries. I develop a typology of democratization strategies similar to Stedman's⁵ (1997) to categorize motherlands based on their intensity and frequency of conflict or cooperative events to contest or not, the political borders of the target state. There are four strategies that are available to a motherland (from good to worse): apathy, inclusivity,

³ Term originated from a discussion with Keith Shimko (Purdue University) and is used here with his permission.

⁴ The matching of ethnic borders with that of a unit of governance, the state.

⁵ Stedman's typology classifies three types of peace spoilers: total, opportunistic, and limited spoilers.

segregationist, and annexationist. The motherland does not have to follow one strategy consistently over time or across countries.⁶ Their goals are dynamic in that they fluctuate based on cost and risk (Stedman, 1997). Strategies can shift as the intensity and frequency of interactions for spoiling change. First, a motherland expressing low levels of intensity for conflict may choose to remain *apathetic* to the political condition of its kin within a target state (when the frequency of conflictual events is low), or to pursue a strategy of *inclusivity* by demanding equal rights and liberties for its kin on par with the group that controls the state (when frequency of conflictual events is high). Generally, low intensity for conflict is typical of a motherland that is a democracy itself and the time since separation from kin is distant. Motherlands that are established democracies, are more prone to cooperation and peaceful resolution of disputes. As such, they may not engage in spoiling. Additionally, the time transpired since the loss of territory may also influence the spoiler strategy type. In cases where a long time has passed since the creation of interstate borders (e.g. end of World War I or II), a motherland may adopt strategies of apathy or inclusivity. Consequently, external democratization is likely as the motherland does not have territorial pretenses against a target state and welcomes any international efforts to improve the condition of its members within that state. One good example of this is Ireland-Great Britain cooperation in bringing about the resolution of the conflict in Northern Ireland.

Second, a motherland that initiates high levels of intensity for conflict but at a low frequency will pursue a *segregationist* strategy where through armed conflict seeks to carve out a territory where its kin govern autonomous of the target state authorities. In exchange for peace, the motherland coaxes the international community and the target state to allow it to exercise some degree of sovereignty over its kin. When both intensity and frequency levels for conflict are high, a motherland pursues *annexation*. It engages in military intervention and occupation to improve the condition of its transnational members by seizing kin held areas from the target state. High levels of intense events for conflict are typical of motherlands with non-democratic regimes whose split from kin occurred within the recent memories of the population. Any democratization efforts may be viewed as an impediment to a motherland's desire to rectify the injustice of past borders it perceives by bringing the kin held areas within its sovereignty. Furthermore, the evidence from

⁶ Some motherlands have transnational ethnic kin spread across two or more neighboring countries. For example, Hungary has ethnic kin in Romania (Transylvania), Serbia (Vojvodina), Slovakia (Komárno and Dunajská Streda districts) and Ukraine (Tisza Valley).

the breakup of former USSR and Yugoslavia seems to indicate that when the time of split between the kin is recent, a motherland is more likely to engage in spoiling. Accordingly, democratization is unlikely as the international community is unable to promote democratization projects in conflict-prone areas or territories under the control of motherland, and the central authorities may resort to illiberal means to fight separatism. Russia is a typical example of an annexationist spoiler who has made use of these policies to pursue its goals in Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine since the breakup of the Soviet Union.

The level of frequency to undertake conflictual events is broadly a function of two capabilities that a motherland may or may not possess. First, with respect to the target country, when the distribution of power⁷ favors the motherland, spoiling does not require much effort. It can militarily overrun the target country's forces, use its economic wealth for sanctions, and yield its diplomatic might to isolate the target country or narrow the responses of the international community.

Second, vis-à-vis the West, motherlands can thwart democracy promoters in several ways. One, the motherlands and their transnational kin can play the long-game. They can be uncooperative with the West and the target state authorities to prevent ethnic reconciliation, (re)building state institutions, allowing the operation of state institutions throughout the whole territory, etc. They can wait for the West to bring its mission to an end and then pursue reunification. Also, they understand the Western psyche of not having the patience to engage in or expand the conflict "because of a quarrel in a far-away country between people of whom we know nothing" (Neville Chamberlain quoted in Ratcliffe, 2018). Two, whereas Western states have to project their efforts across vast distances, motherlands are just across the border and thereby more effective at coordinating collective action at a lower cost (Weidmann, 2009). Moreover, they have a wider range of options to spoil the democratization of target countries. They can invade (e.g., Russia in Ukraine), carry out a hybrid war e.g. (Iran in Iraq), or deceptively cooperate⁸ (e.g. Serbia in Bosnia). Finally, the motherlands have been very successful in getting the West to accept them as

⁷ With respect to military capabilities, economic wealth, population size, territorial area, etc.

⁸ By deceptive cooperation, I mean, a country engages in cooperation in bad faith. On one hand, it publicly proclaims that it recognizes the territorial integrity of the target state, makes statements of friendship, participates in regional cooperation forums, etc. On the other hand, it pushes its transnational ethnic kin (when included in power sharing) to sabotage the workings of the target state. Serbia's current relationship with Bosnia is a good example of deceptive cooperation. It pays lip service to recognizing Bosnia's sovereignty while getting Bosnian Serbs to sabotage the working of the state and threaten secessionism and reunification with Serbia.

major stakeholders in the affairs of target countries. Motherland arguments for a legitimate role in the conflict - not only because the issue concerns their ethnic kin, but also because the motherland is an actual resident in the neighborhood and wants to promote peace – have been embraced by, in particular, European policymakers.

1.3 Policy Implications

In addition to the theoretical contribution that I have outlined in the previous section, this research has also practical significance for the international efforts in promoting democratization abroad. Thus far, Western policymakers have failed to appreciate the role motherlands have had in spoiling the Western efforts in spreading democratization in the Balkans, parts of former Soviet Union, Africa, and the Middle East. With the end of armed conflict in the Balkans in the early 2000s, the issue of borders did not wither away. As recent events in Ukraine, and increasingly in the Middle East with Iran coming to the aid of their brethren in Syria are showing democratization and spoiling will continue to preoccupy Western policymakers and threaten its national interests.

As motherlands have become effective, in varying degrees, at spoiling democratization of target countries, two questions emerge regarding Western policy responses. First, “why doesn’t the West realize in advance that motherlands may spoil democratization efforts and move to blunt the effectiveness of these interjections?” The anecdotal evidence seems to point out that policymakers, at least European, do not see the actions of motherlands as part of a broader pattern, but as isolated cases. For example, the wars waged in the former Yugoslavia were viewed as a set of independent events: as a civil war between Croats and Serbs (Croatia); Bosniaks,⁹ Croats and Serbs (Bosnia); and Albanians and Serbs (Kosovo), instead of a pattern of wars to create a Greater Serbia—a single state that incorporates all Serb inhabited territories in the former Yugoslavia (Pfaff, 1993). To policymakers, the actions of motherlands are not seen as causes of instability in target countries but as a consequence of internal instability within those countries.

Another potential explanation involves the Western appeasement of a motherland’s actions. Whether in the former Yugoslavia and USSR or the Middle East, the West has granted concessions to motherlands (most frequently in imposing decentralization along ethnic lines) with hopes that each conflict is the last one. In cases where a target state has pushed back against decentralization,

⁹ Bosnians of Muslim faith, who are a Slavic people, refer to themselves as Bosniaks.

the West has used the target country's access to funds, trade deals, and membership in international institutions as incentives to acquire acquiescence. This failure to recognize that bargaining in one situation is going to influence subsequent bargaining positions has marred Western democracy promotion (Fearon, 1995; Schelling, 1980). As the West has not been able to bind itself to carry threats of punishing the spoilers for their interjections in target countries, they have lost the power to constrain their adversaries (Schelling, 1980). Instead, motherlands are made partners in helping solve the ethnic issues (even if they are the ones responsible for fomenting ethnic strife) in target countries and are heralded as key factors of regional stability.

Second, in the event the West does not recognize in advance that motherlands are a problem, "why don't they pick up on this later and make the necessary adjustments?" This is a policy question for which there is no clear-cut answer. However, we can identify several potential explanations for Western ineffectiveness in dealing with spoilers. One, policymakers are not as pragmatic as we would like to believe. The belief in democracy as a universal antidote for all ills is not necessarily a widely shared sentiment, especially if democracy is conceptualized as free and fair elections. Such 'electoral democracies' have resulted in regimes that bypass constitutional limits on their power, and/or bring to power extremist groups (Flynt et al., 2007; Zakaria, 1997). To this effect, as motherlands are recognized as major stakeholders in the process involving their transnational kin, the West has exacerbated the situation by trading concessions (in the form of ethnic decentralization) in pursuit of peace to long-term stability and democracy (Newman & Richmond, 2006b). However, as numerous studies have shown, decentralization along ethnic lines is not conducive to peace nor democratization (Deiwi, 2010; Philip G. Roeder & Rothchild, 2005; Sisk, 2003).

Adjustments by western policymakers facing a motherland are also hampered by contextual factors. When a motherland has strong military capabilities (e.g. Russia in Ukraine), the responses are very limited (e.g. economic actions, low level of political isolationism). When a weaker motherland¹⁰ has participated in large scale atrocities in a target country (e.g. Serbia in Bosnia), the West has militarily intervened to displace the motherland from a target country. However, in certain situations, a defeated motherland can still indirectly sabotage the democratization processes through hybrid war. When a motherland pursues segregationist or inclusivist strategies, the West has conditioned a motherland's progress toward the EU and NATO

¹⁰ Implies a disfavorable distribution of power vis-à-vis the West (weaker military, political, economic capabilities).

membership, and economic aid. Finally, when faced with increased interference by a motherland, the West is limited in its response as it does not want to broaden the war to include the main culprit – the motherland.

In instances when the motherland is willing to wield power at greater levels than the West, it can occupy territories within the target state and then it can deny access to the area to promoters of democratization (Greenhill & Major, 2007). Despite best efforts, Western access to eastern Ukraine is severely limited by Russia (confined to monitoring cessation of hostilities and mediating in a prisoner exchange). Additionally, in some countries despite successfully displacing a motherland's military troops from the target country, the West is yet to find a solution to spoiler's challenges. Kosovo is a good example of such challenges, as Serbia upon its withdrawal in 1999, set-up a parallel government in areas inhabited by Serbs, blockaded NATO troops from effectively exercising their mission by setting up human walls on roads and highways, and assaulted EU police and NATO troops without incurring any costs.¹¹

Success or failure of democratization depends not only on actions of spoilers but also on the role of the West in dealing with such spoilers. Letting the motherland take occupy or annex territories is unlikely to bring about the democratization of the target country, as witnessed by Russian actions several former Soviet republics (Pfaff, 1993). The socialization of motherlands may be more effective with inclusivist spoilers since the West can offer a “carrot or stick” approach to induce a change in behavior. The case of Hungary persuaded by the EU to take a more constructive approach to its transnational kin in Romania and Slovakia in return for EU membership is a good example of this. Concerning coercion of annexationist spoilers, potentially, the West has the means to stop the meddling, but that requires raising the cost for non-compliance by expanding the conflict to include the motherland – costs that the West appears not willing to incur (Fortna, 2008). It took over 3 years, more than a hundred thousand dead, and the ethnic cleansing of two million people before the West intervened in Bosnia. Gaining domestic support to expand the intervention to include the spoiler (i.e. Serbia) could prove unattainable. If the West is not ready to wield the necessary amount of power to neutralize the spoiling because its optimal

¹¹ In 2011, Kosovo Serbs attacked EU police and Austrian troops in the northern part of Kosovo in response to Kosovo police taking over the border control. Whereas the EU police fled the area, Austrian troops did not retaliate. Only with the coming of American troops and notice that there will be military retaliation for any attack on US troops, did the Serbs cease (Der Spiegel 2011). Retrieved from <http://www.spiegel.de/international/europe/border-dispute-with-kosovo-serbian-attackers-shoot-at-nato-soldiers-a-777117.html>.

strategy may be too risky or costly, then its efforts at democratization will prove ineffective and may make matters worse (Greenhill & Major, 2007; Stedman, 1997).

1.4 Overview of Chapters

In Chapter 2, I describe the state of the literature on the international causes of democratization, primarily the role of democracy promoters in fostering the democratization of a target country. Since 1945, first and foremost the United States, but also European countries alone or through European Community/Union have prioritized democratization abroad as a means of promoting their national security and economic interests. In the aftermath of World War 2, the US relied on military force and state-building to promote democracy in Western Europe. With some exceptions, both the US and later Europe promoted democracy by relying on the state-building mechanism: reforming or creating new governmental institutions and establishing impartial institutions such as civil society, independent media, political parties, and strengthening the education sector. In post-conflict countries, the international community, especially since the end of the Cold War, has promoted political decentralization as a means of political settlement. Yet, despite this rich scholarship, motherlands have not been considered as a variable that affects democratization.

In Chapter 3, I offer my theory of why democracy promotion fails in certain contexts. I show that a motherland has four strategies that are available to it. The adoption of a particular strategy depends on motherland's intensity and frequency to initiate events that challenge or accept the political borders of a target state with whom it shares transnational ethnic kin. A motherland that is a democracy herself and was separated from her kin a long time ago will exhibit low intensity for spoiling—is less likely to try and contest the political borders of the target state and will adopt strategies (apathy or inclusivity) that may aid in the democratization. A motherland that is non-democratic and was recently separated from her kin will initiate more intense conflictual events; will adopt spoiling strategies (segregationist or annexationist).

In Chapter 4, I present Croatia's efforts at democratization from 1991 (declaration of independence) to 2015. I show that Serbia played a motherland to Croatian Serbs and pursued two different strategies with regards to the democratization of Croatia. Between 1991 and 1998, Serbia pursued an annexationist policy as it occupied one-third of Croatian territory. During this time, democratization suffered as Serbia expelled Croatian national authorities from occupied territory alongside the non-Serb population, it built an illiberal statelet and restrained the international

community from promoting democratization. After 1998, with the liberation of the last Serb controlled territory, Croatia's level of democracy increased as Serbia could not undertake high levels of intensity and frequency for conflict to play a spoiler. Subsequently, Croatia democratized and joined the European Union and NATO.

In Chapter 5, I examine motherland's spoiling on the level of democracy of the target state using large- N statistical analysis. In the analysis, the effects of intensity and frequency for conflict or cooperation on the level of democracy is assessed. The results of this study indicate, across various model specifications and estimators, that as the intensity and frequency for conflict increases, the level of democracy decreases in a target state. Correspondingly, a motherland that initiates intense cooperative events and undertakes an increasing number of cooperative events is likely to lead to increased levels of democracy in a target state. While conflictual events are highly correlated and statistically significant with increased levels of democracy, the effect of cooperative events initiated by a motherland towards a target state is a stronger predictor of increased democracy scores.

In Chapter 6, I offer my conclusions to this research in form of key findings, present some implications for policymakers if democracy promoters continue to ignore spoilers in the democratization of target countries, and offer some suggestions for future research.

1.5 Chapter Summary

In this chapter, I detailed the empirical puzzle for this project, explained the contribution of my research toward existing literature, present an overview of the policy implications and outlined the progression of this dissertation. In the next chapter, I describe how the literature on democratization has treated the international causes of democratization. I also show that democracy promoters since 1945 have primarily relied on three mechanisms to aid in the democratization of a target country: military intervention, state-building, and decentralization. Moreover, I present the viewpoints of those that are optimists and pessimists about the ability of external parties to foster democracy. Finally, I describe how despite a body of literature that examines the effect of states with transnational links on conflict, democratization scholarship has omitted this key variable that this dissertation will examine.

CHAPTER 2. THE LITERATURE ON THE EXTERNAL CAUSES OF DEMOCRATIZATION

The literature on the causes of democratization is rich. During the Cold War, this topic was primarily the domain of comparativists, sociologists, and economists who held that the sources of democratization are monadic. That is, by examining the domestic variables of a country we may find the explananda for democratization. Over the years, the domestic variables explaining democratization have expanded from socioeconomic (Almond & Verba, 1963; Boix & Stokes, 2003; Bollen & Jackman, 1985; Burkhart & Lewis-Beck, 1994; Hadenius, 1992; Lipset, 1959; Przeworski et al., 2000) to also include elite pacts (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2001; Higley & Burton, 1989; Karl, 1990), civil society (Gill, 2017; McLaverty, 2002; Threlfall, 2008; White, 1995) and others.

Toward the end of great ideological (Democracy vs Communism) divisions in the 1980s scholarship began to conceptualize democratization as a dyadic outcome. That is, the causes of democratization are external to the country undergoing the process; that there are international dimensions to democratization (Whitehead, 1996). The explanatory variables on the international causes of democratization have included: military force (De Mesquita & Downs, 2006; Downes & Monten, 2013; Hermann & Kegley Jr, 1998; Meernik, 1996; Peceny, 1999b; Pickering & Kisangani, 2006; Pickering & Peceny, 2006); international institutions (Pevehouse, 2002a, 2002b); geographical diffusion (K. S. Gleditsch & Choung, 2004; K. S. Gleditsch & Ward, 2006; Kopstein & Reilly, 2000; O'Loughlin et al., 1998; Wejnert, 2005)¹²; globalization¹³ (Bhagwati, 1995; Eichengreen & Leblang, 2008; Li & Reuveny, 2003; Rudra, 2005); and democracy aid (Finkel et al., 2007; Savun & Tirone, 2011; Scott & Steele, 2011).

Yet, despite this voluminous literature on the role of foreign actors on the causes of democratization, researchers have largely ignored the presence of a third actor in the form of a nearby ethnonational homeland or motherland, with the motivation and the capabilities to spoil or support the democratization of a target country with whom it shares transnational ethnic kin.

¹² O'Loughlin et al., (1998, p.568) study shows that no universal laws govern democratization; it is a process that is affected by local, regional and contextual elements.

¹³ These studies look at different proxies for globalization including measures for: trade; capital flows as percent of GDP (Rudra 2005); foreign direct investment inflows, portfolio investment inflows (Li and Reuveny 2003; trade liberalization and capital account liberalization (Eichengreen and Leblang 2008).

Motherlands are an important factor in international affairs. But, the extent to which it has been treated in the literature, is limited to its effect on civil war, the onset, duration, or the spread conflict (Cederman, Buhaug, et al., 2009; Cederman, Girardin, et al., 2009; Cederman et al., 2013; K. S. Gleditsch, 2007; Salehyan, 2007). In light of the findings that transnational ethnic links matter when it comes to war, it is not far-fetched to expect that motherlands could have a transnational effect on democratization as well.

The issues surrounding the external causes of democratization continue to be a subject of spirited debate. One school holds that external actors have very little influence over the democratization of target countries because democratization is primarily an endogenous process (Bouchet, 2015; Downes, 2010; Downes & Montén, 2013). However, just because favorable domestic conditions may be necessary for democratization to consolidate, it does not mean they are sufficient. Ignoring the external factors in democratization is a fundamental mistake. As Rustow recognized in 1970, “foreign influences are almost always present” in the democratization process (1970, p. 348). Democracy does not and cannot emerge in a vacuum.

In the post-World War 2 era, Western efforts at promoting democratization abroad have been expansive in form and function. They have not relied on coercion alone or mainly to impose democracy. The international community has fostered domestic conditions, by engaging in state-building missions and fostering peace and reconciliation (in cases of conflict) through an expansive political process that decentralizes power, to strengthen democratization. No country since 1945 became a democracy completely on their own. The desire and push for democracy may emerge endogenously, but as Kevin Narizny acknowledges, the “global spread of democracy was induced, imposed, and stabilized ‘from above’ as much as it was built ‘from below’” (2012, p. 344). The favorable environment for its growth and consolidation is fostered by the established democracies.

The overall goal of this chapter is to show that while the scholarship on the external causes of democratization may have picked up steam with the end of the Cold War, the West has long held that democratization of other countries is a foreign policy priority. I show that there is a long history of democracies, first the United States (US) and later the European countries and institutions, of advancing democratization abroad. For the past 73 years, democracy promotion has involved numerous mechanisms such as military intervention, state-building or capacity building, and decentralization or power-sharing.

In this chapter, I seek to accomplish several things. In the next section, I briefly offer definitions of terms on democracy, democratization and democracy promotion, as they pertain to the dynamics between external actors and target state. Second, I summarize the role democracy promotion has played in the foreign policies of major Western powers, the US and European Union (EU). Third, I discuss the state of literature with respect to the three most important mechanisms that the West has used to promote democratization: military intervention, state-building, and decentralization. Finally, I conclude this chapter, by introducing a frequently overlooked, but a significant variable of international involvement is missing in the study of democratization – that of the motherland with transnational ethnic kin settled in a nearby country

2.1 Key Terms: Democracy, Democratization, and Democracy Promotion

Democracy, democratization, and democracy promotion are related terms that pertain to the objective of fostering a democratic political regime; the process that the target country must undergo to become a democracy; and the mechanisms external parties have used in fostering democracies abroad. At a conceptual level, most definitions of democracy take on a Schumpeterian dimension in that they refer to electoral processes as the critical benchmark (Dahl, 1973; Fukuyama, 1992; Przeworski, 2004; T. Smith, 1994). For many, *democracy* is a regime where the election of parties and individuals to exercise control over “effective centers of governmental power” (T. Smith, 1994, p. 13) involves a process where all citizens through secret ballot, in free and fair elections, vote to select their preferred choice among many candidates and parties (Przeworski, 2004, p. 301). Dahl’s original conceptualization of democracy rested on eight institutional mechanisms¹⁴ that require of a state to guarantee all its citizens the ability to “formulate their preferences; signify their preferences, and to have their preferences weighted equally” (Dahl, 1973, pp. 2-3).

If democracy is the political regime that external actors seek to obtain, then *democratization* is the process that target states go through in transforming the political regime from a non-democracy to a democracy. According to Coppedge democratization “include[s] any process in which countries become democracies or not, become more democratic or less so,

¹⁴ Dahl’s (1978) eight institutional mechanisms include: freedom of organization, freedom of expression, the right to vote, broad eligibility for public office, the right to compete for support and votes, the availability of alternative sources of information, free and fair elections, and the dependence of public policies on citizens’ preferences.

survive as democracies, or breakdown” (2012, p. 7). The process of democratization fosters the conditions that “initiate, consolidate, and perpetuate democracy” (T. Smith, 1994, p. 13). The democratization process that moves a target country’s regime from some form of authoritarianism to democracy can be lengthy as it includes the abolishment of the old regime; the transition to a new regime; and finally, the institutionalization and legitimation of a new political regime (H. P. Schmitz & Sell, 2002). This last stage is the most important phase as democracy becomes intertwined with the identity of the state and allows the international actors to influence political development so the state can function effectively, be inclusive, and demonstrate accountable governance (Bunce, 2003, p. 179).

Democracy promotion, on the other hand, speaks to a variety of approaches or mechanisms used by foreign actors to influence the democratization process (Bouchet, 2015). According to Schmitter and Brouwer democracy promotion “*consist[s] of all overt and voluntary activities adopted, supported, and (directly or indirectly) implemented by (public or private) foreign actors explicitly designed to contribute to the political liberalization of autocratic regimes and the subsequent democratization of autocratic regimes in specific recipient countries*” (1999, p. 12). Such a wide range of policies, strategies, and activities are present at every stage of the democratization process (Huber, 2015; Sedaca & Bouchet, 2014) and operate across a spectrum, from cooperative to coercive.”

This range of policies highlights that democracy promotion can occur along a continuum (Hobson & Kurki, 2012). At one end, democracy promotion is instituted at the behest of a target state’s government. In a given country, after a period of political upheaval, the elites (government and opposition) may strike a deal for the political liberalization of the country. The process may not always require a government-opposition deal but may emanate from regime collapse. As a means of ushering a new era, the elites invite external actors to first assist in the transition of the political system¹⁵, and then to provide the technical expertise in reforming of the old and the founding of new institutions, such as civil society, political parties, free media, and others.

The democratization of Central Europe after 1989 is a great example of foreign powers being invited by a new government to engage in democracy promotion. Once the decision for political liberalization was undertaken in countries such as Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and

¹⁵ E.g. election organization and monitoring, constitutional framing.

other Central/Eastern European countries, the US and European Community¹⁶ were invited to assist in the democratization process. These two actors responded by providing foreign aid and technocratic expertise in transforming the political and economic systems of these countries. By 2004, the economic transformation and democratic consolidation had reached the stage that allowed Central European countries to be admitted as full members of the European Union.

At the other end of the continuum, democracy promotion can be imposed by the international community when an autocracy systematically engages over a period of time in ethnic cleansing and/or genocide of its population. In such cases, the international community through military intervention replaces the regime or removes it from a portion of the territory, so that it may engage in democracy promotion in the target country. Examples of coercive democracy promotion include the US and EU involvement in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s to end Serbian ethnic cleansing and genocide in Bosnia and Kosovo. As Serbian forces withdrew upon their defeat, the international community promoted democratization through numerous state-building programs and various political decentralization schemes, while continuing to keep military forces to secure the peace.

Democracy promotion has received a lot of attention since the Western intervention in former Yugoslavia in the 1990s and the U.S. led invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq in the early 2000s. However, foreign-imposed regimes are not new to international politics. In the next section, I will discuss the importance of democracy promotion in the foreign policies of the United States and Europe and provide a very brief historical background to their democracy promotion efforts.

2.2 The Foreign Policy of Democracy Promotion

Great Powers have historically sought to impose their regime type in neighboring countries and afar, as a means of instituting regimes that internalize their values and to promote their institutions (Huber, 2015; Nau, 2000; Owen, 2002; Risse, 2009; T. Smith, 1994). So, '[w]hy do nations spend money to advance democracy abroad?' asked Larry Diamond in (1992). Since that question was first asked, the international community's toolset for democracy promotion has expanded to include not only military interventions, but also state-building projects, and decentralization.

¹⁶ European (Economic) Community (1957-1993) was the predecessor to the European Union.

In light of increasing military interventions to promote democratization abroad since the end of Cold War, one can supplement Larry Diamond's question by asking why are nations willing to spill the blood of their soldiers and risk their reputation just to promote democratization abroad? The answer is simple. To enhance its national security and promote its political and economic interests. The first argument advances the notion that Country A¹⁷ promotes democratization in Country B because it enhances Country A's security. Former US Secretary of State and National Security Advisor, Condoleezza Rice argued that "Great Powers do not just mind their business" but advance their national interests through promotion of "economic growth and political openness" (2000, p. 47).

Since the end of Cold War, the world has seen an increasing number of failed states in the Balkans, parts of Africa and the Middle East that has led to civil wars, ethnic cleansing, mass refugees, and more recently, the proliferation of terror groups in command of large swaths of territories in such states. Such state failure has resulted in increased threats to Western national interests (L. Diamond, 1992; Fukuyama, 2004; Krasner & Pascual, 2005). Civil wars in many countries have led to military interventions¹⁸ costing billions of dollars; genocide in Rwanda affected the reputation of the US and Europeans;¹⁹ the Syrian refugee crisis has sown divisions within the European Union (EU) regarding refugee relocation quotas; and as a result of civil war in Iraq and Syria, terror groups such as Islamic State have been successful in gaining control over territory and threaten neighboring states allied with the US. Consequently, third-party involvement is deemed necessary to bring about the conditions required for "democratization as it is not viable in countries where violence or threat of violence is pervasive" (L. Diamond, 2006).

The second argument states that Country A promotes democratization in Country B because it advances Country A's political and economic interests. Regarding the United States, the "spread of democratic values and a liberal political model abroad" has long been a core component of US foreign policy (Sedaca & Bouchet, 2014, p. 5). For Jonathan Monten "democracy promotion is not just another foreign policy instrument...it is central to US political identity and sense of national purpose" (2005, p. 113) as "no country has benefitted more...from transformation of autocratic regimes into democracies" (Fukuyama & McFaul, 2008, p. 24). Democratization

¹⁷ Unilaterally or multilaterally with allies or under the UN auspices.

¹⁸ NATO interventions in the Balkans, and other coalitions when intervening in other parts of the world.

¹⁹ Accused of racist policies because NATO was willing to intervene in the Balkans, but not in Rwanda where the genocide was on a much larger scale than in the former Yugoslavia.

increases economic prosperity by facilitating long-term economic growth and fostering free markets, and political pluralism (Lagon, 2011; Olsen, 2000; Sedaca & Bouchet, 2014). Additionally, it opens up markets, brings down trade barriers, and creates opportunities from free trade. In the post-Cold War era, promotion of political liberalism and free markets have become staples of western democracies, including numerous international institutions such as the World Bank, IMF, and the European Union that have mandated democratic reforms in return for loans, aid and membership (Bridoux & Kurki, 2014a; Ethier, 2003; Keil, 2013; Michaelowa & Hännny, 2010).

2.2.1 American Democracy Promotion

The US is traditionally viewed as the preeminent democracy promoter as a result of its expanding military superiority, economic might, and its political and cultural clout (Bouchet, 2015; Mitchell, 2016; T. Smith, 1994). The US is also a country with the longest history of democracy promotion, from Latin America in the 19th century to Southeast Asia at the dawn of the 21 century.²⁰ According to Tony Smith, democracy promotion manifests the “central ambition of American foreign policy during the twentieth century” (1994, p. 3). The rise in democracy promotion activity in the 1990s, as well as the American intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan, may lead one to believe that such evangelism is a consequence of American ideological triumph over communism. However, the American promotion of democracy has its genesis to a time long before the U.S. became a superpower, with the willingness and the capabilities to export democracy.

In its infancy, the US pursued a passive policy of democracy promotion. Since the founding of the state was based on universal values it “made the US in its foreign policy as well as in its domestic policy a quintessentially moralistic and ideological country,” according to Tony Smith (2000, p. 89). Whereas the early proponents of American democracy promotion, Thomas Jefferson, and John Quincy Adams, (Nau, 2000; T. Smith, 1994) recognized the virtues of democracy abroad,²¹ they were adamant about not going abroad “in search of monster to destroy” (Adams, 1821) and to “*avoid implicating ourselves with the powers of Europe, even in support of principles which we mean to pursue*” (Jefferson, 1801).

²⁰ Here I am referring to the US intervention in Afghanistan in 2001.

²¹ “Wherever the standard of freedom and Independence has been or shall be unfurled, there will her heart, her benedictions and her prayers be. But she goes not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own. She will commend the general cause by the countenance of her voice, and the benignant sympathy of her example.” (John Q. Adams 1821).²¹

Despite this initial resistance to democracy promotion, as the national interests have evolved over the centuries, democracy promotion became and has remained a core priority of the US foreign policy. Tony Smith in his masterpiece of examining America's mission in promoting democracy abroad captures the essence of this grand objective: *"The American agenda calling for a world order of democratic states thus needs to be understood not only as an expression of the American national interests conducted with respect to individual countries, but also in the context of nationalist debated about state building in the twentieth century and American efforts to create a comprehensive framework for the world order"* (T. Smith, 1994, p. 9). This mission has transcended presidential administration, ideological lines, and major world events.

2.2.2 European Democracy Promotion

America's partner in promoting democracy abroad, Europe, was late to this mission. Except for imperial British or French colonial institution-building that proved successful in rare instances of democratization during the decolonization era (e.g. India), the European embrace of democracy promotion prior to the 1970s was very limited. Its policies are constantly evolving due to its unique circumstances. In the aftermath of World War 2, the impetus was on the 12 member states to adopt and share democratic norms and institutions. As democracy consolidated in Western Europe, attempts at exporting democracy have been pursued at two levels by the Europeans. On one hand, countries such as Germany, Holland, and Nordic countries have promoted democratization as part of their national foreign policy. For example, Germany through its political party foundations such as Fridreich Ebert Foundation and Konrad Adenaur Foundation, promoted the political organization of masses, political parties, and election monitoring in southern Europe and Latin America in the aftermath of the overthrow of military dictatorships in the 1970s (Lloyd, 2010; Magen & McFaul, 2009).

Exporting democracy became a top priority in response to the changing security environment with the withering of the Soviet Union and as a means of expanding global stability (Olsen, 2000). The fall of Communism in Europe opened new opportunities for European democracy promotion in Central and Eastern Europe as EU member countries and EU institutions both pursued complementary policies. The likes of Germany focused mostly on promoting liberal economic reforms while Nordic countries emphasized social liberalization as a means to economic and social development, key prerequisites to democratization (Lipset, 1959). At the same time, EU

institutions advanced democratization by taking potential members through a rigorous process of bringing local economies, institutions, and legislation in line with the *acquis communautaire*²² of the European Union.

While Western countries have traditionally constituted the core of democracy promotion, since the 1970s, the number of actors has increased to include international organizations, international financial institutions, non-governmental organizations, and on the ground recipients (Bridoux & Kurki, 2014b, p. 22). As the number of participants has increased, democracy promotion has become more multilateral as more countries²³ and international institutions²⁴ have joined the traditional democracy promoters like the US and UK. This multilateralism has broadened the international legitimacy of the interventions and deepened the effectiveness of democracy promotion. For example, in order to nurture a conducive environment for democratization to succeed, democracy promoters have placed significant resources in the economic development of a target country. International financial institutions like International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) have been engaged to leverage their core competencies in assisting with the transformation of economies to free market.

International non-governmental organizations (INGO) such as the Freedom House, National Endowment for Democracy (NED), Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy (IMD) and German Stiftung (e.g. Friedrich Ebert, Konrad Adenauer) have taken the lead in promoting programs dealing with civil society, political parties, electoral reform. German Stiftung(s) in the 1970s actively engaged in Spain, Portugal, Greece, and some countries of Latin America, to establish parties, organize and monitor elections and promote human rights (Freedom House, 2014; Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2011; Magen & McFaul, 2009; Mair, 2013). In the years since, the landscape has changed significantly with an increase in the number of INGOs who are considered vital to democracy (Butler, April 11, 2017) as they “think differently and have a

²² “The *acquis* is the body of common rights and obligations [35 chapters] that is binding on all the EU member states. It is constantly evolving and comprises: 1) the content, principles and political objectives of the Treaties; 2) legislation adopted pursuant to the Treaties and the case law of the Court of Justice; 3) declarations and resolutions adopted by the Union; 4) instruments under the Common Foreign and Security Policy; 5) international agreements concluded by the Union and those entered into by the member states among themselves within the sphere of the Union's activities.” Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/acquis_en on August 21, 2018.

²³ Nordic countries, Germany, Japan, South Korea, and others.

²⁴ E.g. the UN, EU, OSCE, NATO.

different perspective and different analysis from the State Department” (Thomas O. Melia quoted in Silver, 2006).²⁵

After the Cold War, with some interventions, the international community has brought together in a systemic way the whole chorus of actors (state and non-state) to fulfill various functions to provide the security, undertake state-building, and improve economic conditions necessary for democracy to become entrenched. For example, in Kosovo in 1999 NATO forces intervened to displace the Serbian military and police forces. Upon removal of Serbia’s security forces, the United Nations established an international protectorate to govern Kosovo until its status is resolved. International financial institutions (e.g. IMF, World Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development) quasi-governmental agencies (e.g. National Democratic Institute), and non-governmental organizations (e.g. Open Society Foundation), during the protectorate era (1999 – 2008) and thereafter, have assisted in the wide transformation of the economy, the establishment of a civil society, multi-party system, independent media, training programs for state employees, and numerous other activities.

2.3 The Mechanisms of Foreign Democracy Promotion

Several approaches to external democracy promotion have been suggested in the literature: coercive, utilitarian, identitive (Huber, 2015), adaptation (H. P. Schmitz & Sell, 2002) and capacity-building (Risse, 2009).²⁶ In this dissertation, I use terminology consistent with practitioners’ language to denote the three main mechanisms that external actors have utilized in this respect: military intervention, state-building, and decentralization. Military intervention refers to the use of armed force by a country (e.g. the US), a group of countries (e.g. NATO), or the international community (e.g. UN) to remove an oppressive regime and to ensure that the democratization process within target country is not spoiled. State-building is a mechanism that consolidates a range of policies that have taken on different terms in the literature (democracy assistance, democracy aid, capacity-building, or nation-building). Lastly, decentralization is a

²⁵ For more information on the bureaucracy of democracy promotion, including names of NGOs see also Thomas O Melia, https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/democracy_bureaucracy-2.pdf. For a list of US based democracy promotion democratization see https://fsi.stanford.edu/docs/democracy_promotion_organizations_in_the_united_states/

²⁶ Risse (2009) “pathways of influence” also include the mechanisms used by Huber (2015), although he uses different terms: force/coercion; incentives; persuasion. H.P. Schmitz and Sell (2002) use similar terms as the other two authors in denoting ways in which external actors are able to promote democratization (i.e. pressure, socialization).

recent term in policymaking circles used to promote democratization, but in actuality, it refers to the power-sharing and territorial rearrangements commonly implemented in the post-conflict contexts.

Depending on the circumstances, since 1945, democracy promoters have favored a mix of mechanisms to accomplish their objectives. While military intervention is the most prominent and intensive mechanism as it leads to human casualties and destruction, state-building is the most time consuming and costly endeavor since it spans decades and involves a large international bureaucracy. The dramatic rise in ethnic wars in the post-Cold War era (Reilly, 2001) has led the international actors to add decentralization to this toolset of democracy promotion. It has increasingly gained in popularity in the EU policy circles, as an easy fix to ethnic conflict. This approach, however, is the least transparent mechanism since it mostly takes place behind the doors and the details of plans and agreements are kept out of the public eye.

At times, all three mechanisms have been used to support the democratization of a target country. According to Schmitter and Brower (1999), the choice of a mechanism depends on the target country's regime, the political will of the target country for liberalization, and the objectives of democracy promoters. In the aftermath of World War 2, the US relied on military forces and state-building mechanisms (e.g. Marshall Plan) to democratize parts of Western Europe (T. Smith, 1994; Wilson Center, 2003). In Central/Eastern Europe after the fall of Communism, the West engaged in state-building only as means of fostering democratization. It invested money and technical expertise (e.g. PHARE, TACIS, Europe Agreement, NED, and others)²⁷, in assisting target countries in reforming their political regimes and economic system (Demeš, 2011; L. J. Diamond, 1995). In other parts of the world where a target country was engaged in a vicious campaign against a segment of its populations (e.g. former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq), democracy promoters relied on all three mechanisms. The combination of all three mechanisms has given rise to international protectorates in Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Democracy promotion has involved the suspension of a government's sovereignty and the transitional transfer of sovereignty to the international community

²⁷ Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies (PHARE) was extended to other former communist countries of Central and East Europe (other than former USSR); Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS) was the program established to assist the former Soviet Union with transition to market economy and democratization.

In the next three sections, I will explain the state of literature with respect to the effectiveness of the Western actors to promote democratization in target countries by resorting to military intervention, state-building, and decentralization.

2.3.1 Military Intervention as a Mechanism

With the fall of Communism across most of the world, many if not most, previous non-democracies open to political liberalization willingly gained Western assistance to transition their countries to some form of democracy. In fact, no country has ever militarily intervened in a target state with the sole purpose of promoting democratization (Magen & McFaul, 2009). However, in certain cases, military intervention has been the only mechanism that could jump-start the democratization process by overthrowing a regime that pursued genocide and/or ethnic cleansing.

2.3.1.1 Intervention and Democratization: The Debate

The proponents of the view that military intervention leads to democratization point to the successes of the U.S. in democratizing Germany and Japan after World War II, and Grenada and Panama in the 1980s. Studies by (K. S. Gleditsch & Choung, 2004; N. P. Gleditsch et al., 2007; Hermann & Kegley Jr, 1998; Meernik, 1996; Peceny, 1999b; Tures, 2005) find that military interventions are positively associated with democratization of target countries, especially if the US adopts pro-liberalization policies such as free and fair elections, support for centrist parties and moderate interest groups, and promotion of human rights, or through declaratory policies by US presidents.²⁸ Some studies suggest that although unilateral interventions by the US have been somewhat successful in bringing about democratization in certain cases (i.e. 3 cases²⁹) (Meernik, 1996; Pickering & Peceny, 2006), interventions under UN auspices are more likely to lead to democratization as international organizations can empower democratic forces, constrain authoritarian leaders, and promote democratization (Russett, 2005).

In light of such arguments that democracies are able to bring peace and democracy through the use of arms, the question arises why are democracies more likely to promote democratization? The most frequently offered explanation, confirmed through numerous empirical studies, concerns the democratic peace theory which suggests that democracies rarely fight one another and promote

²⁸ When U.S. president openly states that the purpose of the intervention is to promote democratization.

²⁹ Panama, Grenada, Dominican Republic.

a decline in interstate conflicts (Hegre et al., 2001; Lake, 1992; Maoz & Abdolali, 1989). Furthermore, the governments of the Group of Seven (G-7), as well as the former Clinton and George W Bush administrations, had proclaimed the promotion of democratization as pillars of the US foreign policy. Their intent was to enlarge the community of democratic states and that military intervention should be a “prominent tool in the arsenal of democracy” (Epstein et al., 2007; Kegley Jr & Hermann, 1996; Mansfield & Snyder, 1995).

However, there is a divergence in support of the idea that military intervention can lead to democracy abroad. Scholars who argue that military intervention is not conducive to democracy point out the failures in Haiti, Somalia, and more recently in Iraq and Afghanistan as evidence of the inherent inability of democracies to promote democratization at the ‘point of bayonets.’ One group of scholars argue that intervention does not lead to democratization because of political constraints that democratic leaders operate under and their necessity to promote a regime in the target country that will focus on executing interveners’ policies, thereby assuring their political survival with domestic constituencies (Bueno De Mesquita & Downs, 2006; Lake & Fariss, 2014). An analysis of military interventions finds that democracies are unable to positively impact democratization of the target country as interveners have no incentives to engage in democratization that may lead to a regime that is not responsive to the needs of the intervener (Berger et al., 2013; Bueno De Mesquita & Downs, 2006).

Recent research indicates that democratization is a function of internal politics—structural conditions such as ethnic fractionalization, socioeconomic development, and prior democratic experience—and as such it cannot be imposed by third parties (Downes, 2010; Downes & Montén, 2013; Greig & Enterline, 2014). An intervention is conducive to democratization insofar in it seeks to reinstall a democratic regime that has been overthrown (Downes, 2010). Democratization becomes very difficult when in addition to missing the structural conditions, it is attempted in a country with a history of established extreme autocracies (Moon, 2009). Considering that military interventions are more likely to target poor, multi-ethnic countries with no prior experience of democracy, interveners should dampen their expectations for democratization to take place (Downes & Montén, 2013). A strand of this research asserts that countries in transition from authoritarian to democratic regimes (i.e. hybrid regimes) in the absence of these prerequisite internal conditions to democratization, are less stable than autocracies and more likely to engage

in civil conflict as a result of increased competition between different groups, or in a war against their neighbors (Mansfield & Snyder, 1995; Merkel, 2008).

As military interventions are increasingly used to promote democracy abroad, it has become important for all those involved to pursue broad state-building policies to bring about the conditions necessary for democracy to emerge. In the next section, I will discuss this mechanism and the debating surrounding the success of state-building to bring about the democratization of a target country.

2.3.2 State-Building as a Mechanism

State-building³⁰ as a political concept has become very prominent in the post-Cold War era as a result of increasing international interventions in the aftermath of the violent breakup of multiethnic states, state weakening, and state failure. State building can be understood as “forming a community where none previously existed, or shoring up one that was not firmly or properly constructed, or whose existence has been undermined, in many cases by war or inner strife” (Etzioni, 2004, p. 3). State-building, however, is about more than democracy promoters attempting to build governmental institutions or creating a new state. It requires democracy promoters to “engineer major social, political, and economic reconstruction...[to bring about] rapid and fundamental societal transformation” (Rathmell, 2005, p. 1014). In practice, state-building covers the advocacy for establishment, reform, or strengthening of both government-controlled institutions (e.g. legislature, presidency, government, security forces) and non-government institutions such as civic society, independent media, political parties, NGOs, and private education (Fearon & Laitin, 2004; Fukuyama, 2004; Von Bogdandy et al., 2005). Efforts by external actors at state-building are not just about building or rebuilding a polity to what it once was, but to transform it into a liberal democracy with a free market economy.

Why is state-building central to the democratization of a target country? According to Fukuyama “the central project of international politics in the 21st century is the state-building of weak states (where governance is weak), strengthening democratic legitimacy, and strengthening self-sustaining institutions” (2004, p. 99) as a means of reducing major threats to Western interests. Originally, state formation was considered an endogenous process, where people over time

³⁰ In the post-Cold War era especially, state-building as a political term has been used interchangeably with nation-building to denote the political reconstruction of a country after it has experienced some form of civil/ethnic conflict. Largely it denotes an effort by the international community.

develop the capacity to mobilize, extract resources, and have a monopoly of force over a certain territory (Boix & Stokes, 2003). To this day, there are still actors that view state-building as an “endogenous process to enhance capacity, institutions and legitimacy of the state driven by state-society relations” (DAC, 2008).³¹

Since the 1990s, state-building is held as an exogenous process where international involvement is inevitable and necessary to end internal conflict, improve government functions, strengthen stability, enhance economic and social development, and socialize the reformed or new state to rejoin the international community (Jenkins et al., 2008; Talentino, 2004). In the post-Cold War era military “intervention is not just about toppling the dictator and introducing democracy, but most importantly, it is about supporting the processes of democratic consolidation” (Merkel, 2008, p. 495). While a military intervention may not lead to democratization, one way to ensure that democratization fails is by disengaging from state-building at the end of military operations after the regime change (Barnett, 2006; Beetham, 2009; Grimm & Merkel, 2008; Merkel, 2008). Hence, for democratization to become irreversible, long-term engagement through state-building is necessary – just as it was the case with Germany and Japan after 1945.

2.3.2.1 State-Building and Democratization: The Debate

The literature on state-building while bountiful in qualitative research (Brahimi, 2007; Browder & Kaufmann, 2008; Chandler, 2006; Fukuyama, 2004; Heupel, 2009; Jahn, 2007; Krasner & Risse, 2014; McMahon & Western, 2012) is impoverished in quantitative assessment of the relationship between state-building and democratization. One proxy method to quantitative analysis of the impact of state-building is to resort to studies on the role of foreign aid allocated to democracy promotion programs³² on democratization. Studies asserting that foreign aid spent on democracy aid is conducive to democratization argue that through the long term commitment of money and expertise, countries are able to assist in the transformation of societies from autocracies to democracies (Finkel et al., 2007; Knack, 2004; Scott & Steele, 2011). Finkel, Perez-Linan, and Seligson specifically examine the aid disbursed for democracy promotion programs, by USAID in

³¹ Interventions preceding the 1990s did not rely on any state-building outside the “development and modernization” perspective which viewed political and civil liberalization as an evolutionary process. The foreign aid given by the intervener to the client for development and modernization was often squandered by corrupt leaders and bureaucrats who considered such aid entitlement for creating or enhancing the government structures that enabled the successful execution of the interveners’ policies (Boone, 1996).

³² Also known as democracy aid or democratization aid.

165 countries from 1990 to 2003, and conclude that an “increase in democracy 65 percent greater than the change expected for the average country in the sample in any given year” when a million-dollar investment is made (2007, p. 436). This is achieved by directing democracy aid into programs that reform political structures, professionalize the security apparatus, transform the economy into a market economy, train legislators and judicial personnel, create or update tax systems, create a vibrant civil society, establish and finance private media (Allison & Beschel, 1992; Hook, 1998; Krasner & Pascual, 2005). By focusing on such programs, democracy promoters are able to bring about a pluralistic liberal society that yields political stability and peace; a free market economy that brings prosperity; and a civil society and media that ensure social cohesion and governmental accountability.

When we examine the cases of democracy promotion in the former Soviet Bloc countries, the evidence shows that while many countries in the region transitioned from autocracy to democracy through peaceful revolutions, 12 out of 30 countries were engulfed in civil wars (at different times) from 1992 – 2015.³³ In states prone to domestic political violence, democracy promotion programs can not only mitigate civil conflict but also improve democratic governance by reducing commitment problems and uncertainty during the regime transition and the deepening of democratization period through reform and/or promotion of three mechanisms: (1) functioning political institutions enable the government to communicate with opposition groups and to make future promises to society; (2) electoral reforms enable the newly enfranchised groups to view promises by the state as credible; and (3) an empowered civil society can constrain state action from centralization of power and alleviate fears about state intentions (Savun & Tirone, 2011; Scott & Steele, 2011). Studies that examine the importance of donor intent or geopolitical interests in explaining democratization find that foreign aid is associated with an increased likelihood of democratization when aid comes from democratic donors (Bermeo, 2011), especially insofar there is a diminished emphasis on geostrategic or political considerations (Dunning, 2004).

Despite some evidence on the positive correlations between democracy aid and democratization, there is a healthy degree of skepticism on the significance of this relationship. Studies showing a negative correlation between foreign aid and democratization, generally argue

³³ Moldova 1990 – 1992; Croatia 1991-1995; Bosnia 1992-1995; Serbia 1991-1995; and 1998-1999; Albania 1997-1997; Macedonia 2001-2001; Azerbaijan 1988-1994; Georgia 2008; Russia (Chechnya) 1994-1996, 1999-2009; Tajikistan 1992-1997; Ukraine 2014-present; and Uzbekistan 1999.

that government unaccountability and corruption, donor interests, and the misallocation of unearned income are at fault. First, foreign aid makes recipient governments not only less accountable to its citizenry but also fosters corruption. Knack (2004) referring to the scholarship of Karl, Moore, Tilly, and North shows that the reliance on foreign aid enables the government to rely less on taxes as a source of income thereby taking one of the few instruments that citizens have in demanding greater accountability from their government. Moreover, the absence of accountability hinders the development of a civil society, which is necessary for political liberalization to take place.

Separate studies examining the effects of aid find that weakened governance results from (1) competition among social groups for access to foreign aid is associated with higher corruption (Svensson, 2000); (2) reliance on aid inflows reduces the government dependence to have the cooperation of the governed and leads to weak governance (Rajan & Subramanian, 2007); (3) “draws scarce talent from the bureaucracy, and alleviates pressures to reform inefficient policies and institutions” (Knack, 1999). For example, a review of the 2015 Corruption Perception Index shows that only 2 countries (Estonia and Poland) from the former Soviet Bloc are ranked on the top 30 list of countries with the lowest levels of corruption (Transparency International, 2015).

Second, with respect to donor interests, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith (2007, 2009) show that foreign aid hinders democratization because political leaders of the donor countries in order to ensure their political survival use foreign aid as an instrument to purchase policy concessions from recipient country leaders. After the end of the Cold War, Eastern European countries plagued by civil wars and domestic strife adopted hybrid forms of democracy³⁴ - expanded the selectorate by holding elections but continued to be governed by a small-coalition. Such governments rely on cronyism and corruption and its leaders use the aid to ensure their survival by treating the aid as private goods. Consequently, while the welfare of the selectorate of donor countries is improved as a result of policy concession purchase, the average citizens in the recipient state, who are not members of the selectorate, are negatively impacted by getting policies they do not want, and by the perpetuation of the political leadership that will continue to pursue unpopular policies.

³⁴ Larry Diamond may have been the first one to term this type of regime as a hybrid regime. A ‘hybrid regime’ is a regime that is neither clearly democratic nor conventionally authoritarian. A regime that has turned to regular, competitive, multiparty elections and has thus at a minimum become an electoral democracy but has failed to allow for political liberalization that may contest the ruling power.

Finally, democracy aid is a form of unearned income, and as such, it displays similar effects as the so-called “resource curse” (Ross, 1999).³⁵ According to a study by Djankov, Montalvo, and Reynal-Querol (2008), foreign aid mimics the same rent-seeking behavior as evidenced in the studies dealing with “resource curse” and that a recipient country will undergo a decrease between 0.5 to 1 point in a 10 point democracy index, when a country reached the 75th percentile in terms of aid over GDP for a 5 year period. In a cross-country study, 1975-2004, Ahmed (2012) evaluated the consequences of unearned foreign income on the prospects of political survival of the recipient country and found that aid can increase patronage. Thereby, governments in countries that have not experienced a deepening of democratization utilize the aid to reduce the likelihood of regime collapse and major political discontent. Alastair Smith (2008) concludes that foreign aid as a form of free resource is averse to democratization because it exacerbates revolutionary threats in small coalition countries if aid is distributed as a public good. It does this by enabling political opposition to coordinate and organize a revolution. Moreover, greater spending on public goods leads to greater demands for more spending in the future and increased revolutionary threats. Consequently, small coalition leaders do spend a part of the aid on “standard public goods” such as vaccinations, but not on “coordination goods” such as programs that promote free press, transparency, or organizational and coordination skills (A. Smith, 2008).

As state-building efforts have stalled in various parts of the world, especially when the country’s population is split along ethnic lines, the international community has turned to a mechanism that seeks to foster democratization by promoting the decentralization (or dispersing) of political power. In the next section, I will discuss this mechanism and describe the debate between the optimists and the pessimists on whether such an approach causes democratization.

2.3.3 Decentralization as a Mechanism

There is an increase in trends of decentralization as countries strive to become more responsive in the efficient delivery of government services to all their constituents (Hopkin & Van Houten, 2009). However, in many multiethnic countries, decentralization is not pursued to enhance government responsiveness, but as a means of political settlement. This is especially the case in

³⁵ Resource curse refers to the premise that countries rich in mineral resources including oil, impedes democracy. Ross (1999) finds the premise to be valid and statistically robust.

countries emerging from ethnic conflict where decentralization is often promoted or imposed by the international community (Monteux, 2006; Simonsen, 2005).

For the purposes of this dissertation, decentralization refers to the promotion of “dispersive institutions [for the purpose of] devolv[ing] some government powers“ (Bormann et al., 2014, p. 6; Strøm et al., 2017) including “territorial autonomy in defined areas where minorities are compactly settled” (Cornell, 2002, p. 245). A common term for this type of decentralization is ‘ethnofederalism,’ (Bunce, 2007; Deiwiiks, 2010; Philip G Roeder, 2009) although countries decentralized along ethnic lines can include confederations, federations, autonomous regions, and provinces (Monteux, 2006; Wolff, 2011)³⁶. Decentralization is used by some states so that specific ethnic groups within a territorially autonomous subnational unit” (Philip G Roeder, 2009) “will have at their disposal both geographical and institutional platforms for the expression of their interests and the exercise of political power” (Bunce, 2007, p. 7).³⁷ The aim of decentralization is to foster peace in countries that have experienced conflict and enhance democratization through: limits on central authority; inclusion of ethnic groups in governing structures; and provision of efficient solutions to local problems through self-government a defined territorial jurisdiction that serves an ethnic group (Brancati, 2006).

2.3.3.1 Decentralization and Democratization: The Debate

The optimists argue that decentralization is conducive to democratization because in multiethnic countries decentralization is able to accommodate diverse interests through various forms of power-sharing and territorial self-government (De Nevers, 1993; Lijphart, 1977, 1991, 1999; Strøm et al., 2017; Wolff, 2011). On this point, there is a diversity of opinion on how to best achieve the democratization of multi-ethnic countries. One group consists of the supporters of Lijphart’s consociational democracy (McGarry & O’Leary, 2006; McGarry & O’Leary, 2006; Wolff, 2011). Another group advocates a more centripetal model that includes institutions that constrain the power of any ethnic group (D. L. Horowitz, 1985, 1991, 2003; Reilly, 2013; Strøm et al., 2017; Wimmer, 2003).

Lijphart’s consociational democracy—power-sharing and territorial autonomy—for

³⁶ Examples include Switzerland (a confederation to accommodate the German, French, and the Italian speaking populations); Bosnia (a federation set up to accommodate the Serb and Croat populations); Spain (territorial autonomy for the Catalans).

³⁷ While there is no widely agreed upon number, ethnic minorities that constitute 10%+ share of the total population are more likely to demand and get some form of decentralization.

different ethnic groups when an alternative like territorial partition is not available, is meant to induce cooperation between elites of various ethnic groups through grand coalitions,³⁸ mutual veto,³⁹ proportionality,⁴⁰ and territorial autonomy as a means for ethnic minorities to govern themselves (McCulloch, 2014). Lipjhart's consociationalism while successful in Western Europe, has not led to equivalent successes elsewhere (e.g. Lebanon or Bosnia). The likes of McCulloch, Wolff and McGarry and O'Leary have supported a more liberal approach to this type of decentralization that avoids constitutional entrenchment of ethnic representation and serves as a tool of peacebuilding and democratization in post-conflict countries.⁴¹

This liberal version of consociationalism avoids elite bargaining and instead relies on voters to reward the groups that best represent their interests by making use of preferential proportional electoral systems, joint consent across ethnic groups, and sequential proportionality rules in cabinet positions (McGarry & O'Leary, 2006). Additionally, liberal consociationalism is seen as more conducive to democratization in post-conflict countries as it accounts for the role of external actors that bring about a political settlement. This is a very important point considering that third-parties have had an increasing role in conflict settlements since the 1990s. For example, in Bosnia, power-sharing and territorial autonomy for Serbs was embedded in the 1995 Dayton Peace Accords that brought about the end of civil war. In Kosovo, such institutional design was mandated by the EU (granting Serbia sovereignty over Serb majority areas) as part of the 2013 Brussels Agreement in exchange for Kosovo's eventual EU membership.

One alternative institutional design to consociationalism is what is referred to as centripetalism⁴² and advocates institutional design that fosters cross-cutting cleavages that are needed to stabilize and democratize post-conflict countries (D. L. Horowitz, 1993, 2003, 2014; Reilly, 2001, 2012; Sisk, 1996; Wimmer, 2003). The model includes the presentation of electoral incentives, multiethnic arenas of bargaining, and the development of centrist multiethnic parties as a way to facilitate reconciliation and promote democratization (Reilly, 2001). Such institutions are designed to advance democratization through political incentives to depoliticize ethnicity so that there is no ethnic outbidding in the political process (Chandra & Boulet, 2005). The electoral

³⁸ Bring in the ethnic parties to share power in the government.

³⁹ All ethnic parties have the right to veto the decision-making process if their interests are threatened.

⁴⁰ In the legislature, government, and resource allocation.

⁴¹ Countries that have undergone ethnic conflict.

⁴² Other terms used to refer to this alternative include integrative, political incentivism, constraining.

system is the key element of the incentives-based approach, that requires politicians to adopt a conciliatory approach toward other ethnic groups in order to pool votes as his/her election or reelection is dependent on votes of other ethnic groups as well.

The pessimists, on the other hand, argue against decentralization because it ‘creates the motive and the means to escalate conflict and thwart consolidation of democracy’ (Rothchild & Roeder, 2005). The arguments put forward are that decentralization leads to ethnic retrenchment and secessionism (Brancati, 2006; Cornell, 2002; Deiwiiks, 2010; Jenne, 2009). Moreover, in countries that have experienced ethnic armed conflict, decentralization leads to an increased likelihood of recurring violence and failure to democratize (Bunce, 2007; Chapman & Roeder, 2007; Philip G Roeder, 2009). According to Bormann et al., (2014) dispersive institutions that manifest from such an arrangement do not lead to peace, even though such institutions are positively correlated with electoral democracy (Strøm et al., 2017). However, this positive association may lose its significance if we control for whether subnational units are arranged along ethnic or administrative lines.

One theory is that decentralization leads to the emergence of regional parties who in turn emphasize the ethnic and regional distinctiveness of the region, produce legislation that favors the ethnic majority within this sub-national unit and mobilizes ethnic groups (Brancati, 2006). Such authority leads to ethnic entrenchment within their regions and results in a ‘higher mobilization of resources for nationalist purposes’ (Deiwiiks, 2010), especially in regions that are wealthy (Hale, 2000) and increases the likelihood of ethnic conflict and secessionism. In cases where decentralization on ethnic basis was implemented in post-conflict societies (e.g. Bosnia, Kosovo, Moldova) it has led to frozen conflicts and the brewing of tensions, thereby making the situation worse (Monteux, 2006).

Another theory contends that with greater decentralization on an ethnic basis, the sentiment for secessionism and unification with the motherland increases. This has an adverse effect on democratization because the process is very contentious, and as recent regional history proves very violent since it creates a new problem while addressing an old one (D. L. Horowitz, 2003). Namely, the dissatisfied minority ethnic group as it seeks to/or secede(s) in response to the discrimination, it becomes a majority group in the new state, and then it perpetuates the cycle of discrimination of other ethnic groups that have remained within the new state (Tullberg & Tullberg, 1997).

2.4 The Missing Variable: Motherlands

One question that is largely missing from both the optimists and pessimists account of how military intervention, state-building, or decentralization explains democratization is how does the presence of a third actor in the form of a motherland matter for transnational ethnic groups? Concerning the role of military intervention on the democratization of a target country, the optimists fail to account for cases where military intervention should have led to democracy but failed. For example, in countries such as Bosnia and Kosovo, the international community has been unable to transform these countries into full fledged democracies, although on per capita basis, there have been more military troops, police forces, and resources than in Germany and Japan (Dobbins, 2003). These two countries are not only significantly smaller (population and area wise) than Germany or Japan, but unlike the Germans and Japanese after 1945, have populations that are overwhelmingly receptive of US and EU interventions (International Republican Institute, 2017; Kakissis, 2018; Sullivan, 2018). On the other hand, pessimists claim that success stories of Germany and Japan are best explained through their level of socioeconomic development, prior democratization, a high degree of ethnic homogeneity, is somewhat on shaky ground. According to V-DEM data, both, Germany and Japan democracy indices were less than half of the UK and France between 1900 and late 1930s. It would be quite a stretch of the imagination to conclude that international actors had nothing to do with it. After all, the eastern parts of Germany were just as developed and exposed to democratization as western regions before 1939. Yet, the American and Allied backed western parts of Germany became a democracy whereas the Soviet-controlled eastern regions embraced authoritarianism. It took Allied blood and a long-term US occupation and political direction for democracy to take hold.

Specifically, how does the motherland behave toward its ethnic kin in neighboring countries considering that separation from a common state may have occurred within the memory span of current populations (e.g. Russian population in the post-Soviet space)? Perhaps the answer to why the likes of Germany (post-1945), Czech Republic (since 1993), and Belgium became democracies, while Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and other cases did not was due to a third party that had a vested interest to spoil the democratization in the second set of countries, whereas it was missing in the first set of countries. There is a body of literature that has examined the role of motherlands on the ethnic conflicts of the neighboring countries and finds that such countries adversely affect the neighboring countries (Buhaug & Gleditsch, 2008; Cederman, Girardin, et al., 2009; K. S.

Gleditsch, 2007; Salehyan, 2007). Can we expect such motherlands to serve as spoilers when it comes to the democratization of the neighboring countries? One recent example involving Russia shows this to be the case. In Ukraine, upon the fall of the pro-Russian regime in 2013, Russian Special Forces took over Crimea under the pretext that the ethnic Russian population will face genocide by the new ‘right-wing’ government of Ukraine. Subsequently, Russia annexed Crimea in line with the “will of the Crimean people” for reunification with the motherland and is now involved in lending military assistance to its ethnic kin in eastern Ukraine.

The literature on ethnicity and nationalism is replete with cases of ethnic kin with a national homeland supporting their brethren across the state who are involved in the ethnic conflict (Cederman, Girardin, et al., 2009). For these authors, the cases of former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union provide the best examples of where ‘transborder nationalism’ has played a central role in ethnic conflicts. They find “border-crossing ethnic affiliations have a considerable impact on the likelihood of ethno-national civil wars,” especially when the excluded community in the target state is large (2009, p. 432). Gleditsch too finds that “transnational linkages between states and regional factors strongly influence the risk of civil conflict” (2007, p. 293). Such a finding, when applied to the ethnic conflicts in former Yugoslavia, would offer a reasonable explanation of why Serbia resorted to war in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo where Serb population was relatively large,⁴³ but not in Slovenia or Macedonia.

Renee De Nevers (1993) argues that the presence of a motherland hinders democratization because of two factors. First, it leads to the existence or accusations of dual loyalties. For example, the President of Republika Srpska, the highest elected official of the Serb part of Bosnia does not have Bosnian citizenship but has taken the citizenship of Serbia and actively promotes the idea of seceding from Bosnia and joining Serbia. Second, it involves a new set of (external) actors in negotiations about the political arrangement in the target country. Kosovo is currently facing difficulties in accommodating the political interests of its Serb population as the interests of Kosovo Serbs are represented by the government of Serbia. A third factor can be added to De Nevers argument that any decentralization is feared by the domestic elites because in the presence of dual loyalties and external allies, that any arrangement is a prelude to secessionism and

⁴³ Serb population 2% (Macedonia) 2.5% (Slovenia) 10% (Kosovo), 12% (Croatia) and 31% (Bosnia) according to the 1991 Yugoslav Census. Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_the_Socialist_Federal_Republic_of_Yugoslavia#References.

unification with the motherland. Bosnia an excellent example of this factor. Bosnian Serbs have completely paralyzed the workings of the central institutions through various veto powers granted to them with the Dayton Accords in 1995. Despite calls by the international community (Gearan, 2012; Tatham, 2013) for Serbs in Bosnia to become constructive political actors and work toward new political arrangements that would create a more functioning state that is able to join the EU, the ethnic Serbs have refused a more constructive approach as they hope that if they wait long enough, they can convince the international community that a functioning state is only possible through ethnic partition of the country and unification with Serbia.⁴⁴

2.5 Chapter Summary

In this chapter, I have shown that despite the voluminous treatment of the international causes of democratization (i.e., military intervention, state-building, and decentralization) one variable that is missing is that of motherland who can spoil or support the democratization of the target country where its transnational ethnic kin is found. Studies that have looked at the role of transnational ethnic links on the onset and the duration of war find that motherlands do matter.

The debate about the role of external actors on the democratization of a target country continues to rage between the optimists and pessimists with both offering evidence in support of their position. However, the current academic pessimism that external actors are unable to bring about the democratization of target countries may be premature. The relationship between democracy promoters pursuing military intervention, state-building or decentralization and democratization is more nuanced than the statistical significance of many studies implies. Multilateral interventions that remove an illiberal regime and engage in state-building efforts,⁴⁵ lead to better democratization outcomes than unilateral interventions that promote strategic goals of the intervener.⁴⁶ More than 20 years ago, Allison and Beschel (1992) recognized this divergence in outcomes and asked, “is it an accident that the nations occupied by U.S. forces after World War II are democracies?” Their answer was a resounding no (Allison & Beschel, 1992, pp. 82-83). While their article did not address imposed democratization by external forces, it may be too early

⁴⁴ Milorad Dodik, the president of Republika Srpska has asserted on numerous occasions in Serb media that if they hold long enough, the international community will be convinced that Bosnia as a multi-ethnic state is a non-functioning state and that secession on an ethnic basis will be tolerated.

⁴⁵ State-building efforts reform the structural conditions of the target countries.

⁴⁶ This is also the case when interventions are not followed by post-conflict resolution.

to declare the question settled since there has been some improvement in average democracy scores since the Cold War, according to Varieties of Democracy data.

CHAPTER 3. THEORY: MOTHERLAND AS A SPOILER

The fall of Communism in 1990⁴⁷ brought about a major transformation in the international system. With the cessation of ideological struggles (capitalism vs. communism), there arose an almost worldwide opportunity for the promotion and adoption of liberal political and economic ideas. At the same time, free of ideological shackles that prevented the pursuit of nationalism, this window of opportunity allowed a return to a 19th-century style of “National Reawakening” across many parts of the world – the pursuit of expanding state borders to match those of ethnic boundaries.

In this chapter, I present my theory of democratization spoiling focusing on the role of motherlands as potential spoilers. I argue that motherlands have a range of strategies available to them with respect to the democratization of states where their transnational ethnic kin live. A motherland can adopt strategies that are corrosive or conducive to the democratization of a target state. The type of strategy is conditional on whether a motherland intends to reclaim kin-populated territories from another recognized state, or not. If a motherland does not seek to expand its territory by incorporating its transnational ethnic kin, then a motherland is likely to pursue strategies that are conducive to democratization. On the other hand, when territorial aspirations are in play, a motherland is more likely to adopt strategies that are corrosive to the democratization of a target country. The claims to a territory other than her own are based on assertions that targeted territories were historically hers or should have been a part of the motherland when the state was founded (Ben-Israel, 1991; D. L. Horowitz, 1991; Saideman & Ayres, 2008).

This pursuit of national unification results from the incongruence of political and ethnic borders at the time of independence. An ethnic group becomes a transnational ethnic group as the new international borders divided it among two or more countries. Many such countries at the end of the decolonization era, and especially since the end of the Cold War felt empowered to pursue an ethnic foreign policy that challenged the legitimacy of past divisions long frozen by the ideological contest between the West and East. The motherland’s political regime and time since the loss of kin (intensity) as well as its capabilities and external constraints (frequency) are likely to influence the type of actions or events (hereafter events), if you will, she is likely to initiate

⁴⁷ I use 1990 as a reference for the fall of Communism since the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, and by 1990 free and fair elections were held throughout many communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe.

against a target state. A motherland can seek to embrace or challenge the territorial status quo that it exists between itself and the target. By *territorial status quo*, I mean the acceptance of internationally recognized borders or the administrative boundaries of subnational units that subsequently seceded from a federal state (e.g., Soviet Union, Yugoslavia). A state with transnational links may be satisfied or resigned to its political boundaries; may settle for territorial autonomy along ethnic lines for its kin; or seek the annexation of kin-populated territory, in hopes of revising the ‘historical injustice’ of partition in the first place.

I identify four categories of strategies a motherland may pursue against a target state, ranging from harmful to helpful for democratization. I term these strategies as, first, *annexationist strategy*, in which a motherland seeks to establish direct control over kin-populated/controlled territories and bring them under its full sovereignty. Second, when a motherland adopts a *segregationist strategy*, she attempts to carve out a territory where its kin can govern autonomously of the target state authorities and where it can exercise some degree of sovereignty. A third way is an *inclusivist strategy* in which a motherland does not challenge the territorial status quo. Instead, it actively seeks to upend the systemic discrimination of its kin by pushing the target state and the international community to grant social, economic and political equality to its transnational members. Finally, by employing a *strategy of apathy*, a motherland seeks no territorial revisions to incorporate its transnational ethnic kin. Consequently, it does not seek to spoil the democratization processes of countries with whom it shares kin.

The choice of strategy the motherland pursues depends on the intensity and frequency of events it initiates versus the target state. Some motherlands believe that democracy is likely to produce benefits to themselves as well as their ethnic kin over the border. Consequently, they may initiate fewer and less intense conflictual events, perhaps they may even engage in intense cooperation. Others see the democratization of the target state as a threat to their revision of territorial status quo, influence in the region, access to resources, or hold on domestic political power. Accordingly, a motherland may engage in spoiling. Regardless of its views on democratization, a motherland must possess the material capabilities and acquiescence of the international community to pursue an active strategy in the target state.

This chapter is organized as follows. In the first section, I will define what a motherland is and outline how ethnic identity is important to the linkage between motherland and its transnational kin. In the second section, I show how national identity matters for democratization.

Then, I discuss how intensity and frequency influence the type of strategy a motherland is likely to adopt towards a target state. Finally, I present a menu of grand strategies and detail their impact on democratization and the tactics used with each strategy.

3.1 Motherland: Terms and Definitions

The failures of democratization in certain contexts cannot be fully accounted for, by either the failures of the international community to promote structures and value systems that the local population welcomes or the internal conditions of a target state. For example, Kosovo has not consolidated its democracy despite 20 years of democracy promotion and state-building by the West, a pro-Western populace with a high degree of ethnic homogeneity,⁴⁸ and similar levels of GDP per capita as Latvia⁴⁹ (a former Soviet republic). So, what can explain this failure in why democracy has not consolidated or become entrenched in Kosovo? The presence of a nearby motherland is the missing piece of the puzzle that better explains the failure of democratization to consolidate in certain regions where internal conditions were favorable, and the international community was very active in democracy promotion.

In the previous chapter, I introduced a strand of literature that suggests that when it comes to the likelihood of armed conflict or duration of peace, transnational links matter. It should be uncontroversial to expect a similar influence on democratization too. If a motherland is willing to spoil peace, would they be as willing to spoil the democratization of a target state?

As mentioned in the introductory chapter, a *motherland* is defined as the traditional national homeland of a given ethnic group “with transnational ethnic connections and whose settlement area is split by an international border” (Vogt, 2018, p. 1). An ethnic group becomes transnational when its population is spread across one or more countries as a result of arbitrary border redrawing which often occurs with the rise and fall of empires, multiethnic states, decolonization or defeat in war (King, 2010). This relationship does not extend to emigrant groups since the new settlement areas are outside what a motherland considers her historical claims. The new boundaries that cut through a settlement area populated by the same ethnic group produce two

⁴⁸ According to the 2011 Kosovo Census, Albanians constitute 92.9% of the population in Kosovo. Retrieved from <http://ask.rks-gov.net/media/2129/estimation-of-kosovo-population-2011.pdf>.

⁴⁹ Kosovo’s GDP per capita ranged from \$3125 (2008) to \$4068 (2017). Latvia’s GDP per capita ranged from \$2329 in 1995 (first recorded year) to \$4132 (2002). Throughout this period, Varieties of Democracy and Polity classify Latvia as a democracy.

types of status for the transnational group (Chazan, 1991). In one, the kin group becomes “motherless,” in the sense that it is spread across two or more countries, but does not dominate or control the levers of power as a unified group in any state (i.e., a nation without a state). One example of this are the Basque people who are found in both northern Spain and southern France but are not in control of either state. In the other, a group is “parented.” It may be a minority in one or more countries, but in one state it forms the core of that country and dominates politically – this state serves as the motherland. One example of such a transnational group are the Russians who are found across many parts of former Soviet republics but demographically and politically constitute the core of the Russian Federation.

Motherlands have three defining features. The first feature is geographic. There must be some portion of the overall ethnic group that was unwillingly separated when the greater settlement area was divided between two or more states.⁵⁰ One part of the settlement area, including a share of the total ethnic population, went on to constitute the core of a state (motherland) whereas the other parts of the populated area were incorporated as minorities within other states (target). Geographically, this means that the international border crossed the ethnic group; and not that the group crossed the border to settle new areas. Frequently, the transnational kin populates areas contiguous to the motherland since they previously constituted a single settlement area that was partitioned. However, there are instances when geographic proximity between motherland and transnational kin is greater. They can be separated by a body of water or a third country.

The second feature is protective. A state becomes a motherland “for its transnational members when political or cultural elites define ethnonational kin in other states as members of one and the same nation, claim that they ‘belong,’ in some sense, to the state” (Brubaker, 1995, p. 110). The motherland often considers its transnational members as belonging to the motherland, not the target state, and asserts that it has the right and the obligation to protect and promote the interests of co-ethnics (Brubaker, 1995; King & Melvin, 1999). Often, this is the case when the motherland or the ethnic group (both in the motherland and target states) have come to reject the legitimacy of the new borders, especially if the partition was recent. Such a challenge to the territorial status quo becomes especially relevant when the transnational kin in a target state are systemically discriminated against or persecuted.

⁵⁰ I do not include emigrant communities – people who have left their homeland to immigrate to other countries (where they are not native to) in pursuit of some benefit.

Identity is the third feature. The existence of a motherland, while necessary for the transnational relationship to be meaningful, it is not sufficient. The kin outside the motherland must also identify with it “by virtue of an historic association and origin” (A. D. Smith, 1981, p. 188).⁵¹ If a group of people outside the motherland, have been severed from the motherland by a vast geographic distance, or over a long time up to the point where they have established a separate identity, then the relationship between motherland and kin does not hold. For example, while people who originated from France colonized the area known today as Quebec (Canada), and in the distant past identified as French, over centuries have created their own identity of Quebecois and without allegiance to France. Another case that illustrates the importance of identity is that of Belgium. The French and Dutch speaking populations of the country over centuries have undergone an identity change and now consider themselves as Walloons or Flemish instead of French or Dutch. However, the people in the German-speaking parts of Belgium continue to identify as Germans as their incorporation in Belgium was more recent.

The identity links between motherland and its transnational kin can be based on pre-colonial history, colonial history, or geography; but most often are based on ethnicity (Neuberger, 1991). In the West, outside academia, ethnicity is commonly perceived to be one-dimensional, a one size fits all box. Originally, used to refer to the people of non-western European descent (Sollors, 1986), ethnicity more recently has come to refer to a nation, race (Green, 2006) or a minority group. In academia, however, the absence of an ontology of ethnicity has given rise to many understandings of what ethnic identity means. The primordialists argue that ethnic groups are based on extended kinship relations that go back to ancient times. The boundaries between groups are based on culture, traditions, physical characteristics, language, religion – cleavages that do not change frequently or easily (Connor, 1994; Geertz, 1973; Huntington, 1996; Shils, 1957). For constructivists ethnic groups are artificial constructs of modern elites. They argue that ethnic identities are dynamic as group membership and criteria for membership vary over time as people come and go and develop new traditions (Chandra, 2006; Gellner, 2008; Tilly, 1991).

For this dissertation, ethnicity is conceptualized as a constructed category used to describe membership in a group based on common lineage, language, religion, culture, race, or common

⁵¹ The links must be mutually recognized. For example, whereas the Russians of Ukraine recognize Russia as their motherland and hope for, or strive for reunification, the people of Quebec, while French, do not seek or hope to join France.

homeland (Chandra & Wilkinson, 2008; Green, 2006; D. L. Horowitz, 1985; Varshney, 2007). In many countries, however, people believe, feel, and act as if ethnic identity is something that is inherited, not bestowed or constructed. That is to say that ethnicity is experienced primordially (Bell, 1975; D. L. Horowitz, 1998). This broad understanding of ethnicity allows us to capture that aspect of identity that acts as the most significant point of reference for members of a group since not all groups ascribe the same value to one aspect of identity. Ethnic linkages “become thicker when [specific attributes] come to have greater importance in people’s lives, when people’s lives are affected in more ways by the referent” (Hale, 2004, p. 468). For certain groups, religion provides the core of their ethnic identity (e.g. Shia Muslims in the Middle East); for a few groups, language is the binding glue (e.g. the Anglo-Francophone divide in Cameroon), for some it’s the kinship ties (e.g. Kurds), and for a few, identity emanates from correspondence on a number of these attributes (e.g. Russians).

Why is ethnic identity paramount for a motherland? Because it serves three critical functions. First, ethnicity is essential to state-building. In countries where national identity preceded or coincided with state formation (e.g. US, UK, France, other British colonies) national identity is equated with citizenship and not with an ethnic group. Anyone can join or abandon the nation (Greenfeld & Eastwood, 2007; Kohn, 1994). However, in parts of the world where national identity grew “in protest against and in conflict with the existing state” (Kohn, 1994) it suffers from rigor mortis – “membership in the nation is determined by the possession of ascriptive characteristics, most often imagined to be possessed by the nation’s members as a result of their genetic inheritance” (Greenfeld & Eastwood, 2007, p. 269). Generally, the state is identified with the dominant ethnic group and the ethnic group with the state. Hence, in many countries we find the state and ethnic group names intertwine (e.g. Serbia and Serbs, Russia and Russians).

In many cases where the state and the dominant ethnic group are viewed to be one in the same, ethnic identity is used to redraw the political boundaries of the motherland to match ethnic ones (Kohn, 1994). Where that failed, especially outside the West, state formation is considered incomplete as a motherland is left with no sovereignty over its transnational kin (Van Evera, 1994). This lack of congruence between the political and ethnic boundaries, at times of major political reordering or transition and uncertainty in the international system gives impetus to countries demanding a solution to their “National Question” – in the most extreme, it calls for reunification of all lands inhabited by ethnic kin (Chazan, 1991).

Second, ethnic identity also serves an instrumental function. It's a potent mobilization tool to pursue the political goal of bringing all transnational kin territories under the sovereignty of the motherland (Carment & James, 1995; Posen, 1993) or to put it in nationalist language, to correct the historical injustice of imposed ethnic partition. Since ethnic identities are long-lived, it allows a motherland to promote the saliency of an issue dealing with its transnational kin over generations. In target states, an individual seeking political power may appeal to his/her ethnic group's grievances with the regime to gain attention and support (Saideman & Ayres, 2008). Examples of this include Alexander Zakharchenko's mobilization of Ukraine's Russians and ethnic Serb leadership in Croatia and Bosnia in the 1990s. Similarly, leaders vying for power in motherlands may emphasize the plight of their ethnic kin abroad in order to mobilize or manipulate domestic political support. In both cases, an ethnic entrepreneur can create a ready-made constituency by appealing for support among one's co-ethnics (Brass, 1991; Fearon & Laitin, 1996; Gagnon, 1994; Mansfield & Snyder, 2002).

The last function is normative. A motherland justifies its contestation of the status quo on a normative basis in order to appeal to an international audience. Kinship ties are used as justification for its actions against a target state. Actions are not out of enmity towards another group, but out of an affinity for its kin. Russian President Vladimir Putin has continually stressed that Russia views Ukraine as a brotherly republic and that Russian troops would be used to preemptively protect ethnic Russians and Ukrainians from the "rampage of reactionary forces, nationalist and anti-Semitic forces" (Washington Post, 2014, March 4). Leaders may use a number of arguments concerning the redrawing of national borders which left a portion of the population or an essential territory (e.g. historically important or the seat of the motherland's religion or culture) outside the bounds of the national state (Neuberger, 1991). A recent example of this is Russia's claim to Crimea on the basis that the Russian state was founded in Ukraine. Other justifications offered include the saving of kin, who have not only been discriminated against by the target state, but have been persecuted, ethnically cleansed, or killed and that the only way to prevent further bloodshed is for motherland to bring its kin into its fold. The wars in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s were fought under the rationale that the "Serbs would only be safe and prosperous and would only end the cycle of historic victimization, by linking the Serb nation through a physical unification of all territories where Serbs live" (Morus, 2007, p. 154).

In the next section, I will describe that while ethnic identity can play a positive role in bringing about national unification by promoting the congruence of political and ethnic borders of a motherland, it may also hamper the development of the national identity of another state that contains transnational groups. It does this by contesting the legitimacy of the target state and brings into question who belongs to the citizenry. I will also discuss what the implications of a contested national identity are for the democratization of that state.

3.2 Politics of National Identity and Democratization

As many scholars note, national identity matters for the democratization of a country (Almond & Verba, 1963; Freyburg & Richter, 2010; Mostov, 1994; Rustow, 1970). This is important for at least two reasons. The first concerns the internal relationships of various populations within a state – the presence of national cohesion or lack thereof. In many states across the world where state borders do not match ethnic boundaries, the “National Question” remains unsolved. This is especially the case where the division of ethnic groups has occurred within recent memory. The creation of states out of former empires has not always led to the creation of ethnically homogeneous states or states where there is widespread consensus on national identity. National cohesion is the key variable that “must precede all the other phases of democratization” according to Rustow (1970, p. 351). In states with political systems fragmented along ethnic lines, the struggle for who belongs to the state and who the state belongs to, brings about alienation and polarization rather than pluralism. When politics are organized along ethnic lines, irredentism or secession rather than democratization is likely to manifest (Almond & Verba, 1963; Rustow, 1970). According to Almond and Verba, *“the development of a stable and effective democratic government depends upon more than the structures of government and politics: it depends upon the orientations that people have to political process... a process by which individuals can come to develop sense of common political identity; an identity that implies common affective commitment to the political system, as well as a sense of identity with one’s fellow citizens”* (1963, pp. 365-371).

In multiethnic countries containing one or more transnational ethnic groups, the emergence of a unifying national identity is complicated by frictions between groups. The dominant group feels entitled to rule the new state. Moreover, the dominant group may fear that other transnational ethnic groups found within its political borders may subvert the state in hopes of joining with the

motherland. Minority groups may feel a sense of injustice of having been left in one state and not another, or for not having a state of their own. A lack of national cohesion becomes even more problematic when border shifts leave a dissatisfied population that actively challenges the legitimacy of the state or the authority of the state over the group. When national identity becomes politicized, the democratization of a state may be impossible without solving the national question first (Libal, 2002; Mostov, 1994; Rustow, 1970).

The second reason pertains to the external relationship of a transnational group in a country lacking national cohesion, with the motherland. “In nations imagined as ethnic...identity is inseparably bound to the notion that all of one’s co-nationals are in some meaningful sense equal to oneself” regardless of the state they find themselves in as long as they are in their ancestral lands (Greenfeld & Eastwood, 2007, pp. 258-270). The absence of national cohesion while it presents a new set of challenges for a democratizing state, in and of itself, may not be disqualifying to democratization. After all, there are many examples of democracies in countries like Belgium and Switzerland that lack ethnic homogeneity. However, fragmentation becomes corrosive to democracy with the contestation of territorial status quo of a target state (Bieber, 2011; Bugajski, 2004; Džihic & Segert, 2012), from within by a transnational ethnic group, and from outside by a state that is the national homeland of that group. The likelihood of democracy emerging in a country where groups have “doubt[s] or mental reservations as to which political community they belong to” are very small (Rustow, 1970, p. 350). Examples of this include the former Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, with Serbia and Russia as the principal parties in contesting the legitimacy of borders of other former republics and finding confederates amongst their transnational kin to challenge the legitimacy of the new state, take up arms, and pursue unification with the motherland.

Concerning the prospects for democratization in multiethnic countries, Almond and Verba argued that “[i]f a new nation is to create a civic culture, it needs the unifying symbols and system affect” (1963, p. 372). In a multi-ethnic country such as Belgium, neighboring countries of France and Holland, though they share certain ethnic or linguistic links with the Walloons and Flemish, do not contest the political legitimacy or the sovereignty of this state. Lack of national cohesion provides the proverbial foot in the door for that motherland to spoil the democratization efforts of that target state. For some segment of the population, affinity, and loyalty lies not with the state, but with the motherland. In certain countries, the affinity of minorities with the motherland and vice-versa is so strong that it severely curtails the efforts of democratization by the West (Freyburg

& Richter, 2010). Countries may be willing to forgo significant economic, security or political benefits if they perceive that Western countries or institutions are nurturing national cohesion in a target country and/or weakening transnational links with the motherland.

In the next section, I will discuss the variables that are key to explaining the intensity and frequency of events that a motherland initiates against a target state. I will describe the circumstance under which these two variables are more likely to support democratization and when they are likely to harm it.

3.3 Recipe for Spoiling: Intensity and Frequency

The literature on spoilers has traditionally examined the role individuals and groups play on the peace processes, and not on the role of states as spoilers of democratization. Originally, the focus was on the motivation of individuals to spoil the conflict resolution process. In a seminal article, Stedman asserts that motivations for spoiling result from “leaders and parties who believe that peace emerging from negotiations threatens their power, worldview, and interests, and use violence to undermine attempts to achieve it” (Stedman, 1997, p. 5). For Pearlman (2009) spoilers emerge at an even earlier stage of the process, where different individuals or factions vie for the leadership to represent an ethnic group. The spoiling that takes place for group representation also has an effect on contestation over conflict policy. A group may push for negotiations or spoil the peace process depending on which choice grants it political dominance within the group.

When examining the spoiler’s motivation within the democratization context it would still be uncontroversial to assume that leaders promote policies and positions that enhance their political fortunes. But much of the literature suggests that leaders’ motivations are limited to remaining in office (Bueno De Mesquita & Downs, 2006; Bueno De Mesquita & Smith, 2009). Indeed, the goals of leaders may range from myopic, outmaneuvering of political opponents to re(s)election, to establishing a historical legacy as a great leader and global figure. In states with divided societies, appealing to one’s own ethnic group is an obvious way to create a supportive constituency. Similarly, supporting the desires of one’s ethnic kin abroad is a useful way to exert influence in the international arena, which may, in turn, serve this gamut of leader motivations.

However, when it comes to challenging the territorial status quo that exists between motherland and a target state, the fortunes of individual actors, groups, or national leaders are not what matters the most. As Zoran Đinđić, Serbia’s liberal prime-minister after the fall of President

Slobodan Milošević, claimed regarding the widespread support for uniting Serb populated areas in the former Yugoslav republics with Serbia, “there are no differences between the last person in the barricades and Karadzic.”⁵² In that regard, Karadzic is but one spokesman, if I may say, a ‘loudspeaker’ through whom the [whole] nation speaks” (Srbi u Bosni i Hercegovini, 2017).

As ethnic unification with the motherland is a national objective that may span generations of people and leaders, we cannot speak of individual motivations. In order to better understand the role motherlands play, we are better served to frame motivation (at least for this dissertation) as the intensity of events (for conflict or cooperation) that motherland is likely to initiate against a target state.

An additional aspect of intensity that is important to better understand the effect of motherland spoiling (or not) of democracy concerns the identity that emerges from events that are initiated by the motherland. A single conflictual event, no matter how intense (whether war or a threat), or a cooperative event for that matter (provide military aid or consult), is not particularly telling of the relationship between the two parties. What matters the most for the relationship is the cumulative intensity of events, for it is through repetitive events that a motherland initiates against the target that reveals her state identity (Hopf, 1998; Katzenstein, 1998; Wendt, 1999). If the target state’s history of interaction with a motherland is one of cooperation, or rather does not involve frequent conflicts, then one or a few conflictual events will not force the target state to stop or reverse the democratization process. The target state knows what to expect and spoiling is not viewed as likely. On the other hand, if the motherland has a history of conflict with the target state, occasional or rather abrupt events of cooperation will not trigger immediate openings for greater democratization. As Shimko argues, US policymakers do not go to sleep worrying about the United Kingdom’s nuclear arsenal, but they do fear North Korea’s handful nuclear devices.⁵³

3.3.1 Intensity: Political Regime of a Motherland and Time since Loss of Kin

Intensity to pursue conflictual or cooperative events is one dimension that explains whether a motherland will contest the status quo and spoil the democratization of a target state or not. The intensity of initiated events can be related “*to decision makers calculations of advantage and disadvantage, cost and benefit* (Siverson & Starr, 1991, p. 49) ... *[as they] must try to anticipate*

⁵² The leader of Bosnian Serbs, the president of the Serb Republic in Bosnia 1992-1995, and a convicted war criminal.

⁵³ Conversation with Professor Keith Shimko, Purdue University, spring semester 2015, “Realism” class.

and approximate the behavior of others, and see their own behavior constrained within a range of probabilities derived from their environment (domestic, governmental, and international)” (Starr, 1978, p. 369). A motherland willing to contest the territorial status quo is likely to initiate conflictual events of high intensity. If it seeks annexation of territory, the chances are, a motherland must resort to war for no country is willing to peacefully relinquish a portion of its territory.

A motherland's level of intensity for events to challenge the status quo depends on two factors. First, the political regime type of motherland determines the extent of displeasure with the territorial status quo. Motherlands that are democracies are expected, and to a large measure behave in a consistent manner. For one, established democracies do not go to war with other democracies (Doyle, 1983; Oneal & Russett, 2001; Ray, 1998; Russett, 1994). Similarly, it would be unreasonable to expect a democratic motherland to militarily attack a target state which has sought the aid of democratic states to help it democratize. Democratization, especially under the auspices of western countries and international institutions places a lot of emphasis on granting the highest level of political rights and civil liberties and institutionalizing minority rights. This is not to say that democratic motherlands do not interfere in the affairs of another state, but only that a democratic motherland is unlikely to engage in territorial conquest against a democratizing target state to retrieve its transnational kin. An evaluation of military interventions by democracies, reveals that since 1945 no democracy has occupied and annexed the territory of a neighboring state that was undergoing externally promoted democratization.

Two broad arguments can be made for why democratic motherlands are not expected to pursue violent interventions against target states. One, most established or consolidated democracies are found in the West where, for the most part, these transnational links no longer exist. In the New World, transnational ethnic links never emerged. In Western Europe, by the end of World War 2, genocide, ethnic cleansing, and exchange of populations brought about ethnic homogenization of many countries (Halperin, 1998; Proudfoot, 1956). In a few countries where these transnational ethnic kin links still exist (e.g. UK, Italy, Finland), the motherlands have come to accept the territorial status quo and the target states through democratization have come to provide the greatest level of rights to these groups including cultural and/or political autonomy.

Second, democracies have institutional mechanisms that constrain them from engaging in wars of territorial acquisition. If the motherland itself is multiethnic too, then challenging the territorial status quo with another state becomes even harder as the government must rely on cross-

ethnic support for any intervention (Carment & James, 2000). Moreover, a democratic motherland may find it difficult to garner the support of its allies or the wider international community to aid it in the annexation of another state's territory.

A democratic motherland is not expected to seek to overturn the territorial status quo and bring its transnational ethnic kin under its sovereignty. Rather, it is likely to adopt other strategies that are more conducive to democratization. It can leverage its power or status to pursue improvements in the social, economic, and political status of its kin within the existing state borders, in a manner consistent with democratic norms. By advocating on behalf of its kin for equal rights and liberties, a motherland can ensure that its kin continues to live, work, and prosper within the target and not immigrate to the motherland. Large scale emigration to the motherland can be quite costly, especially if the transnational kin population is large (e.g. millions of people), as the country would have to assist and subsidize the new population with regards to housing, education, welfare benefits, etc. Additionally, by restricting its actions to the normative domain, the motherland can foment a friendly bilateral relationship and become an exemplary regional or international actor. This in return can have spillover benefits with regards to international organization memberships and investments. For example, since 1990, Hungary despite having transnational ethnic kin in Romania (i.e., in the Transylvania region), has not sought to expand its political borders to include this group. Consequently, as democratization gained steam in Hungary, and pursued a constructive role with respect to its ethnic kin in the neighboring countries, the European Union admitted Hungary as a full member.

In cases when a motherland is a non-democracy, interventions generally concern resources (Bueno De Mesquita & Downs, 2006; Koga, 2011). Although some scholars have argued that a country may intervene to aid its transnational kin to address a security dilemma (Posen, 1993), others have shown that countries intervene in ethnic conflict solely for territorial expansionism (Ben-Israel, 1991; Kahler & Walter, 2006; Toft, 2002, 2005). Direct control over a target state's territory populated by its kin can bring strategic and economic benefits. This is achieved through the annexation of the territory or by occupying the territory, leading to what is known as a frozen conflict. In cases where direct control over a territory is not achievable, a motherland may be able to exercise indirect control through territorial arrangements that provide autonomy for its kin and the ability of the motherland to have special and direct links with that territory. The presence of such arrangements not only gives the motherland indirect control over the territory but in many

cases political arrangements give the kin veto powers over issues that the kin (by extension, the motherland) deem of national interest, thereby increasing the leverage the motherland has over the whole of the target state.

Another factor that determines the intensity of motherland to spoil the democratization of a target state is the time since loss or separation from kin. Recent losses of kin inhabited territory, especially as a result of the breakup of multiethnic states, or Western military intervention, can be traumatic for a state. This is especially acute if the loss takes place within the recent memory of the majority of the population (Cederman et al., 2010). The emerging new states may pursue a policy that seeks to force the convergence of political and ethnic borders as the majority of the population remembers living in a common state and may seek a similar arrangement. Furthermore, recent territorial losses could lead countries to challenge this new status quo with expectations that contesting territorial integrity of a newly established state may garner greater international legitimacy. For instance, some policymakers and scholars have suggested that Russian intervention in former Soviet Republics may not pose a threat to Western security interests, possibly legitimizing Russian actions (RealClear Politics, 2014).

When time since the loss of kin is long, a motherland may express low levels of intensity for spoiling. At some point, a motherland could have suffered a catastrophic defeat in a war that resulted in many of its kin forced to leave their traditional territory and emigrate to the motherland or third countries, or some sort of exchange of populations between the motherland and a target state could leave very few people behind. The presence of a very small minority in a target state may not bring enough gravity to motherland politics. As Cederman et al., (2010) have noted, transnational populations of less than 50,000 may not carry much gravity to bring about military intervention by the motherland. Since current generations were not part of the single state that collected all ethnic kin under one roof, the motherland may have made peace (with itself and with the target state) with its losses. Over time, a motherland may have institutionalized through various treaties that its former territory now is legally a part of another state.

3.3.2 Frequency: Internal Capabilities and External Constraints

Within the peace spoiler literature, Greenhill and Major (2006) recognize the importance of opportunity in determining the level of spoiling that an actor is likely to pursue in the effort to derail peace in post-conflict scenarios. According to Starr “opportunity” means that an “interaction

exists between individuals of one nation state and those of another so that it is possible for conflicts to arise” (Starr, 1978, p. 368).

For a motherland, “opportunity” is about the frequency of events, conflictual or cooperative. Frequency plays a critical role in its calculus toward pursuing a certain degree of revisionist claims versus a target state. The frequency with which it initiates certain events (conflict or cooperation), thus stands as a proxy for opportunity. The more frequently it engages in conflict or cooperation, it implies the opportunity for conflict or cooperation was greater. This frequency of events it pursues is based on the constraints imposed by its own capabilities and the international community. It explains the level of spoiling (choice of strategy) that a dissatisfied motherland will engage in against a target state. Moreover, for the same reasons as with intensity, it’s the cumulative effect of frequency (sum of events over the years) that is a greater predictor of the level of democracy.

Capability is the first critical element that determines the strategy type that a motherland will pursue. Capability is about the limits imposed on the motherland by its military stature, economic wealth, and political influence. Not all motherlands or target states are created equal. Some motherlands score high on all three. For example, Russia has a very sophisticated military with almost global power projection abilities and an extensive nuclear arsenal. Its military might has gone unchallenged in target states in which it sought to spoil democratization efforts. As such, it has occupied the Russian populated regions in Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine. These target states are unable to militarily displace Russian forces from the territories that it occupies. Additionally, by the virtue of its military might, Russia is able to limit the West to non-military challenges of its spoiler policies.

A motherland with a strong economy has a wider range of options with respect to inflicting damage on the target state. A motherland could control large segments of the target state’s economy, including dominating influx of capital, control of energy resources and national infrastructure (Risse & Babayan, 2015). This is especially the case when the target state and the motherland were part of a single country and recently split. More broadly, others in addition to a target state may depend on a motherland for its raw materials, access to markets, or supply of energy. One example includes Serbia who has used its economic leverage against Kosovo through control of natural resources and infrastructure in northern parts of Kosovo where it exercises a great degree of sovereignty.

Lastly, a motherland may have significant political clout. It could be a permanent UN Security Council member, a major regional power, or a member of international institutions such as NATO or EU exercising a large degree of influence. Its membership in major international institutions and veto powers can be used against the target state to restrict its access to funds and membership. Another example of this is Serbia who has used its historic ties with Russia to get it to veto any UN Security Council resolution that strengthens Kosovo's independence. Hungary too has used its membership in international institutions to condition Romania's (where there is a Hungarian minority) membership drive to the same institutions with improvements in the rights and liberties of the Hungarian minority.

However, if the target state's capabilities are sufficiently greater than that of the motherland, the motherland's strategic choices are limited. Thus, it may indirectly force a motherland to adopt a strategy of apathy or segregation. A militarily superior target state can defeat a weak motherland if challenged. It can also preemptively keep a motherland from engaging it militarily. A target state with significant economic resources or political clout may be able to keep a motherland at bay by having other countries rise to its defense. The political clout may come in the form of its membership in international institutions where the target state may have veto powers and thus prevent the motherland from membership, access to funds, and other benefits. Clout can also come from its membership in alliances or having a close relationship with a UNSC veto power that will advocate in favor of, or protect the target state. Croatia having emerged in the 1990s from a war with Serbia pursued membership in NATO and European Union as a means of increasing its security against potential aggression by Serbia in the future (D. Jović, 2006). With Croatia's membership in both institutions by 2013, Serbia has been unable to spoil Croatia's democratization the way it has in Bosnia or Kosovo.

Second, external constraints posed by the international community influence a motherland's calculation and the likelihood that a motherland's actions toward the target state will be successful. Greenhill and Major argue that "*the degree of spoiler behavior one witnesses at any given time...is largely a reflection of the probability that a given actor assigns to the likelihood that he can unilaterally alter the situation on the ground and the level of risk he is willing to assume to do so, rather than a fundamental difference in type*" (2006, p. 11). This sense of expectation extends to a motherland's rapport with the international community. The expected response by the

international community to the actions of a motherland affects the type of strategy a motherland is likely to adopt (Fukuyama, 2004; Greenhill & Major, 2006; Pearlman, 2009).

The range of actions that the international community can undertake to constrain a motherland's strategic choices regarding spoiling span the spectrum, from innocuous political declarations to sanctions, and the use of military force to displace a motherland from occupied territories of a target state. Nonetheless, there is an element of predictability to external constraints. One, the use of military force by the international community is rare and, when it does happen, it usually targets minor powers and not major or nuclear powers. Second, the international community is prone to inaction. Throughout many conflicts, whether in the former Yugoslavia or Rwanda, it has facilitated ethnic cleansing and violence through inaction (Pfaff, 1993). Frequently, when it acts, it favors the motherland by adopting policies that favor the strong (Fukuyama, 2004). The arms embargo in the former Yugoslavia in the 1990s and currently in Ukraine, allows the stronger party to adopt a more extreme spoiler strategy. Third, if the conflict between motherland and a target state turns violent, then the emphasis shifts to securing peace rather than promoting democratization (Jarstad, 2008; Paris, 2004). When the international community privileges peace over democracy, it may make concessions to spoilers including ethnic segregation and partition. Such approaches can increase the level of spoiling as a motherland ratchets up demands with successive capitulations by the international community (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Newman & Richmond, 2006a). Finally, as studies on spoilers of peace processes show, only in cases when the international community has shown absolute commitment to coerce as well as retaliate against spoilers, has peace and democratization been achieved (Greenhill & Major, 2006; Pearlman, 2009).

3.4 Strategies: A Product of Intensity and Frequency

When a motherland chooses to support its ethnic kin abroad, it may pursue a variety of strategies. Recall from the earlier discussion, that some strategies may promote the democratization of the state, but others are likely to undermine democracy. The tactics used in the implementation of various strategies can range from doing nothing about the borders or the democratization of the neighboring target state, taking a hands-off approach, to the use of military force in challenging the territorial status quo. In the literature on conflict resolution, spoiling usually implies the use of violence. Reiter asserts that spoiling is "any violence committed by those who oppose the accord

or ‘actions taken to undermine a peace process in general and negotiation in particular’ (2015, p. 92). Violence as a spoiling mechanism is used not only to push the alternative representation out or to signal their resolve (Kydd & Walter, 2006) but also because violence leads to the granting of territorial concessions faster than negotiations (Pape, 2003). However, when it comes to democratization, a more expansive definition is required to account for a range of actions that a state can undertake, as violence is not the only game in town.

In this dissertation, following Newman and Richmond (2006a, p. 1), I broadly define spoiling as any action (peaceful or coercive) undertaken by a country that “actively seek[s] to hinder, delay, or undermine” democratization of a target state through a variety of means using its transnational kin and for purpose of reclaiming territories it considers hers.

As discussed previously, a motherland can pursue one of four strategies – apathy, inclusivity, segregationist, and annexationist – with respect toward the territorial status quo that it exists between itself and the target state. The key to identifying the extent to which a motherland can revise the status quo and thereby spoil the democratization of a target country is to examine the intensity and frequency of events (conflict to cooperation) it initiates against the target. Figure 1 shows that the type of strategy that motherland is likely to adopt varies on the basis of interaction effects between these two dimensions. Each quadrant conveys, respectively, a profile of intensity and frequency that results in a choice of strategy that impacts democratization to various degrees. The four strategies are assessed generically in turn and show the conditions under which a motherland is more likely to pursue one strategy and not another.

The expectations are that the level of democracy in a target country will differ depending on a strategy a motherland seeks to adopt. Lower levels of democracy are likely when a motherland initiates high intensity conflicts at a high frequency. If a motherland initiates cooperative events at a high intensity and frequency, then a greater level of democracy it to be expected. In terms of particular political regime outcomes, I expect the following as a result of particular strategies:

1. Strategy of Apathy → Democracy
2. Strategy of Inclusivity → Minimal Democracy
3. Strategy of Segregation → Electoral Authoritarianism
4. Strategy of Annexation → Authoritarianism




Figure 1. Intensity and Frequency Matrix and Strategy Options

Recall from the introduction that a motherland that adopts a *strategy of apathy* is not interested in contesting the territorial status quo that exists between itself and the target state. It's not concerned with the affairs of its transnational kin to the point that requires action on its part. It may issue political declarations in support of its transnational kin, but its conflictual interactions will likely be low in intensity and frequency as it may not be in a position to either improve their condition within a target state or change the territorial status quo in its favor. A *strategy of inclusivity* is adopted by a motherland that can only muster low intensity conflictual events and will not challenge the territorial status quo. It will not annex kin territories or fight to get territorial autonomy within the target state for its kin. Through this strategy, a motherland contests the socio-political standing of its kin and through its opportunity structures works with the target state and the international community to ensure that the democratization process benefits its kin too by granting it the same rights and liberties to that of the dominant group.

A motherland adopts a *strategy of segregation* when it seeks to challenge the legitimacy of the political borders of the nearby state where its kin are found. In the absence of capabilities to annex the kin-controlled territories, it pushes for vast territorial autonomy for its kin. Generally, this implies that some degree of violent conflict has taken place prior and that the motherland's capabilities were strong enough to force the target state, usually by involving the international community, to grant vast political autonomy to the areas populated by transnational kin.

Segregation of kin from the national authorities of the target state occurs as a result of clear demarcation of territory, the establishment of an ethnic ruled government that includes a president, parliament, judiciary, constitution, constabulary, flag, and coat of arms. The autonomous region may also have the right to enter into agreements with other states, the establishment of special links with the motherland, and the right to veto the decisions of the national authorities if the autonomous region feels that its ethnic interests are threatened.

A *strategy of annexation* is adopted when the motherland has the capabilities and lacks the international restraints to engage in frequent and very intense conflictual events to occupy and partition those territories it considers rightfully hers. Such a strategy may entail the use of military force to expel not only the authorities of the target state from its transnational kin populated areas, but also the non-kin population that may constitute the majority in a strategic territory, or when the motherland believes that this population harbors a subversive element.

A motherland's choice of strategy may change over time or across regions if transnational kin is spread across multiple countries. Strategies can shift as the level of intensity and frequency vary. A motherland may move from a strategy of annexation to a strategy of segregation if its actions against the target state bring about international military intervention, thus imposing external constraints which reduce the level of opportunity. A move from a strategy of annexationist to a strategy of inclusivity or apathy can occur if a motherland suffers military defeat, which reduces – or reveals a lack of – capabilities, which also reduces the ability to engage in frequent conflictual events. Changes in the level of intensity may also produce shifts in the strategies a motherland pursues. For instance, if the size of the kin population in the target state falls below some politically relevant threshold, the motherland's demands may become muted, resulting in the pursuit of an apathy strategy. A regime change in the motherland may influence the intensity of events it pursues, as well. For example, if a previously autocratic and spoiling motherland becomes democratic, its leadership may no longer rely on an aggressive foreign policy toward the target state. Such a change may lead to a strategy of inclusivity or apathy.

3.4.1 Strategy of Apathy and its Impact on Democratization

The absence of an antagonistic motherland may hold the best prospects for the democratization of a target state. The adoption of such a strategy by a motherland is conducive to democratization as the relationship moves from triadic (Democracy Promoter – Target State – Motherland) containing

one hostile party to democratization, to dyadic (Democracy Promoters – Target State) with no external spoilers. External actors can promote democratization under peaceful conditions or at the ‘point of bayonets.’ Generally, outsiders engage in peaceful democracy promotion when a target state is voluntarily transitioning to democracy and requests external help to assist with this transition. Under such conditions, democracy is likely to emerge as the democracy promoters will engage in state-building and transform the target state’s political, economic, and social structures to more closely align it with Western political liberalism and market economy. However, in rare cases, the external actors impose democratization through armed force. This is accomplished in autocratic target states that have engaged in a level of oppression of a minority group that is deemed a threat to international peace – a target state that has committed genocide and ethnic cleansing. With the removal of the regime, democracy promoters are free to engage in state-building that can lead to democratization.

Democratization may result in numerous benefits to the target state, including minority groups with transnational links. First, democratization may result in benefits associated with increased trade and cooperation. Second, a democratizing target state, especially when aided by democracy promoters, is likely to advance a set of political rights and civil liberties, laws, and norms that advance the interests of all ethnic groups within the state. Third, democracy promoters usually establish institutions that devolve political power to subnational units, advance cultural autonomy, and/or bring about power-sharing at the national level. Finally, as a target state democratizes, increased ascension to regional and international institutions (e.g. EU, NATO, OSCE) is likely to result in increased security, peace, and prosperity.

3.4.2 Strategy of Inclusivity and its Impact on Democratization

With the exception of a motherland that pursues a strategy of apathy, the only other strategy that can potentially allow the nurturing of democratization by the West in a target country involves inclusivity. A motherland that is an established democracy or peacefully undergoing democratization itself, will adopt such a strategy as a means of engaging the target state and gaining the support of the international community to improve the condition of its transnational kin. Specifically, a motherland seeks for its kin equality with that of the majority group or the group that is in control of the state. This requires not only suffrage, but also political rights and civil liberties that are available to the majority population, representation at every level of

government, some power-sharing and cultural autonomy (e.g. use of native language in public spaces and education, expression of religion, and display of national symbols).

An inclusivist motherland is not a revisionist state when it comes to territory. It only seeks improvements to the rights (personal autonomy) of its transnational kin and their inclusion in the political-economic space within the existing territorial arrangements of the target state. At one time, all ethnic kin inhabited territories may have been a part of another state, or a motherland may have had direct control over the territory that holds symbolic, historical, or religious significance, but it has made peace with its loss. A motherland recognizes the sovereignty of the target state over the territory inhabited by its transnational kin.

While a democratic motherland, or one that is undergoing a transition to democracy, may have a positive impact on the democratization of a target country, in the long run, its policies, irrespective of how benign they are, have the potential to at least in the short-run slow down the consolidation of democracy. Consequently, the outcome of such a strategy could result in minimal democracy. This strategy of inclusivity can hamper the full democratization of a target state in at least two ways. First, the political opening of a society that has been autocratic for a long-time can be overwhelming as the previously shunned individuals, groups and interests, gain a voice. This opening may even be traumatic when a motherland and the West demand that the previously oppressed minorities are given equal rights as a condition for the new regime to receive foreign aid, be admitted to international institutions, or granted membership to security organizations. The promotion of kin causes by a motherland may be taken advantage of by the nationalists to gain power within a target state. Policies that advocate minority rights are misconstrued for propaganda and electoral purposes to paint a motherland as meddling in the internal affairs of a sovereign state; hegemonism and seeking territorial expansionism. Strong nationalism may bring to power a nationalist group or in a governing coalition that may hamper the democratization process.

Second, if a target state is reluctant to grant equal rights to the minority kin as it begins its political transition, a motherland may use its economic and diplomatic muscles to condition the target state's membership in regional and international organizations. A motherland could use its economic strength to impose sanctions on a target state, or its diplomatic weight to block a target state's ascension to international institutions, regional organizations, or security alliances. As Freyburg and Richter (2010) show, countries can use national identity as a filtering mechanism to determine government responses to political conditionality. Thus, if a target state is worried that a

motherland's promotion of kin causes may threaten the national identity of the state, it will reject political conditions irrespective of the benefits. Therefore, a motherland may hamper democratization by denying the target state membership to institutions that foster democratization.

3.4.3 Strategy of Segregation and its Impact on Democratization

A strategy of segregation can hinder the democratization of the target state in three ways. First, segregation can lead the target state to lose its national institutions in the territory outside its national control. This possibility is particularly pronounced when the West intervenes militarily in an armed conflict between the motherland and the target state. In many such cases, the West may intervene but not pursue the total defeat and unconditional surrender of a motherland. Instead, the West seeks a negotiated end to the conflict. This reorients Western focus from pursuing the democratization, to building peace at any cost.

The process of negotiating the end of conflict and peace-building leads the West to treat a motherland as a partner for peace instead of the culprit in spoiling. This reversal of roles gives the motherland a seat at the table, which does not bode well for democratization (Fearon & Laitin, 2003; Jarstad, 2008, 2016; Pearlman, 2009). The withdrawal of motherland's security forces from occupied territory does not lead to complete control of the territory by the Western forces, or the return of the target state's authorities. In fact, a motherland can deny both the West and the target state full control over the region, leading to the territory's status as a *de facto* failed state. When the West pursues only peace-building without state-building, democratization is put on the back burner.

Second, should the motherland and its transnational kin develop some semblance of separate governmental institutions in the target state, these institutions are likely to provide for sweeping emergency powers to the leadership. Elections are repeatedly canceled, and civil rights and liberties are ignored for the sake of peace and safety. The legitimate government in the target state typically lacks the capabilities to oust the separatist regime due to its military backing by the motherland and, perhaps even Western peacemakers who fear creating a power vacuum. More damaging is that, over time, the separatist regime – its leaders, institutions and *de facto* borders – gain international legitimacy. The passage of time promotes the efforts of separatists to entrench or further segregation.

Finally, segregation may create a situation in which the transnational kin become agents of the motherland. Any semblance of democratic accountability is undermined as the separatist leadership represents the interests and demands of the motherland rather than its own people. In effect, the motherland indirectly captures the politics and governance of segregated territory via its own agents. Democracy also suffers because the target state's institutions are unable to function under its own framework. For example, members of parliament representing the separatists may withdraw deputies from sessions to deny a quorum; separatist parties may pull out of a coalition government; or exercise effective veto powers over accession to international institutions, treaties, alliances, etc. The result is the perceived illegitimacy of policies approved by the target state's government. Transnational kin hope to create a dysfunctional national state that would force the target state to acquiesce to secession or push the international community to impose a solution on the target state that formalizes segregation.

3.4.4 Strategy of Annexation and its Impact on Democratization

Annexionist spoiling typically entails some sort of military action on the part of the motherland to acquire territory populated by its kin. A motherland that has adopted such a strategy seeks direct control over a target state's territory through conquest. Annexation can be successfully carried out either by the violent use of force or simply by threats to use force.

This strategy can lead to non-democracy in a target state by the actions of the motherland in kin-controlled territories, and the responses of the target state within the territory it continues to control. First, a motherland's military efforts to consolidate gains in the areas populated by its ethnic kin may lead to ethnic cleansing, mass killings, a show of force, intimidation, and discrimination. As the target state's institutions collapse in areas occupied by motherland's forces, the local kin with the assistance of 'advisors' from the motherland step in to take over the institutions and transform them to serve the occupation. Given that a motherland pursuing an annexation strategy is likely to be autocratic, the annexed territory falling under its control can also be expected to be autocratic.

With the loss of territory and the ongoing threat of military hostilities, the target state's government may declare a state of emergency throughout the country. The leadership may impose extraordinary policies that include dissolution of the parliament, shutting down independent media outlets, and the suppression of political rights and civil liberties. To fight the occupation and the

wholesale disintegration of the state, the target state's leaders may oppress the remaining minority group linked to the motherland through ethnic cleansing or mass arrests. Additionally, other minority groups remaining in the target state may also face oppression as the majority group seeks to preempt other irredentism.

Again, the target state and the international community privilege peace and security over democracy. Because it is more difficult to dislodge an occupier than it is to prevent an invasion, the new status quo becomes fossilized, compromising the ability and will of the target state and international community to restore or pursue democracy. Instead, the West and other members of the international community focus on security issues dealing with conflict containment, ceasefire monitoring, and the separation of warring parties. Efforts to promote democratization are hindered by both the target state – which seeks to maintain control of its remaining territory through emergency powers – and the motherland who seeks to maintain dominance over a destabilized target state.

3.5 Chapter Summary

In this chapter, I have developed an argument showing how the actions of a motherland influence a target state's prospects for democracy. Each of the strategies I have identified – apathy, inclusivity, segregationist, and annexationist – are posited to produce one of four broad categories of democratization outcomes – democracy, minimal democratization, electoral authoritarianism, and authoritarianism – respectively. These outcomes are expected to result from the actions of the motherland as well as responses by the target state and the international community.

Motherlands with illiberal regimes and are recently separated from their kin as a result of new borders, express high motivation to challenge the political borders of a target state with whom they share transnational kin. Consequently, the motherland views a target state's democratization as harmful to its challenge of the territorial status quo. In cases of the breakup of multiethnic states, the group that constituted the core of that state, while they can remain a majority and in power within a state (motherland), they will become an ethnic minority in another newly established state. Two, some scholars have suggested that a country may push against democratization in its neighborhood for fear that it may have a cascading effect and lead people within a motherland to push for democracy (Risse & Babayan, 2015). Three, a democratic target state may give all ethnic groups within the country equal rights and liberties and institutionalize power-sharing, thereby

taking away any excuse for a motherland's interference. Finally, democracies are less likely to be intervened (Pickering, 2002a). As such, a motherland may be limited by the international community if it attempts to reclaim its kin inhabited territories from a neighboring state.

To be sure, arguments can be made as to why these expectations may not produce the posited relationships. For instance, the mere presence of a motherland – even an apathetic one – may be sufficient for the undermining of democracy in a target state. A target state may worry about a motherland irrespective of the motherland's current motivations or opportunities as future conditions may change that turn a non-revisionist state with no claims against a target state into a more pronounced spoiler. Consequently, a target state may oppress the motherland's ethnic kin or keep a tight grip on its overall population in order to forestall segregationist activities. A motherland pursuing an inclusivity strategy may actually hinder democratization in the short term. Even benign efforts by the motherland to advocate for minority rights in the target state may be misconstrued as meddling in the internal affairs of a sovereign state, leading to backlash against the motherland's kin and entrenched authoritarianism. Because challenges to the theory are, essentially, empirical questions, in the next chapter I develop a research design for analyzing the effect of motherland strategies on democratization.

CHAPTER 4. CROATIA'S DEMOCRATIZATION: A TALE OF TWO STRATEGIES

Rise, O Serbia!
 You fell asleep long ago,
 You lay in darkness.
 Wake up now
 And stir up the Serbs!
 You raise your imperial head up,
 Let the earth and the sea know you again.
 Show Europe your beautiful face,
 Bright and cheerful like the appearance of Venus.

Rise, O Serbia!
 You fell asleep long ago,
 You lay in darkness.
 Wake up now
 And stir up the Serbs!
 ... Rise, O Serbia! Rise, O our dear mother!
 And become once more what you used to be...

-Dositej Obradovic 1804

The decade long conflicts in the former Yugoslavia (1991 – 2001) have taken a lot of real estate in academic journals, news, and policymaking (Carpenter, 2000; Clark, 2002; Daalder, 2014; Fukuyama, 1996; Holbrooke, 1999; Mearsheimer, 1993; Zimmermann, 1996).⁵⁴ There are two common misconceptions that have been frequently repeated to the point that they have become prisms through which the region is seen. First, the wars that took place were a manifestation of ancient hatred between various ethnic groups. Second, most ills can be attributed to Slobodan Milošević, the President of Serbia, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.⁵⁵ In this chapter, by examining the case of Croatian democratization, I will show that the decade-long mayhem was not grounded in ancient hatreds as commonly believed, but in Serbia's appetite for territorial aggrandizement. The increasing democratization of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

⁵⁴ A Google Scholar search for key terms "Yugoslavia, conflict" returns 139,000 results for years 1990-2018.

⁵⁵ The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), a state consisting of Serbia (including Vojvodina and Kosovo) and Montenegro, was established on April 28, 1992, upon the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Slobodan Milošević was its 3rd President, from 1997 to 2000.

(hereafter Yugoslavia) that took place between 1974 and 1991, was Serbia's main target as it ran counter to its plan for recentralizing the state and increasing its dominance over the other federal republics and provinces. Moreover, the genocide, ethnic cleansing, and grave humanitarian rights abuses that were the hallmark of the Yugoslav wars were not the work of a single leader, the "Butcher of Balkans,"⁵⁶ but a century-long manifest of Serbia's elites, preceding and succeeding the reign of Slobodan Milošević. Why did Serbia challenge the democratization of the former Yugoslavia, particularly in Croatia between 1990 and 1998, but then embraced it at varying degrees between 1999 and 2015? What were the strategies that Serbia embraced in challenging Croatia's democratization? What tactics did it pursue? These are some of the questions that this chapter seeks to address.

Why is the spoiling of Croatian democratization a case worthy of a study? There are three reasons. One, it shows an evolution in Serbia's strategic choices and how these choices impacted the democratization of Croatia. Between 1991 and 1998, Serbia pursued an annexationist strategy challenge Croatia's political borders. It sought to partition Croatian territory and join it to Serbia. Consequently, the democratization process stalled as Serbia succeeded in: 1) restricting Croatian authorities from exercising sovereignty on one-third of its territory; 2) building parallel institutions that engaged in discrimination, persecution, killings and ethnic cleansing; and 3) preventing the international community from engaging in democracy promotion.

Two, as Serbia's level of intensity and frequency to initiate conflictual events in challenging the territorial status quo decreased as a result of her military defeats 1995 and subsequent removal of close to half of the pre-war Serb population, she abandoned the annexationist strategy in Croatia. Accordingly, the levels of democracy increased in Croatia after the last Serbian controlled territory of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmia (hereafter Eastern Slavonia)⁵⁷ was peacefully incorporated in 1998, and the country was free to switch priorities from pursuing national liberation to democratization.

The third reason speaks to Serbia's persistence in playing the regional spoiler to this day. Through its spoiler strategies it has prevented the consolidation of democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter Bosnia) and Kosovo,⁵⁸ countries with Serb minorities. Moreover, Serbia's

⁵⁶ An epithet used to refer to Slobodan Milošević in the 1990s. Not sure who first originated the term.

⁵⁷ Eastern Slavonia region lies to Serbia's northwest (adjacent to Vojvodina province) and borders the Danube river. Prior to the war, this region had a mixed Serb/Croat population.

⁵⁸ Bosnia and Kosovo were part of former the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

tactics in fighting democratization when it considers it a threat to its territorial expansionism have been emulated by Russia in Georgia (since 1991) and Ukraine (since 2014). Serbia's strategic maneuvering in spoiling democracy in countries with whom it shares transnational ethnic kin is a good example to study for generalizations with other motherlands across other parts of the world.

In this chapter, I will first discuss how the mismatch between the national identity of Serbs and their limited political community in Serbia led to the adoption of the regional expansionist policy. In the second section, I examine Croatia's two paths to democratization including the democracy that could have emerged in the absence of spoiling by Serbia. In the third section, I explain Serbia's pursuit of an annexationist strategy between 1990 and 1998. Section four examines the annexationist era and the tactics employed by Serbia to spoil Croatia's democratization. In section five, I describe Serbia's abandonment of conflict, its adoption of a strategy of apathy from 1999 to present and the resulting increase in democracy scores in the country. In section six, I analyze the two tactics that led to increases in Croatia's level of democracy after 2000. Lastly, I offer my conclusions.

4.1 National Identity and Political Community

Like 82% of countries in the world (Toft, 2002), the states that emerged out of Yugoslavia were non-homogenous with respect to their ethnic demographics. For example, Serbs constituted the core of the population and dominated the government in Serbia but were also found as ethnic minorities in Croatia (12%), Bosnia (31%) and Kosovo (10%).⁵⁹ Other republics and provinces also had transnational ethnic kin spread throughout Yugoslavia.⁶⁰ The last attempt at cementing borders in Yugoslavia, at least before the wars of Yugoslav succession of the 1990s, came from the former communist regime (Juhász, 2013; Lee, 1983). The regime engaged in "adjusting" the territorial boundaries of its republics and provinces in order to create cross-ethnic spaces or to prevent secessionism – leaving people outside their core, and in another territorial unit. Except for Slovenia,⁶¹ every other federal unit contained transnational ethnic kin of a neighboring republic or province.

⁵⁹ The Yugoslav Census of 1991.

⁶⁰ There were ethnic Croats in Vojvodina and Bosnia; Bosniaks within Serbia and Montenegro (Sandzak region); Albanians that were split between Kosovo, Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia.

⁶¹ According to Slovenian statistics, before the 1981 census, the republic's population was over 90% Slovenes. After 1981, with the rise of migration from other Yugoslav republics, the share of Slovenes dropped to below 90%. The

The genesis of Serbia's spoiling of democratization processes in Croatia and other Yugoslav republics is found in this incongruity of borders; in the lack of overlap between the borders of the Republic of Serbia and Serb populated areas outside of Serbia; between the territories it controlled and those which it historically coveted. This dissatisfaction with the extent of Serbia's political borders and its pursuit of revising the boundaries is at the roots of democratization failure in Croatia during the 1991-1998 era. However, this penchant for territorial revisionism is not new nor unique to the last decade of the 20th century but one that dates back to the 19th century.

Serbia's desire for territorial expansion is rooted in a constructed identity of historical greatness and limited opportunities for territorial expansionism. Serbian political elites since the 19th century have regarded that *"[t]he main line and fundament of Serbian politics arises from this notion that she should not limit herself to her current boundaries, but that she should strive to encompass all the Serbian peoples that surround her"* (Garasanin cited in Kopeček, 2007, p. 241).⁶² The pursuit of this national objective can be traced taking place in three periods.

Figure 2 shows Serbia's territorial expansionism over the years, from a small principality, under the tutelage of the Ottoman Empire (1804-1833), to the Kingdom of Serbia (1833-1918) with dominion over former Ottoman territories in the western Balkans, and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes/Yugoslavia (1918-1945) incorporating large areas formerly under Austro-Hungarian rule. The map represents the territorial expansionism of Serbia during her first two historical phases.

1991 census shows 88.3% and the 2002 census shows 83.1% of the population is Slovenes. Retrieved from https://www.stat.si/popis2002/en/rezultati/rezultati_red.asp?ter=SLO&st=7.

⁶² Dositej Obradovic in 1805 expressed concern about Serbia's survival as a state unless it expands territorially (Obradovic, 2007).



Map Title (in English): Historical Map of Expansionism: Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.
Map Source: (The Archives of Yugoslavia, 2009).

Figure 2. Serbia's Territorial Expansionism, 1833 – 1918

The first phase of Serbia's expansionism (1844-1917) coincides with the national liberation movements of the 19th century which swept Europe, including Serbia. The areas in purple in Figure 2, show this expansionism into territories of the former Ottoman Empire, a region largely populated by non-Serbs. In 1844, Ilija Garašanin, a Serbian statesman, penned a masterplan, known as "Nacertanje" (the Draft), which called for the creation of a Greater Serbia carved out of the Ottoman Empire as the only way for Serbia to ensure its prosperity and security. Garašanin

and the Serbian rulers viewed Serbia as a Piedmont⁶³ - the core and the rulers of a South Slav state whose main aim is “*to deliver from the Ottoman yoke the provinces inhabited by the Serbian race*”⁶⁴ *in order to form by their admission to the Principality of Serbia a state... sufficient to aid efficaciously in the accomplishment of Slav destiny in southern Europe.*”⁶⁵ (MacKenzie, 1994, p. 161). The withdrawal of the Ottoman Empire from the Balkans in 1913 was followed by Serbia’s expansion in the territories populated by Albanians in present-day Kosovo and northern Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The second phase of Serbia’s territorial expansionism (1918-1941) coincides with the end of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. In Figure 2, this expansion in the former Austro-Hungarian ruled territory is shown in pink color. The Kingdom of Serbia was a militarily defeated state during World War 1 but emerged victorious as the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in the war’s aftermath. The end of the war provided an opportunity for Serbia’s westward and northern expansionism toward Croatia, Slovenia, and Vojvodina. Its territorial transformation from a principality of about 21,000 square miles into a kingdom of 95,600 square miles occurred by happenstance.

In 1915, France, Russia, Great Britain, and Italy signed the Treaty of London. In return for Italy’s support the Allied Powers agreed to cede parts of Slovenia and Croatia to Italy⁶⁶ (France, 1920). Serbia, although not a party to the Treaty, was to be granted the rest of Croatia, all of Bosnia, and parts of northern Albania as a gift for their war efforts. Toward the end of the war, faced between annexation by the bigger and stronger Italy or joining a South Slav state under the dictates of a smaller and a weaker Serbia, the Slovenian and Croat political elites, the originators of the idea of a single South Slav state, chose the latter⁶⁷ (Ramet, 2006; Zimmermann, 1996). For Serbia, this expansion into Croatia Slovenia and Bosnia was seen as a rather low-cost enterprise. Serbia would not have to fight a war to gain those territories and there was a widely shared sentiment among the Serb elites that Croats, Slovenes, and Bosnians were Serbs who had lost their identity

⁶³ Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia was the main driver for the unification of Italy in the 19th century.

⁶⁴ Serbian identity in the 19th century was more expansive than what it is today. It encompassed people that today we would describe as being Croats, Bosniaks, Montenegrins, and Macedonians.

⁶⁵ Quote by Matija Ban of Dubrovnik, the chief propagandist of Prince Mihajlo Obrenovic, the ruler of Serbia. Slav destiny in southern Europe refers to the unification of all South Slavs (Yugoslavs and Bulgarians).

⁶⁶ One-third of the present territory of Slovenia was to go to Italy as well as the Istrian peninsula, Northern Dalmatia and many islands on the Adriatic Sea.

⁶⁷ Croats and Slovenes had promoted the idea of a single state for all South Slavs of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire. In the 19th century, they founded the Illyrian movement (1835-1849) in pursuit of this goal. During World War 1, they founded the Yugoslav Committee (1915-1918) to attain this objective.

with the adoption of Catholicism and Islam and that in due time would assimilate (Djokić, 2010; Tanner, 1997). In a meeting with the British in 1916, Crown Prince Alexander articulates that Serbia strives for “*the ideal towards the attainment of which we have striven for centuries...is the union in one single fatherland of all the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, who are one people with the same traditions, the same tongue, the same tendencies, but whom an evil fate has divided*” (Djokić, 2010, p. 47). The Corfu Declaration affirmed this view on December 1, 1918, announcing the creation of a new state, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes⁶⁸ (Ramet, 2006). This new state became, what Shale Horowitz called “an expanded version of the prewar, centralized Serbian state” (2005); the fulfillment of the Serb dream of Greater Serbia envisioned by Ilija Garašanin a century before (Francine Friedman, 2013). The new state was not one of equality between the three people, but one where Serbs “aspired to nothing less than political, economic, and cultural hegemony within the new state and saw strict centralism as a logical solution” (Ramet, 2006, p. 37).

The third phase (1974-1990) marks Serbia’s intellectual engagement for territorial revisionism as a result of Serbia’s resentment with its position within Yugoslavia. For Serbia, centralism was a method of exercising dominance, and any devolution of powers to the federal units and increasing liberalism were a threat (Biserko, 2012; Đurić, 1971). The end of World War 2 brought about the end of Serb ruled Kingdom of Yugoslavia, the establishment of a federal state and a Communist regime which asserted the equality of all ethnicities. The downfall of the feared Yugoslav Vice-President and Minister of Internal Security, Aleksandar Ranković (a Serb) in 1966 marks not only the end of centralized power in the hands of Serb dominated communist elite, but also a period when the Yugoslav President Tito (a Croat) and the non-Serb Yugoslav elites initiate a political process of increasing liberalism, devolving greater powers to the republics and strengthening the republic/provincial communist parties at the expense of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) a way of tempering Serbia’s dominance (Biserko, 2012; F. Friedman, 2004). The Constitution of 1974 further diluted Serbia’s dominance through the creation of a confederal arrangement of 8 constituent units with expanded powers⁶⁹ and parity between

⁶⁸ The Kingdom’s motto was “one state, one nation, one king.”

⁶⁹ New enshrined powers for each federal unit included: National Guard (Teritorijalna Odbrana), Supreme and Constitutional Courts, Central Bank, educational system, and constabulary.

federal units, greater rights for ethnic minorities, and a more proportional representation system. Figure 3 shows the borders of the 8 federal units.



Map Source: Perry-Castaneda Library Map Collection, the University of Texas at Austin.

Figure 3. Yugoslavia's Political Borders, 1945 - 1990


The era-defining act of Serb displeasure with the new political developments is enshrined in what came to be known as “The Memorandum” and constituted the intellectual underpinning for Serbia’s destruction of Yugoslavia” (Sell, 2003, p. 46). In 1986, the Serbian Academy of

Sciences and Arts (SANU),⁷⁰ reminiscent of Garašanin's "The Draft," drafted a new masterplan to rectify threats to Serbia's national interests (S. A. Horowitz, 2005). It established a narrative that Serbs outside Serbia are discriminated, persecuted, and ethnically cleansed. It argued that the historical victimization of Serbs outside Serbia would stop, and Serb prosperity would be inevitable only upon the unification of all Serb populated territories with Serbia (Morus, 2007). The Memorandum outlined strategies Serbia must pursue to restore its greatness. The intellectual elites asserted that the "establishment of the Serbian people's complete national and cultural integrity, regardless of which republic or province they might be living in, is their historical and democratic right" and the first requirement in pursuit of this unification is the "democratic mobilization of all the intellectual and moral forces of the nation to devise programmes and map out the future" (Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1986). According to Sabrina Ramet, "[t]he Memorandum was nothing less than an ideological program for revenge and for establishing Serb hegemony over Yugoslavia's non-Serbs" (2018, p. 20).

4.2 The Two Paths to Democratization

The democratization of Croatia, since the first free multiparty elections in 1990, can be separated into two periods. The first period, from 1990–1998, signifies the starting phase of the democratization process that proceeded alongside the war of national liberation for the newly independent republic. The second period, from 1999–2015, marks the switch to peacetime and the consolidation of democratization. In Figure 4, the top two graphs, show Croatia's level of democracy in light of Serbia's intensity/frequency to initiate conflictual events (or spoil). On the bottom part of Figure 4, I show the level of democracy in Slovenia, a neighboring country that was a part of Yugoslavia too. Italy plays a motherland to Italians in Slovenia and the graph plots Italy's intensity of conflictual events and their frequency against Slovenia. The graphs reveal the two democratization periods that Croatia experienced as a result of the two strategies (annexationist and apathy) pursued by Serbia. Moreover, the graphs showing the level of democracy in Slovenia show a consistent strategy (apathy) adopted by Italy with respect to its transnational ethnic kin.

⁷⁰ Serb Academy of Sciences and Arts is the intellectual machine of Serbia. Historically, it was charged with articulating and defending Serbia's national interests. Since the 1970s it has also drafted programs for resolving the "Serb Question" in the former Yugoslavia. That is to bring about the unification of all Serbs in one state.



Source: LDI data is from V-DEM Version 8; Intensity/Frequency data (Goldstein Scores) are from the Phoenix Event Data.

Figure 4. Democracy Spoiling in Croatia and Slovenia, 1990 – 2015

The democracy scores for Croatia from 1990 to 2015, plotted on the top part of the graph, visibly indicates these two periods in the democratization process of Croatia. There is a marked shift in Croatia's level of democracy as Serbia switches strategies from annexation to apathy. Between 1990 and 1999, Serbia pursued an annexationist strategy and a strategy of apathy from 2000 to 2015. According to my theory, a motherland pursues such a strategy when it initiates conflictual events that are of high intensity and high frequency, to contest the political borders of the target state. During this era, as Serbia sought to separate its ethnic kin-controlled territories from Croatia, the political regime that emerged was electorally authoritarian. Croatia's mean democracy score (Liberal Democracy Index) ranged between 0.23 (Autocracy) and 0.33 (Electoral Autocracy). According to the Phoenix Event Data, the scaled intensity data shows that during the

annexationist era, the mean score was 0.56 with a maximum value of 1,⁷¹ with larger values indicating higher intensity for conflictual events. The frequency for conflict data indicates that during the annexationist era (1990-1999), Serbia had committed a total of 104 conflictual events, with the majority of those events taking place between 1991 and 1995 due to the war operations. After 1995, there were no military operations that pitted Croatia against Serbia, although Serbia continued to occupy a small sliver of territory (Eastern Slavonia) until 1998.

As Serbia's level of intensity and frequency for conflict decreased, as a result of political instability in Serbia, military defeat in Croatia and Bosnia, and increasing constraints imposed by the international community, Serbia adopts a strategy of apathy. Starting with the first post-war national elections in 2000, Croatia's political regime becomes significantly more democratic. Croatia's mean level of democracy ranges between 0.59 and 0.73, just shy of V-DEM's criteria for a country to be classified as a "Democracy" instead of a "Minimal Democracy."⁷² Examining the event data after Serbia switches to a strategy of apathy, I find that Serbia's mean intensity score drops by half to 0.27 with a maximum score of 0.59. During this period, the data reveals that the number of conflictual events drops by 2/3 to 34 events from a high of 104 during the annexationist era. Moreover, out of 26 years of conflictual events against Croatia, there are 5 years when Serbia did not undertake any conflictual events, with all taking place since 1999.

The bottom 2 graphs in Figure 4, present Slovenia's path to democratization. What the data reveals is that the consolidation of democracy was more rapid and sustainable than Croatia's. Within a year of its independence in 1991, Slovenia reaches a liberal democracy index score leading V-DEM to classify it as a "Democracy." Like Croatia, Slovenia contains transnational ethnic minorities too. Italians are an ethnic minority adjacent to Italy, but their share of Slovenia's population is insignificant, 0.2% of the total population, or about 3000 people in total according to the 1991 Census Data.⁷³ According to V-DEM, the LDI scores showed the country to be an Electoral Autocracy in 1990 (0.41), a Minimal Democracy in 1991 (0.66), and a Democracy from 1992 to present.⁷⁴ The data does not reveal that Italy adopted more than one strategy in dealing

⁷¹ Originally, Goldstein scores for conflict are registered as negative values and cooperative events take on positive values. In this analysis, I show conflict values as taking on a positive sign. Mean intensity for conflict = 5.20 with a maximum score of 9.2. A value of 0 indicates no conflict event was present, a Goldstein value of 9.2 indicates armed conflict.

⁷² V-DEM's regime categories based on LDI scores: Autocracy ≤ 0.25 ; Electoral Autocracy >0.25 and ≤ 0.50 ; Minimal Democracy >0.5 and ≤ 0.75 ; and Democracy > 0.75 .

⁷³ Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_Slovenia, on May 30, 2019.

⁷⁴ V-DEM records one drop in democracy score below the threshold of 0.75 (required for a full Democracy) in 2004.

with its transnational ethnic kin in Slovenia. The lower democracy scores in 1990 and 1991 can be explained in terms of Slovenia conducting its first multiparty elections in 1990 while still a part of Yugoslavia, and 1991 marks the year the country declared independence and fought a short war against Serb led Yugoslav military.

The intensity plot as seen on the bottom graph (left side) reveals that Italy did display a few episodes of high intensity for conflict. A closer look at the data, however, reveals overall lower levels of intensity for conflict, just as my theory predicts when a democratic motherland has separated from its kin long ago. The mean intensity score across the whole period (1990-2015) is 0.32, about half of what Serbia displayed against Croatia during its annexationist era. This mean intensity value of 0.32 is just a bit higher than what Serbia displayed against Croatia after it switched to a strategy of apathy (0.27). The more conflictual episodes reflect Italy's concerns with the elections in Slovenia. Examining the frequency of conflictual events, I find that Phoenix Event Data records a total of only 19 conflictual events taking place over a 26-year period (1990-2015). Half of those events took place between 1991 and 1996. Since 1996, there were thirteen years when there is no record of conflictual events that Italy initiated against Slovenia.

In the next section, I will show that the same democratization path traversed by Slovenia was available to Croatia as well. Like in Slovenia, democracy did emerge in Croatia too, but only after a decade long detour. I offer a counterfactual to the democratization path by looking at the similarities that were present in both countries. In section 5.3, I describe Serbia's intensity and frequency to spoil the democratization of Croatia, followed by a discussion of tactics that Serbia pursued through its annexationist strategy. In section 5.5, I describe Serbia's intensity and frequency to not spoil the democratization process, followed by a discussion of tactics that were conducive to this process.

4.2.1 Democratization Detour: The Road Not Taken

The democratization of the common state or its federal units was a distinct possibility as the United States and the European Community (EC) in return for a peaceful settlement and agreed reforms for transforming the country, offered Yugoslavia a fast-track membership to the EC and NATO, and billions of dollars in aid (Telegraf, 2015)

Slovenia is the most successful state to emerge out of Yugoslavia having consolidated its democratization. It's a multiethnic country⁷⁵ that declared independence in 1991, fought a 10-day war with Serb-led Yugoslav Peoples Army (JNA), and on May 22, 1992, was admitted to the United Nations. By 2004, it joined the EU and NATO as a full member, and in 2008 it became the first former communist country to chair the EU presidency (BBC News, 2018), a recognition for its consolidation of democracy. Since its independence, Slovenia is classified as a democracy according to both V-DEM and Freedom House.

The same path of democratization and ascension to international institutions was possible for Croatia too. Croatia and Slovenia are more alike to one another than to any other former Yugoslav republic. Religiously, they are both overwhelmingly Catholic. Geographically, both lay to Serbia's west.⁷⁶ Economically, the two were the most prosperous republics within Yugoslavia (Bolt et al., 2018).⁷⁷ Politically, both republics were the most liberal. Their penchant for political liberalism was a product of the Austro-Hungarian Empire rule and their participation in the political life of the empire.⁷⁸

Their political liberalism continued to be evident during the Communist era (1945-1990) as well. During the first part of the regime period, politicians and statesmen like Edward Kardelj⁷⁹ (Slovenia) and Vladimir Bakarić⁸⁰ (Croatia) promoted a more liberal strand of Communism and greater autonomy for the federal units. These institutional developments clashed with Aleksandar Ranković's (Serbia) vision of a centralized Yugoslavia with a dominant Serbia at its core. After Tito's death in 1980, the liberals and federalists came under increasing attacks by Serbia. A new generation of liberal politicians like Milan Kučan (Slovenia) and Ivica Račan and Stjepan "Stipe" Mesić (Croatia) clashed with a despotic Slobodan Milošević (Serbia) who demanded that "the

⁷⁵ According to the 1991 Yugoslav Census, Slovenians made up 88.3% of the population, with the rest of the population made up of Serbs, Croats, Bosniaks, Hungarians, Italians, etc. Retrieved from https://www.stat.si/popis2002/en/rezultati/rezultati_red.asp?ter=SLO&st=7. Accessed May 25, 2019.

⁷⁶ While Slovenia does not share a border with Serbia, Croatia's region of Eastern Slavonia is adjacent to Serbia but largely separated by the Danube River.

⁷⁷ Per Capita GDP (1990): Slovenia = \$16,675 and Croatia = \$14,853 vs Serbia = \$7,320 (Real GDP per capita in 2011 USD).

⁷⁸ Croatia enjoyed political autonomy as the Kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia-Dalmatia within Austro-Hungary from 1868 onward. Retrieved from <http://alex.onb.ac.at/cgi-content/alex?aid=lks&datum=1868&page=132&size=45>. Accessed on May 8, 2019.

⁷⁹ The leading ideologue of League of Communists of Yugoslavia. Served as Minister of Foreign Affairs, Deputy Prime Minister, President of the Federal Assembly and member of the Presidency of Yugoslavia.

⁸⁰ Member of the Presidency of Yugoslavia, speaker of Croatia's parliament; President of Executive Council (Prime Minister) of Croatia.

interests of Serbia must be above all others” in Yugoslavia (Sell, 2003, p. 109). The apex of clashes over different visions for the common state was reached at the 14th Extraordinary Congress of the LCY on January 20 to 22, 1990. As the Slovenian demands for democratic reforms, end of Serbian oppression in Kosovo and the LCY transformation into an umbrella of local autonomous parties (Centrih, 2014) were rejected by the Milošević led Serbian delegates from across Yugoslavia, the non-Serb communist delegates staged a walkout and brought about the beginning of Yugoslavia’s bloody unraveling.

The contours of an alternative Croatian democratization path are evident in the 1990 electoral outcomes in both Slovenia and Croatia, and the constitutional and legislative reforms mandated by the international community in return for statehood recognition. First, electorally, both republics were the first in Yugoslavia to call for multiparty elections to be held in 1990.⁸¹ Slovenian parliamentary and presidential elections held on April 8-22, 1990⁸² brought to power the DEMOS coalition⁸³ despite the reformed communist party (Party of Democratic Renewal, SDP) having won the plurality of votes.⁸⁴ The successive parliamentary elections (1992, 1996, and 2000) returned to power the former communists led by Janez Drnovšek⁸⁵ serving as Prime Minister between 1992 and 2000. The first free and multiparty presidential election in Slovenia was won by Milan Kučan, former head of the communist party of Slovenia. He was elected twice more as President (in 1992 and 1997). In 2002, Janez Drnovšek succeeded Kučan as the president of Slovenia.

A similar electoral outcome in Croatia was likely in the absence of Serbia’s spoiling. The League of Communists of Croatia (SKH) led by Ivica Račan, declared on December 10, 1989, that Croatia will hold free multiparty elections in April of 1990. Despite expectations of victory by the SKH, the pro-independence party of Franjo Tudjman,⁸⁶ the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ),

⁸¹ The 1990 parliamentary elections were held first in Slovenia on April 9 and 12; Croatia (April 22 and May 6); Macedonia (November 11 and 25), Montenegro (December 9), Serbia (December 9 and 23).

⁸² Parliamentary elections were held on April 8 and 12 while the presidential elections took place on April 8 (first round) and April 22 (second round).

⁸³ Democratic Opposition of Slovenia (DEMOS) brought together center-right parties, Slovenian Democratic Union, the Social Democrat Alliance of Slovenia, Slovene Christian Democrats, the Farmers Alliance, and the Greens of Slovenia. See http://www.ukom.gov.si/en/media_room/background_information/elections/parliamentary_election_results_1990_2008/. Accessed May 1, 2019.

⁸⁴ https://archive.is/20120805211041/http://www.ukom.gov.si/en/media_relations/background_information/elections/elections_in_slovenia_in_2002/the_first_multiparty_elections_of_1990/

⁸⁵ President of Yugoslavia’s collective presidency (1989-1990).

⁸⁶ A partisan during WW2, became the youngest general in JNA at age of 38 in 1959. For Tudjman’s biography, see (Sadkovich & Mesić, 2010).

won the majority of the parliamentary seats (205) due to the 'simple majoritarian' election law while receiving only 41.5% of the popular vote. The reformed communist party (SKH-SDP)⁸⁷ led by Ivica Račan came in second with 73 seats despite gaining 33% of the popular vote. Although the elections brought to power Croatian nationalists in the form of HDZ, the nationalist parties got less than 50% of the popular vote.

As in most former communist countries of Europe holding elections in 1990, in Croatia as well, the election of nationalists was inevitable after 45 years of communist rule. In the absence of Serbian spoiling, elections could have yielded a divided government, with the nationalist Franjo Tudjman elected as President and a more liberal parliament and government led by Ivica Račan. The British magazine, *The Economist*, predicted that the election results will bring about a coalition government in Croatia (1990, January 6). It is likely that the former communists and the liberal parties would have won the majority of votes in the parliament, especially with Serb votes and have the mandate to form the government. One piece of evidence to support such an alternative electoral outcome are the elections of 2000. The first elections to be held after the return of Croatian sovereignty throughout the whole of its territory in 1998, brought to power the former liberal communists. Stipe Mesić, the last President of Yugoslavia, was elected President and Ivica Račan became the Prime Minister as his Social Democratic Party⁸⁸ and allies won the majority in the parliament⁸⁹ (Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 2000, January 3).

With 12 % of the population, Serbs in Croatia could have constituted a powerful voting bloc that would have been crucial in any governing coalition. In the 1990 parliamentary elections, Serbs won 5 seats through the Serb Democratic Party (SDS), an ethnic party, and another 24 seats under Ivica Račan's (SKH-SDP) ticket (Bartlett, 2004; Pusić, 1992). Over time the majority of Serbs would likely have coalesced around a single party, the SDS, with some candidates, especially those Serbs that lived in the capital of Zagreb⁹⁰, running as candidates of liberal parties. With 12 percent of the population and a system that favored proportional representation of minorities, Serbs could have been key to Croatian politics. One fact that alludes to the Serbs potential as powerbrokers in Croatia came from the 2003 election, where the HDZ needed the votes of the

⁸⁷ League of Communists of Croatia (Savez Komunist Hrvatske) rebranded itself for the 1990 election as the League of Communists of Croatia-Social Democratic Party (Savez Komunist Hrvatske-Socijaldemokratska Partija, SKH-SDP).

⁸⁸ Former League of Communists of Croatia.

⁸⁹ SDP/HSLs won 71/151 seats together with a liberal coalition of HSS/HNS/IDS (24 seats) formed a government.

⁹⁰ According to the 1991 Croatian Census, 49,965 Serbs were living in the capital of Zagreb.

Serbs to form a government, and the Independent Democratic Serb Party joined the governing coalition (D. Jović, 2006). Even during the war, those Serbs that accepted Croatian sovereignty were elected to the parliament. Serb People's Party had 3 representatives with Milan Dukic (a Serb) serving as deputy parliament speaker from 1992-1996.

Second, the constitutional and legislative reforms in Croatia implemented in the early 1990s were unavoidable as the country sought to transform itself from socialism to democracy. Serbs in Croatia enjoyed a privileged position during the Communist era, and this drew the ire of most Croatians (CIA, 1983; ICG Balkans Report, 1998). As Serbia's parliament curtailed the rights of minorities and the powers of provinces, and adopted a new constitution on September 29, 1990, declaring Serbia to be a sovereign state [Article 72, Paragraph 1; Article 135 Paragraph 2],⁹¹ the Croatian leadership responded in kind with a new constitution in December 1990 (Popovic, 2008, September 23). The new Croatian constitution curtailed many Serb "privileges" (ICG Balkans Report, 1998) that applied at the national level, such as countrywide official use of the Serbian language, but the rights, liberties, and protections that were institutionalized during this time exceeded the framework that was adopted after 2000 as Croatia sought EU membership.

Legislatively, minority rights, especially those of Serbs, were institutionalized with the adoption of the first post-communist constitution in 1990. The preamble stated that "*Croatia is hereby established as the national state of the Croatian people and a state of members of other nations and minorities who are its citizens: Serbs, Muslims, Slovenes, Czechs, Slovaks, Italians, Hungarians, Jews and others, who are guaranteed equality with citizens of Croatian nationality and the realization of ethnic rights.*"⁹² Article 12 of the Constitution guaranteed national minorities their language and script to hold official capacity in locales where they constituted a significant portion of the population.⁹³ Articles 14 and 15, ensured that the state would protect the fundamental freedoms and rights of all citizens including expressions of national identity and cultural autonomy.⁹⁴ In its Declaration on the Establishment of the Sovereign and Independent

⁹¹ The 1990 Constitution of Serbia. Retrieved from <http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/UNTC/UNPAN019071.pdf>. Accessed March 21, 2019.

⁹² Retrieved from <http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/hr01000.html>.

⁹³ Article 12: "[i]n individual local units, another language and the Cyrillic or some other script may, along with the Croatian language and the Latin script, be introduced into official use under conditions specified by law."

⁹⁴ Article 14: "[c]itizens of the Republic of Croatia enjoy all rights and freedoms regardless of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, education, social status, or other characteristics;" Article 15: "Members of all nations and minorities have equal rights in the Republic of Croatia. Members of all nations and minorities are guaranteed freedom to express their national identity, freedom to use their language and script, and cultural autonomy." Retrieved from <http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/hr01000.html>.

Republic of Croatia (June 25 1991), Article 3, “*guarantees the Serbs of Croatia and other minorities living on its territory respect for all human and civil rights, particularly freedom of speech and the cultivation of their own languages and promotion of their cultures, and freedom to form political organizations. The Republic of Croatia protects the rights and interests of its citizens irrespective of their religious, ethnic, or racial affiliation.*”⁹⁵ Additionally, it adopted the Charter on the Rights of Serbs and Other Nationalities in the Republic of Croatia (June 25, 1991) which provided for minority self-government and proportional representation at the national level. The Charter stated: “*A just solution of issues concerning Serbs and other nationalities in the Republic of Croatia is one of the essential factors of democracy, stability, peace and economic prosperity, and of cooperation with other democratic countries*” (Article 1). Charter’s Article 5 guaranteed that “*Serbs and other nationalities in Croatia shall have the right to participate proportionally in the bodies of local self-government and in adequate bodies of government authorities. They shall have the right to secure their economic and social development for the purposes of preserving their national identity and being protected from any attempt at being assimilated.*”

The Badinter Commission (1991-1993) established by the European Community to examine the legal implications arising out of the dissolution of Yugoslavia concluded in one of its first opinions (No. 5) that Croatia did not fulfill the criteria for recognition as it lacked the constitutional protections for minorities (Ragazzi, 1992; Rich, 1993). Following this handing of this opinion, the Croatian government in order to gain international support for its statehood broadened its legislative framework to offer increased freedoms and protections to its minorities, especially the Serbs. It adopted the EC Peace Conference on Yugoslavia Treaty Provisions for the Convention which granted not only additional guarantees on the rights of national/ethnic groups but also provided for a Special Status of Autonomy in territories where a national minority forms the majority (Trifunovska, 1998). Accordingly, the Croatian Parliament amended the constitution in 1992 to recognize self-governing status to areas where a national minority constituted more than 50% of the population based on the census of 1981.⁹⁶

⁹⁵ Retrieved from <http://www.sabor.hr/Default.aspx?art=15680>.

⁹⁶ Additionally, Articles 22 and 26 were amended to list the districts where the special status would apply as well as competencies granted to these autonomous units.

4.3 Intensity and Frequency for an Annexationist Strategy

My theory states that intensity and frequency to initiate conflictual events (spoiling) are key to explaining the level of democracy in target countries with transnational kin in their midst. A motherland initiating high intensity events to challenge political borders, and the frequency to accomplish its goal of revising the territorial status quo, is likely to adopt an annexationist strategy. Such a strategy entails the use of force to partition the kin-controlled territories from the target state, establish a parallel government to administer the occupied territories, and restrain the international community's response to the crisis. Democratization is unlikely to consolidate in a target state as an illiberal regime is likely to emerge since war leads to loss of sovereignty over portions of territory, change in demographics due to emigration and ethnic cleansing, and illiberal responses to national security threats. Democracy is effectively placed on the back burner as a country fights an invader, subdues subversive elements, and takes drastic measures to curtail the political rights and civil liberties of other minorities for fear of rebellion expanding. In Croatia, as I will discuss later, despite free and fair elections and increasing democratization between 1989 and 1992, democracy stalled as Serbia occupied its territory, engaged in the ethnic cleansing of the non-Serb population from the said territory while building parallel institutions. In response, the Croatian government resorted to illiberal policies in pursuit of the 'Homeland War.'⁹⁷

As described in Chapter 3, the propensity to adopt a particular strategy is a function of motherland's political regime and time since the loss of kin-controlled territories or loss of power by its kin. A motherland will adopt an annexationist strategy when its domestic regime is non-democratic, and its transnational kin has experienced a recent loss of power. As studies have shown, most states fight wars over territory (Holsti, 1991; Toft, 2002; Vasquez, 1995). For Serbia, the war in Croatia and elsewhere was no different. However, unlike states that may go to war over territories long lost and empty of kin, Serbia penchant for annexation was particularly strong in that it was fought over territories populated by Serbs desiring unification with Serbia.

First, the domestic regime within the motherland matters. While some scholars (Libal, 2002; Mansfield & Snyder, 1995) have argued that countries undergoing democratization experience increased likelihood of conflict, however, numerous other studies have affirmed that democracies do not fight one another (Doyle, 1986; N. P. Gleditsch, 1995; Oneal & Russett, 1997;

⁹⁷ Croatia war of national liberation from 1991-1995 is called the Homeland War (Domovinski Rat).

Russett, 1994). While democratization can be turbulent as free and fair elections may create opportunities for nationalists to capitalize on ethnic divisions, it may also be peaceful as it promotes rigorous political competition rather than contests of arms. Thus, it is not unreasonable to expect that two genuinely democratizing countries would behave similarly to two consolidated democracies. Those that support the argument that democratization is conflictual may point to the wars in former Yugoslavia and parts of the Soviet Union as evidence to back up their claims, but more than half of the former communist bloc countries democratized without engaging in conflict, despite ethnic heterogeneity. For example, Hungary shares transnational ethnic kin with both Slovakia and Romania.⁹⁸ During the same period in the 1990s, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia were all undergoing democratization, just like the former Yugoslavia. Yet, Hungary did not go to war to reclaim ethnic Hungarians from both of these states but resorted to strategies that were conducive to democratization. The same can be said of the Baltic republics path to democratization. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, despite containing large ethnic minorities⁹⁹ with neighboring motherlands, 24.9%, 25.2%, and 6.6%, respectively, after a 13-year process of democratization joined the EU and are now consolidated democracies.

In Serbia, however, not only was Slobodan Milošević's communist regime non-democratic but when it came to Serbs outside Serbia, the entire political spectrum from liberals like Zoran Đinđić to fascists like Vojislav Šešelj supported the government's annexationist strategy. Successive parliamentary elections overwhelmingly reflected this chorus of territorial expansionism. In the 1990 parliamentary election, the three largest parties included the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS) led by Slobodan Milošević, the Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) of Vuk Drašković, and the Democratic Party (DS) chaired by Zoran Đinđić. Between the three parties, they controlled 220 out of 250 seats and had received 69.33% of the popular vote.¹⁰⁰ As the war in Croatia engulfed Bosnia, the 1992 parliamentary elections expanded the number of seats held by parties and politicians favoring annexation of these lands to 230 seats, or 72.4%. Moreover,

⁹⁸ Hungarians make up 10.1% of the population in Slovakia and 6.6% in Romania, according to the Ethnic Power Relations 2018 dataset.

⁹⁹ Estonia (24.9% Russians), Latvia (25.2% Russians), Lithuania (6.6% Poles and 5.8% Russians).

¹⁰⁰ 1990 Elections (# of seats): SPS = 194; SPO 19; DS = 7. Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1990_Serbian_general_election.

these elections turned the ultra-nationalist, Serb Radical Party (SRS) led by Vojislav Šešelj, into the second-largest party with 73 seats.¹⁰¹

Serbia held elections twice more during the annexationist era (1990-1998). In 1993, while the distribution of seats in the parliament changed,¹⁰² overall the number of seats held by parties advocating a Greater Serbia increased to 243 out of 250,¹⁰³ or 78.71% of the popular vote. The parliamentary elections of 1997, the first to be held after the loss of Krajina in Croatia and the end of the war in Bosnia, kept a similar distribution of seats. Parties still favoring Serbia's hegemonism were in control of 237 seats¹⁰⁴ with 86.59% of the popular vote, with SRS again becoming the second-largest party in the parliament. Despite numerous reports of electoral fraud in Serbia in the 1990s (Schoen, 1993; Sekelj, 2000), free and fair elections would have brought about a different distribution of seats between the parliamentary parties for certain, but the overall outcome would have remained relatively unchanged, with most political parties still favoring territorial expansionism.¹⁰⁵

This broad support for the national integration of all Serbs in one state is best exemplified by an apocryphal story of a French philosopher visiting Belgrade in the mid-1990s to support the democratic opposition trying to oust Milošević. Upon criticizing Milošević's wars in Croatia and Bosnia, he came to learn the hard way¹⁰⁶ that the opposition was not angry with him for fighting the wars in Croatia and Bosnia, but for not succeeding in uniting Serb territories with the motherland.¹⁰⁷ The only point of contention within the elites was the extent of territorial expansion, with Slobodan Milošević being one of the more reasonable ones. Whereas Milošević was content with parts of Croatia and half of Bosnia, the military leadership and other political groups pushed for over half of Croatia¹⁰⁸ and 70% of Bosnia (Biserko, 2012; CIA, 1995b, 1995c)

¹⁰¹ 1992 Elections (# of seats): SPS = 101; SRS = 73; DEPOS = 50; DS = 6. Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1992_Serbian_general_election.

¹⁰² With SRS losing some seats to the SPS and the DS gaining seats too.

¹⁰³ 1993 Elections (# of seats): SPS = 123; DEPOS = 45; SRS = 39; DS = 29. Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1993_Serbian_parliamentary_election.

¹⁰⁴ 1997 Elections (# of seats): SPS = 110; SRS = 82; SPO = 45; DSS = 7. Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1997_Serbian_general_election.

¹⁰⁵ When it came to this national objective, the few voices, such as Natasa Kandic, Sonja Biserko, that opposed the annexation of Serb territories in Croatia and Bosnia never held any significant support with the public.

¹⁰⁶ The French philosopher was forcefully removed from the meeting.

¹⁰⁷ I have read this story in a peer-reviewed article, but I cannot find the reference despite my best attempts.

¹⁰⁸ Karlobag-Ogulin-Karlovac-Virovitica, is the boundary that YPA was advocating and historically the line that saw the extent of Serbia's westward expansion. This is in line with the Treaty of London 1915 that would have seen the UK and France award these territories to Serbia. It includes most of the Dalmatian coast and separates Croatia into two sections.

The second factor that explains why a motherland is likely to pursue conflictual events that are high in intensity pertains to the recent loss of power by its kin and increases the likelihood of conflict (Cederman, Girardin, et al., 2009). This factor was important to Serbia's pursuit of annexation. Since the establishment of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, in 1918, Serbia and the Serbs dominated the common state. As Sabrina Ramet (2006) has shown, all the key political positions in the Kingdom were controlled by the Serbs. For decades under the communist rule, Serbs in Croatia enjoyed a privileged position, and through them, Serbia exercised a measure of influence over Croatia and the federal state that other republics and provinces were not privy too. Sources show that Serbs were overrepresented in the centers of power in Croatia. Despite constituting 12.2% of the total population, their share of membership in the League of Communists of Croatia was between 22.6% and 30.5%;¹⁰⁹ 17.7 % of appointed officials; 16.4% of political leaders, and 28-49.9%¹¹⁰ of the Ministry of Interior Affairs and police forces (Bjelajac & Žunec, 2012; Štulhofer, 1993). Some of the senior ranking politicians in Croatia or as Croatia's representatives to the federal institutions were Croatian Serbs. These included Milutin Baltic¹¹¹, Dusan Dragosavac,¹¹² Admiral Branko Mamula,¹¹³ and General Veljko Kadijević¹¹⁴ (CIA, 1983) amongst others. As Serbia's plans for recentralization of the federal state or the weakening of other republics failed, Serbia perceived that its influence over Croatia would be very limited since its kin would become minorities without the level of influence once enjoyed. For Serbia, the only option was to bring its kin to its fold by separating them from Croatia.

Recall from my theory, that the frequency of events initiated by a motherland is a function of military capabilities and the international community's level of constraints on the motherland's challenge to the territorial status quo. Between 1990 and 1995, Serbia's capabilities were superior to Croatia's. Militarily, Serbia was well served by its control of the Yugoslav Peoples Army (JNA).¹¹⁵ The fourth-largest military in Europe during the Cold War, in 1990 it became Serbia's

¹⁰⁹ Štulhofer (1993) relying on data from Lazic (1990) reports that Serbs were 2.5 times more represented than their share of the population.

¹¹⁰ Bjelac and Žunec report Serb proportion of police forces were between 28-31%, whereas Štulhofer reports a 49.9% share based on "Godišnji izvještaj RSUP-a SRH za 1984. godinu, tabela 9." Robert Niebuhr "Death of the Yugoslav Peoples Army and the Wars of Succession" (2004) gives a figure that 69% of police officers in Croatia were ethnic Serbs as of August 1990.

¹¹¹ President of SR Croatia presidency.

¹¹² Member of Yugoslav communist party presidium as Croatia's representative, 1983-1984.

¹¹³ Yugoslav Defense Minister, 1982 – 1988.

¹¹⁴ The last Yugoslav Defense Minister, 1988 – 1992.

¹¹⁵ Yugoslav Peoples Army (Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija, JNA).

chief instrument in taking over Serb claimed territory in Croatia. While Serbs constituted 36.3% of the Yugoslav population, they held 57.1% of officer ranks in JNA (Bjelajac & Žunec, 2012; Marijan, 2002; Niebuhr, 2004). Control over officer ranks and subsequent policies were aided by the JNA leadership. Both, General of the Army Veljko Kadijević (Minister of Defense), a Croatian Serb, and Colonel General Blagoje Adzic (Chief of General Staff) a Bosnian Serb, conducted the JNA on behalf of Serbia's leadership to attain the goal of Greater Serbia. In his memoirs, Kadijević expresses that

“I have always thought that the interests of whole the Serbian nation must be treated and defended equally, whether those of Serbs in Serbia, or Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. Furthermore, I have thought that with the disappearance of Yugoslavia as a whole [unitary state], the Serb nation would be more successful in countering and defending its national interest, if it is united [all Serbs people across Yugoslavia] in its defense” (Veljko Kadijevic quoted in HKV.org, 2007).

According to Borisav Jović, Serbia's representative to Yugoslavia collective presidency, Kadijević in a meeting with the Serb political leadership expressed that “JNA must transform into the military of those people who favor remaining in Yugoslavia: Serbia, Serbian nation [Serbs of Croatia and Bosnia] and Montenegro” (B. Jović, 1996, p. 367) and withdraw to territories that would constitute the future state. Furthermore, after the European Community's Peace Conference on Yugoslavia in October 18, 1991, in a meeting of the Yugoslav Presidency, Kadijević declared that EC proposals for solving the Yugoslav crisis are unacceptable to JNA as they “most of all threaten the unity and interests of the Serbian nation, as its significant parts are divided, are brought to the status of national minorities, and are exposed to the dangers of destruction” (Novinar Online, 2007).

Serbia's capabilities against Croatia were strengthened by three factors. First, to ensure its military superiority, Serbia through JNA demilitarized the Territorial Defense Forces¹¹⁶ (TDF) to prevent their transformation into the nuclei of republican militaries. This transformation had begun in the mid-1980s with Plan Jedinstvo (Unity), as the Serb led JNA underwent a structural reorganization from six armies based on republican borders to 3 military (land) and 1 naval region

¹¹⁶ Territorial Defense Forces were a component of Yugoslavia's Total General Defense and were set up in the aftermath of Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. They were set up to serve as auxiliary infantry units and were under the command of republican leaderships. Constitution of SFRY, 1974, Articles 240, 262 and 279.

that cut across republican borders (Croatian Reserve Officers Association, April 30, 2014). Additionally, General Blagoje Adzic in 1990 ordered that all armaments stored in TDF facilities under republican control seized and moved to JNA military bases to deny TDF the means to offer resistance in case of future conflict.

Second, Serbia began to arm local Serbs in Croatia. As it pursued the demilitarization of TDF, JNA separated the TDF into non-Serb and Serb units. Whereas JNA disarmed the non-Serb TDF units, Serb-units were armed and trained to resist Croatian authorities (Pond, 2006). The extent of this practice is made known in the memoirs of Veljko Kadijević where he writes that “the future Army of Serbian Krajina was built, equipped with the necessary armaments and materials” by JNA (quoted in Fond za Humanitarno Pravo, 2018, p. 16). The main objective of equipping local Serbs was to “prepare and organize for war against Croatian forces” (Fond za Humanitarno Pravo, 2018, p. 15). The arming of the Serb population in Croatia took place in two ways. As JNA forces withdrew from Slovenia after the 10-day war, its military units and arsenal withdrew to bases in Serb areas of Croatia and Bosnia. Additionally, throughout the 1991 JNA in two major operations “Proboj 1” (Breach 1) and “Proboj 2” (Breach 2) with the aid of military intelligence and local Serb political leadership in Croatia distributed large quantities of armaments and artillery from military bases in Croatia and Bosnia (Fond za Humanitarno Pravo, 2018, p. 16).

Finally, Serbia’s capabilities were also enhanced by the international community’s ambivalent position regarding the dissolution of Yugoslavia. This lack of constraints by the international community can be ascribed to Serbia’s diplomatic actions and the inaction of the international community toward Serbia’s aggression. First, Serbia and Slobodan Milošević were successful in convincing the world, between 1989 and 1992, that they were fighting to safeguard the unity of Yugoslavia (Glaurdic, 2011). Even at his war crimes tribunal Slobodan Milošević kept insisting that “The Serb people, the Serb leadership and I personally made every attempt to preserve the Yugoslav community” (Traynor, 2004).

The US policymakers including Secretary of State James Baker and President George HW Bush, contrary to the dissolution processes that was playing out in the open, kept insisting “that the United States would continue to support the unity, territorial integrity, and independence of Yugoslavia” (Zimmerman, 1996). European Community too kept publicly expressing their support for a unitary Yugoslavia to the point that the president of the EC Council of Foreign Ministers, Jacques Poos declared that Yugoslav nations are too small to be sustainable as sovereign entities

(Klemencic, 2013). When asked about why the international community supported Yugoslavia, the last president of Yugoslavia, Stipe Mesić,¹¹⁷ claims this was so “*because West and East were sentimental regarding Yugoslavia’s positive role during the Cold War, East-West clashes. Yugoslavia was one of the main factors in the creation of the Non-Aligned Movements. Slobodan Milošević lied to the world. He claimed that he was fighting for Yugoslavia. The world, for the most part, believed him*” (quoted in TRT Bosanski, 2013). According to Thomas Cushman (2004), the international community’s biases resulted from years of diplomats and academics being socialized in Belgrade. They came to accept the Serb version of history as the legitimate perspective.

Another reason for the international community’s unwillingness to constrain Serbia’s aggression concerned the links between the West and Serbia. Historically, the West had nurtured pro-Serb sympathies and sought to use Serbia to prevent the expansion of Russian influence in the region (Gagnon Jr, 2006). In the 1866 Austro-Prussian War, Prussia, Italy, and France all offered parts of Croatia and Bosnia to Serbia in exchange for its entry in to war, irrespective of who the victor would be (Manetovic, 2006). In the early 20th century, with the 1915 Treaty of London, Great Britain and France again offered Serbia territories in Croatia and Bosnia for their efforts in the Great War. Despite the evidence of Serb aggression and atrocities, Western leaders and policymakers justified their inaction by arguing that the Yugoslav conflict was a result of ancient hatreds between ethnic groups (Cushman, 2004). When they did act, it was usually for the wrong reasons, and the wrong actions (Fukuyama, 2004). For example, instead of enforcing the recommendations of the Badinter Commission and prioritizing the democratization of the new states, the international community’s energies were spent on peace plans that included some form of ethnic partition – formalizing Serbia’s territorial gains.

Another example included the UN arms embargo which exacerbated Croatia’s losses. In response to the “heavy loss of human life and material damage”, the UN passed a Security Council Resolution 713 placing an arms embargo on “all deliveries of weapons and military equipment” to Yugoslavia (SIPRI, 2012). This action had the opposite effect as it ensured Serbia’s military preponderance, by the virtue of having inherited almost all of the JNA arsenal, while leaving Croatia to clandestinely pursue small arms trafficking to resist military aggression. If Croatia and other republics had not been exposed to an arms embargo, in a short time they may have been able

¹¹⁷ Stipe Mesic elected as the second President of Croatia twice since independence (2000-2010).

to build up their military capacities to create some sort of balance of power that would have limited Serbia's aggression and forced it to adopt a more benign strategy with respect to its transnational ethnic kin.

4.4 The Annexationist Era and the Democratization Spoiling Tactics (1990 – 1998)

The political transformation of Yugoslavia in 1990, provided the opening salvo for Serbia's subsequent annexationist strategy and the spoiling of democratization in Croatia and elsewhere. Why did non-democracy reign during this annexationist era? The answer is simple. Democracy cannot emerge in the presence of external threats, a state of war (Colaresi & Thompson, 2003; Thompson, 1996), or in states where sovereignty is contested (Bieber, 2011; Džihic & Segert, 2012; Gligorov, 2011). As the republics organized multiparty elections, held constitutional conventions, and began to discuss the dissolution of Yugoslavia and independence for the republics in line with the Constitution of 1974.¹¹⁸ Serbia resorted to fighting democracy by pursuing three plans in pursuit of its annexation strategy.

Three Serbian plans emerged to restore its dominance of Yugoslavia in light of the democratization processes and calls for greater autonomy. First, the *recentralization of Yugoslavia* with a dominant Serbia had the support of the whole political spectrum, from communist to fascist parties, shared the same vision of Serbia's dominant role in Yugoslavia. Since the early 1980s the communist elite pushed for Serbia's recentralization of the federal state by moving governing powers from the republics to the federal institutions (CIA Confidential, 1987; Wachtel & Bennett,

¹¹⁸Slovenia and Croatia but also other non-Serbs argued that the 1974 Yugoslav Constitution grants them the power to secede. Article 1 asserted that Yugoslavia "is a federal state having the form of a state community of voluntarily united nations." That the "Republics are states" (Article 2) based on the sovereignty of the people (Article 3). The inviolability of borders was affirmed with Article 5 of the constitution stating that "[t]he territory of a Republic may not be altered without the consent of that Republic, and the territory of the Autonomous province – without the consent of that Autonomous Province."¹¹⁸ International law supported these arguments. Council of Ministers of the European Community (precursor to European Union) charged a panel of international law experts, chaired by Robert Badinter¹¹⁸ to provide the EC Conference on Yugoslavia with expert advice on the legality of country's dissolution, the validity of republican borders and the status of ethnic groups within republics. The Arbitration Commission, also known as the Badinter Commission (1991-1993), issued several opinions asserting that republics are not seceding from Yugoslavia, but that Yugoslavia is in the process of dissolution (Opinion 1). It charged that the republican borders are to be treated as international borders (Opinion 3) and that they are inviolable unless the targeted republic consents to change in borders. Additionally, in response to the Serbian claims of ethnic sovereignty, the Commission stated that minority ethnic groups within the republics do not have the right to self-determination but are entitled to minority rights and protections (Opinion 2).

2012) and strengthening the League of Communists of Yugoslavia¹¹⁹ at the expense of the local communist parties. In the 1980s, even the non-communists such as Zoran Đinđić (future Serbian Prime Minister) and Vojislav Koštunica (future President of FY Yugoslavia and Serbian Prime Minister) advocated for the recentralization of the state (Biserko, 2012). On the extreme side, Vojislav Šešelj, the notorious war criminal, urged belligerent reorganization of Yugoslavia to include the abolishment of Bosnia as a republic and armed conflict with Croatia, for which he was arrested in 1984 (Morus, 2007). Serbia's unilateral and illegal revocation of Kosovo's and Vojvodina's federal status as autonomous provinces were the first attempts at recentralizing Yugoslavia.¹²⁰ However, this plan failed as the Bosnian and Kosovo's Serb appointed Albanian representative defected and sided with Slovenia and Croatia stopping Serbia's plan to declare martial law throughout the country, arrest the republican leaders, and impose the centralization of Yugoslavia.

The second plan called for the *weakening of other Yugoslav republics*, in case recentralization failed. Serbia argued that in light of democratization, just as other Yugoslav nations can use the democratic process to advocate for self-determination and sovereignty, Serbs too should have the right to decide whether they want to join Serbia. However, for Serbia, self-determination applied on ethnic principles and not on republican basis as the 1974 Constitution demanded since they viewed republican borders as administrative and not national (Jelena Kosanovic cited in Glaurdic, 2011). Serbia was receptive to increased autonomy and liberalization in Croatia and other republics so long as Serbs were out of the territorial jurisdiction of the republican authorities. The biggest proponents of this idea included Vuk Drašković, the leader of Serbia's largest opposition party in 1990. His plan called for the cantonization of Croatia, Bosnia, and Macedonia¹²¹ so that Serb populations in Croatia, Bosnia, and Macedonia would be autonomous and outside the political authority and territorial sovereignty of republics in which they were found (Ramet, 2006). Ethnic cantonization and ethnic sovereignty were principles that

¹¹⁹ Serbia believed that by empowering the national LCY it would increase its dominance since it could count on the votes of Serb communist members from other republics/provinces.

¹²⁰ Serbia replaced the provincial political leadership and granted itself the power to name provincial representatives to the federal institutions. Including Montenegro's vote, Serbia controlled 4 out of 8 votes in Yugoslavia's collective presidency. Since Bosnia's representative to Yugoslav presidency was Bogić Bogićević, a Bosnian Serb, Serbia counted on controlling the majority of votes at the presidency and have the ability to reform the state in Serbia's image.

¹²¹ Draskovic's plan called for an Albanian dominated canton in Macedonia since Albanians constituted more than a quarter of Macedonian population and were primarily located in the western part of the country. However, Draskovic rejected the idea of cantonizing Kosovo where Albanians were the dominant population with 90% of the population. For Serbs and Serbia, Kosovo was considered undivided Serb territory and no plans pertained to its control of it.

would apply to the republics with Serb populations but not to Serbia itself despite the presence of significant populations of Albanians, Hungarians, Bosniaks, and Croats (34.08% of the total population in Serbia).¹²²

As the first two plans failed to gain the support of other republics, by the summer of 1991, Serbia began to implement a third plan involving territorial conquest and the creation of a *Greater Serbia*. With Serbia's annexation of Kosovo and Vojvodina in 1989, this new state,¹²³ would extend to include large portions of Croatia, all of Bosnia, Montenegro, and Macedonia. Initially, supported by the extreme Serb nationalists such as Vojislav Šešelj, in the aftermath of Yugoslavia's dissolution, it was embraced even by the liberal elites including Dobrica Ćosić, Zoran Đinđić, and others who favored a new federation of Serb lands including Montenegro (Biserko, April 26, 2012; Pavković, 1998). Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadžić, articulated Serb wide support for this plan because Serbs "*do not want to be foreigners nor minorities in any part of that state [Yugoslavia] that was ours...and for whom we spilled so much Serbian blood*" (Drašković, 2016, June 19).

Serbia's plan to annex territories in Croatia and elsewhere involved three tactics: 1) expelling national authorities from Serb claimed territories; 2) establishing parallel institutions to govern these areas; and 3) limiting international community to conflict management instead of democracy promotion. Such tactics by Serbs brought about non-democratic responses by the national authorities in Croatia. Faced with no control over large parts of the country, the elected governments enacted warpath policies: persecution of moderates, control of media, and repression of non-Croat populations.

4.4.1 Expel the National Authorities

As Serbia was unable to get Croatia and other republics to agree to the recentralization of Yugoslavia (Plan 1) or cantonization of territory on Serb ethnic basis (Plan 2), it moved to bound Croatian sovereignty to territorial areas not claimed by Serbia (Plan 3). JNA was the main instrument enlisted to prevent the exercise of Croatian sovereignty throughout its territory. JNA was not caught by surprise by the democratization process taking over Yugoslavia. According to

¹²² According to the 1991 Yugoslavia' Census, Serbia's (including Kosovo and Vojvodina) population was 65.91% Serb, 17.2% Albanian, 3.52% Hungarian, 3.31% Yugoslavs, 2.52 Bosniak Muslims, 1.08% Croats, and 2.85% other nationalities. Albanians and Bosnian Muslims (in Kosovo) boycotted the official census since its autonomy was revoked.

¹²³ Popularly referred to by the non-Serbs in Yugoslavia as Serboslovakia.

new archival releases in Croatia, JNA had been preparing for the military takeover of Croatia since 1987 with plans for Operation Jedinstvo (Unity) (Hudelst, 2017, July 15). By 1993, the Serb political and military leadership instituted Plan “Drina”, to “*defend the territorial integrity of the Serbian states west of the Drina and Danube rivers and the FRY [Serbia and Montenegro], protect Serbian people from genocide, liberate parts of Serbian territories with Serbian majorities, create conditions for the establishment of a single state of the Serbian people*” (Calic, 2012, p. 132).

The genesis of armed conflict in Croatia lays in the ‘log revolution’ where local Serbs used large logs to block highways leading into claimed territories on August 19, 1990. According to Biserko “*this was the beginning of the plan to mark the hypothetical boundary Karlobag-Ogulin-Karlovac-Virovitica, cutting Croatia in two. These borders coincided with the borders that the YPA (JNA) would define in the 1990s*” (2012, p. 170). By 1991, local Serbs with the support of JNA and Serbia completed their seizure of the Krajina, West Slavonia and East Slavonia regions (CIA, 1995a).

The main objective of JNA in Croatia was to consolidate Serbia’s new borders and to “transform itself into the military of those [Serbs] that seek to remain in Yugoslavia” (Fond za Humanitarno Pravo, 2018, p. 17). Under the guise of fighting for Yugoslavia and bringing about peace, JNA used its might to wrest control from Croat authorities and secure Serb control (Zimmermann, 1996). After local Serbs, under the direction of Serbia’s intelligence service would initiate violent skirmishes, JNA would impose itself as the neutral party and create buffer zones between Croatian and Serb settlements, and Croatian security authorities and local Serb police forces (FHP 2018). According to the Croatian Serb leader Milan Babić,¹²⁴ buffer zones were a JNA tactic for “its deployment on those territories envisioned to belong to Serbia in the future and to create...de-facto conditions that would gain international legitimacy at a later date” (ICTY, 2006, p. 1416). In his testimony at the ICTY, Babić further explains this JNA tactic. He testifies that JNA “*always deployed itself in the same way [as a buffer] after incidents and provocations staged by the police of Krajina, the JNA would always come out, or rather first the Croatian police would respond and then the JNA would deploy itself in a buffer zone. That was the pattern...in the entire territory of Croatia, wherever conflicts happened*” (ICTY, 2006, p. 1506).

The areas seized from Croatia included not only those territories that had a clear Serb majority population, but also those that were mostly Croat and of strategic value to Serbia (Gagnon

¹²⁴ At one time the President of Republic of Serb Krajina (1991-1992) and also Prime-Minister (1995).

Jr, 2006). According to Croatia's census of 1991, Serbs were the absolute majority in 11/102 counties. Even within those counties, Serbs constituted 144,260/581,663 (about 25%) of all Serb population in Croatia. Croats constituted 22% of the population within those 11 counties. In two other counties (Pakrac and Petrinja) Serbs were the relative majority (53%) to Croats (47%). But, the territories that Serbia claimed included an additional 9 counties¹²⁵ where Serbs constituted the minority 27.7% of the population or 129,740 out of 466,450 people. The creation of Serb-only spaces, or no-go areas for Croatian authorities (Gow, 2003) posed significant problems for Croatia as main transportation routes and national infrastructure links were severed. In turn, this made it impossible for the national authorities to include Serb controlled territory in its national legal system (Bjelajac & Žunec, 2012). So when the parliamentary elections of 1992 were held, not only were the Serb controlled territory and population in those areas not accessible to the authorities to conduct the elections, but also tens of thousands of people who had left Croatia seeking refuge in the West were not able to vote (Župarić-Iljić et al., 2012). Consequently, both in Serb controlled RSK and most of Croatia the nationalists strengthened their hold.

As Serbia occupied large areas, the party in power (HDZ) became increasingly nationalistic and illiberal. Its justification was that extraordinary times require extraordinary measures in bringing about national liberation. Often, the ruling party's national liberation policies did not go hand in hand with policies of consolidating democratization. HDZ took several measures that prevented consolidation. One, it engaged in the ethnic cleansing of Serbs from non-occupied Croat territories. According to Marie-Janine Calic (2012) there were 78,555 Serbs that sought refuge in Serbia. Two, the war brought about a change in the electorate structure to favor nationalists. As many young and educated people emigrated to the West, the ruling HDZ elite was strengthened (Bartlett, 2004) and supported by the more rural, less educated, older voters (Grittersova, 2013; Zakošek, 1994), and many of the 250,000 Croats who had been kicked out of their homes by Serbs (CIA, 1995a). Three, HDZ adopted laws that were discriminatory against the Serbs between 1995 and 1999.

¹²⁵ Data from UN sectors (CIA 1995-05-01) covering 22 counties, including Beli Manastir, Osijek, Vukovar, Vinkovci, Grubsino Polje, Daruvar, Nova Gradiska, Novska, Slunj (counties with Croat majority population according to Croatia's Census from 1991). Retrieved from https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991_Croatian_census.

4.4.2 Build a Parallel State

The building of Serb parallel (governing) institutions, or proto-state in Croatia did not take place in a vacuum. Its planning had taken place months if not a couple of years before the outbreak of armed hostilities. The armed conflict was an instrument in advancing the political program for the partition of territories claimed by Serbia, not a consequence of it. The parallel state that was created in Croatia was the principal political instrument that harmed Croatia's democratization. This was done in different ways. First, through the withdrawal of their representatives from their respective parliaments and governments after the multi-party elections, to creation of governments that were in defiance of domestic (whether Croatian/Bosnian or Yugoslav) and international law, and the use violence to bring about ethnic homogenization of territories.

As it became evident that Croatia's independence is inevitable, on May 30, 1990, the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) of Jovan Rašković, at Serbia's instructions broke all ties to the Croatian parliament. As Serbs withdrew from their functions at the national level in Croatia, they began their plan to create new territorial units along ethnic lines and the setting up of autonomous governments at the local and regional levels. The first such unit was the 'community of Serb municipalities' of Northern Dalmatia and Lika (27 June 1990). In July 1990, Serbs lead by Milan Babić met in an assembly in a town of Srb and adopted a Declaration of the Sovereignty and Autonomy of the Serb Nation in Croatia and formed the Serb National Council as the governing authority for Croatian Serbs. This declaration was followed by the creation of the Serb Autonomous Regions (SAR).¹²⁶ The first SAR to be established was SAR Kninska Krajina on August 1, 1990, SAR Krajina¹²⁷ on December 21, 1990, SAR Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem on June 25, 1991, and SAR Western Slavonia on August 12, 1991. Toward the end of the year, all SARs were brought under one umbrella territory, government, and leadership. On December 19, 1991, SAR Krajina was declared as the Republic of Serbian Krajina. The Constitution of Serbian Krajina came into effect the same day. On 26 February 1992, the SAO Western Slavonia and SAO Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmia were added to the RSK, which initially had only encompassed the territories within the SAO Krajina.

¹²⁶ Serb Autonomous Regions (Serbian: Srpska Autonomna Oblast, SAO) were territorial unit organizations that were organized to be more powerful (with greater authority) than the Communities of Serb Municipalities.

¹²⁷ SAO Krajina was formed with the merging of SAO Kninska Krajina and Community of Municipalities of Northern Dalmatia and Lika.

4.4.3 Restrain the International Community

When we think of the role of the international community in Yugoslavia's saga, we tend to think of their humanitarian interventions – as saviors of the weak who stopped the war, brought peace, initiated reconciliation, and put countries on a path to democratization. However, the role of the international community from 1990 to 1995 was far more nefarious than the heroic entry of international troops amid flocks of jubilant people showering soldiers with flowers as CNN news frequently showed. Despite the Western embrace of democratization in the former Soviet Bloc at the end of the Cold War, in Yugoslavia, their actions proved to be anti-democratic. However, its role in Croatia and Bosnia was not new. It was an encore of European great power politics that used these two countries as bargaining chips in gaining Serbia's favor. In the 1990s, instead of forcefully containing Serbia from war-making and pushing for democratization, including minority rights as Badinter Commission had recommended, it continued to embrace Serb exceptionalism and appease Serbia's territorial aggrandizement (Cushman, 2004).

Josip Glaurdic best captures the international community's approach to dealing with Serbia's aggression.

To say that the EC/EU failed the Yugoslav test would be a dramatic understatement. Its failure was demonstrated not only by the humiliating inability of its diplomats and foreign policy makers to stop the wars which resulted with tens of thousands of deaths, millions of refugees, devastated economies, and torn families and communities or by their powerlessness to arrest the process which turned the former Yugoslav region from a front-runner of East European reforms and the best candidate for EC integration into a dark hole on the map of Europe whose troubles continue to destabilize the continent to this day. The failure of the EC/EU was also demonstrated by the actual manner in which its diplomats and foreign policy makers displayed their futility. With every new violent twist in the crisis, they appeared to be more concerned with outmaneuvering each other than with solving real issues on the ground. Their divisions and diplomatic gamesmanship were at times so explicit and so narrow-minded that their whole involvement seemed to belong to the nineteenth and not to the brink of the twenty-first century (2011, pp. 2-3).

The international community's complicity in unraveling democratization processes in Croatia is multi-faceted. Initially, as communism began to unravel across the Iron Curtain, the US and the European Community (EC) embraced the democratization of Yugoslavia. In the late 1980s, Yugoslavia was considered the best candidate for EC expansion eastward as it was economically

more developed, had some experience with private enterprises, and was the most politically liberal of all communist countries of Europe. However, this enthusiasm for democratization begins to unravel as a result of two developments. One, Western insistence on the unity of Yugoslavia provided the ammunition that Serbia needed to push its hegemonism under the guise of fighting to keep Yugoslavia together. Two, and more consequentially, as Serbia engaged in open warfare to secure the territories it sought to incorporate into Greater Serbia, Western support for democratization began to be replaced with Western support for peace and stability at the price of democratization. Democracy promotion activities were exchanged for ceasefire monitoring, separation of warring factions, and conflict containment, and in some ways, the international community by not constraining Serbia's annexation strategy became complicit in the crisis.

However, Croatia's road to extending its sovereignty to Eastern Slavonia was not without challenges even after their military victory and liberation of Krajina. The international community's vision for Eastern Slavonia did not closely align with Croatia's plan for extending the sovereignty to this region too, at least initially. Whereas Croatia sought its complete reintegration in line with its pre-war status, the international community kept promoting a plan that would see Serbs awarded territorial autonomy. In 1994, the UK government had pressed Croatia to cede the region to Serbia in exchange for some Serb controlled territory in Krajina that would have improved Croatia's access to the southern Dalmatian coast (Ivanković, 2009). According to Mate Granic, the former Croatian foreign minister, testifying at ICTY,

"as early as 1994 in New York, Lord Owen¹²⁸ told me once that it was impossible to achieve peace and reintegration of the occupied territory without territorial concessions by Croatia (ICTY, 2009, p. 24748) ...'the British asked that we surrender Baranja and a part of eastern Slavonia to Serbia. The British proposal, agreed with Slobodan Milošević, was that Baranja and eastern Slavonia should become a condominium, that is, administered jointly by Croatia and Serbia' (Ivanković, 2009).

The agreement despite being reached in good faith and followed with a robust UN force to ensure that neither party would renege on the deal was initially prone to spoiling as no party believed in its faithful execution of it. At Dayton peace talks, Milošević kept insisting that there

¹²⁸ David Owen, UK foreign minister (1979-1979), and the European Community's co-chairman of the Conference for Former Yugoslavia.

are 200,000 Serb in the region, and they should have the right to a referendum to decide whether they want to be a part of Croatia or Serbia (Holjevac Tuković, 2015). Serbian hopes for spoiling were raised by the US Ambassador Galbraith who initially kept urging Croat authorities to implement the Z-4 plan¹²⁹ in Eastern Slavonia. The problem for Croats was that the Z-4 plan that they had signed on prior to the liberation of Krajina, involved the creation of a Serb mini-state with greater links to Serbia than to Croatia. Furthermore, the Z-4 plan covered only the Krajina region where the Serbs constituted the majority of the population and not Eastern Slavonia where Serbs were in minority pre-war. Galbraith's insistence that Croat constitution allows for territorial autonomy for Serb minority and as such it should be implemented, was strongly refuted by the Croatian authorities. Croats argued that the constitution allowed for territorial autonomy only in areas where Serbs were in majority before the outbreak of hostilities in 1991. In Eastern Slavonia, Serbs constituted a minority according to the 1991 census. Additionally, Croat authorities firmly believed that territorial autonomy leaves the door open to a subversive Serb mini-state contiguous to an aggressive Serbia (Dimitrijevic, 2011).

Serbia's attempts at sabotaging the signed agreement were similar to their policies in sabotaging the Dayton Accords in Bosnia, during the same period. Not only were local Serbs demanding territorial autonomy (Klein, 2003), but were insistent that the region should have a voice of whether they want to remain in Croatia or join the motherland, Serbia. In January of 1996, German diplomatic circles at the UN informed their Croatian counterparts that "Yugoslav representative at the UN is intensely engaged in lobbying the Security Council members to delete all mentions of [Croatia's] sovereignty over eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem" (Holjevac Tuković, 2015, p. 630). As Croatian authorities were persuasive that if peaceful integration as agreed fails, they will ensure forceful incorporation of this last remaining region, the international community and Serbia relented and ensured the successful implementation of the agreement. In January 1998, the last Serbian controlled parts of Croatia territory were officially under the sovereignty of national authorities. With statehood complete, the country was finally ready to pursue democratic consolidation.

¹²⁹ Z-4 Plan, was the last-ditch effort of the international community to get Serbs and the government of Croatia to resolve their conflict through a political settlement that envisioned semi-sovereign status for Krajina, nominally within Croatia's borders but with special links to Serbia. Z stood for Zagreb (Croatia capital city) and 4 stood for the 4 parties involved in the deal (US, Russia, EU, and the UN).

4.5 Intensity and Frequency for Spoiling during the Apathy Era

Another strategy available to the motherland is the strategy of apathy. As my theory argues, a motherland is more likely to pursue such a strategy when both its levels of intensity and frequency for conflict, in contesting the territorial status quo, are low. When a motherland adopts such a strategy, there is a greater probability that the level of democracy will increase as the democratization of the target state continues. This is especially the case when there is a domestic consensus/push within a target state for democratization and a high level of assistance by external actors to engage in state-building as to ensure that democratization is sustainable, or consolidated.

According to my theory, a non-democratic regime within a motherland that has experienced a recent loss of kin/separation from kin is likely to be a spoiler. Serbia's political regime, throughout the 1990s, continued to be a non-democracy. However, this period marks Serbia's switch to low intensity and frequency of conflictual events. It adopts a strategy of apathy in dealing with Serbs in Croatia as a result of several critical developments: increasing political instability in Serbia, and the international military intervention in Bosnia, and later in Kosovo.

First, Serbia was plagued with electoral instability. The regime engaged in electoral fraud during the local elections in 1996. Despite the victory of opposition parties, Serbia's Socialist Party (SPS) did not recognize the results. The opposition and the ruling regime organized massive protests and counter-protests over a period of 88 days, with occasional clashes with regime supporters and police forces. In the early weeks of January close to 500,000 people answered the opposition's call for protests giving the regime a wakeup call to recognize opposition victory in several cities, including Belgrade (Danas, 2016; Vreme, 2000). The electoral instability continued with the 1997 presidential elections which brought about the election of ultranationalist Vojislav Šešelj as Serbia's president. The ruling SPS and Milošević annulled the elections under the justification that Šešelj did not win the mandate since less than 50% of the electorate voted. New elections were ordered and through 'rigged' votes, Milan Milutinović (SPS candidate) emerged victorious. Despite protests, the political regime between 1998 and 2000 remained the same. Slobodan Milošević and his SPS party were solidly in control of Serbia. The opposition too was largely the same as during the annexationist era (1991-1998).

Political instability reached critical levels during the first part of 2000. Following Serbia's defeat in Kosovo upon NATO's military intervention, Serbia was forced to withdraw its entire state apparatus from Kosovo by June 20, 1999. For the first time since 1912, Serbia did not control

Kosovo, a territory considered by most Serbs as the historical cradle of the Serbian state, and the catapult of Slobodan Milošević's rise to power. Loss of sovereignty over Kosovo brought about further instability as more extreme nationalists forces accused Milošević and the ruling party of betraying the Serb nation by withdrawing from Kosovo. Additionally, Serbia's conduct during the war brought about international indictments by the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) on "charges crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, and violations of the laws or customs of war" against the whole upper levels of its government including military establishment for their participation in a "joint criminal enterprise...[for] the forcible removal of the majority of the Croat and other non-Serb population from the approximately one-third of the territory of the Republic of Croatia" (ICTY, 2001).¹³⁰ Separate indictments for Serbia's leadership covered crimes in Bosnia and Kosovo. The political climate was further exacerbated after the 2000 presidential elections when Milošević tried to annul the election after losing to Vojislav Koštunica and the resulting massive protests that occurred between October 5 and 7 that brought about Milošević's downfall. Six months later, on April 1, 2001, Slobodan Milošević is arrested and extradited to the international tribunal on June 28.

Following the overthrow of Milošević and the new elections, the level of democracy within Serbia improved slightly according to V-DEM.¹³¹ However, despite the climb in democratization levels, the new "liberal" government was largely made up of the same nationalists who had favored Greater Serbia for decades, with Zoran Đinđić serving as the Serbian Prime Minister (2001-2003) and Vojislav Koštunica as President of the FR Yugoslavia (2000-2003). Two years later, on March 12, 2003, Prime Minister Zoran Đinđić was assassinated on March 12, 2003, and the new elections made the Serb Radical Party of Šešelj and DSS of Vojislav Koštunica as the largest two parties in Serbia's parliament. Following the elections, the government emerged from a coalition of parties led by Koštunica, Drašković, SPS and G-17.¹³²

Another development that kept Serbia away from spoiling democratization in Croatia concerned Serbia's relationships with Montenegro and Kosovo. In 2003, the European Union

¹³⁰ Slobodan Milošević (President of FR Yugoslavia), Milan Milutinovic (President of Serbia), Nikola Sainovic (Deputy PM of FR Yugoslavia), Nebojsa Pavkovic (Chief of the General Staff), Momcilo Perisic (former Chief of the General Staff), Vljeko Stojiljkovic (former Serbian Minister of Interior), amongst others. For a full list of people indicted by ICTY, see <http://www.icty.org/en/cases/key-figures-cases>.

¹³¹ The country moved from being an Autocracy (V-DEM score = 0.18 in 1999) to Electoral Authoritarian (V-DEM score = 0.47 in 2001) to a Minimal Democracy (V-DEM score = 0.53 in 2003).

¹³² G-17 a political party led by economic experts.

negotiated a new political arrangement for Serbia and Montenegro upon the dissolution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The new state was established as the Union of Serbia and Montenegro. The new constitution granted each republic the right to a referendum on self-determination within three years from the establishment of the new state.¹³³ On May 21, 2006, Montenegro voted yes on independence and on June 5 declared its independence.

Moreover, in 2006, the United Nations launched negotiations on the future of Kosovo. After a year of negotiations and in the absence of a compromise between Kosovo and Serbia on the permanent political status for Kosovo, the UN emissary Marti Ahtissari recommends conditional independence for Kosovo. On February 17, 2008, Kosovo declared independence. This event, even more than Montenegro's secession, led to violent protests by Serbs in Serbia, Kosovo, and Bosnia. Serbia's spoiling of any democratization in Croatia was in the rearview mirror, as it continued its diplomatic war to reverse or limit Kosovo's independence, and its increasing appetite to make up its losses by developing closer links with Republika Srpska in Bosnia.

Serbia's ability to undertake conflictual events at a high frequency decreased as a result of changes in Serbia's military capabilities and forceful international diplomacy. First, between 1994 and the first half of 1995 military, the US-trained¹³⁴ and newly equipped¹³⁵ Croatian forces to promote it as a counterweight to Serbia's military might. In the summer of 1995, Croatia undertook two major military operations that brought about the liberation of Krajina. In May, in Operation Flash, Croatia liberated a strategic area that straddled the Zagreb – Belgrade highway that connected eastern parts of Croatia with the capital. In August of that year, as US warplanes bombed several positions of Serb forces, Croatian military in Operation "Oluja" (Storm), over the course of 4 days rolled into Knin, the capital of Republic of Serb Krajina. Croatia's military defeat of Serb forces, brought about not only the liberation of the Krajina region which constituted the bulk of the Serbian controlled territory but also contained the majority of the Serb population in Croatia. As the Serb military forces withdrew in a haste to Serbia and Serb controlled territory in Bosnia, Serb political and military leadership ordered the entire Serb civilian population of Krajina to evacuate en masse (Express, 2017, August 4). As a CIA report states "[t]he Croatian conquest of

¹³³ Article 60 of the Union of Serbia and Montenegro Constitution. Retrieved from <http://eudo-citizenship.eu/NationalDB/docs/MON%20SM%20ustavna%20povelja%202003.pdf>.

¹³⁴ US-trained Croatian military through Military Professional Resources Inc., a provider of military contractor services. MPRI employed retired US generals that trained the Croatian military in NATO tactics.

¹³⁵ US government did not engage in direct sales of military equipment. However, it chose to look the other way as Croatia smuggled weapons in contravention of the UN arms embargo.

the Krajina removed for the Serbian leader the dilemma of defending distant Serb-held territory” (CIA, 1995c). The absence of a population denied Serbia a subversive element in Croatia to pursue a segregationist strategy.

Other military developments that affected Serbia’s frequency levels to play the spoiler in Croatia, resulted from Croatian and Bosnian forces rollback of Serbian gains in Bosnia. By September of 1995, the combined Croat-Bosnian offensive reduced Serb control of Bosnia from 70% to 50% and put the largest Bosnian Serb town of Banja Luka under threat. Serbia could not muster to fight on two fronts. In 1997, Serbia began to fight an Albanian insurgency in Kosovo. Serbia’s aggressive response to the rebellion included massive ethnic cleanings and mass murders that brought about a military response by NATO. Between March 23, 1999, and June 11, 1999, NATO was involved in airstrikes against Serb targets in Kosovo and Serbia. It brought about Serbia’s total withdrawal from Kosovo.

Serbia’s frequency levels were further curtailed as a result of increasing constraints by the international community. Years of appeasement by the international community resulted in behavior reminiscent to that of Germany in the late 1930s. Appeasement begets greater aggression. The genocide in Srebrenica (July 11-22, 1995) followed by the second bombing¹³⁶ of the Marakale farmers market (August 29, 1995) turned the international community against Serbia that resulted first in NATO bombings and then in an imposed peace conference in Dayton.

Diplomatically, Serbia’s ability to continue spoiling events at a high frequency were also limited by Croatia’s rapid democratization after 2000, and its ensuing access to international institutions. It signed the Stabilization and Association Agreement with EU in 2001 and gained EU membership in 2013. It joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace in 2000 and became an official member in 2009. Croatia’s economy performed better than Serbia and according to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Croatia’s military spending surpassed Serbia’s for 14 out of the last 23 years (SIPRI, 2019).¹³⁷

¹³⁶ The first massacre at the Markale Market occurred on February 5, 1994.

¹³⁷ For two years, Croatia’s military spending is less than \$2 million of Serbia’s spending, according to SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute).

4.6 The Apathy Era and the Democratization Tactics (2000-2015)

Serbia's pursuit of an annexationist strategy during the first phase of Croatia's democratization did not turn Croatia into a totalitarian country. For Croatia's ruling elite, despite a degree of illiberalism displayed, "total democracy [is to be pursued] when we liberate every inch of land" (Kearns, 1998, p. 247). The consolidation of democratization during the second phase picked up speed after 1998 as the country switched from national liberation to peacetime agenda.¹³⁸ In the 1998 State of the Nation address, President Tudjman affirmed that with liberation complete, "it was now time to focus on the home front...social justice must be promoted and the rights and freedoms of each and every individual citizen must be protected" (Kearns, 1998, p. 247). As Croatia extended its sovereignty throughout its whole territory in 1998, the national authorities focused on improving the rights of minorities at the individual level. As the international community's plans for territorial autonomy for Serbs in Croatia fell apart with Serbia's defeat, they switched tracks to condition Croatia's access to international institutions with improvements to minority rights, especially those of Serbs.

So how did Croatia go from having an electoral authoritarian regime at the end of 1998 to becoming a borderline democracy¹³⁹ since 2000? In the sections below, I show that democratization in Croatia was possible not so much by Serbia's adoption of a constructive approach, as for their inaction. Serbia's inability to spoil democratization, allowed Croatia to genuinely pursue this process by deconstructing the territorial fragmentation that Serbia had brought about since 1991, and by embracing international community's conditions to democratize in return for EU and NATO membership.

4.6.1 Eliminate the Subnational

The core of Serb controlled territory in Croatia was in the Krajina region (consisting of Northern Dalmatia, Lika, Kordun and Banija). The greatest concentrations of Serbs in Croatia were in the

¹³⁸ In the aftermath of the liberation of Krajina in August of 1995, Croatia was still left with eastern parts of its territory outside its control. In November of 1995, at the Dayton peace talks for the resolution of the war in Bosnia, Croatian President Tudjman and Serbian President Milošević agreed on a solution to Serbia's control of Eastern Slavonia. The parties agreed on a two-year transition period supervised and implemented by the UN that would lead to the peaceful incorporation of the remaining territory into Croatia's national system. The end date for transition was January 15, 1998.

¹³⁹ V-DEM's regime categories based on LDI scores: Autocracy ≤ 0.25 ; Electoral Autocracy >0.25 and ≤ 0.50 ; Minimal Democracy >0.5 and ≤ 0.75 ; and Democracy > 0.75 . Between 2000 and 2015, the mean LDI score is 0.66. Since 2010, the LDI score is 0.71

Krajina region (144,260) and its territory was the largest of the three occupied regions¹⁴⁰ that constituted the Republic of Serbian Krajina. The military defeat of Serb forces in Krajina in August 1995 resulted not only in the collapse of parallel institutions but also in the evacuation of the Serb population from Krajina (Express, 2017, August 4). According to Serb sources, the numbers of Serbs that left Krajina is about 300,000 (Budimir, August 4, 2016) however, CIA sources place the number of those that left at between 150,000 and 200,000 (DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force, 1995, September 11). As the majority of Serbs (just over half of the prewar population) left Croatia, democratization was more likely as Croatia was ‘deprived of its subversive potential’ (Dimitrijević, 2011). Serbia could not spoil democratization in the absence of any ethnic kin in Krajina as the military occupation would be unsustainable (Holjevac Tuković, 2015). Serbia’s military defeat in Krajina and the more confrontational approach by the international community forced Serbia to acquiesce to a peaceful political resolution of its occupied territory in Eastern Slavonia.¹⁴¹

Croatia’s military successes in August of 1995, drastically changed the political direction of the talks about the status of Eastern Slavonia, the last Serb controlled territory in Croatia. Ceding it to Serbia was not an option anymore as the international community and Serb attempted between August of 1995 and January of 1998 as Croatia could rely on military force to achieve a similar outcome to one in Krajina. After Croatian and Bosnian military successes in Bosnia and the international community’s intervention in Bosnia in the summer and early fall of 1995 forced Croatian, Serb and Bosnian presidents to forge a grand bargain bringing to end the war in Bosnia and resolving the issue of Eastern Slavonia. The peaceful process of incorporating Eastern Slavonia was agreed at the Dayton peace talks in November 1995, but the steps taken in proceeding with the reintegration of the region, the authority of transitional administration, and the rights of Serbs were cemented with the signing of the Erdut Agreement on November 12, 1995.

The main document that set the stage for Serbia’s final defeat and Croatia’s path to consolidating its democratization, is known as the Erdut Agreement. Reached between Croat authorities and Milan Milanovic¹⁴² (Foreign Minister of Serbia), and mediated by the US Ambassador to Croatia, Peter Galbraith, the agreement called for a UN peacekeeping force to deploy to Eastern Slavonia to assist in the administrative transition of the region from Serb control

¹⁴⁰ The other two regions included Western Slavonia, and Eastern Slavonia and Western Syrmia.

¹⁴¹ Serbs referred to this region as Eastern Slovenia, Baranja and Western Srem.

¹⁴² Head of Serbia’s Negotiating Delegation.

to Croatian national authorities. The UN mission was approved for a period of twelve months with the potential for another 12-month extension. The Erdut Agreement outlined the mandate of the UN forces: deployment of an international force to maintain peace and provide security during the transition; demilitarize the region; assist and train new professional local police forces; oversee the return of refugees and aid with the organizing of new local elections (Annex 1995:3-4). Furthermore, the agreement listed commitments undertaken by the Croatian government with respect to Serb rights. The government committed to: respecting “[t]he highest level of internationally recognized human rights” (Article 6); allowing the return of refugees to their place of residence (Article 7); to restore the unlawfully taken property or compensate each displaced person for its loss (Article 8); recognize the right to recovering appropriated property, receive compensation for it, or offer assistance in reconstruction of damaged property (Article 9). Lastly, it calls on the international community (countries and institutions) to provide their assistance in aiding in the fulfillment of this agreement (Nobilo, 1995, p. 5).

4.6.2 Embrace the International Community

Between 1990 and 1998, despite some constructive policies by countries such as Germany and the US, the international community’s policy toward Serb aggression in Croatia resembled that of a patient with Dissociative Identity Disorder. One on hand, it recognized Croatia’s independence within the republican borders of Yugoslavia per Badinter Commission’s ruling. On the other hand, it promoted peace plans that severely curtailed Croatian sovereignty by granting Serbs territorial autonomy with sovereign powers. The international community’s policy toward Croatia becomes consistently constructive only upon the end of the United Nations Administration for Eastern Slavonia (UNATES) mission in 1998 and Eastern Slavonia’s reintegration. The greatest advantage in this policy shift was the international community’s switch from supporting conflict management to fostering democratization, through leverage when necessary.

The ‘carrot and stick’ approach was largely unsuccessful in Croatia in the early 1990s. The international community’s insistence on special territorial status for Serb majority areas in exchange for Croatia’s ascension to international institutions and state-building programs like PHARE were largely rejected by Croatia. For the government, the loss of sovereignty over parts of its territory was simply non-acceptable and non-negotiable. However, Croat elites were receptive to conditions that would aid its reincorporation of Serb controlled areas. One successful

example of leverage included US military and logistical aid in liberating Croatia in return for Croatia to renounce its claims over Bosnian Croat controlled territories in Bosnia. As Croatia forged an alliance with the Bosnian government in jointly fighting Serbia in Bosnia, the US provided training and equipping of Croatia's military, and diplomatic support in the liberation of Krajina region in 1995.

After 1998, the international community including the US, increased their criticism of Croatian government human rights abuses, labeling it as authoritarian, and demanding democratization (Bonner, 1999; Holbrooke, 1999). Croatia's path to joining Western-led institutions including financial institutions was conditioned with improvements in political liberalism [reference]. This democratization process that ensued can be best described as one of voluntary conditionalism. Democratization resulted from the intersection of domestic and foreign policies, as Croatia's "internal reforms [were] driven by [its] foreign policy goals" (Cierco, 2009, p. 190). Croatia understood that in order to secure its primary national objective of integration in the European Union, it must make significant legislative-bureaucratic changes to align it with EU legislation. With statehood complete, the EU was better positioned to condition Croatia since it sought membership.

Since 1990, with the exception of the declaration of independence and the consolidation of sovereignty over all its territory, there was no greater national objective that unified the Croatian political spectrum than the incorporation of Croatia into Euro-Atlantic structures, especially membership in the European Union (Sanader, 1999). EU integration had taken a backseat during the Homeland War, but with the war over, the elites were willing to accept any conditions to secure membership. The broad support for membership in the EU as a national objective was two-fold. First, it was cultural. Croats view themselves as belonging to the Central European family. In the past, most parts of the Croatian territory were parts of Austria-Hungary (a symbol of European belonging and Western progress, a view shared by the locals). Such popular sentiments were echoed at the inaugural address of the Croatian Parliament on May 30, 1990, where President Tudjman described Croatia's European priority. He states: *"[s]imultaneous with the democratic transformation we need to undertake all the necessary steps for Croatia to be included into the European community as soon as possible. For centuries, Croatia has been a constituent part of the Western European (Mediterranean and Central-European) culture. Even when it lacked full*

political statehood, Croatia was inseparably connected to the Western European civilization”(Tudjman, May 30, 1990).

Following the end of the Homeland War, Tudjman in his 1996 State of the Nation speech reaffirms his government’s commitment to bringing Croatia into the EU. He states: “*one of the priorities of Croatia’s foreign policy is its inclusion in the central European civilizational and economic space, that is, [Croatia’s] orientation toward the objective of European integration*”(Tudjman, January 15, 1996).

Second, Croatia’s pursuit of EU integration had instrumental value. Vladimir Drobnjak, Croatia’s chief negotiator with the EU, in 2005 described Croatia’s pursuit of membership as bringing about “*the complete and full transformation of Croatian society. The EU accession means an increased standard of living, a stronger economy, and more opportunities for investment and new jobs being created day by day. By becoming a member of the Union, Croatia will enter a system of collective peace and security*” (D. Jović, 2006, p. 87). Coming out of a five-year conflict with Serbia, Croatia aspired to join the NATO alliance as a means to ensure its security in the face of future Serb expansionism. With the election of a new government in 2000, Croatia joined NATO’s Partnership for Peace.¹⁴³ Ten years after the return of its sovereignty, in April 2008, Croatia began accession talks to become a member of the Alliance. A year later, Croatia officially became a NATO member on 1 April 2009. With NATO membership complete, any future aggression by Serbia has become less likely as that would bring about Serbia’s conflict with NATO alliance.

Furthermore, EU membership was embraced by the elites because it would foster economic prosperity. Years of war had taken a toll economically, and the process of EU membership would bring economic assistance to rebuilding the country, open up new markets for Croatian goods, and secure financial aid to bring about the reform of state institutions. As Dejan Jović writes: Croatian “*isolation was neither desirable nor viable in the long term. In order to survive as a state, Croatia must join European institutions. If it remained outside, it could risk economic, cultural, and political regression, which would then, ultimately, lead to a permanent sense of insecurity, including the fear of being defenceless.*” (2006, p. 93). On July 1, 2013, Croatia became the 28th

¹⁴³ A program based on a commitment to democratization and designed to foster increased stability and reduce threats to peace. Retrieved from https://www.nato.int/cps/ra/natohq/topics_50349.htm.

member of the European Union. As a member, Croatia could pre-empt any potential spoiling by Serbia, by denying Serbia the coveted membership in the EU that it seeks.

However, Croatia's road to EU membership was not without its challenges. It was particularly more difficult than that of Slovenia or other Central/Eastern European countries that gained membership in 2004. All aspiring members are required to bring their legislation in line with the *acquis communautaire*¹⁴⁴ of the European Union. Croatia's ascension process was particularly filled with additional conditions as it was a post-conflict state. The Copenhagen Criteria¹⁴⁵ required that Croatia fulfills the political criteria leading to state-building (stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities), makes changes to its economic policies as to function as market economy with the capacity to cope with competition and market forces; and strengthen its administrative-institutional capacity to implement the *acquis* and meet the obligations emanating from EU membership. Popular resentment against the rebelling Serb minority, coupled with a lack of state-capacity as a result of war, and close to a decade of electoral authoritarianism presented significant challenges to Croatia's meeting the Copenhagen conditions.

Beginning with Croatia's membership drive, the European Union adopted a new process in vetting potential members. As potential candidates included a large number of countries (Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Albania) that were involved in armed conflicts, the EU initiated the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA), a contractual process that prepares candidate countries for membership. This process is intended to improve state-building and foster regional rapprochement. To bring Croatia's legislation on par with its requirements, the EU required that Croatia adopt legislation that protects the rights of minorities, especially for Serbs, and enforces the respect for political rights and civil liberties. Consequently, Croatia adopted several broad legislation reforms to meet the EU criteria.

First, political-institutional reforms initiated with the election of a new government in 2000 sought to prevent potential abuse of power along the lines of what President Tudjman and HDZ

¹⁴⁴ "The *acquis* is the body of common rights and obligations [35 chapters] that is binding on all the EU member states. It is constantly evolving and comprises: 1) the content, principles and political objectives of the Treaties; 2) legislation adopted pursuant to the Treaties and the case law of the Court of Justice; 3) declarations and resolutions adopted by the Union; 4) instruments under the Common Foreign and Security Policy; 5) international agreements concluded by the Union and those entered into by the member states among themselves within the sphere of the Union's activities." Retrieved from https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/acquis_en on August 21, 2018.

¹⁴⁵ Declaration by the European Council in 1993 at their meeting in Copenhagen, Denmark sets out the general policies that must be met by EU membership candidates.

did in the 1990s. The increasing authoritarianism of Franjo Tudjman and HDZ between 1991 and 1998, enabled by the system led to the need for a reformed system to ensure no democratization backsliding.¹⁴⁶ The government of Ivica Račan together with President Stipe Mesić undertook broad constitutional reforms to restructure the parliament, and weaken the authority of the president by consigning presidential powers to the parliament and prime minister, thereby turning Croatia into a parliamentary democracy. The constitutional reforms undertaken in 2000 removed presidential powers assigned by the 1990 constitution which granted the President the right to preside over sessions of the government (Article 102) as well as appoint and relieve of duty the Prime Minister, deputy prime ministers and members of the government (Article 98).¹⁴⁷ The new constitution restricted presidential powers to confide the mandate to an elected member of parliament to form a government (Article 98), “propose to the Government to hold a session and consider certain issues; and be present at the meeting of the Government and take part in deliberations”¹⁴⁸ (Article 102). Moreover, in 2001 the structure of the Croatian Parliament was changed from bicameral¹⁴⁹ to a unicameral institution.¹⁵⁰

Second, Croatia was obligated to undertake significant legislative reforms to advance minority rights. Following the liberation of Krajina in August of 1995, the Croatian government undertook several legislative measures dispossessing the Serb minority of their property as a punishment for their rebellion. However, despite such illiberal policies targeting Serbs, Croatia does not emerge as a state without a framework on national minorities, or as a state that had systematically discriminated and persecuted every minority group. Croatia’s democratically elected parliament since its first inauguration in 1990 comprised many minority members representing numerous ethnic groups¹⁵¹ including at least three Serbs from Serb People’s Party, with Milan Dukic rising to the position of deputy parliament speaker between 1992 and 1996. Minorities were also part of the top echelons of the Croatian Military (HV). For example, Brigadier

¹⁴⁶ In 1990, as Croatia prepared for independence, Croatian constitutionalist lawyers examined various constitutional models of countries that underwent transitions to democracy, before settling for semi-presidential system.¹⁴⁶ See Branko Smerdel, *Annales* XLVI, N. 63, 51-66, 2014. Retrieved from <https://dergipark.org.tr/download/article-file/7086>.

¹⁴⁷ Croatia’s Constitution of 1990. Retrieved from <http://www.servat.unibe.ch/icl/hr01000.html>.

¹⁴⁸ Retrieved from https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Croatia_2010.pdf?lang=en.

¹⁴⁹ House of Representatives and House of Regions.

¹⁵⁰ House of Representatives.

¹⁵¹ Some noted ethnic representatives include Furio Radin (representing Italian community), Muhamed Zulic (representing Bosniak community), Jakob Eltz (who was German himself), Ference Farago (representing Hungarian community).

General Rahim Ademi and Chief of Staff of 5th Corps Agim Çeku were Kosovo Albanians and decorated numerous times for their contributions in the Homeland War, including Operation Storm, by the Croatian President.

Yet, despite constitutional protections for the minorities and the inclusion of some minorities at all levels of the government, legislative measures undermining Serb minority rights after the fall of Krajina raised alarms amongst the international community and brought about additional conditions to Croatia's membership drive. Croatia's political elites understood that for Croatia to join the European Union, it was imperative to have a minority's framework that meets the standards of the EU. From 1991 to 1997, Croatia ratified 36 human rights treaties, including the 1950 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the 1995 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, and the European Charter on Regional or Minority Languages, amongst others.

Thus, the improvements in minority rights that took place during this era resulted from two converging visions. One, domestically, political elites understood that EU membership is conditional on applicant countries having the legislative framework and executive-administrative protections in place to bring the country in conformity with EU rules on minorities. Two, the international community's stand was that Croatia would not enjoy any meaningful association with, or benefits from EU institutions unless it meets the criteria dealing with minority protections. While it would be a stretch to claim that minorities in Croatia, especially the Serbs, enjoy the same rights, liberties, and protections as the Swedish national minority in Finland, Croatia expanded minority rights and protections with greater intensity in the aftermath of the new government in 2000 and with the official opening of EU membership talks in 2003.

The Croatian parliament in 2002, adopted new legislation in support of minority rights including the rights of Serbs who had left Croatia as refugees and sought to return. Some of these laws included the Constitutional Law on the Rights of National Minorities, including Council of Minorities; Conclusions on Tenancy Rights Holders (2003); commission on refugees, returnees, and property restitution (2004). The focus on improving minority rights became irreversible for the elites as they pursued EU membership. In 2003, the nationalist HDZ won the snap elections and returned to power after a 3-year hiatus. Although there were apprehensions that the new HDZ government will revert to the old habits of discriminating against the Serbs (Wood, 2003), the new Prime Minister Ivo Saander "*work[ed] to involve them [Serbs] in the affairs of state through*

electoral laws providing for a guaranteed number of seats in parliament and through practical political alliances, such as the coalition of the Serbian Democratic Forum with the right-wing and nationalist Croatian Democratic Union, which provide the representatives of that Serbian party with some influence in the executive branch” (Dimitrijevic, 2011, p. 24)

Finally, one of the pillars of the EU Stabilization and Association process mandated regional reconciliation. The key criteria required Croatia to cooperate with the ICTY in arresting and extraditing all those charged with war crimes and hiding within its jurisdiction. Arresting those accused of war crimes was particularly a sensitive topic in Croatia as it viewed itself a victim of Serbia. Amongst many Croats charged by the ICTY, the arrest warrants against generals Ante Gotovina and Rahim Ademi, held as heroes for the liberation of Krajina, caused mass uproar and reluctance for the government to meet this condition. The ICTY charged Gotovina and Ademi, amongst others, “with crimes against humanity and violations of the laws or customs of war” (Del Ponte, May 21, 2001) for their role in the deaths and expulsions of Serbs from Croatia between 1992 and 1995.

Croatia’s reconciliation with her neighbors was particularly necessary as it was not only a victim of Serbia’s aggression but an aggressor herself in Bosnia. Between 1992 and 1994, Croatia engaged in an armed conflict with Bosnia’s government seeking to retrieve areas populated by Bosnian Croats. During the course of the conflict, Croatian forces and the Bosnian Croats engaged in numerous atrocities. After the Bosnian war, many Bosnian Croats sought shelter in Croatia to evade the international forces pursuing war criminals in Bosnia. The ICTY and the EU held Croatia responsible for also arresting those Croats and Bosnian Croats who had committed atrocities.

For years, Croatia refused to cooperate with ICTY in extraditing Bosnian Croat and its own military officers. Reconciliation required, and the EU demanded, that war criminals be brought to justice if Croatia is to pursue membership (International Crisis Group, 2001). As Croatia resisted extraditing those accused of atrocities to the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, so did the EU willingness to let Croatia join its institutions. Stabilization and Association Agreement required that Croatia cooperates with the ICTY in arresting and extraditing Croats accused of war crimes. In order to ensure no backsliding, the EU built in suspension clauses so that talks can come to a halt in case Croatia backslides on minority rights, but particularly if not cooperating with ICTY. After years of non-cooperation, in March 2005, the EU did just that. Croatia became the first aspiring member to have talks halted due to its failure in

arresting and extraditing Ante Gotovina to ICTY. Faced with the uncertainty of prolonging its membership drive and risk economic crisis and potential Serb spoiling, the government from December 2005 and onward began to cooperate with ICTY in extraditing those accused of war crimes including working with Spanish authorities in arresting Ante Gotovina in the Canary Islands. Prior to the finalization of the ascension talks with the EU, ICTY confirmed Croatia's cooperation and fulfillment of its obligations toward the tribunal.

After 22 years since independence and 15 years since the return of its sovereignty throughout the whole of its territory, and after having fought two wars against Serbian aggression and as an aggressor itself in Bosnia, Croatia joined the EU on July 1, 2013.

4.7 Chapter Summary

At the end of the Cold War, Croatia like other constituent republics of Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Bloc, pursued a policy of political liberalization that set the country on a path to democratization in the 1990s. Whereas Slovenia (another former Yugoslav republic] rapidly democratized and within 12 years of independence became an EU member, Croatia's path was far more challenging.

Serbia, seeking to bring its ethnic Serb population in Croatia within its sovereignty sought to expand its political borders to match its ethnic boundaries. Between 1991 and 1998, Serbian elites and the majority of the population favored a policy of annexation of Croat territories. The absence of a democratic regime within Serbia (despite frequent multiparty elections) and the recent loss of kin provided the intensity for Serbia to expand its borders. Its historic control over the Yugoslav People Army and as a successor state to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia provided the military capabilities and diplomatic clout, or the frequency, to challenge Croatia's territorial boundaries. This challenge hindered Croatian democratization as the country shifted focus from pursuing democratization to engaging in a war of national liberation. The expulsion of Croat authorities from over a third of Croatian territory and the establishment of Serb controlled governing institutions led not only to ethnic cleansing and mass killings by Serbia, but also Croatian policies that limited democratization, minority rights, and engaged in violent reprisals in pursuit of national security.

After the liberation of the largest Serb held territory in the Krajina region in August of 1995 and the peaceful reincorporation of Eastern Slavonia in 1998, Serbia spoiling came to a halt. The

military defeats in Croatia and Bosnia, the evacuation/expulsion of a significant share of the Croatian Serb population, and the military intervention by the international community drastically reduced Serbia's intensity and frequency for spoiling. Consequently, in the absence of Serb spoiling, the 2000 elections in Croatia brought to power pro-democracy forces that shifted national priorities to embracing democratization. Within a few years, Croatia was led on a path to joining international institutions such as NATO and the EU. The Croatian government undertook structural reforms with respect to ensuring that no President can exert overwhelming authority over all branches of the government. It also pursued ethnic reconciliation by adopting legislation protecting the rights of minorities. As it sought EU membership, Croatian policies were to a large extent conditioned by the EU. By 2013, Croatia was not only a NATO member but also an EU member.

In the next chapter I will examine whether such a relationship between spoiling (intensity and frequency) and the level of democracy holds when I examine data from across 89 target countries from 1946-2015.

CHAPTER 5. DEMOCRATIZATION AND MOTHERLAND SPOILING: A STATISTICAL ASSESSMENT

My theory argues that a motherland with transnational ethnic kin that lay adjacent to its territory may hamper or help the democratization of the target state with whom it shares the kin depending on whether the motherland seeks to overturn the territorial status quo (recognize the political borders) between itself and the target state, or not. There are a number of strategies that are available to the motherland in dealing with a target state: apathy, inclusivist, segregationist, and annexationist. The strategy that motherland is likely to adopt is a function of the intensity and frequency to spoil the democratization process. A motherland that is a democracy and has long been separated from its kin is likely to adopt strategies that are conducive to democratization, as it will not seek to expand its political borders. On the other hand, a non-democratic motherland that has been recently split from its kin will likely pursue strategies that are corrosive to democratization as it seeks to expand its political borders to match its ethnic boundaries.

In the previous chapter, I showed how Croatia's level of democracy was affected by Serbia's pursuit of its transnational ethnic kin in Croatia. Between 1990 and 1998, Serbia pursued an annexationist strategy; it displayed high levels of intensity and frequency for conflict. As it sought to expand its political borders using force to include Serb populated areas in Croatia, the country was unable to consolidate its democratization process. Between 1995 and 1999, as Serbia faced successive military defeats in Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo, and facing international isolation, Serbia switched to a strategy of apathy. Between 1999 and 2015, Serbia displayed a higher level of intensity and frequency for cooperation. In the absence of Serbia's spoiling, Croatia was able to undergo the institutional reforms required by the EU for membership and subsequently its levels of democracy.

Cases like Serbia's spoiling of democratization in Croatia are commonplace throughout the former communist countries of Europe, whether in the former Yugoslavia or the Soviet Union. However, at times, the number of cases from this region of the world may be illustrative of my theory of motherland spoiling but may not necessarily be an adequate test of the theory. As such, I rely on a statistical assessment of the level of democracy of countries with transnational ethnic kin for which there is an adjacent motherland. Quantitative analysis will enable me to systematically identify whether my hypotheses hold up in a more general way and across various

regions of the world. To test this relationship between democratization and motherland spoiling I employ the Varieties of Democracy dataset and my own dataset on motherlands founded on Ethnic Power Relations 2018 and Phoenix Event Data. I rely on a number of statistical estimators (least squares and ordinal logistic) and model specifications to test the hypothesis.

To summarize, I hypothesize that the level of democratization in a country with a transnational ethnic group(s) is affected in the following ways:

H₁: a motherland displaying high levels of intensity for conflict will negatively affect (spoil) the level of democracy of a target state, as it challenges the political borders that exist between itself and the target state;

H₂: a motherland displaying high frequency for conflict will negatively affect (spoil) the level of democracy of a target state, as it challenges the political borders that exist between itself and the target state;

H₃: a motherland displaying high levels of intensity for cooperation will positively affect the level of democracy of a target state, as it does not contest the political borders that exist between itself and the target state;

H₄: a motherland displaying high frequency for cooperation will positively affect the level of democracy of a target state, as it does not contest the political borders that exist between itself and the target state.

The findings regarding the intensity and frequency for conflict/cooperation and democratization are encouraging of further research. Two findings are particularly important. First, motherlands exhibiting higher cumulative levels of intensity and frequency of conflict are associated with a lower level of democracy in the target country with whom they share transnational ethnic kin. Also, a target state is more likely to manifest a higher level of democracy when dealing with a motherland that initiates high intensity cooperative (cumulative) events and at a high frequency. Second, when examining the predicted probabilities of regime types, I find

that a target state is more than twice as likely to be a democracy if faced with a motherland that displays high levels of intensity and frequency for cooperation.

5.1 Research Design

I evaluate my theoretical propositions using the universe of countries that have transnational ethnic kin with a contiguous motherland between 1946 and 2015. Recall from the previous chapter, that a motherland is the ethnonational homeland of an “ethnic group with transnational connections and whose settlement area is split by an international border” (Vogt et al., 2015). I have classified only those cases of motherlands that are adjacent to states with whom they share transnational ethnic kin (TEK). However, this does not include immigrant communities – “all persons who have ever migrated from their country of birth to their current country of residence” (OECD Factbook, 2007). For example, Greece views Greeks in Albania as transnational ethnic kin who inhabit a settlement area that is inherently Greek, whereas Greeks in the US are considered an immigrant community with no historical links or claims to the lands in the US. The data indicate that motherlands are found primarily in Africa, Asia, and Europe.¹⁵²

I rely on the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) Dataset Family (Vogt et al., 2015), updated for 2018, to code all the actual and potential motherlands. EPR’s Transborder Ethnic Kin (TB EK) sub-dataset allows me to identify all “politically relevant ethnic groups living in at least two countries” (Ruegger, 2018, p. 1), whereas EPR Core sub-dataset “provides annual data on politically relevant ethnic groups, their relative sizes as a share of the total population, and their access to executive state power in all countries of the world with a population of at least 250,000 and where ethnicity has been politicized” (Vogt et al., 2018, p. 1). Per my definition in the theory chapter, a country can be coded a motherland to its TEK if two conditions are met: a) an ethnic group must be natively present in two or more countries, and b) in at least one country, that ethnic group must be in control of the state, or constitute the majority of the population. This dataset shows all politically relevant ethnic groups within a country and codes each group’s access to

¹⁵² The one exception is Guatemala where the Maya are over 50% of the population (but not in power) and can potentially play a motherland to Maya groups who are ethnic minorities in Mexico and Honduras.

national levels of power. An ethnic group can have a monopoly¹⁵³ or dominate¹⁵⁴ the national government. An ethnic group, if it does not control the state alone, it may share power with one or more other ethnic groups. It can be a senior partner,¹⁵⁵ or a junior partner¹⁵⁶ at the national level. In many cases, an ethnic group can also be excluded from the national levels of power. An excluded group can be powerless,¹⁵⁷ discriminated against,¹⁵⁸ or self-excluded¹⁵⁹ (Vogt et al., 2018).

I code the actual motherland by cross-referencing the transnational ethnic kin between TBEK and EPR Core sub-datasets. A transnational ethnic group is coded as having a motherland if in one state its kin controls the national government (monopoly or dominate) or is a senior partner in a governing coalition. For most transnational ethnic kin groups, coding for the appropriate motherland is rather straightforward. After all, many states bear the name of the ethnic group (e.g. Germany–Germans; Greece–Greeks; Malaysia–Malay). In cases where the name of the ethnic group and the state differ, I cross-reference the ethnic group in power in a state with its transnational kin as coded by EPR-Core. For example, the Pashtuns (ethnic group) have historically¹⁶⁰ dominated the government in Afghanistan, but, are also present in areas in western Pakistan where their political position has shifted between powerlessness and junior partner. In this case, Afghanistan plays a motherland to the Pashtuns in Pakistan. In a few instances, the TBEK sub-dataset is not clear on the relationship between the transnational ethnic kin across states. EPR–TBEK coders use very broad identities based on religion, race, national group, language, or continental ascription (e.g. Christians, Blacks, Arabs, English Speakers, and Asians). I drop such

¹⁵³ “Elite members hold monopoly power in the executive to the exclusion of members of all other ethnic groups” (Vogt et al., 2018, p. 5)

¹⁵⁴ “Elite members of the group hold dominant power in the executive but there is some limited inclusion of “token” members of other groups who however do not have real influence on decision making.” Ibid.

¹⁵⁵ “Representatives of the group participate as senior partners in a formal or informal power-sharing arrangement. By power sharing, we mean any arrangement that divides executive power among leaders who claim to represent particular ethnic groups and who have real influence on political decision making.” Ibid.

¹⁵⁶ “Representatives participate as junior partners in government. The choice between senior and junior partner depends on the group’s absolute influence in the executive – that is, irrespective of group size –, measured by the number and importance of the positions controlled by group members.” Ibid.

¹⁵⁷ “Elite representatives hold no political power (or do not have influence on decision making) at the national level of executive power – although without being explicitly discriminated against.” Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ “Group members are subjected to active, intentional, and targeted discrimination by the state, with the intent of excluding them from political power.” Ibid.

¹⁵⁹ “The special category of self-exclusion applies to groups that have excluded themselves from central state power, in the sense that they control a particular territory of the state which they have declared independent from the central government.” Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Since 2002, in the aftermath of the US invasion, Pashtuns are a senior partner in the government. Prior to 2001, their authority over the national government has vacillated between monopoly, domination, and senior partner.

cases from the dataset since pairing transnational ethnic kin with its respective motherland is highly uncertain. It's very difficult to ascertain what the motherland would be for "Christian lowlanders" in the Philippines, Blacks in the USA, Arabs in Iran, English Speakers in South Africa, or Asians in Uganda.

A potential motherland is coded as such only if a transnational ethnic group does not control the government in any state, but constitutes the majority of the population in one. Theoretically, since a group constitutes the majority of the population in one state, it may come in a position to overthrow the minority-run government, gain control of the national levels of power, and may generate policies that contest or accept the territorial status quo of the target state where its TEK is found. One such state is Guatemala, where the Mayans constitute over 50% of the population but have no monopoly over the national government nor do they dominate or are a senior partner in the government (Vogt et al., 2015). As such, they are not an actual but a potential motherland to the Mayan population in southern Mexico and Honduras, where they are in minority and do not control the national government. See Appendix B for a list of potential motherlands.

In very few cases, the same ethnic group can control the national government in two separate countries. For example, West and East Germany, North and South Vietnam, North and South Korea, or Albania and Kosovo (after 2008). In such cases, I do not code one country to be a motherland to the other country as the same ethnic group has a monopoly, dominates the national government, or is a senior partner in the government in both countries.

Table 1 list the target countries that contain 1, 2, 3, or 4+ TEK for which there is a motherland adjacent. Between 1946 and 2015, there were 46 countries (52% of the countries in the dataset) that contained only 1 TEK, 24 countries included 2 TEK, 13 countries had 3 TEK, and 6 countries comprised 4 or more TEK. Refer to Appendix A for a more detailed matching of TEK groups with respective motherlands, on basis of TEK name (target state-motherland) and years for when a motherland existed. During the Cold War, a target country included no more than three TEK groups for which existed a motherland nearby. The fall of Communism and the dissolution of multiethnic states of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia brought about 22 new states some of which became motherlands to their kin across multiple states. For example, between 1946 and 1990, China contained only 2 TEK (Mongols and Koreans) for which there was a motherland bordering China (Mongolia and North Korea). The emergence of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan as sovereign states in 1991 (with the dissolution of the Soviet Union) brought about 2 additional

motherlands with TEK (Kazakhs and Kyrgyz) in China. So, the number of motherlands for TEK in China is coded as 2 for the period between 1946 and 1990, and 4 since 1991.

Table 1. Target States with Number of Motherlands per Target Country

Number of Target Countries		46	24	13	6
Target Country Name	Motherlands				
	TEK / Target Country	1	2	3	4+
	Austria; Azerbaijan; Bangladesh; Belgium; Benin; Burkina Faso; Burundi; Cameroon; Central African Republic; Chad; Czechoslovakia; Egypt; Estonia; Finland; Gambia; Ghana; Guinea; Honduras; Israel; Japan; Kenya; Kosovo; Laos; Lebanon; Liberia; Libya; Malaysia; Mexico; Moldova; Nigeria; Papua New Guinea; Philippines; Republic of the Congo; Romania; Rwanda; Singapore; Slovakia; Sudan; Tanzania; Thailand; Togo; Uganda; United Kingdom; Yemen, North; Zambia; Zimbabwe	Albania; Angola; Belarus; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Bulgaria; Cyprus; Ethiopia; Greece; Guinea-Bissau; India; Italy; Kazakhstan; Kyrgyzstan; Latvia; Lithuania; Macedonia; Malawi; Mozambique; Niger; Pakistan; Senegal; Slovenia; Uzbekistan; Yugoslavia	Afghanistan; Cambodia; Cote d'Ivoire; DR Congo; DR Vietnam; Georgia; Indonesia; Iran; Myanmar; Poland; Tajikistan; Turkmenistan; Ukraine	China; Croatia; Montenegro; Russia; Serbia; South Africa	

Whereas all TEK can only have one motherland,¹⁶¹ (e.g. for ethnic Russians in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Moldova, Baltic republics and other former Soviet republics look to the

¹⁶¹ In a few cases, one ethnic group can control 2 states. In most cases, such motherlands existed between 1945 and 1989. For example, Germans in West and East Germany, the Vietnamese in North and South Vietnam, North and South Yemen, Greece and Cyprus. Some cases continue to exist in the post-Cold War era, such as North and South Korea, as well as new cases such as Albania and Kosovo, where Albanians dominate in both states. In cases where a TEK may have 2 motherlands, the one that is adjacent to the target state is coded as a motherland. For example, East

Russian Federation as their motherland), a target state may contain multiple TEK populations for which there are adjacent motherlands. A good example of this is Afghanistan. In addition to the Pashtuns, who make up the plurality of the population, there are Tajik (Tajikistan), Turkmen (Turkmenistan) and Uzbek (Uzbekistan) populations. Additionally, while motherlands tend to be static (i.e., they persist as ethnonational homelands to TEK), there are some cases when the same transnational kin would come to dominate a different state upon the loss of power in a neighboring country. One good example of this pendulum-like shift in motherland behavior are Burundi and Rwanda. Both countries contain Hutu and Tutsi ethnic groups that have, at different times, controlled the levers of power in one state while powerless in another. Between 1966 and 2001, the Hutu were powerless or discriminated in Burundi, but had a monopoly over the government in Rwanda. After 2002, the Hutu in Burundi became a senior partner in the national government but were a powerless ethnic group in Rwanda during the same period.

5.2 The Dependent Variable: The Level of Democracy

In order to account for the Level of Democracy, I rely on the Liberal Democracy Index (LDI), Version 8.0, compiled by the Varieties of Democracy Institute or V-DEM (Coppedge et al., 2018). Liberal Democracy Index captures the two main components of democracy, Electoral Democracy Index¹⁶² and Liberal Component Index.¹⁶³ While the most popular measures of democratization in the literature come from Freedom House and Polity IV, democratization indices from V-DEM are better suited for this research for a number of reasons: (1) allows for the measurement of various dimensions of democracy (electoral, liberal, participatory, deliberative, egalitarian); (2) a high degree of disaggregation – 340 indicators; (3) multiple, independent coders for each (non-factual) question; (4) inter-coder reliability tests; (5) confidence bounds for all point estimates associated with non-factual questions; and (6) transparent aggregation procedures (Coppedge et al., 2017, p. 19). V-DEM democratization data is available on an annual basis for the entire period under study, 1946-2015.¹⁶⁴

Germany served as a motherland to the Germans in Poland, as it bordered Poland. West Germany on the other hand, was not coded a motherland as it did not lay adjacent to Poland.

¹⁶² Relies on measures for: suffrage, elected officials, clean elections, freedom of association, and freedom of expression.

¹⁶³ Relies on measures for equality before the law and individual liberty index, judicial constraints on the executive index and legislative constraints on the executive index.

¹⁶⁴ The democratization data is available as far back as 1900 for most countries.

In the V-DEM dataset, LDI values are normalized and scaled from 0 to 1, with lower values indicating more autocratic regimes, and higher values typical of more democratic systems. Since the LDI scores do not follow a normal distribution, I take the natural log ($\ln(\text{LDI}/(1-\text{LDI}))$) of this measure. No country in my dataset has a perfect score of zero or one.¹⁶⁵ As such, the transformed LDI variable takes on values from -4.95 to 2.17, with higher values indicating greater levels of democracy.

Additionally, I make use V-DEM's 4-category ordinal variable for the LDI so that I may evaluate the predicted probabilities of democratization. According to V-DEM classification, countries with lower values are non-democracies. Thus, a country taking on a value of 0 is classified as an "Autocracy;" a country with a score of 0.33 is termed an "Electoral Authoritarian;" those with values of 0.67 are "Minimally Democratic;" and "Democratic" is a country with a score of 1.¹⁶⁶

5.3 The Independent Variables: Intensity and Frequency for Spoiling

The observations in the dataset are country-years. I rely on the Cline Center Historical Phoenix Event Data to construct my variables that tap into intensity and frequency of motherland to spoil or support the democratization of a target state. The dataset uses about 14 million articles from the New York Times, the British Broadcasting Corporation's Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB), and the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) and "documents the agents, locations, and issues at stake in a wide variety of conflict, cooperation and communicative events in the CAMEO ontology framework" (Althaus et al., 2017). My data combines the three events datasets (NY Times 1945-2005; SWB 1979-2015; FBIS 1995-2004). Then, I proceed to delete all dyads that are not relevant to the study. The only relevant dyads that remain in the dataset are the "motherland-target state." Overall, my data contains 87,920 events that are aggregated into 4,341 yearly events that occur over 168 motherland—target state pairs. (See Appendix A for a table of motherland—target state dyads).

Phoenix Event Data uses the Conflict and Mediation Event Ontology or CAMEO, which captures the dyadic relationship of two actors and the action initiated by Actor A (source) upon

¹⁶⁵ The minimum score is 0.007 and the maximum score equals 0.898.

¹⁶⁶ Lindberg, Staffan I. 2016. "Ordinal Versions of V-Dem's Indices: When Interval Measures Are Not Useful for Classification, Description, and Sequencing Analysis Purposes."

Actor B (target) (Gerner et al., 2009).¹⁶⁷ In my dataset, the source represents the motherland whereas the target is the target state. CAMEO “is specifically designed to code events relevant to the mediation of violent conflict but can also be used for studying other types of international interaction” (Schrodt, 2012, p. 2). The coding of events starts with neutral events and moves from cooperation to conflict, using 20 classification types¹⁶⁸ (Schrodt, 2012). The interactions between two states, if they exist, can be conflictual, cooperative or neutral events. Events like “intent to cooperate; diplomatic cooperation; material cooperation; provide aid” are CAMEO events indicating cooperation between motherland and a target state. CAMEO events such as “coerce; assault; fight; mass violence” indicate conflict between the two parties, whereas events such as “Make a public statement”, or “Appeal” are considered neutral events as they do not indicate conflict or cooperation. Neutral events are deleted from the dataset.

The Goldstein scale applies an intensity score to every CAMEO event along the cooperation–conflict continuum between the motherland and the target state. The Goldstein scale ranges from -10 (indicative of very conflictual events such as a military attack) to a +10 (indicative of very cooperative events such as extending military assistance). According to Goldstein *et al.*, the scale “represents the sum of actions taken by an actor toward a target within a given time period. Each action is weighted by the magnitude of cooperation or hostility implicit in the act” (Goldstein et al., 2001, p. 600).

However, the use of Goldstein scores has not been without its detractors. Some scholars (D'Orazio & Yonamine, 2015; Lowe, 2012; Pevehouse, 2004) have shown that the use of Goldstein scores can be problematic because of aggregation and the mean problems associated with the full spectrum numerical measure of conflict-cooperation. For Pevehouse, aggregating “conflict and cooperation on the same scale, eliminat[es] the possibility that [an activity] could simultaneously increase cooperation and conflict” (2004, p. 252). Not only does aggregation force cooperation and conflict to be mutually exclusive, but on numerous occasions, scholars have pointed that a highly conflictual event (-10 score) would cancel out a highly cooperative event (+10 score)

¹⁶⁷ Example: “Serb forces were engaged in ethnic cleansing in Kosovo against the majority Albanian population of the province, according to the US government” (CAMEO Manual 1.1.b3, Schrodt 2012). Retrieved from <http://eventdata.parusanalytics.com/data.dir/cameo.html>.

¹⁶⁸ CAMEO Events Root Codes: 01: Make a public statement; 02: Appeal; 03: Express intent to cooperate; 04: Consult; 05: Engage in diplomatic cooperation; 06: Engage in material cooperation; 07: Provide aid; 08: Yield; 09: Investigate; 10: Demand; 11: Disapprove; 12: Reject; 13: Threaten; 14: Protest; 15: Exhibit military posture; 16: Reduce relations; 17: Coerce; 18: Assault; 19: Fight; 20: Engage in unconventional mass violence.

(D'Orazio & Yonamine, 2015); “a major cooperation would “wipe out” occasional disputes” (Pevehouse, 2004, p. 253); or that a few smaller events would aggregate to a disproportionately massive event. As Schrodtt (2007) put it, “three riots equals one thermonuclear war.” In many such cases, whether we take the sum or the mean of the single continuum would equal a value of zero, same as for a non-event. As D’Orazio and Yonamine argue “the problem of violent events masking the concurrent presence of cooperative actions—notably negotiations occurring during periods of ongoing violence—is very real and occurs frequently” (2015, p. 6).

One solution to the issues outlined above has been to split the Goldstein scale. Why? Because conflict and cooperation events are not mutually exclusive, especially regarding the motherland—target state relationship. Scholars have shown that states that are interdependent may behave both conflictual and cooperatively with one another (Bechev, 2011; McMillan, 1997; Pevehouse, 2004). In my case, the sharing of transnational ethnic kin between the two states can lead to both conflict and cooperation events. For example, in Croatia, while Serbia fought a war against Croatia, there were numerous acts of cooperation concerning the exchange of population from certain areas, prisoner release, trade, and making sure that the interconnected utilities infrastructure is working (Caspersen, 2003). In addition, the two states having been a part of a common state in the past may have their economies intertwined.

An examination of all motherland-target state dyads reveals that despite conflict, on average, the dyads are more cooperative. The average Goldstein score for a single scale cooperation—conflict dimension is 1.57. When I look at the Russia-Ukraine dyad, as the most recent, ongoing conflict where Russia has spoiled the democratization by contesting the political borders of Ukraine, I find that between 2013 and 2015, the years of most intense fighting between the two, average Goldstein scores are 0.61, 0.01 and 0.34, respectively. Furthermore, for most dyads with multiple motherlands per target state, the data shows the most conflictual dyad is also the most cooperative one. Looking at all the dyads, out of 89 total dyads, there are 45 dyads of multiple motherlands per target state, of which only 7 dyads are less cooperative than conflictual.

5.3.1 Intensity

In order to avoid some of the same issues that have plagued past studies, I follow (Craig, 2018; Pevehouse, 2004; Yonamine, 2011) and split the single conflict—cooperation Goldstein scale into two separate scales, one for conflict and another for cooperation. Both scales are continuous.

Conflict events originally take on Goldstein scores between -10 and -0.1. However, I reverse the scale (so that conflict values range from +0.1 to +10) for ease of interpretation. Cooperation events take on Goldstein scores between +0.1 and +10. A value of zero (0) is used to indicate the absence of any events (whether conflict or cooperation) between motherland and a target state in a given year.

I first construct two variables to measure the intensity of motherland to contest or support the territorial status quo that exists between itself and the target state. The first measures the *Cumulative Intensity for Conflict* and I use it to test Hypothesis 1. A negative coefficient implies that an increase in the cumulative intensity for conflict leads to lower levels of democracy in a given year. The second variable measures the *Cumulative Intensity for Cooperation* and I use it to test Hypothesis 3. A positive coefficient implies that an increase in the cumulative intensity for cooperation leads to higher levels of democracy in a given year.

Since some target states face more than one motherland and considering that not all motherlands are annexationist (seeking to expand its political boundaries to match its ethnic borders through occupation and annexation of lands within a target state), I first calculate the annual mean Goldstein scores (for conflict and cooperation, separately). For example, when calculating the intensity for conflict in a given year, if Target State X is facing 2 motherlands with annual conflict scores of -1 (Motherland 1) and -5 (Motherland 2), then the average intensity for conflict in that year would be a -3. On the other hand, if Target State X faces two motherlands that are cooperative, Motherland 1, (Goldstein score = 4) and Motherland 2 (Goldstein score = 6), then the average intensity for cooperation score in that given year is 5. Then, the cumulative effects of intensity are calculated by discounting the yearly mean Goldstein scores (conflict and cooperation, separately) at a 1% rate per year. Cumulative intensity scores have been rescaled to take on values from 0 to 10.¹⁶⁹

Because conflict and cooperation between motherland and a target state are long-term processes, following (Dancy et al., 2019; Pickering, 2002b; Trejo et al., 2018) I calculate the cumulative effects for the intensity of the relationship between motherland – target state). Cumulative intensity for conflict or cooperation can give us cues about the identity of the motherland. Countries' patterns of behavior create reputations for conflict or cooperation over time

¹⁶⁹ Cumulative intensity for conflict (unscaled): 0 to 149.8158; Cumulative intensity for cooperation (unscaled): 0 to 93.7477

that become veritable identities from the perspective of other countries. For example, an examination of the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s shows that Serbia's motivation to pursue its ethnic kin in Croatia and Bosnia were not reflexive responses to the rise of Milosevic, but the culmination of a history of Serbia's desire to expand its territories westward to include large swaths of Croatian and Bosnian territory. Constant display of Serbia's displeasure with the territorial arrangements of Yugoslavia coupled with their dominance of Yugoslavia's military and security apparatus hampered the democratization processes as Serbia pursued armed conflict to claim the Serb populated territories, and the national authorities of Croatia and Bosnia resorted to non-liberal measures to stave off Serbia's advances. On the other hand, France and Austria have not sought to annex areas of Italy populated by ethnic French (Aosta Valley) or Austrian/Germans (South Tyrol).

I also examine the impact of intensity for conflict/cooperation in the year of democratization. I have created two additional variables that measure this effect, *Immediate Effect for Conflict* and *Immediate Effect for Cooperation*. These two variables measure the annual mean Goldstein scores in a given year.

Alternatively, for robustness check, I create the variable *Intensity Conflict-Cooperation* to measure the intensity of the relationship between a motherland along a single continuum in line with the Goldstein scale. Recall from my earlier discussion in this section, this continuous variable takes on values from -10 (conflict) to +10 (cooperation) in the Goldstein scale. For cases where a target state is facing more than one motherland, "Intensity Conflict-Cooperation (Mean)" measures the mean Goldstein score, whereas "Intensity Conflict-Cooperation (Sum)" totals the scores of all motherlands in a given year. For example, if a target state faces two motherlands with each showing value of +3 and -1, respectively, then the intensity value will be a +2 for that year. This variable is transformed to measure the cumulative effect of the intensity and rescaled to take on values from 0 to 10.¹⁷⁰

5.3.2 Frequency

To measure the frequency for conflict or cooperation events, I follow the same procedure as for the intensity, for the same reasons outlined above. However, the frequency for conflict/cooperation is measured by separately summing the counts of conflict and cooperation events. A score of zero indicates that no event has taken place (conflict or cooperation).

¹⁷⁰ Intensity Conflict-Cooperation: (unscaled, mean) = - 80.033 to 55.071; (unscaled, sum) = - 2637 to 7242.

I create two variables to measure the cumulative effects of the frequency of interactions initiated by the motherland. The *Cumulative Frequency for Conflict* variable will test Hypothesis 2. It takes on scaled values from 0 to 10.¹⁷¹ A negative coefficient implies that an increase in the cumulative frequency for conflict leads to lower levels of democracy in a given year. The *Cumulative Frequency for Cooperation* will test Hypothesis 4. It takes on scaled values from 0 to 10.¹⁷² A positive coefficient implies that an increase in the cumulative frequency for cooperation leads to higher levels of democracy in a given year. Just like with the intensity measures, the frequency variables are discounted at 1% rate per year.

I also test the impact of frequency for conflict and cooperation in the year of democratization. I have labeled these variables, *Immediate Frequency for Conflict* and *Immediate Frequency for Cooperation*. Both variables are scaled to take on values from 0 to 10.¹⁷³

Alternatively, for robustness check, I use the CINC (Composite Index of National Capability) scores as a proxy for the capabilities of the motherland to be a spoiler. The variable *CINC Capabilities* calculates the ratio of the motherland to target state CINC scores. In cases where there was an international intervention (e.g. UN, EU, NATO), the CINC scores of the leading countries within the international mission are used instead of the target state's capabilities.¹⁷⁴ Moreover, for target countries that are NATO members (e.g., Estonia, Lithuania), the US CINC scores are used instead considering that under Article 5 of the NATO Treaty all members including the US are to come to Estonia's defense if attacked by Russia (a motherland to ethnic Russians) (NATO, 2018). In dyads, where both the motherland and the target state are members (Turkey-Greece), I rely on Motherland/Target State CINC ratio and do not factor in the alliance (US) capabilities.

¹⁷¹ Cumulative frequency for conflict (unscaled, event counts): 848.

¹⁷² Cumulative frequency for cooperation (unscaled, event counts): 3154.88.

¹⁷³ Immediate frequency for conflict (unscaled, event counts): 317; Immediate frequency for cooperation (unscaled, event counts): 690.

¹⁷⁴ The UN has data on all country contributors (in terms of troops) to UN missions since 1990. I have used the combined CINC scores of the top 2 troop-contributing countries. I could not find any data for the period prior to 1990, so I used Canada's and Finland's CINC data since these two countries were the biggest contributing countries in 1990. For NATO interventions, I use the CINC scores for the US as it provides the largest number of troops within the alliance. For EU interventions, I rely on Germany's CINC scores. I could not find data on troop contributions by country, so I use Germany's CINC as it is the most important country in the EU. Also, the CINC scores of Germany do not vary dramatically from those of the UK and France, the other two military powers in the EU.

5.3 The Control Variables

I control for the leading explanatory variables from the comparative and international relations literature on democratization. The top three explanations in the literature for democratization deal with the socio-economic development of a target country, foreign aid, and international military intervention to bring about regime change. I also include other control variables that may explain the democratization: the number of motherlands with TEK in a target state, whether the target country has undergone an internal war or interstate war, the time-period (Cold War or post-Cold War), and political-geographic region of the world (e.g. sub-Saharan Africa, East Europe, etc.).

Number of Motherlands (0-2): is a categorical variable that tests whether the number of motherlands has a varying impact on democratization in a target county. Seventy-three (73) countries serve as motherlands to TEK found in one or more countries. For example, Sweden plays a motherland to only the Swedes in Finland. There are no Swedes (outside Sweden) that are native to any settlement other than those in Finland. However, some motherlands have TEK in more than one country. For example, Serbia plays a motherland to ethnic Serbs in Croatia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Montenegro.

Based on the EPR Database, I have coded three categories for the various numbers of motherlands that a target country may face. A value of 0 = potential motherland; 1 = 1-2 motherlands; 2 = 3+ motherlands. Of the 89 target countries in the dataset, 44 countries are home to only one TEK, 25 countries contain 2 TEK, 14 countries have 3 TEK, 6 target countries have 4 or more TEK in their midst. Furthermore, there are 29 target states for which there is a potential motherland at one time or another.¹⁷⁵ See Appendix B for a list of countries that are potential motherlands to various target states.

A target country may have more or less TEK (number of motherlands) over the years. For example, prior to 1991, China was home to only two TEK for which there was a motherland nearby (Mongols-Mongolia, and Koreans-North Korea). With the break-up of the Soviet Union and the independence of former republics in 1991, China's Kazakhs and Kyrgyz minorities too gained motherlands (Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan). So, between 1946 and 1990, China is coded as having 2 motherlands, whereas after 1991, the number of motherlands equals 4.

¹⁷⁵ A state may become a target for a motherland depending on whether the TEK controls the national government in a given year. As an ethnic group gets hold of power in a state it becomes an actual motherland and may pursue its TEK across the border. However, once the group loses national power, then it becomes a potential motherland. These episodic motherlands are usually found in Africa.

GDP per Capita (Log): much of the literature (Burkhart & Lewis-Beck, 1994; Lipset, 1959) concerning democratization suggests that economic development plays a key role. To address the impact of economic development on democratization, I control for a country's economic development.¹⁷⁶ Considering that GDP per capita is highly skewed, I use the logarithmic value of GDP per capita. The data is from Maddison Project Database 2018 (Bolt et al., 2018) which contains the most extensive information on economic wealth across countries and time period.¹⁷⁷

Foreign Aid (Log): foreign aid variable is constructed using data from AidData 3.2, which lists all foreign aid dedicated to democracy promotion programs (Aid Data sectors: Government and Civil Society, Support to NGO's, Conflict Prevention and Security) (Tierney et al., 2011). The dataset contains aid data to countries by bilateral donors (e.g. Austria) and multilateral organizations (e.g. World Bank). Since the amount of aid received by a target country is highly skewed, I use the logarithmic value of foreign aid.

International Organization Mission (0/1): numerous studies have examined the role of foreign intervention on the democratization of third countries. To control for this, I have created a dummy variable to account for military-political missions by international organizations. It takes on a value of 1 if a target country experienced an international organization mission, and 0 otherwise. The variable accounts for the UN (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2017), NATO (NATO, 2019), EU (Action, 2019), and/or Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, 2018) missions. This variable is created using the international organization data (i.e. UN, NATO, EU, and OSCE) and noting their international missions. The missions, depending on the organization, vary in nature. For example, the UN missions include peacekeeping (e.g. UN Mission in Liberia) as well as state-building missions (e.g. UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo). NATO missions are all military¹⁷⁸ in nature (e.g. Implementation Force, IFOR, in Bosnia). EU missions can include military (e.g. EUFOR in Central African Republic), police (e.g. EUPOL in DR Congo) and state-building (e.g. European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo). Finally, OSCE missions are state-building in nature (e.g. OSCE Mission to Georgia) and do not deploy military troops.

¹⁷⁶ Based on Real GDP per capita in US\$2011.

¹⁷⁷ Maddison Project Database does not have any GDP data for Kosovo and Papua New Guinea. As such, the GDP data for these two countries is from World Bank Development Indicators (GDP per capita, Current \$).

¹⁷⁸ Military missions can include the use of force (NATO intervention in Kosovo), securing peace in post-conflict settings, or capacity-building and the training armed forces.

Target State Population (Log): Population size is a proxy measure for state size. There is literature that argues that there is a correlation between state size (population) and democratization. One school of thought argues that there is a positive correlation between states with small populations and democratization (Anckar, 2008; Lundell, 2012; Ott, 2000) as small size makes it easier for the populace to participate in the political process, strengthens consensus, enhances social cohesion, or resource scarcity overrides ideological concerns. Others argue that autocracies are more likely in countries with small populations due to lower varieties of political interests and ease with which authorities can exercise control (Kwong & Wong, 2017; Veenendaal, 2013, 2019). I rely on population data from QOG dataset. I take the log of population, since the data is highly skewed. The dataset includes countries over 500,000 people including some small (e.g. Montenegro, 630,000 people) and some very large countries (e.g. China, 1.5 billion people).

Internal War (0/1): drawing on information from UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Database (N. P. Gleditsch et al., 2002; Pettersson et al., 2019), I generate a dummy variable to control for armed conflict in a target country. A value of 1 signifies that a target country is involved in an internal armed conflict and 0 otherwise. A target state may be engaged in multiple internal wars in any given year. When two or more internal wars are taking place within a given year, only the extreme cases are coded.¹⁷⁹

Interstate War (0/1): drawing on information from UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Database, I generate a dummy variable to control for interstate war that the target state is involved in. A value of 1 notes that the target state is engaged in an interstate war and 0 otherwise. This variable may include a war between a target state and a motherland. A target state may be engaged in multiple interstate wars in any given year. When two or more interstate wars are taking place within a given year, only the extreme cases are coded.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁹ When there are multiple conflict data for a single year, then I apply the following criteria to select which event to record: I rely on “Type of Conflict” as my first filter for coding armed conflict. UCDP/PRIO uses code 4 to denote international internal armed conflict and a code of 3 to indicate internal conflict. UCDP/PRIO uses a score of 2 to identify interstate wars; 2. If conflict type is the same, then “Intensity” of conflict determines the reported event. Wars with a greater number of deaths (> 1000 deaths) are coded over those with fewer deaths (25 - 999 deaths). If a country has the same coding in terms of conflict type and intensity, then I rely on “Incompatibility” to decide which case is coded. Wars over government and territory (code 3) > wars over territory (code 1) > wars over government (code 2).

¹⁸⁰ When there is multiple conflict data for a single year, then I apply the following criteria to select which event to record: I rely on “Type of Conflict” as my first filter for coding armed conflict. UCDP/PRIO uses code 4 to denote international internal armed conflict and a code of 3 to indicate internal conflict. UCDP/PRIO uses a score of 2 to identify interstate wars; 2. If conflict type is same, then “Intensity” of conflict determines the reported event. Wars with greater number of deaths (> 1000 deaths) are coded over those with less deaths (25 - 999 deaths). If a country

Post-Cold War (0/1): is a dummy variable that controls for the Cold War vs post-Cold War time period. A value of zero is used to indicate the Cold War period (1946-1989). The post-Cold War period takes on a score of 1. While there is some divergence in the literature about the date signifying the end of Cold War, the fall of Berlin Wall on November 1989, (with post-Cold War era starting in 1990) is a good starting point with some support in the literature (N. P. Gleditsch et al., 2007).

Political Geographic Region (1-10): is a variable constructed using the Quality of Government coding for various regions of the world. QOG divides the world into ten political regions based on “geographical proximity...and demarcation by area specialists having contributed to a regional understanding of democratization”¹⁸¹ (Teorell et al., 2019, p. 364).

5.4 Methods

I test the four hypotheses using a time-series, cross-section research design since I have information on 89 target countries from 1946-2015. For statistical modeling, I use several estimators. Primarily, I use least squares regression with country fixed effects to account for unobservable characteristics within countries that may influence democratization. This method is used in consideration of its ability to mix the characteristics of both cross-sectional and time-series data, which is important to deal with “intertemporal dynamics and the individuality of entities” under investigation (Dielman, 1983). As a robustness check on estimator type and in order to fit linear cross-sectional time series models, I employ a panel-corrected standard error (PCSE) with Prais—Winsten regression. Such an estimator “assumes that the disturbances are, by default, heteroskedastic and contemporaneously correlated across panels” (StataCorp, 2017, p. 1).

Finally, I estimate an Ordered Logistic model with year fixed effects to estimate the likelihood that the level of democracy is reached by a target country to become a Democracy, Minimally Democratic, Electorally Authoritarian, or revert/remains an Autocracy. Accounting for fixed effects allows me to control for the average differences across countries, reduce the impact

has the same coding in terms of conflict type and intensity, then I rely on “Incompatibility” to decide which case is coded. Wars over government and territory (code 3) > wars over territory (code 1) > wars over government (code 2).

¹⁸¹ 1. Eastern Europe and post-Soviet Union (including Central Asia) 2. Latin America (including Cuba, Haiti & the Dominican Republic) 3. North Africa & the Middle East (including Israel, Turkey & Cyprus) 4. Sub-Saharan Africa 5. Western Europe and North America (including Australia & New Zealand) 6. East Asia (including Japan & Mongolia) 7. South-East Asia 8. South Asia 9. The Pacific (excluding Australia & New Zealand) 10. The Caribbean (including Belize, Guyana & Suriname, but excluding Cuba, Haiti & the Dominican Republic)

of omitted variable bias, and improve fit (Torres-Reyna, 2007). Additionally, the finely grained data may not be as telling since a country may have a larger or smaller LDI score yet still fall under a political regime that we associate with some form of authoritarianism or democracy. Broader categories of regime type also provide a better test of the theory, given that I argue that intensity and frequency promote broad categories of political regimes. Ordinal logistic regression provides the measure to group countries into regime types which allows us to calculate predicted probabilities mirroring the hypotheses.

The basic structure of the models I use to test my argument is as follows:

Democratization, log (LDI/1-LDI)

$$= a + b1(intensity_{conflict/cooperation}) + b2(frequency_{conflict/cooperation}) + b3(\# motherlands) + b4(log economic wealth) + b5(log foreign aid) + b6(international mission=0, 1) + b7(log population size) + b8(internal war=0, 1) + b9(interstate war=0,1) + b9(time period_{cold war=0, 1}) + b10(world political region) + b11(country fixed effects) + e$$

In the next section, I will present the results of my statistical assessment and in Section 5.6, I will discuss what effect my findings have for my theory.

5.5 Results

My findings summarized in Table 2 provide support for the argument that a motherland that adopts a more conflictual approach is likely to have a negative impact on the democratization of the target country with whom it shares transnational ethnic kin. Furthermore, the evidence shows that a target state is generally more democratic when dealing with a neighboring motherland(s) that has a proven record of favoring cooperation events. Table 2 displays six models with different specifications to test the hypothesized relationships. All models rely on a least-square estimator with robust standard errors and fixed effects. Models 1 through 3 are base models regressing only the variables for intensity and frequency (separately for conflict and cooperation) on the log democratization. While Models 1 and 2 show the cumulative and immediate effects of the independent variables, respectively, Model 3 displays the results of both, the cumulative and immediate effects of intensity and frequency. Models 4 through 6 reveal the results of full specifications including the main control variables found in the literature. Whereas Model 4 shows

the cumulative effects, Model 5 accounts for the immediate effects. Lastly, Model 6 accounts for both cumulative and immediate effects of my independent variables on democratization.

Models 4 and 6 are may main models as they include the main control variables from the literature in addition to my independent variables dealing with the intensity and frequency for spoiling. Model 4 includes only the cumulative effects of intensity and frequency for both conflict and cooperation, whereas Model 6 includes the cumulative and immediate effects of the independent variables, in addition to the other control variables.




Figure 5. Motherland's Intensity and Frequency for Spoiling on the Level of Democracy

Figure 5 presents the findings from Model 6. It shows the cumulative effects of intensity and frequency for conflict (top part of the graph) and cooperation (bottom part of the graph). The result from this model is statistically significant at $p < 0.001$ level and in the predicted direction. The top-left graph in Figure 5 tests Hypothesis 1. I find that as a motherland's cumulative intensity for conflict increases, there is a greater likelihood that the level of democracy in a target state will decrease, thereby confirming my Hypothesis 1. The top right graph shows the impact of

cumulative frequency for conflict. I find support for my Hypothesis 2 that as a motherland's frequency for conflict with target state increases, the level of democracy in that target state decreases. The lower left graph visualizes the effects of cumulative intensity for cooperation. I find that motherlands that over time have shown a greater intensity for cooperation with a target state, the more likely a target state is to democratize. This confirms my Hypothesis 3. Lastly, the lower right graph shows support for my Hypothesis 4. As a motherland increases the frequency for cooperation over time (cumulative) with a target state, that level of democracy increases as well. Past the midpoint of the frequency scale for cooperation (6 units), I find that increased cooperation has a diminishing effect on the level of democratization.

In Table 2, I show the range of models (Models 1-6) with different specifications and the results of the cumulative and immediate effects of a motherland's intensity and frequency of spoiling on the level of democracy of a target state. The table lists the coefficients and standard errors. The findings from Model 4 show that a one standard deviation increase in the intensity of conflictual events initiated by a motherland leads to a -0.201 point decrease in the $\log(\text{democratization})$ of a target state. A one standard deviation increase in the frequency (count) of conflictual events initiated by a motherland leads to a -0.105 point decrease in the $\log(\text{democratization})$ of a target state. With respect to cooperation, a one-unit increase in the intensity or frequency for cooperation by a motherland leads to a 0.196 or 0.147 points increase in the $\log(\text{democratization})$ of a target state, respectively.

Additionally, the findings from Model 6 (including cumulative and immediate effects) show that a one standard deviation increase in the: 1) intensity for conflict leads to -0.205 points decrease in $\log(\text{democratization})$; 2) frequency for conflict leads to -0.091 points decrease in $\log(\text{democratization})$; 3) intensity for cooperation leads to +0.187 points increase in $\log(\text{democratization})$; and 4) frequency for cooperation leads to +0.15 points increase in $\log(\text{democratization})$ of a target state.

Table 2. Intensity & Frequency of Spoiling on the Level of Democracy (OLS with Robust Standard Errors, All Motherlands)

	Model 1 Base (C)	Model 2 Base (I)	Model 3 Base (C & I)	Model 4 Full (C)	Model 5 Full (I)	Model 6 Full (C & I)
Intensity for Conflict (C)	-0.0093 (0.021)		-0.0057 (0.022)	-0.0847*** (0.016)		-0.0862*** (0.016)
Intensity for Cooperation (C)	0.2162*** (0.015)		0.2039*** (0.016)	0.0725*** (0.014)		0.0690*** (0.014)
Frequency for Conflict (C)	-0.2393*** (0.029)		-0.2508*** (0.030)	-0.0862*** (0.023)		-0.0749** (0.024)
Frequency for Cooperation (C)	0.1223*** (0.035)		0.2170*** (0.049)	0.1638*** (0.026)		0.1675*** (0.030)
Intensity for Conflict (I)		0.0259** (0.008)	-0.0029 (0.008)		0.0023 (0.004)	0.0049 (0.004)
Intensity for Cooperation (I)		0.1247*** (0.012)	0.0334** (0.012)		0.0199*** (0.006)	0.0153* (0.006)
Frequency for Conflict (I)		-0.1569** (0.059)	0.0628 (0.065)		-0.0538+ (0.030)	-0.0404 (0.030)
Frequency for Cooperation (I)		0.0852+ (0.049)	-0.1968** (0.065)		0.0639* (0.028)	0.0085 (0.032)
# Motherlands: 1-2				-0.0904* (0.040)	-0.0747+ (0.041)	-0.0893* (0.040)
# Motherlands: 3+				0.2583** (0.084)	0.1902* (0.083)	0.2499** (0.084)
GDP per Capita (Log)				0.1163*** (0.031)	0.1595*** (0.027)	0.1201*** (0.031)
Foreign Aid (Log)				0.0080*** (0.001)	0.0079*** (0.002)	0.0076*** (0.002)
International Mission				0.2168*** (0.044)	0.2186*** (0.044)	0.2131*** (0.045)
Target State Population (Log)				-0.3585*** (0.053)	-0.3360*** (0.050)	-0.3615*** (0.053)
Target State Internal War				-0.1466*** (0.032)	-0.1542*** (0.032)	-0.1502*** (0.032)
Target State Interstate War				0.1895+ (0.107)	0.1660 (0.105)	0.1783+ (0.107)
Post-Cold War				0.8881*** (0.037)	0.9315*** (0.035)	0.8840*** (0.037)
South America				-1.3914*** (0.180)	-1.1676*** (0.166)	-1.3959*** (0.181)

Table 2 continued

Western Europe				1.6618*** (0.161)	1.8488*** (0.145)	1.6321*** (0.162)
Central-East Europe				-2.3052*** (0.176)	-2.4391*** (0.174)	-2.3597*** (0.179)
Sub-Saharan Africa				-0.1252 (0.126)	-0.0159 (0.134)	-0.1419 (0.128)
Middle East/North Africa				-1.5643*** (0.136)	-1.5117*** (0.121)	-1.6056*** (0.138)
South Asia				-0.9607*** (0.198)	-0.7571*** (0.179)	-0.9982*** (0.200)
Far East				-0.9490*** (0.189)	-0.8913*** (0.184)	-0.9578*** (0.190)
Oceania				-0.3523 ⁺ (0.194)	-0.1324 (0.179)	-0.3528 ⁺ (0.194)
Fixed Effects				Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	-2.0209*** (0.028)	-1.6784*** (0.031)	-2.0533*** (0.029)	3.7109*** (0.969)	2.8447** (0.870)	3.7225*** (0.971)
R^2	0.129	0.037	0.132	0.820	0.818	0.820
F	156.4430	46.6121	84.2405	766.5400	729.2886	714.2028
Observations	4341	4341	4341	4294	4294	4294

Standard errors in parentheses

⁺ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

C = Cumulative; I = Immediate; Base #Motherlands = 0 (No Motherlands) Base Political Region = North America

Concerning the immediate effects of intensity and frequency for conflict and cooperation, Model 5 in Table 2 shows the results of the immediate effects plus control variables. Contrary to the expectation, the findings show that an increase in the intensity for conflict is associated with an increase in the level of democracy. However, the direction of the relationship is not statistically significant. With respect to the other three independent variables, the direction of the relationship is in line with the predicted direction of cumulative effects. Frequency for conflict leads to lower levels of democracy, whereas the intensity and frequency for cooperation are associated with higher levels of democracy. The findings are statistically significant.¹⁸² A one standard deviation increase in the: 1) intensity for cooperation is associated with a 3.9% increase; 2) frequency for conflict is associated with a 2.8 decrease; and 3) frequency for cooperation is correlated with a 4.1% increase in the level of democracy, respectively.

Lastly, the effects of the immediate effect of intensity and frequency in the fully specified Model 6 are similar to the results from Model 5. The direction of the relationship is the same, but only the intensity for cooperation is statistically significant ($p < 0.05$ level).

Models 1 through 3 are the base models, as they do not account for other variables that may affect the level of democracy in a target country, nor do they include fixed effects. Model 1 shows the effects of cumulative intensity and frequency; Model 2 includes just the immediate effects; and Model 3 incorporates both the cumulative and immediate intensity and frequency for conflict and cooperation. All independent variables (cumulative effects) are in the predicted direction. The results suggest that increases in the cumulative intensity and frequency for cooperation are correlated with higher levels of democracy, while an increase in the level of frequency for conflict is associated with lower levels of democracy. While the intensity for conflict is not statistically significant at any typical level, the intensity for cooperation, the frequency for conflict, and frequency for cooperation are significant.

The findings from Table 2 also show the effects of the number of motherlands on the level of democracy in a target country. Compared to a target country facing no actual motherland (only potential motherland), a target country with 1 or 2 transnational ethnic kin with a motherland(s) nearby is likely to have a lower level of democracy. The average difference in log(democratization) between a target state with 1 to 2 motherlands and a target state with only a potential motherland

¹⁸² Intensity for Cooperation at $p < 0.001$; Frequency for Conflict at $p < 0.1$; and Frequency for Cooperation at $p < 0.05$ level.

(actual motherland=0), is between -0.0904 (Model 4) and -0.0893 (Model 6) points. Substantively, a target state with 1 to 2 motherlands will have about 9% lower levels of democracy than a country with a potential motherland nearby. The results also show that target states with transnational ethnic kin for which there are three or more motherlands nearby are substantively more democratic. Compared to a target state with potential motherlands, countries in this category are likely to have about 29% higher levels of democracy.

In Figure 6, I show the cumulative effects of intensity and frequency on the level of democracy using other specifications for my independent variables. The top part of the graph shows the results from Model 7 (Table 3) whereas the bottom part of the graph shows the results from Model 9 (Table 3). The most important differences from Figure 5 (and Table 2) pertain to the measures for the intensity and frequency.




Figure 6. Motherland's Intensity (Single Scale) and Frequency/Capabilities on the Level of Democracy

Whereas Figure 5 plots models containing separate scales for conflict and cooperation, following (Pevehouse, 2004), in Figure 6, the top part of the graph plots the intensity of events on a single scale, from conflict to cooperation (i.e. Goldstein scale). The bottom of the graph plots the ratio of the motherland to target state CINC score as a proxy for the frequency of the relationship motherland-target state. The intensity measure is the same in both Models 7 and 9.

The left two graphs show the intensity of the relationship (single scale, Conflict to Cooperation). The two graphs on the rights display the effects of frequency/capabilities on the level of democracy. The results are similar to those shown in Figure 5 and Table 2. The top-left graph shows that as a motherland's intensity of events moves along a continuum from conflict to cooperation, the level of democracy in a target state rises, lending support to my Hypothesis 1 and 3. Regarding the frequency/capabilities to spoil the level of democracy, the data indicates that as a motherland increases the level of interaction with a target state, the level of democracy in a target country drops. Since this variable sums all events (conflict and cooperative), it is not clear whether conflict or cooperative events are driving this relationship. So, in order, to gain some clarity on this point, the bottom right graph shows how capabilities affect democracy. The data show as the ratio of the motherland to target state CINC score increases, the level of democracy drops, in line with my theoretical expectations. Motherlands that have superior capabilities to those of target states are more likely to pursue strategies that lead to the spoiling of democratization.

In Table 3, I show Models 7 through 10 which include these new specifications. In cases where a target state has more than 1 motherland, Model 7 shows the results of the mean values for intensity and frequency. Model 8 presents the findings of the sum scores for intensity and frequency across all motherlands. Alternatively, in Models 9 and 10, I test the effect of the ratio of motherland to target state CINC scores on the level of democracy.

The results presented in Table 3 below, show across model specifications (7 through 10) that as the intensity of interactions increase from conflict to cooperation, whether we examine the mean or the sum of intensity when Motherlands > 1, so do does the level of democracy. This relationship is statistically significant at $p < 0.001$ level (Models 7-9) but not in Model 10. When it comes to the frequency/capabilities of interactions, across models the relationship is in the predicted direction and statistically significant. With the exception of Model 7,¹⁸³ the level of significance is at $p < 0.001$ level.

¹⁸³ Significance level is at $p < 0.05$.

Table 3. Cumulative Intensity & Frequency (All Motherlands) of Spoiling on the Level of Democracy (Conflict-Cooperation Scale)

	Model 7 (OLS w/RSE)	Model 8 (OLS w/RSE)	Model 9 (OLS w/RSE)	Model 10 (OLS w/RSE)
Intensity Conflict-Cooperation (Mean)	0.0676*** (0.013)		0.0767*** (0.012)	
Frequency Conflict-Cooperation (Mean)	-0.0321* (0.015)			
Intensity Conflict-Cooperation Scale (Sum)		0.1312*** (0.034)		0.0339 (0.023)
Frequency Conflict-Cooperation (Sum)		-0.1332*** (0.024)		
CINC Capabilities (Mean)			-0.1395*** (0.037)	
CINC Capabilities (Sum)				-0.1557*** (0.029)
# Motherlands: 1-2	-0.0678+ (0.037)	-0.0648+ (0.038)	-0.0721+ (0.037)	-0.0675+ (0.038)
# Motherlands: 3+	0.1819* (0.076)	0.2118* (0.079)	0.1631* (0.075)	0.1373+ (0.076)
GDP per Capita (Log)	-0.0490 (0.033)	-0.0573+ (0.033)	-0.0400 (0.033)	-0.0525 (0.033)
Foreign Aid (Log)	0.0100*** (0.002)	0.0096*** (0.002)	0.0095*** (0.002)	0.0089*** (0.002)
International Mission	0.0713 (0.044)	0.0568 (0.044)	0.0786+ (0.044)	0.0659 (0.044)
Target State Population (Log)	-0.7608*** (0.062)	-0.6982*** (0.063)	-0.7291*** (0.059)	-0.6544*** (0.063)
Target State Internal War	-0.1160*** (0.031)	-0.1129*** (0.031)	-0.1414*** (0.031)	-0.1579*** (0.031)
Target State Interstate War	0.1163 (0.098)	0.1282 (0.104)	0.1120 (0.098)	0.1131 (0.101)
Post-Cold War	2.6816*** (0.232)	2.6618*** (0.231)	2.6656*** (0.223)	2.6338*** (0.224)
South America	-2.6983*** (0.208)	-2.4338*** (0.209)	-2.5932*** (0.203)	-2.2796*** (0.211)
Western Europe	0.8302*** (0.167)	1.1123*** (0.167)	0.9024*** (0.164)	1.2379*** (0.168)
Central-East Europe	-3.3964*** (0.196)	-3.2453*** (0.204)	-3.3217*** (0.191)	-3.2393*** (0.213)

Table 3 continued

Sub-Saharan Africa	-0.3755** (0.119)	-0.2927* (0.119)	-0.3560** (0.117)	-0.2334* (0.119)
Middle East/North Africa	-2.5059*** (0.155)	-2.3760*** (0.156)	-2.4235*** (0.151)	-2.3045*** (0.156)
South Asia	-2.0221*** (0.207)	-1.6894*** (0.206)	-1.9519*** (0.202)	-1.5580*** (0.207)
Far East	0.0189 (0.188)	-0.2079 (0.198)	-0.0595 (0.180)	-0.3042 (0.199)
Oceania	-1.9831*** (0.239)	-1.7676*** (0.239)	-1.8832*** (0.235)	-1.6261*** (0.240)
Fixed Effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	10.9207*** (1.191)	9.8937*** (1.222)	10.2291*** (1.146)	9.3298*** (1.233)
R^2	0.835	0.834	0.836	0.836
F	344.8042	351.0848	345.0510	364.0642
Observations	4294	4294	4294	4294

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

C = Cumulative; I = Immediate; Base #Motherlands = 0 (No Motherlands) Base Political Region = North America

In Appendix C, I show the results when using a more robust statistical estimator, least squares with panel corrected standard errors. The results are in the predicted direction for Models 11 and 12. Increases in the intensity and frequency for conflict (separate scale) as associated with lower levels of democracy whereas increases in the intensity and frequency for cooperation (separate scale) is correlated with increased democracy. In Models 13 and 14, where I test the single scale measure for intensity, the direction of the relationship is not in the expected direction. As the number of interactions increases, or the ratio of the motherland to target state capabilities, so does the level of democracy.

Examining the main control variables, we find that some of the results follow a predictable pattern. Numerous quantitative studies on this topic find that there is a positive correlation between economic wealth and democratization. My results (Models 4-6) confirm previous findings as well. Target states with higher levels of GDP per capita experience higher levels of democratization. A doubling of GDP per capita would lead to a 12% increase in the level of democracy.

My results show that increases in foreign aid dedicated to democratization programs¹⁸⁴ instead of general foreign aid, I find that increased levels of foreign aid are generally correlated with higher levels of democracy. A 100 % increase in foreign aid dedicated to democracy programs is associated with a less than 1 percent increase in the democratization level.

The analysis from Models 3-5 shows that a target country hosting an international mission, in the form of UN, NATO, EU or OSCE, will have higher levels of democratization than one that has no such international presence. All else equal, a target country in which there is an international mission will experience 27.37% higher level of democratization than a country without a UN, NATO, EU or OSCE mission.

The findings also reveal that countries with larger populations are likely to have lower democratization levels. When it comes to armed conflict, a target country experiencing internal armed conflict will have lower democratization levels. Model 5 results show that the level of democratization in a country engulfed in internal war is 11.9 % lower than a target country that is not experiencing internal war. This relationship is statistically significant at $p < 0.001$ level. With respect to interstate wars, results show that there is a positive relationship between a target country

¹⁸⁴ Aid Sectors 150 (Government and Civil Society), 151 (Government and Civil Society, General) 152 (Conflict Prevention and Resolution, Peace and Security), 220 (Communications) and 920 (Support to Non-Governmental Organizations and Government Organizations). AidData 3.2, 2018.

engaged in interstate war and democratization level, however, this relationship is not statistically significant.


Regarding the Cold War versus the post-Cold War period, the data shows, in general countries have experienced higher democratization levels since the end of the Cold War in 1989. With respect to political regions of the world, compared to North America (baseline), only Western Europe has experienced higher democratization levels. Every other political region (South America, Central-East Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, Far East, and Oceania) registers lower democratization levels. This relationship is statistically significant at 95% level (sub-Saharan Africa and Far East) and 99% level (other regions).

5.6 Discussion of Results

In Figure 7, I show the effect of cumulative intensity and frequency for spoiling as we move one standard deviation away from the mean, on the level of democracy. The plot shows the average level of democracy (V-DEM) from 1946 to 2015 for two categories of countries. The baseline (solid black line) is the average level of democracy for all countries without a motherland (actual or potential). For example, countries such as Canada, Brazil, Norway, Australia, are included in this baseline. The other category of countries (colored dash lines) include all those target countries for which there are one to two motherlands.

In line with my hypothesis 1 and 2, the data reveals that target states facing one to two motherlands with increased cumulative levels of intensity and frequency for conflict (green and red dash dot lines), experience lower levels of democracy. As the intensity for conflict moves one standard deviation away from the mean, the democracy score¹⁸⁵ decreases by 18.21%. As the frequency for conflict increases by one standard deviation, the democracy score drops by 9.97%. Accordingly, regarding cooperation events initiated by motherland toward a target state, as the intensity level increases by one standard deviation, the democracy score increase by 21.65%. As the frequency of cooperative events increases by a standard deviation, the democracy score increases too by 15.84%.

¹⁸⁵ Liberal Democracy Index takes on values from 0 to 1, according to V-DEM.



Note: Intensity and Frequency at +1 Standard Deviation Away from the Mean (#Motherlands=1-2).

Figure 7. The Level of Democracy of Target States (1-2 Motherlands vs. No Motherlands)

If we are to look at the example of Croatia, between 1992 and 1995 (at the height of military conflict with Serbia) the democracy score (LDI) averaged 0.22. Between 1996 and 1999, after the military operations had ceased but during a period of limited cooperation with Serbia, Croatia's democracy score averaged 0.28, about an 18% difference in the scores (conflict vs post-conflict era). As the level of cooperation increased between the two countries in the aftermath of new governments in both countries (after the downfall of Milosevic and the loss of HDZ at the ballot box), so does the level of democracy in Croatia. The year the 2000 elections were held, Croatia LDI was 0.55, in the years after, the average LDI score was 0.671, about a 22% increase.

What Figure 7 also shows is that the target states dealing with 1-2 motherlands that exhibit increased levels of intensity and frequency for cooperation, on average, have comparable democracy levels as countries with no motherland (actual or potential). During the Cold War, there were episodes when such target states behaved in a sinusoidal manner, but since 1990, they exhibit

higher levels of democracy. Between the intensity and frequency of cooperative events, the intensity levels show to perform better.

It may not be unreasonable to expect such behavior. Motherlands whose regime type is a democracy and have been long since separated from kin, more so than their capabilities may determine how a target state responds to the democratization processes. Recall from earlier in the chapter that cumulative intensity is reflective of identity that a motherland builds over the years. Target states may be more open to democratization processes knowing that a neighboring motherland will not lay claim to territories within the target state inhabited by transnational ethnic kin. Since 1946, no democracy has intervened militarily to annex the territory of another state that was undergoing democratization voluntarily (not imposed). This is important for the target state as it can undertake reforms, especially in terms of increased political rights and civil liberties of ethnic minorities, without worrying about motherlands promoting segregationist or annexationist policies. The democratization of Central Europe in the post-Cold War was more rapid because the TEK in their midst had motherlands in Western Europe, where all countries were democracies that were split from their kin at the end of World War 2.

Linear regressions provide evidence for my hypothesis across various model specifications. The results are not sensitive to democracy measures. Even when regressing the independent variable on the original scale of Liberal Democracy Index, the findings hold. However, such regressions are not very telling regarding political regimes we expect to come across in target countries as intensity and frequency for conflict/cooperation change from low to high (0/1). A country can experience an increase or decrease in democratization scores yet remain broadly within the same regime category. For example, between 1990 and 2012, the UK saw a general increase in the democratization score from about 0.7735 to about 0.8980. However, by 2015 its democratization score decreased to 0.8047. During this entire period, the UK is classified as a democracy according to V-DEM.

In Tables 4 and 5, I show the predicted probabilities of a target country falling into one of four political regimes (as classified by V-DEM) at different levels of intensity and frequency for conflict or cooperation. See Appendix D (Table 6) for the results from various categorical model specifications.

Table 4. Predicted Probabilities of Democratization (Conflictual Motherland)

Intensity Low = 0	Frequency High = 1	A	EA	MD	D	A (Lean)	D (Lean)
0	0	0.56	0.25	0.12	0.06	0.81	0.19
0	1	0.62	0.23	0.10	0.05	0.85	0.15
1	0	0.62	0.23	0.10	0.05	0.85	0.15
1	1	0.67	0.21	0.08	0.04	0.87	0.13

Political Regimes: A-Autocratic; EA-Electorally Authoritarian; MD-Minimally Democratic; D-Democratic

Autocratic Lean = Autocratic + Electoral Authoritarian; Democratic Lean = Minimally Democratic + Democratic

Table 5 Predicted Probabilities of Democratization (Cooperative Motherland)

Intensity Low = 0	Frequency High = 1	A	EA	MD	D	A (Lean)	D (Lean)
0	0	0.74	0.16	0.06	0.03	0.91	0.09
0	1	0.60	0.24	0.11	0.06	0.84	0.16
1	0	0.63	0.22	0.10	0.05	0.85	0.15
1	1	0.47	0.28	0.16	0.09	0.75	0.25

Political Regimes: A-Autocratic; EA-Electorally Authoritarian; MD-Minimally Democratic; D-Democratic

Autocratic Lean = Autocratic + Electoral Authoritarian; Democratic Lean = Minimally Democratic + Democratic

The data for conflict shows that when a motherland expresses low intensity for conflict (0) and low frequency for conflict (0), a target country has a 81% predicted probability falling of under some form of autocracy (autocratic or electoral authoritarian), and 19% predicted probability of being somewhat democratic (minimally democratic or democratic). As both, intensity and frequency for conflict rise to high (a value of 1), the predicted probabilities of a target country leaning autocratic rises by 6% (Autocracy Lean rises from 81% to 87%) and leaning democratic decreases from 19% to 13%.

Examining the results from Table 5, we can see that when both intensity and frequency for cooperation are low (a value of 0), a target country has the predicted probability of 74% being an autocracy. When a motherland(s) expresses high intensity and frequency for cooperation (a value of 1), then the predicted probability of a target country of being an autocracy drops to 47 percent. If we are to look at broader political regime leanings (autocratic + electoral authoritarian) or (minimally democratic + democratic) we find that as motherlands move from low to high levels of intensity and frequency, the predicted probability of a country leaning autocratic drops from 91% to 75%, and democracy leaning increases from 9% to 25%.

5.7 Chapter Summary

In this chapter, I have tested the relationship between motherland spoiling and the level of democracy of a target country, using the intensity and frequency of events, conflictual and cooperative, respectively. I find that spoiling is highly correlated with the level of democracy. Motherlands that have traditionally (cumulative) pursued a more conflictual relationship against a target country with whom they share ethnic kin, are more likely to adversely affect the level of democracy in that state. Moreover, the more frequently a motherland has initiated conflictual events against a target state, the lower the level of democracy in the target country. This relationship is statistically significant and holds across various model specifications.

Since motherlands and target states share the geography (adjacent), the people (TEK), and are linked economically since once upon a time constituted a single country, conflict and cooperation are not mutually exclusive events. When I test the intensity and frequency of cooperative events initiated by a motherland against a target state, I find that the greater the level of cooperation is correlated with higher democracy scores. This relationship, as well, is statistically significant at the typical levels, all else equal. While conflictual interactions lead to lower levels

of democracy, cooperation is a stronger indicator of higher levels of democracy in a target state. A motherland that shows high levels of intensity and frequency for cooperation is almost twice as likely to have at least a minimal level of democracy as a country that shows low levels of intensity and frequency for conflict. When plotting the level of democracy as the intensity or frequency for cooperation increases by a standard deviation, I find that there is very little difference between target states with one to two motherlands and countries that have no motherlands at all.

In the next chapter, I offer my conclusions to this research. I summarize my key findings, discuss some key policy implications of democracy spoiling, and layout some directions for future research.

CHAPTER 6. CONCLUSION

“The policy of ethnic cleansing had a strategic logic, as well as a political logic, and it was carried out in a consistent pattern. The idea was simply to establish an area along the Drina and Sava rivers, which would make continuous the areas inhabited by Serbs in Bosnia, Serbia, Montenegro, and Croatia, to facilitate the contacts between those groups. The logic of the strategic purpose was also inevitable in its outcome. As the Serb population in those areas was much less than the non-Serb population, it behoved that logic to remove the population, which was inimical simply because there weren’t enough people of the dominant group to be able to control those who were not. So, rather than risk having, if you will, an inimical or enemy group at your back, the strategic dictates were to ethnically cleanse them. The tactics were simple. The tactics were really very simple and rather simplistic. The tactics were simply to engage in the type of violence that would cause people to leave, after many had suffered and been killed, with the fear of what might happen to them and with the terrorizing effect that it created. In fact, it is very telling that in 80 percent of the rape cases that we investigated, the acts of rape were done with the purpose of enhancing the element of shame and embarrassment of the victim, of her family, and of the community, so as to create a terror-inspiring effect that would cause people to flee and not to return.”

(Sherif Bassiouni)¹⁸⁶

At the writing of this dissertation, it has been exactly 100 years since December 1, 1918, a momentous date for Eastern European powerhouses Serbia and Hungary, two neighboring countries with transnational ethnic kin dispersed throughout the region. For Serbia, December 1, 2018, represents the 100-year anniversary of the Corfu Declaration, establishing the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, and unifying all South Slav¹⁸⁷ people into one country under Serb dominion; the realization of the dream of generations of Serb elites who sought to resurrect the medieval Serb Empire. For Hungary, on the other hand, this date signifies a century since its loss of Transylvania – a territory that was under Hungarian rule for centuries and a region containing

¹⁸⁶ The Chairman of the Security Council’s Commission to Investigate Violations of International Humanitarian Law in the Former Yugoslavia, said in testimony before the U.S. Congress on April 4, 1995; U.S. Congress files, April 4, 1995. http://ftp.fas.org/irp/congress/1995_hr/genocideinbosnia.html).

¹⁸⁷ The only exception are the Bulgarians who are a South Slav people but did not fall under Serb dominion despite Serb elites territorial aspirations to include them in a Serb led state. Ilija Garasanin in his *Nacertanje* (1848) wrote about the need for Bulgarians to be a part of the common state. Between 1946 and 1948, Yugoslav and Bulgarian leaders, Tito and Georgi Dimitrov worked on establishing a Balkan Federation that would bring these two countries plus Albania into one common state.

a majority Hungarian population – to Romania (Wynn, 2018). These two outcomes in the aftermath of World War 1 have resulted in a different fate for each of the countries.

Serbia is yet to come to terms with the dissolution of Yugoslavia in 1991 and its loss of control over that state. As its control loosened, Serbia pursued armed conflict, ethnic cleansing and genocide in pursuit of expanding its political borders to match its ethnic boundaries. It contested the territorial status quo (political borders) of Croatia, Bosnia, and Kosovo, and it challenged the democratization processes taking place throughout the former Yugoslavia because democratization weakened Serb domination of the common state. In Bosnia and Kosovo, to this day, it continues to spoil the democratization process as it continues to challenge the territorial status quo, by seeking to reclaim Serb populated/claimed areas in these two states. Its main strategies in dealing with these two countries have included annexation and segregation (setting up a mini-state for its ethnic kin). Consequently, Bosnia and Kosovo have not consolidated their democracy despite over 20 years of intensive democracy promotion by the US, EU, and UN.

On the other hand, as Soviet Union's grip on its client states in Europe loosened at the end of the 1980s, there were expectations that ethnic riots in Transylvania in 1990 (Transylvania Free Press, 2019) may lead Hungary and Romania into an armed conflict over the fate of Transylvania (Dupuy, 1992). The fears that Yugoslavia's drama may engulf these two countries too proved unfounded as the years since the fall of Communism have shown that Hungary has made peace with its loss of Transylvania. For some years after the fall of communism, the level of democracy in Romania lagged behind that of Hungary as there were fears that greater democratization may increase Hungarian appetite for a segregationist strategy in Romania. However, over the years, as Hungary joined major international institutions (NATO and EU)¹⁸⁸ ahead of Romania, it did not condition Romania's ascension to these structures with demands for territorial autonomy for its kin in Transylvania. At no time did it demonstrated that an annexationist or a segregationist strategy is in play. Consequently, Romania's level of democracy increased to the point, that in 2015, its level of democracy was higher than that of Hungary, according to V-DEM data.

Throughout this dissertation, I have referred to many examples from Central/East Europe and the former Soviet Union, as I am most familiar with these two regions. However, this relationship (motherland-target state) and what it means for democracy promotion by third parties is not confined to these two regions alone. The splitting of a single historical settlement of an

¹⁸⁸ Membership year: in NATO (Hungary 1999, Romania 2004); in the EU (Hungary 2004, Romania 2007).

ethnic group between two or more states can be found throughout Western Europe, Africa, and Asia. And, depending on a motherland's regime type, time since the loss of kin, capabilities and the response of the international community, the political borders of a nearby target state, have in the past and may in the future, be contested or not. For example, while Ireland has not contested the UK borders, Iran since 2003 is increasingly spoiling the nascent Iraqi democracy through its fellow Shia in Iraq. Others have pointed out that even North America may not be immune to this type of dynamics. Samuel Huntington in his essay "The Hispanic Challenge" argued that in the near future, Mexico may challenge the political borders of the US in the states (Texas, California, Arizona, Nevada, and Utah) where Mexicans are increasing in numbers and in lands considered as historically Mexican (Huntington, 2009).

6.1 Key Findings

The motivation for this research came from my childhood growing up in Yugoslavia. As the country began to unravel in the late 1980s, there were constant references to "motherland" by Serbs, Albanians, Croats, and Bosniaks alike. When referring to the motherland, the sentiments always invoked a yearning for belonging (to) and protection (by) the motherland. As if all the troubles would just go away upon unification. As I began my doctoral studies, I was interested to learn more if this type of relationship that resulted in chaos in the former Yugoslavia, travels to other regions of the world as well.

I started this project with the question: Why do some external democratization efforts fail even in circumstances that should have brought about success? To address this question, I considered existing explanations for the success or failure of external democratization efforts through military intervention, state-building or decentralization. I found that these three variables only partially explain the failure of democratization when promoted by external actors. Despite some findings that internal conditions such as ethnic homogeneity, socioeconomic development, or a political leadership responsive to the domestic audience are the best predictors of democratization, some recent examples such as Kosovo or Azerbaijan (among many others) show that even when a country is over 90% ethnically homogenous, with over \$4,000 GDP per capita and a political leadership that is not externally imposed, a country experiences lower levels of democracy.

One variable that the literature on democratization has overlooked is that of the motherland. Since previous conflict studies have shown that motherland is an important variable in predicting the onset, the duration, or the spread of civil/ethnic war, it is not far-fetched to expect a similar correlation between motherland and the level of democracy in a country with whom it shares transnational ethnic kin. Through a mixed-method approach, I sought to examine such a relationship. I used process tracing to show how Serbia, by pursuing an annexationist strategy, negatively affected the democratization process in Croatia between 1991 and 1998. After 1999, as Serbia was forced to adopt a strategy of apathy, as a result of international intervention and the loss of the Serb population in Croatia, the level of democracy rose significantly in Croatia. In 2009, Croatia joined NATO, and since 2013 it has been a member of the European Union.

In my research, I also examined whether such a finding can be more generalizable to other countries and regions. Using different estimators and model specifications, I analyzed the data from 89 target countries from 1946 to 2015 to test whether the presence of nearby motherland would spoil the democratization process of a target country. I analyzed the intensity and frequency, for conflict and cooperation, of events initiated by a motherland against a target state. I hypothesized that: a) a motherland that initiates high levels of intensity/frequency for conflictual events will negatively impact the level of democracy of a target state, as it seeks to challenge the territorial status quo of that state; and b) a motherland that initiates high levels of intensity/frequency for cooperative events will positively affect the level of democracy of a target state, as it recognizes the territorial status quo.

In this dissertation, I demonstrate that motherlands indeed are significant actors in the democratization of the target country with whom they share that kin. The very presence of motherland is not necessarily detrimental to the democratization process of the target country. After all, not every motherland is a spoiler. For example, countries like Ireland or Austria did not spoil the democratization of the UK or Italy, despite the presence of Irish in Northern Ireland or Austrians in South Tyrol region of Italy. The effect on democratization is context-dependent. External actors are more likely to be successful at promoting democratization in a country when a nearby motherland has a history of engaging in highly cooperative acts (e.g. provide military protection, economic cooperation) at a high frequency.

Analogously, democracy is spoiled when a motherland initiates high intensity conflictual events (e.g. threaten attack, engage in ethnic cleansing, occupy territory) and at a high frequency

seeking to contest the political borders of the target state. This is particularly the case when a motherland has shown a historic propensity to engage in conflict. Over time, in making claims against the territorial integrity of the target state, and then engaging in conflictual events, a motherland creates an identity of being a revisionist state which makes it difficult for the target state to engage in democratization as it fears the motherland may take advantage of the process to expand its borders. This was the case in former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s, with Serbia claiming since other republics voted to secede it would be undemocratic for these aspiring new state not to grant Serb minorities the right to vote whether they want to join Serbia or stay within the republic in which they are found.

6.2 Policy Implications

The end of World War 2 was to signify the end of an era where nationalism and ethnic superiority reigned supreme. The years since 1945, at least in the Western world, were years that promoted ideologies and policies that denounced nationalism and ethnic divisions. However, this period of increased democratization seems to have come to an end, perhaps even reversed. In the new millennium, nationalism and ethnic identity are again on the march across Europe and the US. Nationalist political parties have made significant inroads across the European continent. In Switzerland, Austria,¹⁸⁹ and Italy, nationalist parties are part of governing coalitions. Even Germany, a country averse to extremism in politics, witnessed the rise of the nationalist Alternative for Germany (AfD) to become the third-largest party in the parliament in 2017, and the first nationalist party to enter the parliament since the Nazi era. The more liberal North European countries were not spared of rising nationalism either. In Sweden, Finland, and Denmark, nationalist parties have more than 17% of the votes for the parliament (BBC News, May 24, 2019). The nationalist sentiment has taken hold in the United States too. The Congressional elections since 2010 and the Presidential Election of 2016, have yielded the election of nationalists to Congress (Tea Party members) and the White House (President Donald Trump).

The increasing nationalism, not only in Europe and the US, but also elsewhere has also resulted in increased illiberalism. New EU member states, Hungary and Poland, are increasingly adopting legislation and executing policies that are illiberal and in contravention of European laws

¹⁸⁹ In Austria, on May 2, 2019, the government, of which FPÖ (Freedom Party of Austria) was a coalition partner, collapsed as new elections are scheduled for September 29.

and norms (The New York Times, May 3, 2018). Since 2016, the US has witnessed some backsliding in democracy scores as well (V-DEM Institute, 2019). The question then arises, if nationalism and illiberalism are on the rise in Europe and the US, the bastions of liberty and democracy, why would other countries not follow these examples? For many years there have been warnings of increasing illiberal democracies (Zakaria, 1997). According to organizations that measure democracy across countries and years, Freedom House and V-DEM, for the past 16 years democracy is in recession across the globe, including countries with a long record of democracy (US, India) and others with a recent record of democracy (Poland) (Freedom House, 2019; V-DEM Institute, 2019).

Ethnic identity politics seems to experience a bit of renaissance in international relations too. While once considered a phenomenon that would go away with modernization, the last decade has shown, that not only is it alive and well in non-democracies, but it's also sprouting in established democracies. For example, Scotland held a referendum on seceding from the United Kingdom and chart its own course as a separate country. Although that referendum failed in 2014, since the British referendum on leaving the EU (Brexit), the Scottish government has begun to talk anew about another independence referendum in Brexit's aftermath (Institute for Government, 2019). A similar development, albeit one more divisive, is taking place in Spain, where the regional parliament of Catalonia declared independence in 2017 in defiance of Spanish authorities. The Catalan moves towards independence have been met with the suspension of regional autonomy and the persecution of independence leaders. Even in Italy, in South Tyrol, there is some aspiration among German speakers for reunification with Austria (Marchetti, 2014).

For close to 70 years in Europe, the former foes and friends have sought to charter an ever greater union, starting with the European Coal and Steel Community. While aspiring members did not mind sacrificing some of their ethnic foreign policies (e.g. recognizing political borders of other member states, refrain from conflict, and be a good neighbor) in return for membership, it is worth asking whether member states would return to an ethnic foreign policy in pursuing their transnational ethnic kin if the EU project is to falter? While newer EU members would almost for certain pursue their transnational ethnic kin more aggressively (e.g. Hungary, Croatia, Poland), it is not implausible to expect a similar outcome in the West either. After all, there has been some talk among the Irish and the British that with Brexit there is a "[v]ery real chance of Irish unity

poll”, a referendum on the reunification of the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland (Eardley, 2019).

These trends in the decline of democracy and the increasing emphasis on ethnic identity should raise alarms in capitals across Europe and the US. Democratization has been a top foreign policy priority for the US since the end of the 19th century, and in Western Europe since the 1950s. Much blood, resources, and political prestige have been invested by democracies in advance of democracy worldwide. Its retreat, including the traditionally liberal West, may create significant challenges to major democracies as there is no alternative to democracy in these countries. Furthermore, China and Russia, the leading authoritarian states, are increasingly promoting their model of governance throughout the globe and have even used influence operations to stir ethnic sentiments in the West, to not even speak of other countries. During the 2016 US presidential election, Russian trolls targeted Mexican-Americans with maps of Greater Mexico and exploited racial tensions of African-Americans (CNN Business, 2018; Lockhart, 2018).

In the 1990s, the West and the international community had to deal with the consequences of motherlands who sought to challenge the territorial status quo of adjacent states. The wars in the former Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union introduced a new generation of people to the old ills of transnational ethnic conflict. These conflicts quickly took on an international dimension as the consequences spilled over across the region (e.g. refugees, organized crime, and instability) and invited military interventions by the international community, in places like Bosnia and Kosovo.

However, military intervention and a quarter-century of democracy promotion in the Balkans and other places, continue to increase the potential for transnational ethnic conflict and hamper democratization. Other cases where we may see motherlands pursue their transnational ethnic kin include the Middle East. Since the US invasion in 2003, we have seen Iran increasingly spoil the democratization of Iraq through its Shia kin. While it has benefitted from the US democracy promotion, with Shia parties winning big in elections as a result of their 60% share of the population, the political rights and civil liberties of the Sunnis have been curtailed in Iraq. With respect to Kurds, although the Kurdish Regional Government does not represent a sovereign state, the Iraqi Kurds for years have been playing a motherland to Kurds in Turkey and more recently in Syria where Kurdish Peshmerga were sent to northern Syria (i.e. Kobane) to fight the Islamic State.

The coming years may see the entry of China in contesting the political borders of states with whom they share transnational ethnic kin. China’s increasing economic power since 2000 has

translated into military power and a more assertive foreign policy, especially in Asia. Over the last 20 years, it has pushed its territorial claims in South China Sea and had largely militarized the sea through building military basis on existing and artificial islands. Though claims to South China Sea lack the transnational ethnic kin component as the region is uninhabited, China has a history of “coming to the defense” of its kin, in places like Myanmar, when it serves its interests (Han, 2017). There are numerous ethnic Chinese communities in countries like Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Changes in the international system favoring China may witness increasing Chinese assertiveness in “protecting” its kin in these countries by sending military troops, demanding decentralization for kin, or having its kin in key positions to influence the foreign policies of said countries.

The target states where motherlands’ have been most successful are becoming a checkboard for Great Power competition. In Syria, where Iran has aided its fellow brethren against the Sunni majority population, the civil war had also led to the US and Russian military confrontation (Gibbons-Neff, 2018). In the Balkans, an American sphere of influence since the 1990s, Russia and Serbia have made inroads in contesting US influence by exploiting transnational ethnic links that still exist throughout the former Yugoslavia. In Macedonia they have been stoking ethnic conflict since 2008, while in Montenegro in 2016, Russian and Serbian agents unsuccessfully plotted the overthrow of the government, to ensure that these two countries would not move toward NATO membership (Harding et al., 2017; Kramer & Orovic, 2019). In Bosnia and Kosovo too, Russians have sought to spoil democracy by aiding Serbia in pursuing a strategy of segregation that keeps Serb controlled areas outside the jurisdiction of national authorities and sabotaging the state with hopes that the dysfunction it has caused would tire the international community and allow it to pursue reunification with Serbia.

6.3 Directions in Future Research

This dissertation significantly advances our understanding of the effect motherlands have on the democratization of neighboring countries with whom they share transitional ethnic kin. Despite the new findings that this research has generated regarding strategies and tactics motherlands can use in contesting the political borders of the target state and harm the democratization process, there is ample room for improvements. Future research could proceed along four paths. First, there is a need for a broader conceptualization of the links between motherland and its transnational

ethnic kin to travel beyond the geographic contiguity, present in this dissertation. I will offer two alternatives to deal with this issue. One, I will extend this conceptualization of motherland-target state to include transnational ethnic kin that is found in their historical settlements in countries that are non-contiguous to the motherland. For example, the Mandingue,¹⁹⁰ an ethnic group found in Senegal, are also found throughout numerous countries of West Africa. Two, as immigrant communities, especially in the West, have increased over the last decades it would be of interest to see how a motherland effects the political regime of the state that is a host to its diasporic community. Over the last few years, there have been increasing reports of China seeking to influence the policies of states like Australia, New Zealand, Western Europe, and Canada and the United States through its diaspora communities in these countries (L. Diamond & Schell, 2018; R. Schmitz, 2018).

Second, this research took a rather conservative approach to the identity of transnational ethnic kin. It included only those cases where the link was rather straightforward (e.g. Germany-Germans; Rwanda-Hutu, Malaysia-Malay). Future research may include a looser definition of ethnic kin as to include broader identity groups. For example, in this study, the Walloons and the Flemish of Belgium were not coded as kin to the French (France) and the Dutch (Netherlands), respectively, and as such were not included in the analysis. However, the Wallons are French speakers and the Flemish speak Dutch. Also, while the Walloons are contiguous to France, the Québécois or French Canadians are not. Hence, future research could include groups such as these that are not only more loosely associated but also reside further away from the motherland (global).

Third, future improvements to the study of this phenomenon can result from the inclusion of alternative measures of spoiling. While the current analysis relies on the intensity and frequency of events (conflict or cooperation) data, we should also look at other proxies. One set of variables, from studies of conflict, could include kin population concentration and their territorial settlement patterns (Toft, 2002; Weidmann, 2009). Since states usually fight over territory (Holsti, 1991; Toft, 2002; Vasquez, 1995), variables for kin concentration and settlement patterns, whether the region borders the motherland or its found further inland, or whether the kin is concentrated in one settlement or dispersed throughout the state, may provide some insight into motivation for spoiling. For example, Serbs in Bosnia are concentrated in the Serb Republic, an area contiguous to Serbia;

¹⁹⁰ According to Ethnic Power Relations, depending on the country they are found, the name changes: Northerners (Ivory Coast), Malinke (Guinea), Mandingo (Liberia, Mande (Mali), Mandinka (The Gambia)

but Hungarians in Romania (Transylvania) are settled further inland and surrounded by majority Romanian territory. Further, in places like Rwanda, the Tutsi do not constitute a single mass but are dispersed throughout the country. Such settlement patterns may be a better predictor of whether a motherland will spoil the democratization or not. Transnational ethnic kin living in compact areas may be easier targets for annexation than kin that is dispersed throughout a country. Dispersion may raise the cost of invasion by having to engage in ethnic cleansing and ruling over areas that contain hostile non-kin population.

The size of kin population is also important to gauge the ability or the opportunity of the motherland to engage in spoiling. The percent of ethnic kin that was left outside the confines of the motherland, or the size of kin as a share of the target state, can serve as a proxy for opportunity. The presence of a very small number of transnational ethnic kin may not have the gravity that would propel the motherland to initiate conflict to expand its borders. The costs of military invasion may prove too high in terms of international standing just to bring a few small towns or villages within its fold.

Lastly, as indicated earlier, as rising China has sought to use its diaspora to engage in activities ranging from technological espionage to political influence operations, it may be of interest to policymakers in particular, that we examine the relationship between diasporic communities and political influence in host countries.

APPENDIX A.

Motherland - Target State Dyads and the TEK Links

Dyads: Motherland - Target State	Transnational Ethnic Kin Name
Afghanistan_Pakistan	Pashtun
Albania_Macedonia	Albanians
Albania_Montenegro	Albanians
Albania_Yugoslavia/Serbia	Albanians
Armenia_Azerbaijan	Armenians
Armenia_Georgia	Armenians
Armenia_Iran	Armenians
Austria_Italy	German/Austrians (South Tyrol)
Azerbaijan_Georgia	Azeris
Azerbaijan_Iran	Azeris
Azerbaijan_Russia	Azeris
Bangladesh_India	Bengali
Belarus_Latvia	Belarussians
Belarus_Poland	Belarussians
Belarus_Russia	Belarussians
Benin_Nigeria	Yoruba
Bosnia_Croatia	Bosniaks
Bosnia_Montenegro	Bosniaks
Bosnia_Serbia	Bosniaks
Botswana_South Africa	Twsana
Burkina Faso_Cote d'Ivoire	Northerners (Mande and Voltaic/Gur)
Burundi_Democratic Republic of Congo	Tutsi-Banyamulenge
Burundi_Rwanda	Tutsi and Hutu
Cambodia_Vietnam	Khmer
Cape Verde_Guinea-Bissau	Cape Verdean
Central African Republic_Chad	Sara
Central African Republic_Dem. Republic of Congo	Ngbaka
Chad_Central African Republic	Northern groups (Baya, Banda, Mandjia, Sara, Goula)
Chad_Libya	Toubou
Chad_Niger	Toubou
Chad_Sudan	Zaghawa
China_Myanmar	Chinese
China_Vietnam	Chinese (Hoa)
China_Indonesia	Chinese (Han)
China_Malaysia	Chinese
China_Philippines	Chinese (Fil)
Congo_Angola	Bakongo
Congo_Democratic Republic of the Congo	Bakongo
Cote d'Ivoire_Liberia	Krahn (Guere)
Croatia_Bosnia and Herzegovina	Croats
Croatia_Montenegro	Croats

Croatia_Yugoslavia	Croats
Democratic Republic of the Congo_Angola	Lunda-Chokwe
Democratic Republic of the Congo_Zambia	Luanda
Finland_Russia	Finns
France_Italy	Aostans
Gabon_Congo	Batéké
Gambia_Senegal	Wolof
Georgia_Russia	Georgians
Germany_Belgium	Germans
Germany_Poland	Germans
Ghana_Togo	Ewe (and related groups)
Greece_Cyprus	Greeks
Greece_Albania	Greeks
Guatemala_Honduras	Maya
Guatemala_Mexico	Maya
Guinea_Guinea-Bissau	Peul
Hungary_Croatia	Hungarians
Hungary_Czech Republic	Hungarians
Hungary_Romania	Hungarians
Hungary_Yugoslavia/Serbia	Hungarians
Hungary_Slovak Republic	Hungarians
Hungary_Slovenia	Hungarians
Hungary_Ukraine	Hungarians
India_Bangladesh	Bengali Hindus
India_Myanmar	Indians
India_Pakistan	Hindus
Ireland_United Kingdom	Irish (Northern)
Israel_Egypt	Jews
Italy_Croatia	Italians
Italy_Slovenia	Italians
Jordan_Israel	Palestinianians
Kazakhstan_China	Kazakhs
Kazakhstan_Russia	Kazakhs
Kazakhstan_Turkmenistan	Kazakhs
Kenya_Ethiopia	Other Southern Nations
Kenya_Tanzania	Maasai
Kosovo_Macedonia	Albanians
Kosovo_Montenegro	Albanians
Kosovo_Yugoslavia	Albanians
Kyrgyz Republic_China	Kyrgyz
Kyrgyz Republic_Tajikistan	Kyrgyz
Lesotho_South Africa	Pedi (North Sotho) and South Sotho
Liberia_Cote d'Ivoire	Kru
Macedonia_Albania	Macedonians
Macedonia_Bulgaria	Macedonians
Macedonia_Greece	Macedonians
Malaysia_Cambodia	Cham and Malays
Malaysia_Indonesia	Malay

Malaysia_Singapore	Malay
Malaysia_Thailand	Malay (Muslims)
Mali_Burkina Faso	Gur
Mali_Guinea	Malinke
Mali_Cote d'Ivoire	Northerners (Mande and Voltaic/Gur)
Mali_Senegal	Mandingue (and other eastern groups)
Mongolia_China	Mongolians
Montenegro_Serbia	Montenegriins
Mozambique_South Africa	Tsonga
Namibia_Angola	Ovimbundu-Ovambo
Niger_Nigeria	Hausa-Fulani and Muslim Middle Belt
Nigeria_Benin	Southeastern (Yoruba/Nagot and Goun)
Nigeria_Cameroon	Fulani
Nigeria_Niger	Hausa
North Korea_China	Koreans
North Korea_Russia	Koreans
Pakistan_India	Kashmiri Muslims
Papua New Guinea_Indonesia	Papuans
Poland_Belarus	Poles
Poland_Lithuania	Poles
Poland_Russia	Poles
Romania_Ukraine	Romanians
Russia_Belarus	Russians
Russia_Estonia	Russians
Russia_Georgia	Russians
Russia_Kazakhstan	Russians
Russia_Kyrgyz Republic	Russians
Russia_Latvia	Russians
Russia_Lithuania	Russians
Russia_Moldova	Russians
Russia_Tajikistan	Russians
Russia_Turkmenistan	Russians
Russia_Ukraine	Russians
Russia_Uzbekistan	Russians
Rwanda_Burundi	Hutu or Tutsi
Rwanda_Democratic Republic of the Congo	Tutsi-Banyamulenge
Rwanda_Uganda	Banyarwanda
Senegal_Gambia	Diola?
Serbia_Bosnia and Herzegovina	Serbs
Serbia_Croatia	Serbs
Serbia_Kosovo	Serbs
Serbia_Macedonia	Serbs
Serbia_Montenegro	Serbs
Slovenia_Austria	Slovenes
Solomon Islands_Papua New Guinea	Bougainvilleans
Somalia_Ethiopia	Somali (Ogaden)
Somalia_Kenya	Somali
South Korea_Japan	Koreans

South Yemen_North Yemen	Sunni Shafi'i (Arab)
Swaziland_South Africa	Swazi
Sweden_Finland	Swedes
Syria_Lebanon	Alawites
Tajikistan_Afghanistan	Tajiks
Tajikistan_Uzbekistan	Tajiks
Tanzania_Malawi	Southerners (Lomwe, Mang'anja, Nyanja, Yao)
Tanzania_Mozambique	Makonde-Yao
Thailand_Myanmar	Shan
Thailand_Cambodia	Thai-Lao
Thailand_Vietnam	Thai
Thailand_Laos	Lao Tai
Togo_Benin	Southwestern (Adja)
Togo_Ghana	Ewe
Turkey_Bulgaria	Turks
Turkey_Cyprus	Turks (Cypriot)
Turkey_Greece	Muslims
Turkmenistan_Afghanistan	Turkmen
Turkmenistan_Iran	Turkmen
Ukraine_Poland	Ukrainians
Ukraine_Russia	Ukrainians
Uzbekistan_Afghanistan	Uzbeks
Uzbekistan_Kazakhstan	Uzbeks
Uzbekistan_Kyrgyz Republic	Uzbeks
Uzbekistan_Tajikistan	Uzbeks
Uzbekistan_Turkmenistan	Uzbeks
Vietnam_Cambodia	Vietnamese
Zambia_Malawi	Northerners (Tumbuka, Tonga, Ngonde) and Chewa
Zambia_Zimbabwe	Ndebele-Kalanga-(Tonga)
Zimbabwe_Mozambique	Shona-Ndau

APPENDIX B.

The List of Potential Motherlands and Target States

Motherland (Country Name)	Target State (Country Name)
Benin	Nigeria
Botswana	South Africa
Burkina Faso	Ivory Coast
Burundi	Rwanda
Chad	Central African Republic; Libya; Sudan; Niger
Democratic Republic of the Congo	Zambia; Angola
Ghana	Togo
Guatemala	Honduras; Mexico
Israel	Egypt
Ivory Coast	Liberia
Jordan	Israel
Kenya	Tanzania
Mali	Ivory Coast; Guinea
Mozambique	South Africa
Namibia	Angola
Niger	Nigeria
Nigeria	Benin, Niger; Cameroon
Republic of Congo	Democratic Republic of the Congo
Rwanda	Democratic Republic of the Congo; Uganda; Burundi
Senegal	Gambia
Syria	Lebanon
Togo	Benin; Ghana

APPENDIX C.

PCSE Analysis of Spoiling on the Level of Democracy

All Motherlands

	Model 11	Model 12	Model 13	Model 14
Intensity for Conflict (C)	-0.0170 (0.022)	-0.0441* (0.022)		
Intensity for Cooperation (C)	0.0823*** (0.021)	0.1087*** (0.021)		
Frequency for Conflict (C)	-0.0646+ (0.038)	-0.0244 (0.039)		
Frequency for Cooperation (C)	0.0633 (0.051)	0.0180 (0.051)		
Intensity for Conflict (I)		0.0006 (0.001)		
Intensity for Cooperation (I)		-0.0062** (0.002)		
Frequency for Conflict (I)		-0.0265+ (0.014)		
Frequency for Cooperation (I)		0.0217 (0.018)		
Intensity Conflict-Cooperation Scale			0.0350+ (0.019)	0.0254 (0.018)
Frequency Conflict-Cooperation			0.0523+ (0.027)	
CINC Capabilities				0.1569*** (0.044)
# Motherlands: 1-2	-0.0240 (0.030)	-0.0264 (0.030)	-0.0220 (0.030)	-0.0219 (0.030)
# Motherlands: 3+	0.0501 (0.064)	0.0351 (0.063)	0.0542 (0.063)	0.0510 (0.062)
GDP per Capita (Log)	0.1766*** (0.043)	0.1957*** (0.040)	0.2028*** (0.043)	0.2188*** (0.042)
Foreign Aid (Log)	0.0011+ (0.001)	0.0011+ (0.001)	0.0013* (0.001)	0.0013* (0.001)
International Mission	0.0532* (0.026)	0.0553* (0.026)	0.0618* (0.026)	0.0605* (0.026)
Target State Population (Log)	-0.0308 (0.032)	-0.0485+ (0.028)	0.0168 (0.030)	0.0042 (0.030)
Target State Internal War	-0.0438*** (0.013)	-0.0425** (0.013)	-0.0446*** (0.013)	-0.0439*** (0.013)
Target State Interstate War	-0.0177 (0.028)	-0.0117 (0.028)	-0.0221 (0.028)	-0.0203 (0.027)
Post-Cold War	0.2396*** (0.049)	0.2441*** (0.048)	0.2606*** (0.051)	0.2596*** (0.051)
South America	-0.4046 (0.336)	-0.4314+ (0.253)	-0.2431 (0.299)	-0.2796 (0.319)
Western Europe	1.7057*** (0.291)	1.7801*** (0.187)	2.0024*** (0.233)	1.9766*** (0.251)
Central-East Europe	0.1792 (0.300)	0.1513 (0.208)	0.2537 (0.264)	0.3112 (0.272)

Sub-Saharan Africa	-0.1653 (0.285)	-0.1769 (0.191)	-0.0061 (0.247)	-0.0156 (0.265)
Middle East/North Africa	-0.9901*** (0.296)	-0.9854*** (0.193)	-0.7734** (0.240)	-0.7608** (0.258)
South Asia	-0.5121+ (0.292)	-0.4945* (0.200)	-0.2910 (0.249)	-0.3699 (0.263)
Far East	-1.5222*** (0.274)	-1.4575*** (0.189)	-1.4537*** (0.238)	-1.3904*** (0.260)
Oceania	0.2357 (0.364)	0.3028 (0.275)	0.3896 (0.324)	0.3638 (0.330)
Constant	-2.5257*** (0.742)	-2.4163*** (0.657)	-3.7284*** (0.716)	-3.5850*** (0.714)
R^2	0.270	0.321	0.278	0.278
F				
Observations	4294	4294	4294	4294

Standard errors in parentheses

+ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

C = Cumulative; I = Immediate; Base #Motherlands = 0 (Potential Motherlands) Base Political Region = North America

APPENDIX D.

Table 6 Cumulative Intensity & Frequency on Categorical Democratization (Ordinal Logistic Regression with RSE)

	Model 15	Model 16 Interact Conflict	Model 17 Interact Cooperate	Model 18 Interact CN&CP	Model 19 Interact CC&CINC
Intensity for Conflict (0/1)	-0.0730 (0.110)	-0.0495 (0.144)	0.0183 (0.111)	-0.0403 (0.141)	
Intensity for Cooperation (0/1)	0.3613*** (0.108)	0.3657** (0.111)	0.6752*** (0.141)	0.6774*** (0.141)	
Frequency for Conflict (0/1)	-0.1752 (0.129)	-0.1521 (0.160)	-0.2454+ (0.131)	-0.3108+ (0.170)	
Frequency for Cooperation (0/1)	0.4972*** (0.145)	0.4984*** (0.145)	0.8772*** (0.177)	0.8910*** (0.179)	
Intensity: Conflict-Cooperation Scale					0.1295 (0.111)
CINC Capabilities					0.0107 (0.096)
Intensity x Frequency: Conflict		-0.0490 (0.208)		0.1303 (0.212)	
Intensity x Frequency: Cooperation			-0.6748*** (0.195)	-0.7046*** (0.204)	
Conflict-Cooperation x CINC					0.2951* (0.145)
Number of Motherlands (1-2)	0.5943*** (0.136)	0.5941*** (0.136)	0.6257*** (0.137)	0.6271*** (0.137)	0.6924*** (0.133)
Number of Motherlands (3+)	-0.7106*** (0.172)	-0.7094*** (0.172)	-0.6789*** (0.172)	-0.6810*** (0.173)	-0.5271** (0.166)
Fixed Effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
Control Variables	Included	Included	Included	Included	Included
Pseudo R^2	0.195	0.195	0.196	0.196	0.192
AIC	7650.6940	7652.6395	7641.0310	7642.6646	7677.4075
BIC	8178.9869	8187.2973	8175.6888	8183.6874	8199.3353
chi2	1346.5172	1346.4126	1335.7197	1339.0513	1265.7836
Observations	4294	4294	4294	4294	4294

Standard errors in parentheses + $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$; CN: Conflict, CP: Cooperation, CC: Conflict-Cooperation scale, CINC: Composite Index of National Capabilities

APPENDIX E.

Table 7. Descriptive Statistics for Dependent and Independent Variables

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Liberal Democracy Index (Log)	4,341	-1.3330950	1.4227050	-4.95	2.18
Cumulative					
Intensity for Conflict (Mean, All Mothers)	4,341	2.3921560	2.3655230	0	10
Intensity for Cooperation (Mean, All Mothers)	4,341	3.6496890	2.7105810	0	10
Frequency for Conflict (Mean, All Mothers)	4,341	0.5347897	1.2156130	0	10
Frequency for Cooperation (Mean, All Mothers)	4,341	0.4002746	0.8920376	0	10
Immediate					
Intensity for Conflict (Mean, All Mothers)	4,341	2.3869230	3.0675960	0	10
Intensity for Cooperation (Mean, All Mothers)	4,341	2.3095240	1.8962690	0	8.5
Frequency for Conflict (Mean, All Mothers)	4,341	0.1473733	0.5253635	0	10
Frequency for Cooperation (Mean, All Mothers)	4,341	0.2154983	0.6172070	0	10
Cumulative					
Intensity: Conflict-Cooperation Scale (Mean, All Mothers)	4,341	5.3635680	1.6097030	0	10
Frequency: Conflict + Cooperation Events (Mean, All Mothers)	4,341	0.2128662	0.6211689	0	10
Intensity: Conflict-Cooperation Scale (Sum, All Mothers)	4,341	2.8519590	0.6353769	0	10
Frequency: Conflict + Cooperation Events (Sum, All Mothers)	4,341	0.4198067	0.8886073	0	10
CINC Capabilities (Mean, All Mothers)	4,341	0.3771910	1.0528920	0	10
CINC Capabilities (Sum, All Mothers)	4,341	0.5505798	1.2955380	0	10

Appendix E continued

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Liberal Democratization Index	4,341	0.2731061	0.2436329	0.0070	0.8980
Number of Motherlands (Categorical)	4,341	0.9898641	0.5378644	0	2
GDP per Capita (Log)	4,294	8.2719570	1.1720410	5.0626	11.0923
Foreign Aid (Log)	4,341	7.7325630	10.8293000	-4.6052	21.8249
International Mission	4,341	0.1665515	0.3726179	0	1
Target State Population (Log)	4,341	16.4019700	1.5131540	12.8801	21.0390
Target State Internal War	4,341	0.2186132	0.4133532	0	1
Target State Interstate War	4,341	0.0105966	0.1024049	0	1
Post-Cold War	4,341	0.5019581	0.5000538	0	1
Political Region of the World	4,341	3.9806500	2.1210150	1	9

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