

**THERE IS POWER IN A PLAZA: SOCIAL MOVEMENTS,  
DEMOCRACY, AND SPATIAL POLITICS**

by

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*For my sister, Stryker, for being my reason to try to make a better world, and for doing more than I ever could to get us there.*

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## **ABSTRACT**

How does the built environment contribute to democracy? Can the built environment shape democratic processes of representation? This project employs mixed-methods to explore the relationship between the city, as a built and lived environment, and the inclusion of marginalized groups in democratic politics, focusing on how social movements contribute to political representation. Using the Gezi Park protests in Turkey and the Women's March protests in Boston, San Antonio, Pittsburgh, and Amarillo, I develop a theoretical account of how and why the built environment encourages democratic inclusion of diverse groups. I test these expectations through a series of statistical analyses of an original dataset on the Women's March protests covering 330 cities with competitive mayoral elections between 2017-2018. Through both my quantitative analyses and my qualitative cases, I find that the spatial structure of the city shapes movement inclusion and that inclusive movements positively impact the quality of democracy, not only when activists are making direct claims to occupy particular spaces, as in the Gezi case, but also when activists come together for more abstract goals, as in the case of the Women's Marches.

## INTRODUCTION: FROM THE UNEQUAL CITY TO INCLUSIVE ORGANIZING

On May 28, 2013, a group of environmental activists began occupying Gezi Park in order to save one of Istanbul's last few green spaces from becoming a shopping mall. The protest grew to include hard-line secularists and devout Muslims, mothers and students, Kurds and Turkish nationalists, rival football clubs, and the LGBT community. Unlikely alliances were built. For example, football clubs revised homophobic chants, and secularists protected devout protestors praying (Karakayali and Yaka, 2014; Kuymulu, 2012). The relationships built throughout the protest led to remarkable solidarity actions even after the protest was dispersed: Gezi activists attended Pride and Trans pride events and marched in solidarity with Kurdish activists for the first time. Furthermore, as a result of the experience at the protest in Gezi Park, members of the LGBT community felt empowered to run for office for the first time. Why and how did this happen? Why did an originally small protest aimed at protecting a few trees in the middle of the city lead to sustained solidarity among unlikely allies? Why and how did the protest broaden political representation? Most importantly, are there generalizable lessons from this case for our understanding of social movements and democracy?

Democratic theorists have long wrestled with the puzzle of how to advance inclusion for marginalized groups (Banting and Kymlicka, 2017; Dovi, 2002; Mansbridge, 1999; Young, 2000; Young, 2011). Increasingly, analysts are pointing to social movements as potential avenues for advancing such inclusion, showing that social movements can improve representation and participation on the part of the most marginalized (Einwohner et al., 2019; Paxton et al., 2006; Weldon, 2012; White and Farr, 2012). Can social movements advance the goals of inclusive democracy? If so, which social movements *most* advance these goals? Extant scholarship suggests that movements that actively work to develop inclusion, whether through inclusive norms or the development of inclusive solidarities, are more likely to be successful in their efforts to influence electoral and policy outcomes (Einwohner et al., 2019; Tormos, 2017; Weldon, 2006; Weldon, 2012). Yet the question remains, how can movements achieve greater inclusion internally?

My dissertation provides new answers to these age-old questions by examining the relationship between protest and representation. In my dissertation, I offer an empirical and theoretical account of how movement use of space affects their ability to include a wider range of

groups in their activities. I use a detailed case study of the Gezi Park Protests of 2013 to develop a theoretical argument for paying attention to protest's use of space and how this affects inclusion, both within movements and in local elections. I then explore my hypotheses about how protest affects local democracy using an original dataset on the Women's March and local elections across 330 cities in the US. Using this dataset, I test my expectations that the presence of a Women's March is associated with more women, and women of color running for local office, and that the spatial structure of the city influences the degree to which Women's Marches achieve inclusion. I then extend this analysis and see if my causal expectation that the spatial dimensions of protest are associated with increased movement inclusion and increased numbers of political candidates from dispossessed subgroups hold in the US context. To do this analysis, I selected four US cities (Boston MA, San Antonio TX, Pittsburgh PA, and Amarillo TX) for structured focused comparison of the Women's Marches. These comparisons allowed me to tease out the ways that spatial dimensions of protest shape political impact and the development of inclusion within democratic politics.

### **Theoretical Approach: Why and How Spatial Dimensions of Protest Deepen Democracy**

My central claim is that space matters, and that space is more than the physical arrangement of roads, buildings, walls, and parks. It is also the ways these physical environments are lived and understood by the people who use them (Lefebvre, 1991). The spaces where activists choose to act are not value-neutral, and movements both challenge and use existing taken-for-granted understandings of space. Activists contest taken-for-granted understandings of space by shutting down streets or diverting traffic, inscribing spaces with new meanings using graffiti (Brighenti, 2010; Chmielewska, 2007), creating strategic public art (Reid, 2008), removing or using existing public monuments as focal points, using their bodies in ways that defy expectations based on gender (Parkins, 2000), and occupying parks and squares (Murphy and O'Driscoll, 2015; Hammond, 2013). However, where some contestations of the existing spatial arrangements aim to create new democratic spaces, as in Gezi, others assert exclusionary anti-democratic understandings of space, as seen through the Unite the Right protests held at former Lee park in Charlottesville. Raising the first question, how do movements create democratic spaces? When do critical engagements with the space of the city enable the development of inclusion of dispossessed group? Second, I address the expected impacts of inclusive democratic spaces by addressing the

question, how do the spatial characteristics of the cities where movements organize effect their democratic impacts, in terms of representation and persistence.

In order to understand both the process of creating inclusive democratic spaces and the impact I expect these spaces to have, it is necessary to address the way inequality is embedded within existing spatial arrangements. Consider how the arrangement of physical space can entrench inequality in public life (Bryant, 1995; Enos, 2017; Hoskyns, 2014; Ingram, 2015; Jacobs, 1992; Pastor, 2007; Lefebvre, 1991; Young, 2011). Practices such as redlining and siting of industry near working class and minority neighborhoods limit the potential of minority communities (Bryant 1995; Pastor, 2007). Even technical decisions (for example, concerning the height of a bridge or tunnel) can affect whether or not a community is accessible to those who rely on public transit, enabling the wealthy to insulate their neighborhoods (Winner, 1980). Likewise, separating business, school, and home through the typical suburban design makes it difficult for parents to handle childcare and work, creating physical incentives for mothers to remove themselves from the workforce (Jacobs, 1992; Kern 2020; Young, 2011). In this way, particular physical arrangements of space support the continuation of unequal social systems, where working-class minority children lack access to clean air and water impacting their health and educational achievement (Pastor, 2007) or women are excluded from public life (Jacob 1992; Kern 2020).

The exclusion of women, minority men, working class people, and sexual minorities from public space supports their exclusion from the political process. The political spaces where democracy occurs are assumed to be masculine (Benhabib 1998). Masculine behavior and language is privileged within parliaments (Rai 2014) as well as within ideal understandings of democratic governance (Young, 2000), while feminine bodies and feminine forms of communication have historically been excluded from the halls of power (Young, 2000; Young, 2005). Historically, these exclusions have been challenged. For example, suffragettes disrupted the taken for granted exclusion of women from parliament through actions that broke with feminine norms through feats of strength and even violence, such as heckling and breaking windows (Parkins, 2000). Indeed, the continued association of the spaces where governing occurs with dominant forms of masculinity contributes to the exclusion of women from contemporary processes of democratic governance. In the Indian parliament, for example, parliamentarians perform not only masculinity but also Indian national identities through their choice in clothing, speech, and in the ways in which the building is adorned (Rai 2014). Likewise, the cat-calling of



French Housing Minister Cecil Duflot when she took the podium in National Assembly in a floral dress indicates the way in which femininity is unwelcome within the halls of power (Ellen 2012).

Using the Gezi case, I argue that a movement's contestation of space creates opportunities for the creation of inclusive democratic spaces- but that these opportunities must be harnessed through democratic deliberation. Movements must explicitly contest the existing inequality embedded in public space. The contestation and deliberation can be achieved through both institutions and spatial practices. At Gezi, we see this through the use of deliberative decision-making which facilitated developing inclusive norms and the physical creation of space for marginalized groups, through the arrangement of the camp with the spaces for LGBT protestors, and the use of graffiti to make claims concerning the need to combat sexism and homophobia. In contrast, Unite the Right reasserted an exclusionary understanding of (formerly) Lee Park through the embodiment of the space by white nationalists with an explicit goal of excluding other groups from the park, particularly the anti-racist student groups present. Movements can actively destabilize and disrupt the taken-for-granted assumptions about who belongs in the space, and who can have ownership of the space (Lefebvre, 1991; Hoskyns 2014).

The disruption of public space can occur in a variety of ways, including but not limited to active embodiment of the space (Parkins, 2000), using the space in unexpected ways, such as occupation (Hammond 2013; Murphy and O'Driscoll, 2015), public art (Hajer 2003; Reid, 2008), graffiti (Brighenti, 2010; Chmielewska, 2007; Riggle, 2010) and the like. Movements that actively challenge the control over the space by dominant groups will facilitate productive dialogue over the way inequality functions (Hoskyns 2014). Furthermore, the disruption of public space leads to the development of what Lefebvre (1991) terms a *counter-space* which I argue deepened inclusion within the movement by enabling the development of solidarity among the protestors that recognized the complex relationship classism, Turkish nationalism, homophobia, and transphobia through contestation between the groups present in the Park.

I argue that that movements that develop inclusive spaces will be more persistent over time and will inspire and enable more women, people of color, and LGBT people to run for political office. Some extant research suggests that more inclusive movements will be longer lasting and more influential (Weldon, 2006; 2011; Tormos, 2017), and more likely to develop the social and political capital of marginalized groups (Featherstone, 2008; Pastor, 2007).

Some spaces are more conducive to organizing diverse coalitions than others. In the case of Gezi, the park as a space with multiple salient symbolic meanings for diverse social groups (Lefebvre, 1991), enabled bringing together seasoned and new activists. While it is impossible to address the universe of symbolic meanings associated with a space, one way to identify whether or not a space is accessible to multiple social groups is by addressing whether or not the space is multi-use and includes businesses, residences, and recreation for a wide array of social groups (Jacobs, 1992). The Gezi park protests are one example of this in action, as activists' willingness to work together to protect the park led them to work with activists with whom they might not normally speak if they encountered them in the coffee shops in the surrounding neighborhood. In particular, the history of the park as a gathering place for left-wing protest, celebrations for football wins, picnics, as well as its position within a neighborhood with a history of diversity in terms of the national background, sexuality, gender identity, and ethnicity of residents enabled the development of a protest that brought these groups into conversation with each other as they worked through how to best protect a cherished neighborhood park.

In contrast to spatially oriented movements, such as Gezi, identity-based movements such as the Women's March do not always choose their space for protest based on the symbolic salience of the space for multiple groups. As addressed above, inequality is embedded within space itself, within spaces with salience for both marginalized and dominant communities. Addressing this inequality is necessary to develop greater inclusion (Lefebvre, 1991). I argue that protests where the organizers critically engaged with the space — for example, in the San Antonio case, organizing their March around “points of oppression” that connected their claims concerning women's rights to the physical city — will be more successful in developing inclusive solidarity after the protest is over. Likewise, I argue we must address the role of the city in structuring the organizing process. Whereas in Gezi, organizers came together organically to protect the park, in the cases of the 2017 Women's Marches, organizers worked at most three months from November 2016 to January 2017 organizing the event. In the process of organizing, decisions about where to hold meetings are crucial in potentially supporting or limiting efforts to build inclusive organizing committees. In the U.S. context, suburbanization and public transit access are racialized, creating barriers for organizers to bring together diverse coalitions. Organizers must recognize how the city's structure limits their ability to find and productively engage with possible coalition partners

in order to overcome these barriers (Enos, 2017; Geismer, 2015; Trounstone, 2018). The way in which movements engage with space can deepen their political impacts.

The experience of inclusion has lasting political impact, even after the protest that sparked the inclusive action ends. We should expect that movements which strategically use space to facilitate inclusion will lead to more active citizens who continue to engage both in movement activities and in formal politics. There is evidence that inclusive spatially oriented movements have long lasting political impacts in terms of future political participation (Pastor, 2007), and the development of new political identities (Featherstone, 2008). I argue that we should expect that the experience of inclusion will empower dispossessed people to push for increased access democratic political participation and representation *beyond the immediate spatial and temporal scope* of the movement. Particularly, I expect that the experience of inclusion within spaces where inequality is actively contested will empower dispossessed groups to claim their right to represent themselves within formal politics by running for office.

Inclusion is not only whether or not diverse groups are involved in a movement, but also whether or not these groups have power to set movement goals (Weldon, 2006). When looking at the Women's March inclusion can be measured by addressing whether women of color, lesbian women, trans women, disabled women, and immigrant women are included in leadership as well as whether the Marches goals include issues of concern posed by organizations working racial justice, immigrant justice, trans justice, and disability justice. In this way, addressing whether or not women (particularly women of color, trans women, and lesbian women) run for office following the Women's Marches allows us to address whether or not this experience of struggling towards the development of inclusive space empowered women to deepen their political participation by running for office.

### **Research Design**

In order to apply my theoretical expectations empirically I will be employing a mixed methods approach. First, I develop my theoretical framework with the case of the Gezi Park Protests using process-tracing (Collier 2011; Bennet and George 2004). The Gezi Park Protest is an ideal case for illuminating this theoretical argument because the main variables of interest are present. The protest occurs within a physically accessible space with multiple and conflicting symbolic meanings. A diverse coalition occupied the park, including groups that are marginalized

in the Turkish context, such as LGBT activists and Kurdish activists. Finally, following the protest, new relationships between movements emerged and candidates from dispossessed groups, such as trans women, lesbian women, and gay men, ran for political office in record numbers. Through this case study I demonstrate the links between spatial dimensions of protest, inclusion, and political impact. Leading to the following expectations: movements that succeed in developing a counter space that includes diverse participants will be more likely to develop inclusive solidarities and efforts to run potential descriptive representatives for dispossessed groups and subgroups (see Table 1).

Table 1: Theoretical Expectations

	High degree of disruption of public space	Low degree of disruption of public space
Diverse Participants	Development of Inclusive Solidarity Likely New Claims for Representation Likely	Development of Inclusive Solidarity Unlikely
No Diverse Participants	Development of Inclusive Solidarity Unlikely	Development of Inclusive Solidarity Unlikely

Using an original dataset, I apply the theoretical argument above — developed in the context of the Gezi Park case — to a completely different case, the Women’s March. Using an original dataset that covers the 330 competitive Mayoral elections held in the United States with declaration deadlines between the 2017 and 2018 Women’s March I test my expectations in terms of the role of the built environment of the city in influencing the ability of the organizing team to develop a diverse leadership team, and the relationship between the disruption of public space through protest and an increased number of women and women of color running for Mayor and city council.

Following the statistical analysis of the Women’s March, I interrogate whether or not the same processes that led to the development of inclusion and increased representation in the Gezi case account for the increases in the women’s representation following the Women’s March in the United States. To do this, I conduct a structured, focused comparison of the Boston, San Antonio, Pittsburgh, and Amarillo Women’s Marches. These four cases were chosen based on theoretical considerations related to my proposed explanation, such as whether or not the organizers engaged in a high level of disruption of public space (development of a counter space) and were able to

bring together diverse participants (See Table 2), as well as control/rival variables such as state in which they are located, region of the country, and the like.

Table 2: March Cases by Disruption of Space and Diversity of Participants

	High degree of disruption of public space	Low degree of disruption of public space
Diverse Participants	San Antonio Women's March	Boston Women's March
Less Diverse Participants	Amarillo Women's March	Pittsburgh Women's March

### **Gezi Park Protests Case**

I use process-tracing to identify the mechanisms by which movements use space to facilitate inclusion, create new political spaces, and to show how these spatial aspects are linked to political outcomes – focusing on descriptive representation in candidates for public office. In particular, my approach will focus on the role of qualities of the space and process of building inclusion within the Gezi protest (Chapter 1). Process-tracing allows for an interrogation of the causal process within a case, by examining the case with special attention paid to the expected theoretical story as well as potential alternative explanations (Bennet 2010; George and Bennet 2004). Furthermore, process-tracing enables the research to address the causal process when there is a complex interaction effect between two independent variables (George and Bennet 2004). This makes it an ideal method for assessing my theory, as I expect that the two primary variables, the disruption of public space and the presence of diverse participants, interact leading to the development of a new political space (or agon) where new inclusive solidarities are formed.

In order to build and find pieces of evidence that I can assemble into a timeline that addresses my key theoretical variables, space and inclusion, linking the various events of the Gezi park protest into a story culminating with the candidates running for office (Chapter 2), I will use existing traditional and non-traditional media accounts of the experience of the park, secondary literature focused on understanding the activities of activists within the park (particularly ethnographies), a graffiti dataset including 328 images, relevant documentary films (e.g. Rudnitzki, 2014), and media produced by both candidates and political parties in the 2014 municipal and 2015 parliamentary elections. This data allows me to address both how the activists behaved and organized and the unique ways they contested taken for granted assumptions about the park.

## **The Women's March Cases**

I first conduct my quantitative statistical analyses of the Women's March, in Chapters 3 and 4. I test the association between the presence or absence of the Women's March and the number of women and women of color candidates for city council and Mayor in the elections following the 2017 Women's March (Chapter 3). Likewise, I test my expectation that the spatial structure of the city influences the development of inclusion within social movements, by testing the association between the spatial characteristics of the city (in terms of diversity, segregation, and density) and the level of inclusion within local Women's Marches in 2017 (Chapter 4). Importantly, within these two chapters I find evidence that the theoretical account I develop using the Gezi case can be generalized. Within these analyses, I find evidence that protest is associated with more women and women of color running for local office (Chapter 3) and that differences with spatial structure of the city are associated with differences in inclusion within the Women's March, as measured by diversity of leadership and diversity of movement goals (Chapter 4).

My statistical analyses employs an original dataset. This dataset covers elections for Mayor and City Council in 330 cities, 84 of which held Women's Marches. This dataset combines extant data (e.g. U.S. Census Bureau (2010), United States Council of Mayors (2017), Pressman and Chenoweth (2017) etc.) with original data collected through news reports and social media, as well as city maps depicting physical landmarks. I also develop two original measures, or indices, to help me assess my theoretical arguments. First, I develop a Women Friendly Municipality Index by adapting the Women Friendly District Index developed by Palmer and Simon (2008) to the municipal context, using extant datasets (See Chapter 3). I also develop a City Space Index which combines the Women Friendly Municipality index with extant measures for segregation (Trounstine, 2018). The Women Friendly Municipality Index allows me to control for a number of possible alternative explanations for women's representation and political activity, such as support for Republican Candidates, percent of the population with college degrees, diversity of the district, percent of the population in the working class, urbanization, and whether or not the city is in the South. The City Space Index enables me to address the role of the spatial structure of the city in supporting or hindering movement inclusion (Chapter 4).

For each March in the dataset, I collected original data on inclusion within the protest, and representation. Movements were coded as more or less inclusive based on the degree to which they included leaders or movement agendas items associated with sexuality, gender identity, racial

justice, disability, and immigrant justice. When measuring inclusion of leadership and movement goals, I collected the March's public agendas where possible, and use news reports and public Facebook pages to identify who is involved in organizing the March as well as to identify the goals of the March (more details on this coding are provided in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4).

In order to measure the dependent variable, representation, I used counts of women candidates who ran for mayor and city council before and after the women's march. I also employ measures of the total number of candidates for city council and mayor, the proportion of women candidates for city council and mayor, and the change in both the number and proportion of women candidates. These were collected using electoral records, city records of candidate declarations, and local news sources. The number of women of color candidates was likewise coded using local news sources and campaign materials. When coding women candidates as being women of color, I took into account both the identity the women claimed within their public statements, how they were identified in news sources, and their appearance within their campaign material and news sources. In difficult cases I relied on women's self-identification. For example, when coding women as Hispanic or Latina I did not rely on only last name or appearance but delved into how these women presented their identities.

Next, I turn to an in-depth case study of the Boston Women's March in order to address how the space of the city provided challenges for the organizers' efforts to develop a diverse leadership team, and the implications this had for their ability to develop an inclusive protest event (Chapter 5). This case study is developed through interviews with ten of the organizers of the 2017 Women's March in Boston, news coverage of the March, relevant scholarly work on the city of Boston, the digital archive of the signs produced by protestors housed and collected by Northeastern University, site walks, and participant-observation while living in the city of Boston from July 2018 to January 2020 (for more details see Appendix B). In the chapter, I demonstrate that the organizers' physical location in the city and reliance on their own social networks created barriers for developing inclusion within their leadership team. However, despite these barriers, key women of color within the organizing team were able to act as diplomats repairing rifts with the established organizing community and facilitating deliberation between the organizing team and the indigenous community of Boston preventing a possible counter march.

Following this discussion of the role of the city in challenging organizers efforts to develop inclusive protest, I conduct a structured focused comparison of the cases of Boston, San Antonio,

Pittsburgh, and Amarillo (Chapter 6). These cases are based on primary sources, such as in-depth interviews with fifteen organizers, news sources, site walks, archived protest signs, and relevant social media as well as secondary sources (published academic articles, etc) (for more details see Appendix B). Through this discussion, I demonstrate that the development of counter space appears to be more important than bringing together diverse participants when assessing movement persistence and efforts to gain improved representation for dispossessed subgroups. Likewise, the Boston case demonstrates the importance of addressing this theory as a supplement to existing work on the effect of women legislators as role models (Gilardi, 2015), as Ayanna Pressley's role as the first woman of color on the Boston city council and now first Black woman to represent the state in the House of Representatives appears to be a strong motivator for women candidates for local office in Boston. In contrast, in the San Antonio case, one of the key vectors of dispossession is the lack of documentation for immigrants. This may suggest potentially muted effects of protest on formal representation as undocumented San Antonians cannot run for office.

My dissertation holds both theoretical and practical lessons for those interested in spatial politics, democracy and social movements, illuminating new pathways to deeper democracy and greater inclusion (Hammond 2013; Hoskyns 2014; Ingram 2015; Puwar 2014; Rai 2014). By highlighting the importance of the spaces where deliberation occurs, this study contributes to our understanding of how to develop more inclusive movements (Beckwith 2000; Weldon, 2006; Tormos, 2017). I deepen our understanding of the determinants of movement impact to include these spatial dimensions. I contribute to our understanding of the role of social movements in deepening democratic governance (Dryzek, 2010; Young, 2000; Weldon, 2002) by demonstrating a new pathway towards increasing marginalized groups' participation and representation in formal politics (Mansbridge, 1999; Wain and Lien, 2017). Furthermore, these findings have clear implications for recent protests, as organizers radically challenge assumptions about who controls public space by removing monuments to supporters of white supremacy and imperialism across the globe.

Beyond the practical and scholarly implications of my work, my dissertation findings raise new and old questions concerning the role of social movements in representing dispossessed people. Are politicians who come into formal politics through movements more adept at maintaining mutual relationships with dispossessed subgroups (Dovi, 2002)? What is the role of autonomous feminist organizations, such as *Mujeres Marcharan*, in local policy change (Weldon,



2002)? Does trans-local feminist mobilization support the development of intersectional solidarities and praxis (Masson 2011; Townsend-Bell 2011)? My dissertation suggests, that particularly inclusive movements may enabled the development of preferable descriptive representatives, such as Asya Elmas, who bridge the divide between political parties and social movement activists. Likewise, that feminist movements that critically engage with public space, such as San Antonio's 2017 Women's March, can support efforts to remove laws that limit access to public space and freedom of speech.

## **CHAPTER 1: PRODUCING DEMOCRATIC SPACE AT GEZI PARK: DEVELOPING INCLUSIVE SOLIDARITY THROUGH EMBODIED PROTEST AND CRITICAL GRAFFITI**

On May 2013, a protest that began in Gezi Park with a small group of environmental activists in tents trying to keep bulldozers at bay to protect a small park quickly grew into a large scale occupation uniting unlikely allies around their concerns for Turkish democracy. While a great deal of scholarship has addressed who was present at the protests, and how protestors worked through their differences from the revision of homophobic football chants to the protection of devout protestors praying by their secular allies (Karakayali and Yaka, 2014; Kuymulu, 2012), questions still remain concerning why this particular protest enabled Istanbul residents to reach across traditional divides and the long terms impacts of the protest. Why did an originally small protest aimed at protecting a few trees in the middle of the city lead to sustained solidarity among, for example, traditionally homophobic football fan clubs and the LGBT movement? Furthermore, why were these solidarities maintained even after the protest ended, leading to Gezi activists attending Pride and Trans Pride events as well as marches in Istanbul protesting police brutality against Kurdish activists in the eastern part of the country?

In order to understand how activists were able to develop inclusive solidarity, I argue, we need to examine spatial politics, specifically, how activists at Gezi contested and politicized the use of space in the park. Further, I contend, exploring these spatial dimensions helps us grapple with problems of exclusion and difference in democratic politics.

Understanding how democratic processes can integrate difference is a central question both for democratic theorists (Banting and Kymlicka, 2017; Connolly, 2005; Levy, 2017; Mouffe, 2013; Young, 2000; Young, 2011; van Parijs, 2017) and social movement scholars (Beckwith, 2000; Tormos, 2017; Weldon, 2006, 2012). Extant literature suggests that movements aimed at addressing spatial inequality (siting of factories, access to public space, and access to public transit) are able to mobilize and sustain diverse coalitions, create new political identities and develop social capital (Einwohner et al., 2019; Featherstone, 2008; Harvey, 2013; Pastor, 2007; Soja, 2010). Space plays an important role in supporting or limiting democratic expression (e.g. Ploger, 2004; Wingenbach, 2011). Spaces for protest, critique, and contestation provide the material conditions necessary for the development of protest, for the development of alternative discourse. Spaces

where protestors can interact with one another enable social movements' development by bringing together diverse perspectives and encouraging critiques of movement goals and strategies (Inceoglu, 2015). Likewise, government efforts to control or change space can impact whether or where activists protest (Mitchell and Staeheli, 2005; Schwelder, 2012). By focusing on how we can incorporate the spatial elements that support the discursive labor of social movements, I contribute to a deepening of our understanding of how movements can help us better understand democratic politics (della Porta, 2005a; della Porta, 2005b; Inceoglu, 2015).

Through the Gezi Case, I develop an argument for why contesting the inequality embedded in space enables the development of inclusive solidarity. Through a discussion of the protestors spatial practices, of occupation and the use of graffiti, I demonstrate how the contestation of Erodogan's regime's control of public space created space to both make claims against the increasingly authoritarian regime and claims against fellow protestors concerning transphobia, sexism, nationalism, and homophobia within the occupation. Through this case, I demonstrate the importance of creating spaces for agonistic contestation within movements which enable productively working through tension and domination within movements (Arendt, 2006; Mouffe, 2013) leading to the development of more inclusive forms of solidarity. I theorize that spaces where democratic deliberation occurs matter, and the way organizers engage with these spaces matter. Through critical engagement with the inequality within space, organizers can develop an emancipatory space (Lefebvre, 1991) that enables the development of inclusive solidarities.

### **Gezi Park: Challenging the State's control of Space**

On May 28, 2013, an Occupy-style protest began in Gezi park in the neighborhood of Beyoglu in Istanbul Turkey. The protests began in response to the Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (Justice and Development Party) government's plan to rebuild the Ottoman barracks that had been removed when park was originally created after the foundation of the Turkish Republic. The attempts to re-Ottomanize the space by removing the park and recreating the barracks (as a shopping mall) led to protests which included a wide ranging coalition of Turkish secularists, leftists, environmentalists, anti-capitalist Muslims, and the LGBT community.

This case allows for a deeper understanding of the relationship between space and radical democratic politics in some key ways. First, Gezi provides a space for resistance against the state's efforts to re-Ottomanize Turkey due to its historic position within the diverse neighborhood of

Beyoglu where difference is both accepted and encouraged (Sandikci, 2015; Kuymulu, 2013). Second, the activists occupied the park and employed graffiti to inscribe both new and old meanings on the space, making claims which drew on the ideal of the Turkish Republic as well as a vision of a multi-cultural and inclusive Turkey. Finally, the protestors created space within the park and square that encompassed a wide variety of identities. However, it is important to note, that the state was eventually able to re-assert its will through the dispersion of the protestors using force.

Gezi is situated within Taksim square, a portion of the Beyoglu neighborhood that is known for the large republican square complete with park and statue of the founder of the Turkish Republic Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, as well as the numerous hotels, embassies, clubs, bars, and shops that line Istiklal Avenue. Historically, Beyoglu or Pera neighborhood were a space for foreigners. Under the Ottoman Empire, it was a space where merchants from different trading partners lived side by side leading to a diverse social milieu (Sandikci, 2015). Furthermore, the square itself holds meaning for the Turkish left due to the tradition of May Day protests in the park, the “Bloody Sunday” of February 16, 1969, and the Taksim Square Massacre on May Day 1977 (Kuymulu, 2013; Inceoglu, 2015). Likewise, the park itself holds importance for the LGBT movement as in 1987 a group of trans people, lesbian women, and gay men held a 10-day hunger strike in Taksim to protest police violence against trans sex workers who had organized their own collective housing (Cetin, 2016). The Beyoglu neighborhood has become the center of daily life for the LGBT community, particularly for trans women (Sandikci, 2015).

However, Beyoglu as a space where difference is accepted and encouraged is not without contention. The square and the park exist due to the efforts of the Kemalist regime to remake Turkey into a Republic in the 1920’s and 1930’s through the erasure of the imperial past by bulldozing the Ottoman barracks which used to stand on the site and establishment of a square for celebrations of the Republic (Kuymulu, 2013). Furthermore, these efforts to reshape the both the present and the how the past is understood through changes to built environment continue into the contemporary period. For example, the pedestrianization of Istiklal Avenue effectively homogenized the neighborhood’s past by destroying pieces of the diverse architecture that echoed the neighborhood’s past as a hub of ethnic difference (Sandikci, 2015). The efforts by the current government to erase and remake the neighborhood into a space for the celebration of the Ottoman past while erasing the symbols of ethnic difference, and the promotion of consumer capitalism

through the creation of a new mall in place of the park present a stark contrast to the historic position of the neighborhood. The multiple meanings of the park itself, as one of the last green spaces in Istanbul, for the LGBT community, the Turkish Left, and Republican Turks, were challenged by the AKP's plans sparking protest. After a series of attempts to repress the initial protests, by forcibly expelling the environmental activists camping in the park, the protest grew as neighborhood groups and activists joined to protect the park from being demolished (Inceoglu, 2015).

The 2013 Gezi protest itself combined occupation with a range of contentious politics, including marches, the standing man protest, group yoga classes, political graffiti, setting up a food pantry, and a library. The occupation allowed activists to physically claim the space as well as model a different form of democracy (Inceoglu, 2015; Onbasi, 2016). Communal needs were met through collective efforts such as the food pantry and library. Activists shared knowledge concerning ways to treat tear gas, as well as arranged systems to connect doctors with those who were hurt during waves of repression. Within the encampment, Karakayali and Yaka (2014) observed the protestors as they worked through group decision-making processes and constructed a new identity of *çapulcu* (marauder) in contrast to the state. The identity of *çapulcu* was constructed through a reclamation of the phrase used by Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan, *çapulcu*, to equate the protestors with criminals and discredit their claims. Through the reclamation of the identity, the activists embraced the antagonism between themselves and the state. However, these efforts at group decision-making and identity construction did not necessarily lead to the erasure of difference or prevent conflicts regarding how to address difference.

### **Including Difference and Productive Dissent: Agonistic Politics**

One way to address the incorporation of difference in democratic politics without forcing marginalized groups to conform to the dominant system in ways that silences their contributions is through *agonistic politics*, that is, the productive conflict between adversaries as opposed to unproductive conflict between enemies (Mouffe, 2013). Agonistic politics allow for the contestation of the exclusion of difference through political action by recognizing the ways in which groups are formed through exclusion while simultaneously recognizing the right to dissent by those who are excluded (Laclau and Mouffe, 2014; Mouffe, 2013). Furthermore, agonistic politics rejects the creation of a political order which maintains this exclusion by centering the

need for continued conflict (Mouffe, 2013). Within agonistic politics, dissent is seen as central to the political process and conceptualized as involving competition between adversaries (Mouffe, 2013).

While protest itself can be viewed as a form of agonistic politics in relation to the state (White and Farr, 2012), I focus on the construction of a radical democratic politics *within* movements which enables productive solidarity across social divides (della Porta, 2005a; della Porta, 2005b; Inceoglu, 2015). Contestation within the Gezi protests provides a clear example of agonistic dissent and its productive capacity (Inceoglu, 2015). Activists did not treat each other as enemies even when they were calling each other out for their acquiescence with sexism, or classism. Furthermore, it is through these agonistic conversations that activists were able to recognize difference and build solidarity across difference that addressed important tensions and cleavages within the movement.

One of the benefits of an agonistic politics within movements is the potential to trouble unitary conceptions of identity. Agonistic politics within identity categories can be used to trouble and deconstruct unitary identity categories (Honig, 1998). This process of refusing unitary identity categories supports the creation of solidarity within movements by allowing activists to address both their differences and similarities. As seen with the construction of the *çapulcu* identity during the Gezi protests, activists were able to view each other as allies in the struggle against the state, but continued to challenge each other to address problems of classism and sexism within the movement itself. For protest participants, this experience of building a contested shared identity that embraced difference positively impacted their lives, as noted by a trans woman, Ceylan, who attended the protests building a flexible shared identity through protest led to cis gender Turks who shared that experience being more friendly and open after the protests ended (Krajeski, 2014). Likewise, it led to shifts in individuals understanding of their own complicity in the oppression of ethnic and religious minorities in Turkey (Inceoglu, 2015, p. 539). However, it is also important to note that troubling identity categories through the internal process of agonistic engagement with identity also requires the refusal to allow identities to solidify, because the understanding of identity as changing and fluid (Honig, 1998). In the Gezi case, this recognition of identity as fluid and changing creates room for the soccer fan to restructure their fan identity as anti-homophobic through their protest experience as opposed to requiring them to reject their fan identity because that fandom has been constructed previously on homophobia.

Central to an agonistic approach to democracy is the need to maintain an openness to continued contestation, to afford space for new political claims to be made through continued contestation (Mouffe 2013). However, the parameters of this space of contestation are themselves hotly contested. Within this debate Arendt, and her agonistic critics (Benhabib, 1998; Mouffe, 2013; Honig, 1998), focus on *spaces of appearances*, the divide between public and private, and assumptions concerning who is able to enter the *agon*, or contest in the first place. Critics of Arendt's conceptualization of the *agon* argue her approach to contestation was limited to a context where identity was shared and unitary (Mouffe, 2013). Arendt (1958, 2006) differentiates between the political (contestable) and pre-political (uncontestable) in ways that are limiting from a feminist perspective (Benhabib, 1998). In this way, Arendt actively limits the potential of agonistic politics by leaving issues that are central to political life, such as gender, outside of the scope of politics and so possible contestation (Benhabib, 1998; Mouffe 2013). By broadening our definition of agonistic contestation, to include productive contestation over current exclusions based on gender, and future possible exclusions we cannot yet imagine, we are better able to maintain agonistic democracy's productive capacity (Mouffe 2013). However, the questions remains for agonistic theorists, when, where, and how, can this space for productive contestation be created and maintained? How can we ensure that conflict is agonistic, as opposed to antagonistic when there is not necessarily common ground between adversaries (Mouffe 2013)?

I argue that if we address the physical space where contestation occurs, we can better understand when activists will be successful in creating space for agonistic dissent. As demonstrated by the Gezi case, actively creating shared physical space can support the development of an agonistic democratic process that recognizes difference. Creating physical space for agonistic dissent, however, requires addressing how physical space is produced in a way that limit its agonistic potential and how activists can develop a more open public space (Hoskyns 2014; Lefebvre 1991). Importantly, while public space is designed to support contemporary political orders it is not static. Through contestation, new physical spaces can be created that do not require a shared and unitary identity for access (Lefebvre, 1991). By destabilizing taken-for-granted assumptions about a physical space and recognizing the diverse experiences of a shared physical space, opportunities can be created for productive contestation over the space itself as well as larger concerns regarding the shape of democratic politics (Hoskyns 2014).

The Gezi case enables developing a theory for how an *agonistic space* can be created in a way that does not require a static unitary identity, because the organizers were largely successful in their efforts to make this space (Inceoglu, 2015, p. 540). Within the *agonistic space* citizens have opportunities to challenge one another while also recognizing each other's rights to be in the space where contestation occurs, and their right to undertake contestation as citizens. Public space, particularly the diverse physical space of the city, provides unique opportunities for agonistic politics. As Inceoglu (2015, p. 540) notes, Gezi's position as a public space enabled the creation of an agon where "various identities could appear and engage in a dialogue with each other on a horizontal level." However, not all public space is necessarily able to be an *agonistic space*, I argue that in order to understand why Gezi was able to become an example of radical democracy in action we must address how the protestors produced an *agonistic space* within Gezi Park.

### **Creating and Limiting Space for Democratic Engagement**

In order to create space for competition between adversaries, or the *agonistic space*, we must address how space is produced and lived. Space, particularly public space, is not value neutral (Lefebvre, 1991; Soja, 1989). City governments often limit the democratic potential of space through efforts to rationalize the built environment and cater to elite interests (Lefebvre, 1991). The new built environment is constructed through the process of city planning which flattens the space into maps, turns it into an object to be viewed through renderings and well curated photos (Lefebvre, 1991). Despite the politics embedded in the process of making the new built environment, planned spaces appear apolitical, hiding the power dynamics embedded within its construction (Lefebvre, 1991). This appearance of apolitical space maintains the existing political order, and actively erases the contradictions between, for example, rampant inequality and the promise of equality within a democracy, that necessitate agonistic contestation within democratic contexts (White and Farr, 2012).

Applying Lefebvre's (1991), concept of the production of space to Gezi enables us to address how activists can and do re-politicize physical space enabling productive contestation both with the state and between activists. Gezi's history reflects Lefebvre's (1991) expectations. First, the park is created in an attempt to promote a particular political order, the Republic, and erase the Ottoman past. While the efforts to rebuild the Ottoman barracks (as a mall) reflect a shift in the political order towards a reclamation of the Ottoman past by the AKP and a consumer economy



(Kuymulu, 2013). However, space can never be entirely controlled and alternatives visions of how it could be lived come out of daily life (Lefebvre, 1991). Despite the efforts of the Turkish state, from Ataturk to Erdogan, the park and square have gained additional meanings through protest and the lived experience of residents of Istanbul (Kuymulu, 2013; Inceoglu, 2015; Sandikci, 2015). In a way, the AKP's plan for the park is an attempt to erase the history of protest and further rationalize the space, but this fails. Instead, these efforts to transform the park highlighted existing conflicts over the meaning of space— leading to a movement which explicitly challenged the state's efforts to dictate the form of the built environment, and rejected neoliberal capitalism (Kuymulu, 2013).

It is important to recognize, that while Gezi held the potential to become an *agonistic space*, due to its importance to a range of diverse social groups, and its symbolic connection to various movements, from environmentalism to Turkish nationalism, without contestation over these meanings the space of the park could have just as easily become increasingly exclusionary. For example, the symbolic connection between the square and the conceptualization of the Turkish Republic as an exclusionary nationalist republic without space for the existence of Kurds and Armenians, created the potential for the reassertion of this perspective versus the AKP. Furthermore, nationalists attempted to use the protests to promote their ideological view of what Turkey should be, but were unsuccessful (Inceoglu, 2015). Importantly, through the protests activists worked to build a *space* within Gezi where existing power dynamics were subverted by placing traditionally dispossessed groups on equal footing with dominant groups. I argue that it is through this process that activists were able to create an *agonistic space* at Gezi, which enabled productive contestation and dissent within the protest.

In order to understand this process, it is necessary to address how activists at Gezi created this *agonistic space*. First, the spatial conflict at the center of the protest enabled a diverse and unlikely coalition over a shared interest in maintaining the park (Kuymulu, 2013; Inceoglu, 2015). Second, the protestors changed the space through occupation and political graffiti. When addressing occupation and graffiti as *spatial practices*, or ways of engaging with space (Lefebvre, 1991), we are able to see how activists were able to create *agonistic space*. In the following section I focus on how the protestors created a new Gezi.

## Potential Radical Spatial Practices: Occupation & Graffiti

*Spatial practices* can support or challenge existing power dynamics or divisions within a city. For example, as a spatial practice, rebuilding the Ottoman Barracks would have deepened the power of the AKP and the AKP's vision of Turkey as an extension of the Ottoman Empire. Conventional city planning processes aim to erase the multiplicity of spatial meaning and encourage *spatial practices* which align with existing political structures (Lefebvre 1991). However, despite the efforts of city planners, and policy-makers, the multiple meanings within a space can never be completely erased (Lefebvre 1991). *Spatial practices* which transgress the intended use of a space can highlight the tension between the intended use of the space and the lived reality of the space (Lefebvre, 1991). Furthermore, *spatial practices* that transgress expectations enable the development of *agonistic space*, which supports the development of inclusive solidarities. In the following section, I discuss two *spatial practices* which enabled the development of *agonistic space* in Gezi, the occupation of the park and the political graffiti produced by the protestors.

### Occupation: Destabilizing Norms through Lived Bodies

Encampment as a protest tactic, and *spatial practice*, shows how movements can use space to create new *agonistic spaces*. For example, the Occupy Wall Street and Gezi Park movements both led to a reconfiguration of space through the occupations of public parks (Zuccotti park by Occupy, and Gezi Park in the second case) by activists. In the case of Occupy Wall Street, the occupation of Zuccotti Park challenged the taken-for-granted understanding of the park and the neighborhood as a place that prioritized business (Murphy and O'Driscoll, 2015). Furthermore, the occupation itself highlighted the contradictions within the capitalist system itself by bringing tents to the door of Wall Street. Similarly, occupation by activists in Gezi brought attention to the conflicts between AKP and everyday Turkish citizens over the meaning of Gezi park, as former Ottoman barracks, a republic square, or a space for protest (Inceoglu, 2015). However, the question then is why does occupation succeed in creating opportunities for the creation of an *agonistic space*?

Here it is important to address how occupation as a *spatial practice* transgresses norms concerning how space is lived, and occupation as an embodied form of protest. In order to address how occupation can be viewed as a critical *spatial practice*, we must address both the potential

and limitations bodies face within space of the city. Bodies can continue reproducing the contemporary order by adhering to existing norms on how particular bodies should move through space or they can challenge the current spatial arrangement by highlighting the contradictions within space (Young, 2005; Lefebvre, 1991). For Lefebvre (1991) bodies are able to become disruptive in spaces that encourage bodies to break from the regulation of their daily life and indulge in multiple ways of being. However, bodies' radical potential is not limited to what they do and where. Re-centering our focus on bodies using a female instead of male gaze can open up new ways of viewing bodies and conceptualizing new forms of embodied action (Young, 2005). The radical potential of embodiment relies on breaks with the current ways of thinking about bodies (Young, 2005) or interaction with spaces that are not completely under thrall to the current mode of production (Lefebvre, 1991).

This radical critique occurs when bodies transgress what is expected or what is considered 'common sense' knowledge of a particular identity (Machin, 2014; Parkins, 2000). One example of the radical potential of bodies can be seen through the suffragette movement. Suffragettes embodied feminist agency when they *acted* like citizens, through their engagement with politicians, heckling and breaking windows, despite being excluded from formal citizenship (Parkins, 2000). These actions transgressed the norms of everyday life, of women staying in the private sphere and behaving in peaceful and docile manners. Furthermore, the tensions between women's bodies and their actions is a powerful tool for maintaining the public's attention. Within the context of Gezi, women experiencing police brutality, such as Ceyda Sungur, the iconic "Woman in Red" were seen to embody the protests. In particular, the image of Sungur highlights this through the juxtaposition of her feminine apparel yet resolute stance with the aggressive response by the militarized police force (Toor, 2013). It is not only Sungur's body but her dress that transgresses 'common sense' understandings of what constitutes a threat (Parkins, 2000), a woman in a sundress is not a threat to a police man with body armor, actively challenging the claims by the state that the protestors are violent or require being subdued. This iconic image of Sungur demonstrates that while women's bodies are limited by social expectations (Young, 2005), transgressing these limits or even playing into these assumptions can challenge the political order (Machin, 2014; Parkins, 2000).

In the case of occupation-style protests, such as Occupy or Gezi, activists create new spaces for democratic contestation through embodied protest. Occupation, as a *spatial practice*, is the act

of holding a space through the combination of the numbers of activists, and changes to the built environment to address the needs of the protestors (ex. tents and food pantries). The activists' occupation of Gezi and Zuccotti Park challenged the state's authority over the park in terms of who has access to and control over the future of the space. As a *spatial practice*, occupation blurs the lines between public and private, as activists live in the public space simultaneously claiming the space for the public and privatizing it as a living space. These actions problematize taken for granted assumptions about the barriers between public and private space, as well as who is control of these spaces. Where the state has clear jurisdiction over public space, private spaces are oftentimes (though not always) spaces where individual authority is privileged over the state's authority (Berlant, 1998). In both cases of occupation, the refusal of the activists to remove their bodies from the space and the use of their bodies to claim the space for the people over the state or capital constructs a new *agonistic space*. In these ways, their bodies' remake the space by highlighting the contradictory claims to who can be in the space and who has authority over it.

### **Graffiti in Gezi: Claiming Space for Who?**

Where bodies engaged in actions that transgress what is considered normal can challenge existing norms over how a space is used and understood, graffiti makes visible the contradicting claims to space through both the act of symbolically claiming the space and interacting with previous claims to the space. In order to better understand how graffiti makes visible the multiple meanings embedded in space, claims space, and enacts new claims to space it is necessary to address both graffiti as an artistic practice and a *spatial practice*.

Graffiti as an artistic practice, is linked to its position as a *spatial practice*. Understanding the relationship between artistic practices and the street requires attention not only to the location of a piece but how the piece interacts with the space of the street (or how it is being used as a *spatial practice*) (Biedarieva, 2016; Brighenti, 2010; Reid, 2008; Riggle, 2010). The tools used, the placement of the piece, and the way it is created are not only aesthetic but also political choices (Murphy and O'Driscoll, 2015; Winner, 1980). Artistic practices interact with a specific space and time in order to be understood we must address this interaction (Murphy and O'Driscoll, 2015). Graffiti as an artistic practice is intentionally a *spatial practice* that interacts with public space, graffiti on a canvas is in many ways no longer graffiti (Lachmann, 1988). In order to understand graffiti as a *spatial practice*, we must address both the relationship between the piece, the street,

and the viewer. When interrogating the relationship between street art and the viewer we must ask: does the piece allow the viewer to touch, deface, or change the piece? Or does it create distance between the viewer and the piece, effectively allowing the art world to colonize the street? (Riggle, 2010). Likewise, when engaging with the relationship between the piece and the street we must ask: Does the piece engage with the space? Does it change it? Does it claim the space, and if so for who? (Riggle, 2010).

As a *spatial practice*, graffiti changes space by challenging taken for granted assumptions about what the street is and what belongs in public space. Graffiti can change how we think about walls from dividers between the *within* and *beyond* into vertical cavasses (Brighenti, 2010, p. 322). The state regulates the lives of citizens through the construction of walls as dividers, while for the graffiti artist walls are a blank canvas, a vertical space instead of a demarcation of the limits of horizontal space (Brighenti, 2010). These translations introduce a new way to view the everyday, and open new possibilities for the viewer.

In order to address the graffiti produced within the Gezi protests as a *spatial practice* that enabled the development of an *agonistic space*, we must address its context within both the practice of graffiti and the practice of graffiti in Istanbul. Graffiti, is recognized as a potential form of contentious politics that allows the artist to make claims against the state (Walder and Dobratz, 2013). However, graffiti is also a particular *spatial practice* that combines the discursive and the material, both when it is an art form and when it is a form of protest. The politics of graffiti as a *spatial practice* is both linked to both what graffiti *does* and *how it is formed* (Winner, 1980). Graffiti, and tagging are largely recognized as visibly claiming space, whether by claiming space for a specific tagger, gang, or even a political party (Brighenti, 2010; Chmielewska, 2007; Llachmann, 1988; Yanık, 2015; Walder and Dobratz, 2013). Within the graffiti community, there are styles that are only interpretable by those who are graffiti literate (such as wild style) and require training from within the community limiting the possible audience and possible artists (Pabón-Colón, 2018). In contrast, the political graffiti produced at Gezi is often times more crude and reliant on stickers, stencils, and sloppily printed claims, making it accessible to new artists and audiences alike.

This more accessible form is not an accident. Istanbul is not outside of the larger transnational graffiti community, and both international and local artists produce complex wild style murals that reflect the form originated in Brooklyn (see Image 1) (Chmielewska, 2007;

Pabón-Colón, 2018; Sivaslioglu, 2015). However, the streets are more often a mix of both simple text statements linked to political positions with, for example, the sleek pieces of graffiti artists such as German artist Kripoe's yellow hands which pop up throughout Taksim (Image 2) (Sivaslioglu, 2015). Where wild style pieces are meant to be original, oftentimes political messages are prepared as stencils which are easy to reproduce throughout a neighborhood (see Image 3 and 4). Likewise, these political messages are linked to mass protests, in the lead up to May Day 2012, the graffiti along the March route and within more left-win neighborhoods increased as organizers used the walls of the street as an easy message board to engage possible participants and claim the physical space for the Turkish left, for example Anarsist Kadınlar (Image 4) in the Kadikoy neighborhood. In this way, the graffiti produced before May Day in 2012, prepared the streets *in advance* of the protest, despite police efforts on the day of the March to keep protestors on the streets away from the already graffitied buildings. In this way, the political graffiti produced at Gezi fits within the wider use of graffiti as a *spatial practice* to claim space and share political messages.



Image 1: Graffiti Murals Taksim 2012, photo by Kaitlin Kelly-Thompson





Image 2: Love Music Hate System Taksim 2012, photo by Kaitlin Kelly-Thompson





Image 3 Que Se Vayan Todos Taksim 2012, Photo by Kaitlin Kelly-Thompson




Image 4 Anarsist Kadınlar Kadikoy 2012, Photo by Paul Thompson

Within the context of the Gezi protests, the protestors were prolific in their use of graffiti to claim the space of the park drawing on multiple forms of graffiti production from stencils to simple text scrawled quickly across an available wall. In order to analyze the graffiti produced at Gezi, I first pulled all of the images of graffiti collected by [#duvardageziparki.tumblr.com](https://www.tumblr.com/duvardageziparki). During the protests the admins for this account collected “creative graffiti and banners from GeziPark

protests” as they state in the English translation they provide on their account. The images were collected using both twitter and tumblr hashtags, #duvardageziparki. As such the account provides a convenient digital archive. In Fall 2015, I downloaded all the images of graffiti from this digital archive. The graffiti images range include slogans in English, Turkish, and Turkish, as well as stenciled images. 141 of the images were either in English, translated already by the admins, or images. Of the remaining 223 images I translated, 187. Due to my limited knowledge of Turkish, the use of slang, and the complexity of sentence structure, I was unable to translate 36 images. Within this piece I focus on images that demonstrate how graffiti can be understood to combine both spatial and discursive claims on the space. A large number of the pieces replicate the claims made within these pieces: critiques of Erdogan’s promotion of pro-natalist policies (Image 5), use established leftwing slogans (such as ACAB) (Image 6), or as in the case of Ali Ayse’yi seviyor (Ali loves Ayse) declarations of love most often found on trees and picnic tables globally (Image 7). Other scholars such as Gurel (2015), have also contributed a great deal to our understanding of the graffiti produced at Gezi through their analyses of “turkish humor” in Gezi’s graffiti.




Image 5 Anneler Çocuk Çocuklar Devrim Yapar! (Mothers Make Children, Children Make Revolution!) (#DuvardaGeziParki, n.d.)





Image 6 ACAB, Bu bir Sivil Direnis (This is a Civil Resistance), Anarchy  
(#DuvardaGeziParki, n.d.)



Image 7 Ali Ayşe'yi seviyor (Ali loves Ayse) (#DuvardaGeziParki, n.d.)

Similarly, the politics of explicitly political graffiti produced during Gezi are not limited to the message being portrayed. While the political messages promoted through the graffiti produced at Gezi are important and allow us to see the claims protestors are making. The process of marking the space itself is a political act that makes claims on the space as well as makes discursive claims concerning justice, identity, or even simple claiming of love for a sweet heart. Likewise, the variety of skill levels within the graffiti produced during Gezi, from well produced stencils, such as Sokaktaki Hayvanları gazdan koru (protect animals on the street from gas) (Image 8), to quick freeform writing, such as “Benim gibi 3 çocuk ister misin?” (Do you want three kids like me?) (Image 9), indicate the supremely democratic nature of the technology. Anyone can write with spray paint and have their message seen, even if temporarily. The democratic nature of the technology itself, then enables us to see the conflicting understandings of what Gezi was and should be within the Graffiti produced by the protestors.



Image 8 “Sokaktaki Hayvanları gazdan koru” - Protect street animals from gas  
(#DuvardaGeziParki, n.d.)




Image 9: “Benim gibi 3 çocuk ister misin?” - Do you want three kids like me?  
(#DuvardaGeziParki, n.d.)

Within the graffiti produced at Gezi, there is a great deal of variety in terms of how gender is deployed. For example, pieces such as Transfobi Öldürür (Transphobia kills) reminds cis viewers that current gender regimes are deadly for the trans community. In contrast, in “çok tatlısın” (you are very sweet), relies on old sexist, transphobic, and homophobic tropes to critique Erdogan by feminizing him. These two pieces together, demonstrate the tensions within the park over who



will have control of the space, and what their ideal Turkish democracy could be, is it a space where transphobia no longer leads to trans death or a space where transphobia can be weaponized against an unpopular leader?



Image 10 “Transfobi Öldürür” - Transphobia Kills (#DuvardaGeziParki, n.d.)





Image 11 çok tatlısın – you are very sweet (#DuvardaGeziParki, n.d.)

Importantly, the protestors did not simply accept graffiti that supported sexism, instead there is evidence of a spatialized agonistic discourse taking shape through the graffiti produced by the protestors. For example, the piece “Cinsiyetçi küfü içerdği için silinmiştir” (Deleted because includes sexist language) challenges fellow protestors to resist re-inscribing sexism into the space of the protest. In this piece, the author not only erases a previous statement but informs the reader that they have done so in order to address the sexist message of the piece. The layered spray paint indicates not only a deliberation concerning sexism that is embedded within the space itself. In this way the space is transformed from one where sexism is taken as a given, as in most public space (Kern 2020), into a space where sexism is challenged. Importantly the author of the piece does not claim the park is an anti-sexist utopia but instead highlights their rejection and makes the previous sexism visible challenging their fellow protestors to reject actions that maintain sexism within the park. Similarly, “Zengin eylemcilerin kaliteli maskesi var, kıskanıyoruz” (Rich activists



Image 12: "Cinsiyetçi küfür içerdiği için silinmiştir" - Deleted because includes sexist swearing (#DuvardaGeziParki, n.d.)

have quality masks, we envy them), highlights the lived experience of classism within the park making the existing inequalities among activists visible and challenging their fellow activists to recognize the difference in the risks taken by those with resources and those without.






Image 13 Zengin eylemcilerin kaliteli maskesi var, kıskanıyoruz” - Rich activists have quality masks, we envy them (#DuvardaGeziParki, n.d.)

Where rationalizing space can be achieved through the obscuring of alternative understandings of a space, developing an *agonistic space* requires recognizing the multiple meanings and experiences of the space. Pieces such as “Zengin eylemcilerin kaliteli maskesi var, kıskanıyoruz” (Rich activists have quality masks, we envy them) and “Cinsiyetçi küfü içerdiği için silinmiştir” (Deleted because includes sexist language), highlight the multiple ways the space of the Gezi was experienced, making visible classism and sexism while contesting it. Importantly, this process of engaging with the space is central to the development of the *çapulcu* identity that bound the protestors together through their shared struggle enabling them to reach across existing divides. This understanding of this identity is reinforced within the graffiti produced at Gezi, for example pieces such as “I chapul therefore I am – Descartes” (Image 14) both claims the *çapulcu* as an identity that is built through action and enacts the identity through the process of marking the street. In this way the identity of *çapulcu* is claimed through the authors engagement with the physical space of the protest itself, and through the interactive process with other protestors. In this way the act is potentially transformative, helping to constitute a new identity that is able to engage within the agon through the protestors efforts to construct an *agonistic space*. Maintaining

the *agon* requires continued engagement with the space itself: continued critical artistic engagement provide a way to ensure that the space does not close by highlighting and juxtaposing the many different meanings a space can hold.



Image 14 I CHAPUL THEREFORE I AM - Descartes (#DuvardaGeziParki, n.d.)

In this way Gezi represents a potential case where protestors created space for deliberation across difference, and built solidarity in order to challenge the state without exclusion of marginalized voices or privileging privileged voices (Einwohner et al., 2019). But it also marks

the fragility of these physical spaces. The protest and the space were violently suppressed through the use of tear gas, water cannons, and the forceful eviction of protestors by militarized police, and while the state agreed to postpone the plans to recreate the Ottoman barracks the plans may still be enacted in the future. However, some of the effects on activists' political participation have been more persistent. One of the primary successes of the movement was the creation of lasting solidarity across deeply held cleavages in Turkish society, ranging from the presence of marches in solidarity with Kurdish struggles in formerly Republican strongholds (the protests in Besiktas after the death of a Kurdish protestor in Lice) to the acceptance of transwomen as political actors and potential candidates by the Halk Demokratik Partisi (HDP – People's Democratic Party) (Einwohner et al., 2019; Karakayaki and Yaka, 2014). The experience may have led to shifts in the understanding of the secular/Islamic divide, one of the most historically important divides in Turkish politics, within Istanbul (Damar, 2016). Without the space of the park, these shifts would not have been possible. In this way, the experience of the *agon* within the *agonistic space* of Gezi was a transformative experience where new forms of democratic engagement were developed (Inceoglu, 2015).

### **Implications: Developing Space for Inclusive Solidarities**

Gezi as a space where deliberation occurred and lead to new solidarities demonstrates the importance of theorizing the role of space in democratic politics. Importantly, the *spatial practices* that activists engage in, such as occupation and graffiti, can support processes of deliberation that recognize differences in how people experience public space, the state, and protest differently as a result of their identities (Einwohner et al., 2019). Furthermore, the *çapulcu* identity, which was founded on the protestors presence in the park, and their participation in protest activities including the occupation and political graffiti, enabled the development of solidarity based on a flexible shared identity that recognized their different experiences of both the park and Turkish democracy. Where existing work on the inclusion of difference has demonstrated the importance of representation and the incorporation of new perspectives into democratic politics, this work is limited in the conversation concerning how we can incorporate these perspectives without forcing them to conform to existing power structures (Dryzek, 2010; Weldon, 2012; Young, 2000). Through this chapter, I present a possible approach that addresses how critically engaging with the

spaces where deliberation occurs can open spaces for forms of deliberation that enable dispossessed groups to articulate critique and be heard.

Gezi and Zucotti Park, of the Occupy movement, were able to become spaces for agonistic democracy because they were spaces where people could gather and be seen. However, parks are not the only public spaces where citizens gather to question their government. Public squares also provide spaces where citizens can make demands and talk through political conflicts. Yet, while public spaces may be necessary, simply having public spaces is not sufficient for agonistic contestation. The Gezi case suggests, that these spaces must also be accessible to a range of groups, ensuring that the deliberation which occurs within these spaces takes into account the different ways people experience life and space due to their social positions (Soja, 2010). Furthermore, we may expect that in cities where the built environment is segregated by race and class, and many citizens lack access to public space due to the location of public spaces and poor public transit (Soja, 2010) there may be challenges for developing *agonistic spaces* a problem I address in chapters 4 and 5. Likewise, efforts to increase access to green space can coincide with gentrification, requiring policy makers to address how to create space without compounding existing inequalities in terms of access (Safransky, 2014; Soja, 2010).

Importantly, graffiti and occupation are not the only tools at organizers disposal for challenging the contemporary spatial orders. From mass marches (Beltrán, 2009) to tactical urbanism (Lydon and Garcia, 2015) to flash mobs (Cuffe, 2019) activists engage with tools that temporarily disrupt space bringing in new imagined possibilities for future political action. However, work on inclusive solidarity is primarily concerned with the relational and deliberative approaches that enable the development of these forms of solidarity as opposed to how space can enable and limit these processes (Einwohner et al., 2019). If we take the role of space seriously, activists and organizers engaged in movements aimed at addressing concerns that are not explicitly spatial should take the opportunity to learn from organizers doing work on spatial and environmental justice by paying attention to how the space of the city enables the inequalities they seek to address. Responses to this may be as small as questioning where an organization holds its meetings, can the meetings be accessed by those who you aim to ally with, to questions of tactics, are your actions critically engaging with the spaces where you organize? What is the history of that space? Who is included, and who is excluded by your choice of action location? Furthermore, these questions matter even for identity-based movements. In the following chapter, I address one

of the possible positive implications of Gezi protest, and outline how the inclusive solidarities built within spatially engaged protests can create opportunities for potential descriptive representatives.

## **CHAPTER 2: PROTEST AS A PATHWAY TO FOR POTENTIAL DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATIVES: ASYA ELMAS AND THE HDP IN THE 2014 MUNICIPAL AND NOVEMBER 2015 PARLIAMENTARY TURKISH ELECTIONS**

In 2014, Asya Elmas- a transwoman and a former sex worker- ran as the People's Democratic Party's (Halkların Demokratik Partisi) candidate for mayor of Kadıköy, a neighborhood on the Asian side of the Bosphorus straits in Istanbul. Elmas's inexperience as a political candidate as well as her experiences as a trans woman and a sex worker made her an unexpected candidate. Perhaps surprisingly, then, her campaign centered explicitly on her identity as a transwoman, and as a sex worker, something that might have seemed like a disqualifying background in the past. Further, Elmas was not the only LGBT candidate in the 2014 municipal election: In fact, a record breaking ten LGBT candidates ran for local offices that same year. Furthermore, in the November 2015 parliamentary election, a record breaking, three LGBT candidates ran for office. Some scholars have linked the sharp increase in the number of candidates to the increased visibility and public support by the Turkish LGBT movement resulting from the Gezi Park Protests of 2013 (Cetin, 2016). But few have addressed the mechanisms which enabled this dramatic increase in LGBT candidates. How exactly did the protests opened opportunities for candidates such as Elmas? What can Elmas's story teach us about possible pathways to descriptive representation for members of dispossessed groups, particularly for those who find the deck is stacked against their candidacy due to their gender expression, ethnicity, and work in a stigmatized job? Furthermore, how do parties respond to these new claims for representation and how can this support increased representation?

Descriptive representation is one possible tool for improving the representation of dispossessed subgroups. Theoretically, descriptive representation improves the quality of deliberation within democratic contexts by bringing attention to the interests of marginalized groups, especially in cases where representatives build strong ties with marginalized subgroups within their constituency (Mansbridge, 1999; Dovi, 2002). For this reason, many scholars have focused on elucidating the mechanisms by which descriptive representation may be increased or improved. An extensive literature addresses the conditions that lead to increased descriptive representation, including specifically, the conditions that encourage greater descriptive



representation among those running for office (Crowder et al., 2015; Dahlerup and Friedenvall, 2005; Gilardi, 2015; Wolbrecht and Campbell, 2007; Sanbonmatsu, 2002; Sabonmatsu, 2015; Swain and Lien, 2017). However, this literature tends to focus on mechanisms that support potential ideal candidates, such as party quotas (Dahlerup and Friedenvall, 2005) or candidate trainings that require candidates are clear in which office they will target and why (Sabonmatsu, 2015). Likewise, literature on women's emergence as candidates focuses on individual political ambition among potential candidates from "traditional" feeder career paths (such as law, or education) (Fox and Lawless, 2005). What this literature misses is when and why a candidate whose social position (like Asya Elmas) precludes access to these prestige careers will run for political office.

I argue that protests that are highly disruptive of public space and bring together diverse participants, will create opportunities for new candidates, like Elmas, to emerge in local politics. In the following chapter, I demonstrate how Gezi, as a highly disruptive protest that brought together diverse participants provided opportunities for the development of descriptive representation within existing institutional structures by interrogating how potential candidates, such as Elmas, and political parties, such as the HDP and CHP, responded the aftermath of the protest.

When asked about why she ran for office, Elmas referenced her time at the Gezi Park protest which began on May 28, 2013. While the protest incorporated a range of issues, Elmas argued that it was through her participation that she both recognized the limitations of relying on allies to protect her rights as well as gained the social capital necessary to launch a campaign. Through this example, I develop my argument for why protests that are highly disruptive of public space and bring together diverse participants will lead to the emergence of candidates from dispossessed subgroups, such as trans women in the case of Gezi.

### **Deliberative Democracy, Protest, and Descriptive Representation**

Existing work on descriptive representation focuses on the rational for why descriptive representation is necessary (Dovi, 2002; Mansbridge, 1999), the factors which effect whether or not descriptive representatives run for office (Crowder et al 2015; Dahlerup and Friedenvall, 2005; Gilardi, 2015; Wolbrecht and Campbell, 2007; Sanbonmatsu, 2002; Sabonmatsu, 2015; Swain and Lien, 2017), the effects of descriptive representatives play in supporting the policy preferences of

the group in question (Canon, 1999; Reingold and Smith, 2011; Schwindt-Bayer and Mishler, 2005; Weldon, 2002), and the conditions under which descriptive representatives can win public office (Enos, 2017). I propose to expand on the discussion of why descriptive representatives run for office by highlighting the role of protest in opening political space for representation.

Existing work on why and how descriptive representatives run for office focuses on the institutions which can support marginalized groups inclusion, such as quotas (Dahlerup and Friedenvall, 2005), as well as other factors within the larger political field, such as the role the presence of role models (Wolbrecht and Campbell, 2007; Gilardi, 2015). Institutions which support marginalized groups, such as women, do not arise out of no where. Quotas, leadership programs, and policies which address discrimination exist in part due to political contestation and claims made concerning their necessity. Likewise, potential role models made choices even without the presence of their own descriptive representative role models. This raises the question of why potential descriptive representatives make the choice to run and claim the role of a descriptive representative within unideal contexts?

I argue that mass protest plays a role in encouraging potential descriptive representatives to run for office. Particularly, participation in protests where efforts are made to facilitate inclusion of marginalized groups through deliberation. Furthermore, I argue that these efforts will be more successful in spaces where action is taken to address not only the ways that marginalized people's voices are silenced by norms of rational communication (Young, 2000) but also the ways in which space itself excludes the dispossessed and privileges the powerful (Lefebvre, 1991).

### **Creating Space for New Representation: Protest and Uncrystallized Interests**

The Gezi Protests were distinctive in terms of the activists concerted efforts to develop inclusive forms of solidarity by creating a new physical space that reflected their inclusive ideals, from the organization of the camp to the political graffiti they produced (see Chapter 1). Protest can be a pathway for sparking increased descriptive representation by encouraging the marginalized to run for office. But this only happens when movement deliberation and contestation enable participants to develop a deeper understanding of their political and social context. Deliberation and contestation within movements enables recognition of a community's need for descriptive representation by uncovering otherwise uncrystallized interests, by articulating them (Mansbridge, 1999).

As discussed by Mansbridge (1999), descriptive representation is not always necessary or preferable to achieve substantive representation, but descriptive representation can improve substantive representation (and democratic legitimacy) in certain contexts (Mansbridge, 1999). Namely, descriptive representation can improve substantive representation in contexts of distrust and uncrystallized interest (Mansbridge, 1999). Specifically, in cases where there is a lack of trust between a community and their government, descriptive representatives can facilitate communication with constituents. In addition, descriptive representation can be necessary in contexts where the interests of a dispossessed group are relatively new or uncrystallized (Mansbridge, 1999). Mansbridge (1999, p. 643) defines uncrystallized interests as those issues “that have not been on the political agenda long, candidates have not taken public positions on them, and political parties are not organized around them.” Likewise, Mansbridge (1999, p. 644) notes that these interests may be “surfacing and evolving rapidly on the political agenda.” Social movements, and in particular protest, can put these rapidly changing issues on the political agenda. Contemporary empirical work on social movements and policy making demonstrates the key role movements play in defining issues and placing them on the political agenda (Weldon, 2002, 2006; White and Farr, 2012). However, I make the further argument that movement participation and protest can lead to mobilizing more candidacies for public office from dispossessed communities and groups.

Mansbridge’s (1999) approach to descriptive representation is grounded in her argument for a deliberative approach to democratic policymaking. Historically, deliberative democratic theory has been viewed as being potentially at odds with forms of democracy that center contestation, such as agonistic democracy, raising questions about the position of protest within deliberative approaches (White and Farr, 2012). Theorists concerned with the incorporation of difference note that at times, particularly when domination is present, contestation and irrational speech may be necessary (Connolly, 2006; Mouffe, 2013; Schlosberg, 1999; Young, 2000; White and Farr, 2012). Approaches that privilege rationality silence marginalized voices by privileging the ways in which the powerful communicate (Young, 2000; White and Farr, 2012). Protest is often the avenue used by the marginalized, particularly when they are barred from participation in formal politics, in order to bring attention to their issues and claims.

One way of working through the position of protest within deliberative democracy is through the concept of “no-saying” (White and Farr, 2012). Instead of viewing agonistic

contestation and deliberative democratic norms as opposed, White and Farr (2012) argue, we must address the role of civil disobedience within democracy (Habermas, 1985). The role of “no-saying” as rejecting existing legal institutions in order to highlight how these institutions fail to uphold “the basic principles embedded in a democratic constitution” (White and Farr, 2012, p. 40). White and Farr (2012, p. 41) argue that conceptualizing “no-saying” and civil disobedience as central to constitutional democracy enables deliberation to address the ways in which social context changes and the need for democratic governments to constantly adjust in the face of “new claims, new identities, new settings” that challenge existing institutions.

For example, in the Gezi case a range of “new claims” (White and Farr, 2012) or previously “uncrystallized interests” (Mansbridge, 1999) were brought to the forefront through the protest. Despite the central issue being the protection of the park, the protestors claims on the state included calls for increased democracy, the rejection of the AKP and Erdogan, and the need to address sexism, homophobia, and transphobia within Turkey. Through the claiming of the public sphere participants can develop new identities and solidarities that support future organizing, as seen both in the Gezi case (see Chapter 2) as well as the 2006 immigration protests in the United States (Beltrán, 2009; Terriquez, 2015). In this way, protest itself can be a way for those who have “second class citizenship” to challenge this position and develop support for future claims on the right to be politically represented (Beltrán, 2009; Mansbridge, 1999; White and Farr, 2012).

Protest provides opportunities to develop not only descriptive representatives but also preferable descriptive representatives. As addressed by Dovi (2002) not all descriptive representatives are necessarily good representatives for their communities. Making it necessary to address when a possible descriptive representative will be preferable to existing representation, for Dovi (2002) this means ensuring that potential descriptive representatives have mutual relationships with disposed subgroups within their community. Mutuality for Dovi (2002, p. 735) requires “an interactive relationship between representatives and citizens” where both members of the historically disadvantaged group and the representative recognize each other and coordinate together. Dispossessed subgroups are defined as those who suffer oppression both from within and outside their group (Dovi, 2002). Where protest can create an opportunity to raise uncrystallized interests, the development of solidarity within movements can enable the development of mutual relationships between potential representatives and the larger community.

Taking critique and contestation seriously deepens our understanding of the process of building solidarity. Moments of agonistic contestation are necessary to disrupt dominant groups' taken-for-granted assumptions about the nature of social relations as well as structures which privilege dominant groups within political processes (Connolly, 2006; Mouffe, 2013). Furthermore, through contestation, fundamental assumptions are highlighted and mutual respect can potentially be built through a common understanding that neither party can truly comprehend the other's position (Connolly, 2006). Here it is important to note that this recognition of difference, enables a better understanding of a representative's potential shortcomings and the need to maintain these relationships. Furthermore, within deliberative processes, institutionalizing dissent supports the development of inclusive norms which support the position of marginalized groups within movements (Weldon, 2006). In this way contestation potentially supports the development of a more comprehensive understanding of social relations as well as contributes to the development of mutual understanding necessary for preferable representation.

Theoretically, moments of protest that include internal contestation and the development of new solidarities should enable new claims for descriptive representation by dispossessed groups and communities. Furthermore, as discussed in the previous chapter, within protests where organizers are able to bring together diverse participants and develop a *counter space* we should expect productive internal dialogue leading to the new solidarities. However, the question remains, how and why do potential descriptive representatives move from protest participants into possible elected leaders? Why do activists run for political office as opposed to focusing their energies fully on movement organizing? In the following discussion Asya Elmas's campaign and the responses of the HDP and CHP to LGBT activist following Gezi Park I highlight two possible paths from protest to representation 1) the empowerment of individuals from dispossessed groups through participation in protest and 2) increased pressure on political parties to respond to movement claims concerning the need to run candidates from dispossessed groups and subgroups. In order to demonstrate these two pathways, I first review the position of Gezi as a space where inclusive solidarity was developed with particular attention to solidarity with the LGBT community. Following this discussion, I provide an in depth discussion of Asya Elmas's campaign in order to demonstrate how the experience of Gezi both informed her decision to run and her approach to contesting her own party, the HDP. Following this discussion, I address how the strengthening of the LGBT movement following the Gezi protests created pressure on both the HDP and CHP to

improve their relationship with the LGBT movement creating more space for LGBT candidates. In this way inclusive protest opens the pathway for potential representatives from dispossessed groups by both empowering potential candidates and creating pressure on political parties to run these candidates.

### **Gezi Park: Counter Space with Diverse Participants**

The importance of deliberation and contestation among the activists at Gezi is well documented within the existing literature on the protest. Protestors made decisions through assemblies where members were able to voice dissent as well as created an alternative view of Turkish society where goods were held in common including a library, and shared medical care (Karakayali and Yaka, 2014). Within the park, groups had to navigate existing identity cleavages. Karakayali and Yaka (2014, p. 125) find that the protestors were able to move past differences through deliberation on what they would do and what they would chant. This process ensured that slogans were used which were inclusive of all identities such as “Everywhere is Taksim, Everywhere is Resistance” as well as the use of slogans which affirmed different identities such as the transformation of LGBT activists slogan “so what if we are faggots (Velev ki ibneyiz) to ‘Faggots are here, where is Tayyip? (‘Ibneler burada Tayyip neredede).’ Furthermore, protestors maintained the solidarity developed at Gezi by showing up for Pride, Trans Pride, and in support of peaceful Kurdish protestors in Lice (Karakayali and Yaka, 2014).

The development of solidarity was in part supported through the claiming of physical space for the LGBT community within Gezi. During the protests, there was the development of the LGBTI block which organized “its own demonstrations, rallies, and discussion events” including the Christopher Street Day which was able to bring in over 100,000 people due to the influence of Gezi (Cetin, 2016, p. 15). Likewise, this claiming of space is reflected in the political graffiti produced at Gezi, through pieces “Transfobi Öldürür.” This indicates, that one of the reasons why the LGBTI community was effective in getting their agenda addressed within Gezi occurred in part due to the creation of autonomous groups for the LGBTI community within the larger movement (a known strategy for insuring the inclusion of difference see Weldon (2006, 2012)) and the claiming of physical space for these autonomous groups.

This indicates that inclusive forms of solidarity were being cultivated within the Gezi protests, through the process of deliberation, and the space created an opportunity to improve the

representation of the LGBTI community in Turkey. By working through contention within the Gezi movement around issues such as homophobia and transphobia and creating spaces within Gezi where queer priorities were centered, new solidarities were developed that had lasting impacts on democratic politics in Istanbul by encouraging new candidates for public office and creating pressure on political parties to run LGBT candidates.

### **From Protest to Representation: Asya Elmas**

Despite the efforts of lesbian and gay men in the 1980's through the development of the *Radikal Demokratik Yesil Parti* (Radial Democratic Green Party); by political parties such as *Ozgurluk ve Dayanisma Partisi* (ODP, Freedom and Solidarity Party) and the *Sosyaldemokrat Halkci Parti* (SHP, Social Democratic Populist Party) to run LGBT Candidates in 1999, 2007, and 2009, at most these parties were able to run one or two candidates for each election (Cetin, 2016). However, after Gezi, in the March 2014 municipal elections, ten LGBT candidates ran in local races. In the subsequent June 2015 parliamentary elections, three LGBT candidates ran in parliamentary races. Out of these handful of candidates, I will focus on the unlikely candidate, Asya Elmas. Contemporary work in political science on potential descriptive representatives tends to focus on people who come from backgrounds that are considered possible feeders into political office, such as careers in law (Fox and Lawless 2005). Elmas is a potential example of why the focus on only those with the social capital to, for example, obtain a law degree, limits our understanding of the different pathways to elected office. Unlike many of her peers who ran in the 2014 and 2015 elections, Elmas did not have a history of organizing for LGBT rights before the Gezi protests, and has had limited access to higher education due to her gender identity (Rudnitzki, 2014). However, against all odds in 2014, Asya Elmas a Kurdish trans woman and a former sex worker ran as the HDP's candidate for mayor of Kadikoy (Krajewski, 2014). Elmas's campaign demonstrates how a new activist may be motivated by the experience of solidarity to become more politically engaged through the experience of protest.

Elmas's campaign is a potential ideal case of how protest can empower participants who sit at multiple intersections of oppression to claim their right to representation. As a trans woman, Elmas's identity is highly regulated by the state through the process of obtaining an ID card with her gender properly indicated, and even the process of transition itself (Kandiyoti, 2002). Furthermore, as a Kurd, her identity is symbolically erased through Turkish nationalism which

views Kurds as Turks who have “forgotten” their identity and the ongoing political struggles to gain linguistic and political recognition (Nachmani, 2003).

In her own words, her experience as a Kurdish trans woman is shaped by discrimination, both from Kurdish and Turkish society (Krajewski, 2014). For Elmas, violence is a daily part of life as a trans woman, even Istanbul which, while more tolerant than her hometown of Mardin, is still a space where trans women continue to be oppressed (Krajewski, 2014; Rudnitzki, 2014). Likewise, she experiences formal discrimination, she has not attended university and is even unable to sign up for English classes due to the discrepancies between the sex indicated on her passport and her presentation as a woman (Rudnitzki, 2014). Elmas asserts that for her, and many of her peers, sex work is a bargain for survival, not necessarily an empowering choice (Rudnitzki, 2014). In many ways these experiences make her an unlikely potential representative, and before Gezi her focus was on how to survive in a political and social space that actively limited her potential through violence and discrimination. It is clear through her, and her friends’, accounting of daily life on the margins as trans women in Istanbul that trans women experience “second class citizenship” (Krajewski, 2014; Mansbridge, 1999; Rudnitzki, 2014). Raising the question, why then did Elmas decide to run for political office?

As Elmas articulates, the experience of Gezi changed her life, before the protests her focus was on navigating survival and after the protests she became an outspoken representative for her community. During the protests, Elmas participated with the LGBT camp and contributed to their efforts to provide food, drink, and medical aid to other protestors (Rudnitzki, 2014). As active participants, Elmas and her comrades argue they were able to build legitimacy with cis protestors, as noted by Elmas’ friend, Ceylan notes “Before [Gezi], people were afraid to sit next to us in the café. Now they come up to us and tell us that they remember us from the park” (Krajewski, 2014). Similarly, through involvement with the LGBT camp, Elmas found other queer Kurds who were interested in addressing both their position as Kurds within the LGBT community and their position within the Kurdish community as gay, lesbian, and trans people leading to the establishment of Hêvî LGBTI Initiative a Kurdish organization within Istanbul founded in September 2013 (Rudnitzki, 2014).

In order to address how Elmas is able to move from protest participant to running a campaign, we must address her blending of movement participation and electoral politics. Following Gezi, Elmas was a founding member of Hêvî LGBTI Initiative, a Kurdish organization



within Istanbul founded in September 2013 (Kaos GL, 2013). Hêvî LGBTI was founded by Asya along with her fellow Kurdish LGBT organizers who met at the LGBT camp during the Gezi protests, Rosi Da, Mehmet Umut, Ceylan and Cem Emre (Kaos GL, 2013). For this organization, LGBT politics and Kurdish politics are intrinsically linked. As the organizers state, “The issues of class, ethnicity, sexism, colonialism, and the rights and freedoms of nature and humans are inseparable parts of LGBTI politics. Hêvî is anti-militarist. Hêvî is against the authority’s systematic pressure and violence; hence it is against the violence and war in Kurdistan. Hêvî believes that the contribution of LGBTIs to the politics of peace is the responsibility in achieving an inclusive and stable peace” (Kaos GL, 2013).

As an organizer working at the intersection of Kurdish and LGBT politics, Elmas argued that the recognition of the LGBT community after Gezi is not sufficient when addressing the concerns of her community. Despite the solidarity built during Gezi across movements, Elmas found that without the continued presence of LGBT Turks and Kurds their contributions were already being erased in political events organized as early as 2014 (Krajewski, 2014). For example, Elmas’ recounts how when fellow activists failed to recognize the contributions of the LGBT protestors during a January 2014 rally, she yelled to the speaker reminding him to recognize the LGBT communities’ contributions to the organizing community (Krajewski, 2014). Furthermore, Elmas recounts that despite the HDP’s (a Kurdish political party) ideological support for the LGBT community the party does not always act on its stated support for the LGBT community (Rudnitzki, 2014). Elmas argues that these limitations are one of the reasons it was necessary for her to run her campaign. In order to ensure the issues important to the trans community are on the agenda, there need to be trans representatives present. In essence, Elmas argues that cis Kurds and Turks cannot be trusted to center the trans community. In spite of the HDP’s support for LGBT issues and candidates, there are issues that are not fully formed and new issues may arise in the future, requiring descriptive representation by a trans candidate with both the experience necessary to address “uncrystallized interests” and a track record of supporting the community (Mansbridge, 1999; Rudnitzki, 2014).

Gezi as an inclusive space where contention among activists over issues of sexuality, class, and gender, enabled a form of politics that supports Elma’s position as both a critic and a candidate for her political party, the HDP. When calling out fellow organizers who erase the contributions of the LGBT community at the original protest or when using Gezi footage as a part of her

campaign video (PoyrazProduction, 2014), Elmas engages in a form of “no-saying” which rejects attempts to erase transwomen’s contributions while also reminding the larger community that in order to live up to the ideals of Gezi trans women’s voices must be included. Elmas indicates that cis Turks and Kurds cannot be trusted to continue to center the issues of concern for the trans community. Due to this lack of trust, and the continued presence of “uncrystallized interests,” descriptive representation is necessary for her community (Mansbridge, 1999). Furthermore, as an organizer, she works to maintain mutual ties with dispossessed subgroups, such as her own Kurdish LGBT community, indicating that she could be a potential preferable descriptive representative (Dovi, 2002). Her campaign then is an extension of the contentious politics by other means, which takes the promise of inclusive democracy developed within the park and pushes for it to be kept within Turkish democracy by calling on voters to support her campaign.

Importantly, Elmas is not the only openly LGBT candidate in the elections following Gezi. I offer the story of her campaign an illustrative example of how an unlikely candidate from a dispossessed subgroup can build on the experience of inclusive protest to further challenge their political allies to recognize their own limitations in representing people who do not share their identities (Dovi, 2002). As discussed, Elmas’s claims for representation are not positioned against the AKP, which, is unlikely to support Elmas’s candidacy or even LGBTQI issues in general. Instead, her claims are made against her own party, the HDP, which at its founding has institutionalized support for LGBT party-members through their queer caucus.<sup>1</sup> Despite her critiques of the HDP, Elmas argues that she continues to work with the party both as a candidate and an organizer due to their ideological commitments which enable her to effectively challenge party members by reminding them of their commitments to the LGBT community (Rudnitzki, 2014). In this way, the success of the LGBT communities “no-saying” within the Gezi protest provided a model for internal critique that enabled Elmas’s campaign. As such, it is this experience of process that empowers new possible descriptive representatives following protest.

### **Pressuring Parties: Strengthening Movements and Improving Descriptive Representation**

Beyond the pressure to run LGBT candidates, the increased support for the LGBT movement led to efforts by both the HDP and CHP to further develop their platforms, policies,

<sup>1</sup> The HDP arose out of the the Baris ve Demokrasi Partisi (BDP, Peace and Democracy Party) with developed a queer caucus after the Gezi Protests (Cetin, 2016).

and party lists to show they were receptive to the pressure to address the concerns of the LGBT movement. Furthermore, as the two parties were competing with each other for many of the same possible constituents, these pressures also led to efforts to portray each party as more committed as a way to win possible voters.

Following the Gezi protests, HDP benefited significantly from the long-standing relationships between Kurdish parties and the queer movement established in the 1990's (Cetin, 2016). For example, gay and trans candidates for office such as Elmas and Baris Sulu (a long time gay activist) indicate that running for office through the HDP is a natural choice due to their ideological commitment to LGBT issues ("Turkish LGBTI associations condemn homophobic news items against openly gay HDP candidate," 2015). However, in 2014 we begin to see the CHP actively engage with the LGBTI movement in order to gain support. Most importantly, organizers were able to pressure the CHP into ensuring that it ran four LGBTI candidates in the 2014 municipal elections (Cetin, 2016). Beyond this, the party shifted from its position- before Gezi- where individual representatives may have campaigned for LGBTI rights, towards a formal policy of campaigning on LGBTQ issues. Unlike the HDP, the CHP did not run any LGBTI candidates in the 2015 parliamentary elections, but it did amend its party platform to include support to combat discrimination based on sexual orientation and identity (Cetin, 2016). The CHP moving into explicit support for LGBT candidates in the 2014 municipal elections and within its political platform created pressure on the HDP to demonstrate that as a party, the HDP was more responsive to the LGBT movement.

In response to the CHP's efforts to improve their relationship with the LGBT movement, the HDP took action to demonstrate that they were the party of LGBT rights. In the 2014 municipal elections, the HDP promoted their party as being more committed to descriptive representation than the CHP on their facebook, by highlighting that their LGBTQIA candidates were placed high on their party lists while the CHP's candidates were placed low on their party lists (People's Democratic Party – HDP, 2014). Importantly, these efforts to demonstrate that the HDP was more responsive to the LGBT community created space for new candidates, such as Asya Elmas who centered her experience as a Kurdish, trans woman, and sex worker in her campaign. Additionally, in the 2015 national elections the HDP's presidential candidate ran on a platform that included rights for sexual minorities (Akpınar, 2014). This approach lead to endorsements from twelve LGBTI organizations, including including Kaos GL, Pembe Hayat, Gender Identity and Sexual

Orientation Studies Association (SPOD) and Hêvî LGBTİ Initiative (“LGBT associations announce support for HDP candidate Demirtaş,” 2014). However, despite placing sexual minority candidates high on the HDP’s party lists, the party was unable to gain those seats as it gets a small percentage of the vote both locally and nationally. Yet, this still indicates that competition between these parties for support from the LGBT movement created space for gay, lesbian, and trans people to push the parties for increased descriptive representation and supportive policy.

For the HDP, these efforts to demonstrate that the party was more than a small Kurdish party through their commitment to LGBT candidates potentially paid off. In the June 2015 parliamentary election, the HDP gained 13% of the vote when previously the party had not been able to pass the 10% threshold required to ensure their representation in the Turkish parliament (Pizzi, 2015). Previously the party was not as successful, and it did not make the gains that were initially expected post-Gezi in 2014 (Çarkoğlu, 2014). It is possible that by building on the alliances created during the protests, as well as by actively supporting the LGBT community’s efforts to gain descriptive representation, the HDP was able to present itself as more than just a Kurdish party in 2015 leading to electoral success by embracing difference.

### **Concluding: Claiming Rights to Descriptive Representation**

The HDP’s strategy of engaging with the LGBT movement demonstrate that during the period following the Gezi protests, there were two mutually reinforcing pressures that enabled an increasing number of possible descriptive representatives running for office: individuals from “non-traditional” backgrounds being empowered through protest and pressure on political parties to live up to the “spirit of Gezi” by demonstrating their solidarity with marginalized communities by running candidates and centering their concerns in their platform. In this way, protest opens up political space for increased descriptive representation. These findings provide a potential challenge for approaches to research on candidate emergence among dispossessed groups (such as women; trans people; gay, lesbian, and queer people; and ethnic and racial minorities) that focus on the political ambition of members of the community from a small range of careers viewed as feeder careers for involvement in politics (Fox and Lawless, 2005).

Through a discussion of the Gezi Park protest and Asya Elmas’s campaign in the 2014 local elections in Istanbul I have indicated a possible pathway towards descriptive representation for marginalized groups. I argue that the experience of contention and inclusion within the space

of protest enables new forms of politics to arise which empower marginalized voices. Importantly, this process requires both addressing how space as well as discourse support sexism, transphobia, homophobia, classism and racism.

This experience of protest as a space of inclusion, as well as the limitations of this space create opportunities for marginalized groups to claim the right to descriptive representation by running for office. Particularly, Elmas's campaign both engaged with her positive experience of inclusion within Gezi as well as extended the contention within Gezi concerning the erasure of transwomen's contributions and ally's ability to adequately address transwomen's political needs. In this way, her campaign challenged participants in the movement to support her running for office as a way to make good on the ideals of the movement itself.

### **CHAPTER 3: FROM THE STREETS TO CITY HALL: WOMEN'S MARCHES AND THE WOMEN'S CANDIDACY IN LOCAL ELECTIONS**

One of my primary claims is that protest can lead to the emergence of new political candidates, as demonstrated through the case of the Gezi protests and Asya Elmas' campaign for Mayor of Kadikoy. This is possible, because mobilization enables the development of new claims for representation and participation in protest empowers possible representatives. Much like Gezi, the Women's Marches, which occurred across the United States and the globe on January 21, 2017 in large cities, college towns, and quiet suburbs, opened political space for women's political action, including efforts to run for political office.

In January 2017, Women's Marches became the largest single-day protest in United States history (Waddell 2017). Furthermore, the Women's March has continued to be active, organizing a convention in Detroit in October 2017, and anniversary Marches in 2018 and 2019. Over the same period, there has been an increase in the number of women running for elected office in the United States. While many of the women who ran and won national political office in 2018 have long histories in politics and activism, others, are newer to the electoral process, and cut their teeth organizing Marches in 2017. For example, Stephanie Myers of Miami built on her experience as an organizer with the Miami Women's March and decided to run for the House as a first-time candidate in April 2017 (Shammas, 2017). Similarly, Tram Nguyen, Massachusetts State Representative, already had the ambition to run, but the Women's March led to increased support and pressure from her community to run for State Representative (and successfully defeat her opponent) (Massachusetts Women's Political Caucus, 2018). These cases of women running for office raise the question: did the Women's March lead to the emergence of more women as political candidates within the cities where these Marches occurred? Or are these women anomalies?

I argue that protests, particularly inclusive protests, change the political space of the city creating opportunities for dispossessed groups to run for office and flex their political power. The Women's Marches provide a unique opportunity to clarify and test my claims. As an unprecedented example of women's political power and organizing, I argue that the local Women's Marches spread across the United States opened political space for increasing Women's political representation. Through these local marches, we can see how protest challenges social

expectations about who is a political actor by disrupting the physical experience of the city, by shutting down streets and taking over parks. Furthermore, the Women's March developed a space that highlighted the diverse experiences of women and created pressure for dispossessed women to claim their political rights due to the organizers ideological commitment to supporting diverse women.

Importantly, the efforts of the women's march to develop inclusion were not without conflict, similarly to Gezi, organizers and participants were faced with questions concerning whether this was a white woman's march (Rose-Redwood and Rose-Redwood, 2017; Young, 2017a; Young, 2017b), whether the pink pussy hats that became a symbol of the march were necessarily exclusionary (Gokariksel and Smith, 2017), and who should be included in leadership positions (Young, 2017a; Young, 2017b). These efforts to develop inclusion played out both on the national and the local stage, as Women's March organizers in cities across the world worked to develop their own events. These Marches created a physical space for conversations about what the women's movement in the United States should be, not only at the national level at the March on Washington, but at the local level in cities across the country. As such, the Women's Marches present the opportunity to test my theoretical arguments both about the relationship between protest and representation, and about inclusive public spaces and inclusive movements.

Within this piece, I focus on the effects I expect the Women's Marches to have on local politics, as I expect that the impacts of the development of public space for women's political engagement will be felt most immediately at the local level. Therefore, I argue that we should see an increase in the number of women running for local offices, for Mayor and City Council, in the election cycle immediately following the Women's Marches. Do more women run for local offices in cities where a Women's March occurred? Do more women run for Mayor or City Council in cities that held a Women's March?

When addressing women's representation, the current literature focuses on the conditions that improve women's descriptive representation (or women gaining political office), the interventions that can be taken in order to encourage individual women to see themselves as potential leaders (political ambition), and interventions that can be taken in order to support potential women candidates. Understanding the political contexts which encourage women to run for political office matters for the study of women's representation at the national and local levels (Ondercin and Welch, 2009; Palmer and Simon, 2008; Smith et al., 2011; Swain and Lien, 2017).

Increasingly, there is interest in understanding the contextual factors that support or hinder women's representation in local politics (Smith et al., 2011; Swain and Lien, 2017). Smith et al. (2011) argue that in contexts where women have more resources, in terms of education and business ownership as well as networked women's organizations, we will be more likely to see women elected to offices such as Mayors and on the City Council. In work focused on national races, Ondercin and Welch (2009) find that the political opportunity structure within a house district matters for the extent of descriptive representation, while Palmer and Simon (2008) find that the political geography of Women Friendly Districts encourage women to run.

Where the work on women winning elections focuses on the political contexts which support women candidates, the literature on candidate emergence focuses on the individual motivations of potential candidates. Fox and Lawless (2005) argue that there is a political ambition gap between men and women. The literature on women's individual political ambition suggests interventions that at the individual level, pointing to changes in candidate recruitment and training programs that lead to more women running for office (Fox and Lawless, 2010; Crowder-Meyer, 2013; Sanbonmatsu, 2015). I argue that an individual approach to candidate emergence fails to fully capture the role of political context in shaping these attitudes, political contexts where women's ambition and power is limited will necessarily limit women's views of themselves as possible political actors. In a short word, patriarchy contributes to gaps in men and women's political ambition. However, political context is not static, and it can be changed through both individual oriented approaches (such as candidate training programs) and through collective action (such as protest).

A social-movement-oriented approach centers the role of protest as a means for generating new political imaginaries by claiming public space for that vision. Taking such an approach, I focus on the political contexts that may be more supportive of women emerging as candidates. Through my study of the Women's March, I aim to show how women's mass protest can change the local political context, and lead to increasing numbers of women taking steps to become candidates. This protest experience represents an unexplored force that shapes the context in which women decide whether or not to run, and has been underappreciated as an influence on the extent of women's descriptive representation. In fact, women who may not have previously considered running for office, can be mobilized to emerge as candidates as a result of the experience of protest.



In order to better understand how protest can change the political space for women's participation in electoral politics, I first address the existing literature focused on understanding the political contexts in which women run for national and local office. I then detail the specifics of my theoretical approach, outlining the importance of addressing protest as a distinct phenomenon that produces new political spaces for action. I test my hypothesis that the 2017 Women's March led to an increased number of women running for mayor and city council using an original dataset which includes 330 cities with competitive Mayoral elections with declaration dates between the 2017 and 2018 Women's March. Within this dataset, 84 cities held a Women's March in 2017.

Through my analysis, I find evidence that the Women's March did lead to more women running for mayor in the period following the Women's March. However, I find more mixed results when addressing whether or not more women ran for city council. Nevertheless, it is clear that there is evidence for the presence of an association between the presence of a Women's March and an increased number of women seeking public office. Furthermore, the differences in the characteristics of the marches themselves may account for some of these differences in results (as indicated by my findings in Chapter 5 and 6), indicating that this is a potentially fruitful line of inquiry for future research.

### **Understanding When Women Run for Office: Bringing In Social Movements**

Central to my approach to understanding the role of protest in mobilizing potential political candidates is a focus on the role of social movement organizing in changing the political context of the city. Social movements are complex phenomena that encompass everything from organizations to individuals to new political discourse and protests (Staggenborg, 2011; Tarrow, 2011; Tilly and Tarrow, 2015). Social movements aim to create change within society in order to align it more fully with their ideals. Social Movement organizing takes many forms and is not limited to formal organizations. For example, feminist movement activities in the United States range from a meeting of the National Organization of Women to the conversations sparked by #MeToo to efforts to change linguistic practices through "everyday politics" (Mansbridge 2005). Social movement scholars view protest as an indication the movement's ability mobilize the public, raise new ideas, place pressure on policy makers, develop new political identities, and new

conceptualizations of citizenship (Beltrán, 2009; Featherstone, 2008; Pastor, 2007; Tilly and Tarrow, 2015; Weldon, 2012; White and Farr, 2012; Young, 2000).

Contemporary work in political science has demonstrated that protest can be a powerful tool for political change. Social movement mobilization and protest are associated with shifts in policy making and government responsiveness to minority demands (Gillion, 2012; Gillion, 2013; Weldon, 2002). A long tradition of work on public policy and feminist movements demonstrates that movements can lead to policy change (Kang and Tripp, 2018; McCammon, 2012; Paxton et al., 2006; Weldon, 2002). Likewise, there is evidence protests are able to bring about important political change, by providing important cues from defining the issue at hand to providing information about the concerns of a population to policy-makers (Gillion, 2012; Gillion 2013). Beyond this strong evidence for the role of protest in changing policy, there is increasing evidence that protest effects electoral outcomes within congressional districts (Gillion and Soule, 2018). Furthermore, there is evidence that protest can create a political opening for new candidates to run for public office (Gillion and Soule, 2018), I build on this previous scholarship and argue that in the case of the Women's Marches we should not only expect new candidates to emerge but we should specifically expect that women will emerge as political candidates.

There is evidence that women's organizing, particularly political and advocacy-oriented organizing, has clear implications for whether or not women hold mayoral positions within cities due to how women's political advocacy organizations promote and support women candidates for office (Smith et al., 2011). It would logically follow that within cities with a strong feminist movement, we might expect that the political context may be more friendly to women candidates. Measuring the presence and strength of local women's movements is potentially difficult, and furthermore, the presence of feminist organizations alone is not necessarily a measure of the presence of a feminist movement within a city. For example, the relationship between the presence of social movement organizations and protest is not always neat and tidy, for example, in the case of the Women's March, the so-called Sister Marches, were organized by established feminist movement organizations in some cities and were organized by new organizers in others. Protest is one way to measure the presence of the feminist movement within a particular city. In this way, the presence of a Women's March protest can potentially give insight into the presence and degree of mobilization of the feminist movement within a particular locality, in ways that are not covered by organizational counts.

Beyond the role of protest as potential signal concerning the presence and mobilization of the feminist movement, protest is also a productive space, where new identities are formed that can support the development of potential political candidates. The experience of protest is an experience of shared power with ones fellow protestors, through this shared experience, political identities are forged, strengthened, and reinvigorated (Beltrán, 2009), these experiences create the bonds that support the more tedious and bureaucratic forms of organizing such as letter writing campaigns, canvassing, and attending public meetings that support long term movement organizing. Furthermore, beyond the role of protest in supporting continued political action, this experience of increased political power within the space of protest can empower participants to further their political engagement beyond the movement itself, as with Asya Elmas (Chapter 2).

Why would the experience of the Women's March empower women to claim increased political power? Contemporary work on women as political candidates and the role of political context in shaping women's opportunities offers some insight. Present work on women in politics has demonstrated the importance of addressing the contexts, political institutions, and personal characteristics of the women who run for political office. Important work on when and why women become candidates and win elections focuses on the political institutions and contexts in which women run (Crowder-Meyer et al., 2015; Ondercin and Welch, 2009; Palmer and Simon, 2008; Smith et al., 2011; Swain and Lien, 2017), and the political ambition of potential candidates (Fox and Lawless, 2005). Due to this scholarship, we have a better understanding of the barriers women face as candidates in terms of recruitment (Fox and Lawless, 2010; Crowder-Meyer, 2013), and gender stereotypes (Pruyers and Blais, 2017). Furthermore, scholars have demonstrated the efficacy of interventions such as campaign training programs for supporting potential women candidates (Sanbonmatsu, 2015). Within this piece, I focus on the role of local political context, and how political context can be changed by disruptive mass protest, such as the Women's March.

The relationship between women's mobilization in social movements and women's descriptive representation in political science is relatively understudied. Despite evidence that the density and connectedness of women's organizations can impact women's descriptive representation at the local level (Smith et al., 2011) and a deep literature on the role of women's movements in the process of policy change (Kang and Tripp, 2018; McCammon, 2012; Paxton et al., 2006; Weldon, 2002), there is less attention on the relationship between movement activities (such as protests) and women's emergence as political candidates.

Debates concerning the role of political context when addressing women's descriptive representation have demonstrated the importance of "Women Friendly Districts" (Palmer and Simon, 2008), women's potential resources (Smith et al., 2011), and the political opportunity structure (Ondercin and Welch, 2009). Recent work specifically on women's representation in mayoral and city council elections has tested the impacts of single member and multi-member districts (Crowder-Meyer et al., 2015; Swain and Lien, 2017), and addressed questions concerning the local context in terms of women's education, business ownership, and presence of organizations (Smith et al., 2011). Through this work, scholars have worked to better understand the relationship between the larger political context and each step of the campaign process, from women's decision to run to whether or not women win elected office (Crowder-Meyer et al., 2015; Ondercin and Welch, 2009; Palmer and Simon, 2008; Smith et al., 2011; Swain and Lien, 2017).

When defining and addressing political context, many of these scholars focus on measuring the connection between particular political institutions, and cultural characteristics to particular segments of geography such as districts or municipalities (Crowder-Meyer et al., 2015; Ondercin and Welch, 2009; Palmer and Simon, 2008; Smith et al., 2011; Swain and Lien, 2017). Many of these measures aim to better understand not only the rules that determine how a district or municipality is governed but also how the district or municipality is lived, by including measures such as the school aged population as a measure to better understand whether many of the women within a community have care-work responsibilities (Palmer and Simon, 2008; Smith et al., 2011). Building on this work, and this effort to better understand the political contexts which encourage women to run for political office, I argue that we must address events that can lead to changes within the political context such as protest.

I argue protest is a productive space that enables identity construction and claims to political power by dispossessed groups, and use the Women's Marches as an opportunity to test this claim. A significant effort has been made to understand the Women's March, and the Women's Marchers, yet there has been little work on what we should expect from this wave of mass protest on our political life. Contemporary work in political science and sociology on the Women's March has focused on who was present at protests and the priorities of the protestors in comparison to the other movements colloquially referred to as "the resistance" (Fisher et al., 2018; Heaney, 2019). While this work has given us a deeper sense of who the protestors are and most importantly, why they chose to become involved in the March, it does not give us a sense of what we should expect

from the protests. I expect that the Women's Marches changed the political landscape of the cities where they were held because the protests produced new visions of what is politically possible when women claim their rights as political actors. Empowering women within these communities to view themselves as legitimate political actors and challenging their neighbors to view women as possible political actors as well. In the following section I develop a theoretical explanation for why protests, such as the women's march, create opportunities for political candidates from dispossessed groups to run for office.

### **The Women's March: Creating Space for Women's Political Power**

Protest creates space where new political identities and claimed are imagined and developed (Beltrán, 2009; Featherstone, 2008). If political context can be more or less favorable to the emergence of women political candidates (Smith et al., 2011; Swain and Lien, 2017; Palmer and Simon, 2008), prompts the question of whether protest can change the political context to be more favorable for the emergence of women political candidates and if so, how? In order to understand how protest can change the political context of the city to be more favorable to women's representation, I argue we must address how protest, challenges taken for granted assumptions concerning who controls public space and thus empowers those who have been historically dispossessed of political power to claim their rights to representation.

Protest plays a role both in strengthening and developing political identities and in the disruption of public space. Protest creates a productive space where activist political identities are developed, solidarity is built, and participants are energized (Boothroyd et al., 2017; Featherstone, 2008; Gokariksel and Smith, 2017; Rose-Redwood and Rose-Redwood, 2017). For the protestor, the experience of protest can be the recognition by participants that despite their group's historic exclusion from politics, they have legitimate claims to be made against the state (Beltrán, 2009). The experience of protest may enable a shift in terms of women's political ambition but, as demonstrated within the literature on women's representation, political ambition for office is not the same as taking steps to run for political office (Fox and Lawless, 2005; Fox and Lawless, 2010).

Protest does more than change the identities of those who participate in the event, it also changes the larger community where it occurs. For example, the protest may challenge taken for granted assumptions about who has political power by disrupting everyday activities and bringing attention to ideas and claims that have otherwise been excluded from the larger public discourse

(Young, 2000). Furthermore, there is empirical evidence that protest can create fertile ground for new political candidates to arise by focusing public attention on these new claims (Gillion and Soule, 2018). This disruption of everyday life, and public space, is what I contend is most important when addressing why protest enables the development of a community that is more favorable for women's emergence as political candidates.

Importantly, disruption communicates the power of the protestors *to the onlookers*. As Parkins (2000) discusses in her work on the Suffragettes, disruptive bodies present new visions of who is a citizen and what citizenship is, this is the symbolic power of disruption. For feminist geographers, the embodied choices made by the Women's Marchers matter, as these choices signify their assumptions concerning who is included within their vision of womanhood and the conflicts surrounding who should be included within this vision of womanhood (Boothroyd et al., 2017; Gokariksel and Smith, 2017; Moss and Maddrell, 2017; Rose-Redwood and Rose-Redwood, 2017). For example, embodied resistance, such as wearing the pussy hat at the Women's March (Boothroyd et al., 2017), has the potential both to destabilize our understandings of femininity and create space for new political realities while also signifying an exclusionary view of femininity that is white and cis-centric necessitating internal critique. Therefore, when addressing the productive power of protest, we must pay attention to how protests disrupts public space, how this experience of disruption empowers the protests participants, and the symbolic power of this disruption. Furthermore, we must address the implications of this disruption.

The Women's March of 2017, as a series of mass protests organized by both veteran and new organizers, represents a potential moment where women claimed a group identity as women and claimed political power. Within the various women's marches that were part of the broader phenomenon, we see variation in how the protestors disrupted public space through their protest tactics. In Lafayette, Indiana, the Women's March was small compared to larger cities, but large and unexpected by local standards, and the crowd in front of the courthouse slowly bled into the street, forcing the partial closure of Columbia Avenue, a major arterial road connecting Lafayette and West Lafayette. Smaller protests held in the city previously ended at the same courthouse with only a few participants, and this contrast, with the protestors actually disrupting the flow of traffic, led protestors to feel they were part of something unprecedented and to capture more public attention. Power came from the protestors' ability to disrupt everyday life by slowing traffic.

Therefore, as an action, this experience was one of women's increased political power within the community.

In communities where Marches occurred, both participants and observers were faced with what it meant for their community to participate in the Women's March. Particularly in cities and towns without strong activist communities, record numbers of participants, the closing of streets, and even the presence of a March itself were viewed as surprising and transformative. As indicated by organizers in cities such as Beaumont and Fort Worth Texas, holding a protest within their own cities, instead of driving to Austin to join the larger groups, and being able to draw a crowd felt empowering (Panicker 2017; Skelton 2017). In this way, the presence of a Women's March may indicate a rupture in the community around who has political power and who is relevant (Beltrán, 2009; Lefebvre, 1991).

Historically, work on women's role as candidates has not addressed protest as a potential pathway towards political power, focusing more on the importance of role models and women running for office in previous elections as changing the political landscape and creating opportunities for more women to run in the future (Ondercin and Welch, 2009). Where role models encourage women to run for office by demonstrating that a woman can run and win office, in essence modeling what it looks like for women to hold political power, protest challenges the community to recognize the power of dispossessed subgroups (Beltrán, 2009). In this way mass protest can have a similar effect to the role model effect, by challenging the community to recognize the power of dispossessed subgroups in democratic publics. Women visibly participating in protest offer additional role models of women claiming public space for their voices and bodies. For some, speaking out may even provide an affirmative experience of claiming that space that encourages them to seek similar positive experiences in other contexts, such as running for office. In the case of the Women's March, I expect to see an increase in the number of women running for political office. Leading to my first two hypotheses:

**Hypothesis 1:** Cities where a Women's March occurred in 2017 will be associated with more women running for Mayor in 2018

**Hypothesis 2:** Cities where a Women's March occurred 2017 will be associated with more women running for City Council in 2018?

Beyond the role of the Women's Marches in creating increased space for women in the public sphere, I argue that we must also address whether or not these Marches were an empowering

experience for women of color. We must address the possibility that the presence of a women's march may have a different impact on women of color due to the experience of secondary marginalization, or the intersection of multiple forms of oppression such as racism and sexism, leading to their exclusion within a political movement focused on gender (Cohen, 1999). Furthermore, contemporary scholarship on women's political representation demonstrates the importance of attending to the particular barriers women of color face, due to the intersection of race and gender, when pursuing political office (Sabonmatsu 2015; Swain and Lien 2017). Importantly, at the national level, the organizers of the Women's March released a platform that recognized the diversity of women's experience, and highlighted the importance of addressing all women's concerns, stating:

“The rhetoric of the past election cycle has insulted, demonized, and threatened many of us--women, immigrants of all statuses, those with diverse religious faiths particularly Muslim, people who identify as LGBTQIA, Native and Indigenous people, Black and Brown people, people with disabilities, the economically impoverished and survivors of sexual assault. We are confronted with the question of how to move forward in the face of national and international concern and fear” (Women's March on Washington 2016).

This effort to address how women's oppression is not limited to their experience of gender indicates the Women's Marches ideological commitment to the inclusion of women experiencing secondary marginalization. In this way, the march was not only committed to developing public space for white women, but also women of color, disabled women, immigrant women, indigenous women, etc. By symbolically claiming space for women who experience secondary marginalization, I expect that the political context should not only become more open for white women to claim candidacy but also could lead to increases in the number of women of color running for local political office, leading to my next two hypotheses:

**Hypothesis 3:** Cities where a Women's March occurred in 2017 will be associated with more women of color running for Mayor in 2018

**Hypothesis 4:** Cities where a Women's March occurred in 2017 will be associated with more women of color running for City Council in 2018?



## **Testing the Effects of Protest on Women's Emergence as Local Political Candidates: Measuring the Women's March**

I tested my hypotheses using an original dataset on the Women's Marches of 2017-2018 in the United States. This dataset consists of 330 cities, 246 cities where no Women's March occurred and 84 cities where a Women's March did occur. Cities were included if they held a competitive Mayoral election with a declaration deadline that fell between the 2017 and 2018 Women's Marches. Potential cases were identified using the list of elections available from the US Council of Mayors, and Pressman and Chenoweth's (2017) march counts. Original data was collected on the number of women who ran for Mayor and City Council in 2017, the number of women and women of color who ran in the previous Mayoral and City Council elections, the total number of candidates in each election. The dataset also includes data from a variety of extant sources, such as whether or not a March was held in the city (Pressman and Chenoweth, 2017), census measures addressing relevant population characteristics for each city (including race, ethnicity, median income, school age, education, blue collar workers) (U.S. Census Bureau 2010), geographic variables (whether the city is in the south and census measures for urbanization) (U.S. Census Bureau 2010), the number of women owned firms (U.S. Census Bureau 2010), and county measures for the presidential vote for the Republican candidate in 2016 (MIT Election Data and Science Lab 2018).

The data for the dependent variables, women and women of color running for Mayor and City council between the 2017 and 2018 Women's Marches, was collected using a combination of electoral records, local news sources, and campaign websites and Facebook pages. Candidates were counted as women when they were referred to as women in publications, either their own or in news sources. Candidates were coded as women of color when evidence could be found that they considered themselves to be Black, Asian, Latina, or indigenous or if they were referred to as such in news sources. The same process was used when coding the details of the previous election, the year of the previous election varies due to differences in whether cities hold elections for these offices on a two year, three year, or four year cycle.

The key independent variable, whether or not a march occurred, was collected using Pressman and Chenoweth's (2017) dataset on the 2017 Women's March. The variable, presence of a women's march, is coded as a binary variable with 0 indicating that no march occurred in the city and 1 indicating that a Women's March occurred in the city in 2017.

My key dependent variables are the number of women and women of color running for Mayor and city council in the elections with candidacy deadlines between the 2017 Women's March and before the 2018 Women's March. These measures are counts of the number of women and women of color who declared candidacy for local elections during this period. The counts for the number of women running for mayor and for the number of women of color running for mayor range from 0 to 6. The counts for the number of women running for city council range from 0 to 53, and the number of women of color running for city council ranges from 0 to 34. I treat these counts as continuous variables for the purpose of the analysis.<sup>2</sup>

Based on my hypotheses, I expect that the presence of a women's march should be associated with an increased number of women running for local offices. Therefore, I expect, a positive association between the presence of a March, and the number of women and women of color running for Mayor. Likewise, I expect a positive association between the number of women and women of color running for city council.

In order to control for possible alternative explanations for the increase in the number of women running for local office, I include relevant controls to address the possible role-model effect (Ondercin and Welch, 2009), women's access to social capital (Smith et al., 2011), and the possible openness of the municipality to women's political power (Palmer and Simon, 2008). In order to address the possible role-model effect, I include counts of the number of women and women of color who ran for mayor and city council in the previous election cycle (see Appendix A for full breakdown of these measures). In order to address women's possible access to capital, I use the number of women owned firms within the city, this measure ranges from 203 to 413,899 firms (see Appendix A for full discussion of this measure).

Finally, in order to address how open the city may be to women as political leaders, I use a modified version of Palmer and Simon's (2008, p. 194-195) Women Friendly District Index. By using this index, I am able to capture a great amount of detail about the municipal context without sacrificing degrees of freedom within my analysis. The index ranges from 0 to 8, with 0 indicating that the city is not likely to be supportive of women political candidates and 8 indicating that the city is likely to be supportive of women political candidates. This index uses the same coding as Palmer and Simon's (2008) index on the measures of urbanization, the whether the city is located in the south, the percent of the population which identifies as black, Hispanic, and foreign born,

<sup>2</sup> Similar findings are found when running these analyses using Poisson regression

the percent of the population with a college degree, the percent of the population which is school aged, the percent of the workforce involved in blue collar work, relative median income, and the percent of the vote for the Republican presidential candidate in 2016. However, the index excludes Palmer and Simon's (2008) coding for the area of the district or in this case city. Where Palmer and Simon (2008) find that women are more likely to run in smaller districts, very few cities, only three, are larger than congressional districts that are more likely to elect women (541 sq. miles).

### **Analysis**

In order to test my hypotheses, I conduct a series of OLS regression analyses.<sup>3</sup> In the following four tables, test the association between women running for Mayor and City Council and the Women's March as well as the key controls, a modified version of Palmer and Simon's Women Friendly District Index, city area, the number of women owned firms (Smith et al., 2011), and the number of women who ran in the previous election (Ondercin and Welch, 2009).

<sup>3</sup> Using the reg command in STATA.

Table 3: Women's March and the Number of Women Mayoral Candidates in 2017

	<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>	<b>Model 4</b>
	Number of Women Mayoral Candidates in 2017	Number of Women Mayoral Candidates in 2017	Number of Women Mayoral Candidates in 2017	Number of Women Mayoral Candidates in 2017
Women's March	0.718***	0.529***	0.588***	0.473***
Women Owned Firms		0.00000222		0.00000116
Number of Women Candidates in the Previous election		0.429***		0.407***
Women Friendly City Index			0.123***	0.0915**
City Area			0.00137	0.000601
Constant	0.508***	0.326***	-0.0664	-0.0804
N	330	327	329	327
R-sq	0.110	0.251	0.149	0.269
adj. R-sq	0.107	0.244	0.141	0.257
* p<0.05	** p<0.01	*** p<0.001		

Within my analyses, I find strong support for my hypothesis that the presence of a Women's March is associated with more women running for Mayor. In Table 3, I analyze the relationship between the presence or absence of a Women's March in 2017 and the number of women who run for Mayor following the 2017 March and before the 2018 March and the relevant controls. Through this series of analyses, we see that in all four Models the presence of a Women's March has a positive and significant association with the number of women who run for Mayor. Likewise, the Women Friendly Municipality index has a positive and significant association with the number of women who run for office, as evidenced in model 3 and model 4. As expected, the number of women owned firms has a significant and positive association with the number of

women mayoral candidates as evidenced in model 4. When looking at the substantive effects in models 3 and 4, it is clear that the presence or absence of a March (0.473 in model 4) and an increase in the number of women mayoral candidates in the previous election by 1 (0.407 in model 4) have larger effect sizes than moving up by 1 on the Women Friendly Municipality Index (0.0915 in model 4). These findings indicate strong support for my hypotheses that the presence of a Women's March has a positive effect on the number of women running for Mayor.

Table 4: Women's March and the Number of Women Color Mayoral Candidates in 2017

	<b>Model 5</b>	<b>Model 6</b>	<b>Model 7</b>	<b>Model 8</b>
	Number of Women of Color Mayoral Candidates in 2017	Number of Women of Color Mayoral Candidates in 2017	Number of Women of Color Mayoral Candidates in 2017	Number of Women of Color Mayoral Candidates in 2017
Women's March	0.355***	0.245***	0.271***	0.198**
Women Owned Firms		0.00000144		0.000000463
Number of Women of Color Mayoral Candidates in Previous Election		0.608***		0.595***
Women Friendly City Index			0.0396	0.0352
City Area			0.00133*	0.000868
Constant	0.110**	0.0526	-0.102	-0.123
N	330	327	329	327
R-sq	0.072	0.260	0.100	0.274
adj. R-sq	0.070	0.253	0.091	0.262
* p<0.05	** p<0.01	*** p<0.001		

When addressing the relationship between the presence of a Women's March and the number of women of color running for Mayor, I find support for my hypothesis, that inclusive protest is positively associated with the number of women of color running for Mayor. In table 4,

I test the association between the presence of absence of a Women's March in 2017 with the number of women of color who run for Mayor in the following election. As in the analyses addressing the number of women mayoral candidates, we see in model 5 through 8 that the Women's March has a significant and positive association with the number of women of color mayoral candidates. Likewise, in model 6 and 8, the number of women of color candidates in the previous election has a significant and positive association as well. Unlike when addressing the number of women mayoral candidates, there is not a significant association between the Women Friendly Municipal Index or the number of women owned firms and the number of women of color mayoral candidates. This may be due in part to the importance of protest as a way for women of color to claim political space (Weldon 2012). Furthermore, city area is significant in model 7, but loses significance when the number of women of color mayoral candidates in a previous election and the number of women owned firms are included. These differences as well as the low r-squared and adjusted r-squared values indicate that other variables may be relevant when addressing whether women of color run for mayor.

Table 5: Women's March and Number of Women City Council Candidates 2017

	<b>Model 9</b>	<b>Model 10</b>	<b>Model 11</b>	<b>Model 12</b>
	Number of Women City Council Candidates 2017	Number of Women City Council Candidates 2017	Number of Women City Council Candidates 2017	Number of Women City Council Candidates 2017
Women's March	3.080***	0.965**	1.598**	0.567
Women Owned Firms		0.0000351***		0.0000240**
Number of Women City Council Candidates in Previous Election		0.622***		0.632***
Women Friendly City Index			0.176	-0.00147
City Area			0.0337***	0.0119***
Constant	2.433***	1.032***	0.673	0.695
N	323	320	322	320
R-sq	0.099	0.713	0.238	0.726
adj. R-sq	0.096	0.710	0.230	0.721
* p<0.05	** p<0.01	*** p<0.001"		

When addressing the relationship between the presence of a Women's March and the number of women running for city council, I find support for my hypothesis that the presence of a women's march is associated with an increase in the number of women running for city council. In table 5, I test the association between the presence or absence of a Women's March in 2017 and the number of women city council candidates in the following election. The presence or absence of a March is significant and positively associated with the number of women city council candidates in all models except model 12, which includes all relevant controls. The coefficient here is still positive, and the larger number of variables in the model may suggest that fewer degrees of freedom (less statistical power) are the reason for the different p-value here. On the other hand, the number of women owned firms and the number of women city council candidates

are significant and positively associated with the number of women city council candidates in both model 10 and model 12, suggesting that these associations are powerful even in the full models. Likewise, city area is significant and positively associated with the number of women running for city council in models 11 and 12.

Unlike in mayoral races, the Women's March loses statistical significance when all relevant controls are included in the model. Likewise, the Women Friendly Municipality index is not significant either. Instead the best and most precise predictor variable appears to be whether or not women have run in previous elections based on the large substantive effect size (0.632 in model 12). While the number of women owned firms and city area are significant, the substantive effect size for both is relatively small (0.0000240 for women owned firms in model 12 and 0.0119 for city area in model 12). This analysis indicates that there may be a difference between the role of the Women's March when addressing mayoral and city council races, these differences may be the importance of the role model effect, differences in incumbency incentives (women running in previous races could be the same women in city council races), and the number of seats (explaining the significance of city area either due to differences in the number of total seats available and differences between districts and city wide elections).



Table 6: Women's March and Number of Women of Color City Council Candidates in 2017

	<b>Model 13</b>	<b>Model 14</b>	<b>Model 15</b>	<b>Model 16</b>
	Number of Women of Color City Council Candidates in 2017	Number of Women of Color City Council Candidates in 2017	Number of Women of Color City Council Candidates in 2017	Number of Women of Color City Council Candidates in 2017
Women's March	2.411***	0.773***	1.191***	0.450*
Women Owned Firms		0.0000196**		0.0000130*
Number of Women of Color City Council Candidates in 2017		0.656***		0.644***
Women Friendly City Index			0.283**	0.0553
City Area			0.0245***	0.00853***
constant	0.457**	0.187	-0.953*	-0.292
N	323	320	322	320
R-sq	0.129	0.710	0.308	0.727
adj. R-sq	0.126	0.707	0.301	0.723
* p<0.05	** p<0.01	*** p<0.001		

Similarly to when addressing the relationship between the presence of a Women's March and the number of women running for city council, when addressing the relationship between the march and the number of women of color running for city council I find support for my hypothesis that a march should be associated with an increase in the number of women of color running for city council. In table 6, I test the association between the presence or absence of a Women's March in 2017 and the number of women of color who run for city council in the following election. The the presence or absence of a March has a significant and positive association with the number of women of color city council candidates in all models. The Women Friendly Municipality Index, is only significantly and positively associated with the number of women running for city council on model 13. The number of women of color candidates in the previous election has a positive and

significant association with the number of women of color city candidates in models 14 and 16. Likewise, city area has a positive and significant association with the number of women of color city council candidates in models 15 and 16. Similarly to model 12, in model 16 the number of women of color city council candidates in the previous election has the largest effect size (0.652). This indicates, that while the presence or absence of a march does appear to be associated with increases in the number of women of color running for city council, we see evidence that the role model effect remains a strong force in determining the number of women of color running for city council.

### **Discussion**

Through these analyses I find evidence to support my first and second hypotheses, that cities with Women's Marches in 2017 are likely to see an increase in the number of women and women of color running for Mayor. Likewise, I find supportive evidence for the hypotheses that cities which held a Women's March are likely to see an increase in the number of women and women of color running for city council, even if these associations seem less powerful as predictors of women's candidacy when compared to the role-model effect of prior women candidates or women candidates of color. Furthermore, I find evidence that while the Women Friendly Municipal Index is helpful when addressing the number of women running for Mayor, this index is less reliable as a predictor when addressing the number of women of color running for mayor, the number of women running for city council, or the number of women of color running for city council in the period following the 2017 Women's March. As expected, the number of women who ran for office in the previous election is significant when addressing both mayoral and city council races as expected based on work on women running in House races (Ondercin and Welch, 2009). Likewise, city area is significant when addressing the number of women running in city council races, likely due to the relationship between larger cities and larger city councils. Whereas, the number of women owned firms is significant when addressing the number of women running for Mayor.

Overall, these analyses indicate that the Women's March shifted the local context encouraging women to pursue political power, particularly executive position, in the elections following the women's March. Likewise, other contextual factors such as the size of the city and the presence of women role-models in position of political power remain important when

addressing whether or not women run for local office, particularly when running for city council. Based on the extant literature, we could expect that city size is capturing information concerning the number of city council seats or even differences between at-large and district races which impact whether or not women run for city council (Smith et al, 2012).

The role of previous women running for and holding political office is unsurprising based on the current literature (Ondercin and Welch, 2009), however the role of protest in potentially mobilizing women candidates demonstrates how these two pathways may support on another. Protest, such as the Women's March, may open the space for women to break through when there are not role models present. Within my comparative case studies of Boston, San Antonio, and Amarillo (Chapter 6), I return this question of how protest interacts with the presence of role models in public office.

Furthermore, The Women Friendly Municipal index is not significant when addressing the number of women of color who run for Mayor, indicating the need to potentially use a specifically women of color friendly municipal index when addressing these questions (Palmer and Simon, 2008) as well as consider that other factors may be of importance when addressing whether or not a locality is friendly to women of color as candidates. Palmer and Simon (2008, pp. 202-204) recognize that districts that will be friendly for white women are not the same as districts that will be friendly for Black women. However, they note that despite significant differences between the districts that will be supportive of white women house candidates and Black women house candidates, there is more difficulty in parsing the differences between districts that are supportive of Black women and those that are supportive of Black men (2008, p. 202). My analysis using a modified version of their index to address the relationship between the city context and women running for local office indicates that the index is likely again capturing which cities are friendly to white women candidates, not necessarily women of color candidates for local office. Similarly, to Palmer and Simon (2008) I expect this is due to differences in terms of the location and socio-economic variables, as they note that Black women are more likely to be elected in the South, and more blue collar districts than white women.

My finding that the modified index does not function for women of color, indicates that there may be fruitful future research in parsing out which cities are more friendly for example for Black women, Latina women, Asian women etc. Unlike with house districts, there are a larger

number of possible cases, enabling future researchers to gain more leverage even with the small number of cases where women of color run and are elected to local office.

## **Conclusion**

Through my analysis of the Women's March of 2017 and the following local elections, I find preliminary evidence that the Women's March of 2017 did lead to an increase in women running for mayor in the following election. Likewise, I find mixed evidence that the Women's March of 2017 led to an increase in the number of women running for city council. I find strong support for my claim that protest changes local context and creates space for women to claim political power at the local level by running for local office. These findings, while suggestive, point to a fruitful line of inquiry into the relationship between feminist social movement organizing and women's involvement in local electoral politics.

Questions remain concerning the nature of the relationship between social movement organizing and efforts by dispossessed groups to claim political power. As evidenced by Smith, Reingold, and Owen's (2012) work, the presence of well networked women's political advocacy organizations increase the likelihood of women Mayoral candidates winning competitive elections. Furthermore, some local Women's Marches provided opportunities for new women's and feminist organizations to arise, and for existing organizations to build stronger ties. We may expect that Marches which took place in municipalities where multiple organizations were involved in the planning process may lead to more women running for office, while those which were not tied to existing organizations or were organized by a few interested individuals may have had less of an effect on the number of women who ran following the Women's March. In subsequent chapters (5 and 6) I use case studies of both Boston and San Antonio to shed light upon the differences between established feminist organizations and new organizations in shaping the capacity of the protest to disrupt the space of the city, providing potential answers to these questions concerning the relationship between the Women's march and feminist organizing.

Beyond these questions of how the Women's March fits into larger stories about how feminist organizing and mobilization can support women claiming political power, I also find evidence for the need to develop measures that capture differences between municipalities that support white women's candidacies and those that support Black women, Latina women, and Asian women's candidacies for local office. Importantly, these findings are not particularly

surprising, due to the way race, gender, and sexuality intersect shaping women's experiences, and political action (Crenshaw, 1989; Weldon, 2012; Young, 2000). Indicating a fruitful line of potential inquiry into how cities support or discourage Black women, Asian women, indigenous women, and Latina women from becoming leaders in local politics. My case study of San Antonio (chapter 6) provides potential insights into how Latina, queer, and immigrant women have claimed space within local governments despite challenges providing a potential starting point to addressing the role of the space of the city and protest in Latina women's efforts to gain political office.

## CHAPTER 4: WHOSE MARCH?: THE SPACE OF THE CITY AND INCLUSION IN THE WOMEN'S MARCH

In the previous chapter, I demonstrate that the Women's March is associated with increasing numbers of women and women of color running for public office. However, despite the ideological commitment to inclusion as presented by the national organizing team, local Women's Marches varied in terms of their ability to achieve inclusion. Critics argue that the Women's March was a moment of white feminism, centering the concerns of white women without critically examining how for example race, class, indigeneity, immigration status, sexuality, and gender identity intersect shaping women's oppression (Gokriksel and Smith, 2017; Rose-Redwood and Rose-Redwood, 2017). The Women's March is sometimes discussed as if it was one national march but it included 674 marches in US communities and 263 marches held outside of the United States (Pressman and Chenoweth, 2017). These local Marches provide a unique opportunity to interrogate the question of inclusion within the Women's March.

The story of inclusion within the local U.S. Women's Marches is complicated. On one extreme, in Pittsburgh, white organizers' refusal to address critiques of the March for not connecting with annual events addressing anti-Racism on the same weekend as the women's march led to a counter protest organized by Black women, namely, the "Our Feminism Must be intersectional March" (Young 2017a, 2017b). In contrast, in Boston the organizers I interviewed were very cognizant of these issues, providing self-critique concerning their organizing teams blind spots concerning key issues due to not being representative in terms of race and class and recognizing that women of color within the leadership team played key roles in ensuring the inclusion of the indigenous community. In San Antonio, meanwhile, organizers for the 2017 March, *Mujeres Marcharan*, sought to undertake a deliberative democratic process when deciding whether or not to hold a March, and made efforts to ensure that their March centered the experiences of Latinx, immigrant, and queer women. This variation across these local Marches in terms of their success in developing inclusion raises an important question: where were Women's Marches more and less inclusive? And *why* were some Marches more inclusive than others?

Contemporary scholarship is increasingly concerned with how movements address diversity. How does identity shape how activists engage with each other and with the larger public? How do multiple identities intersect in shaping the mobilization of activists and their actions

(Einwohner, 1999; Einwohner et al, 2009; Fisher et al, 2018; Heaney, 2019; Heaney and Rojas, 2014; Terriquez, 2015; Tormos, 2017; Weldon, 2006, 2012). The Women's March provides a unique opportunity to examine questions about the politics of movement building in the context of such intersectional social relations. Contemporary work on the Women's March, indicates that Women's March activists were motivated not only by the need to address women's rights but the need to address the interconnection between the struggles for women's rights, civil rights, and immigrant rights, etc (Boothroyd et al., 2017; Fisher et al., 2018; Heaney, 2019; Gokariksel and Smith, 2017; Rose-Redwood and Rose-Redwood, 2017). While this scholarship gives a clear picture of how the recognition of how intersectionality shapes struggles for justice motivated individual activists (Fisher et al, 2018; Heaney, 2019), the question remains on why some local protests were truly inclusive, and others re-inscribed existing hierarchies, for example, by centering the concerns of white women?

I propose that in order to understand why, despite the ideological commitment to inclusion, some Women's Marches succeeded in developing inclusion while others struggled and at times failed to develop inclusion, we must address the structure of the cities where these Marches were organized. Drawing on spatial theory (Lefebvre, 1991; Soja, 2010), democratic theory (Jacobs, 1992; Young, 2011), and empirical work on the relationship between segregation and political behavior (Enos, 2017; Trounstein, 2018), I provide a theoretical account for why diverse and less segregated cities enable developing more inclusive movements by shaping how the city is lived. I expect within diverse and less segregated cities, Women's March organizers will be more likely to respond positively to diversity leading to more diverse leadership teams and movement goals that reflect the intersection between multiple struggles for justice. In contrast, I expect that within less diverse and more segregated cities Women's March organizers will be more likely to push back against diversity leading to a re-centering of universalist approaches to Women's Rights (Einwohner et al., 2019; Montoya, 2019; Young, 2000), that ignore the concerns of women who experience multiple forms of oppression.

Empirically I test my expectation that the space of the city matters in determining whether or not local Women's Marches were able to develop inclusive movement goals and diverse leadership teams using my original dataset covering 84 Women's Marches. Across these U.S. Women's Marches there is variation both in terms of whether their movement goals reflect the recognition that women experience multiple intersecting forms of oppression, and in terms of the

diversity of their leadership teams. Likewise, these cities vary in terms of their diversity (in terms of ethnicity, race, immigration status, etc) and in terms of segregation. Through my analysis, I find support for my claim that the structure of the city matters when addressing inclusion within the Women's Marches. Women's Marches that occur in cities that are more diverse, and less segregated are more likely to have more diverse movement goals and have diverse leadership teams. Likewise, cities that are geographically larger and more dense are more likely to have diverse leadership teams. These findings indicate support for continued research into how the structure of the city supports or hinders efforts to develop inclusive social movements and the critical steps activists can take to overcome possible obstacles and create further support through their interaction with the space of the city. Furthermore, as I address in the following chapters (5 and 6) the way organizers engage with and use the space of the city has ramifications for the long-term political impact of these protests.

### **Inclusion in Social Movements and the City**

There is an extensive literature on how social movements deal with issues of diversity and inclusion. Some of this work addresses the complexity of developing collective identities that recognize and are inclusive of difference (Featherstone, 2008), the importance of autonomous organizing by marginalized subgroups in order to set up their own agendas (Weldon, 2012), as well as the possible benefits of leadership from marginalized subgroups (Weldon, 2006), such as queer youth in the immigrant rights movement (Terriquez 2015). Work on collective identity indicates that shared spaces matter in enabling the development of shared movement identities, inclusive or otherwise (Featherstone, 2008; Futrell and Simi 2004; Fraser 1987). Due to the need for spaces that are conducive to developing inclusion within social movements, I argue we should address the space of the city when working to understand why some local Women's Marches succeed and others fail at this task.

Current work on the Women's March and inclusion primarily focuses on the experiences and understandings of the Marches by the participants (Heaney, 2019; Rose-Redwood and Rose-Redwood, 2017). Heaney (2019) finds evidence through surveying participants that participants in Women's Marches were more likely to be motivated by intersectional collective action frames than participants at conservative events (such as the March for Life and March for Trump). While this work is highly relevant for understanding how participants were motivated to become involved



in the Women's March, it does not necessarily address the question of why some Women's Marches were viewed as primarily being the purview of white women (Moss and Maddrell, 2017; Rose-Redwood and Rose-Redwood, 2017) leading to counter Marches in some cases, such as Pittsburgh, by women of color frustrated by white organizers failure to fully understand the need to center black and queer voices (Young, 2017a, 2017b). In order to better understand both when movements are able to develop inclusion as well as its impacts on persistence, I argue we must address the local context. In particular, I argue we need to address the space of the city.

Traditionally, both theoretical and empirical work on social movements in urban politics has focused on movements oriented at changing or addressing the urban environment (Harvey, 2013; Mayer and Boudreau 2012; Soja, 2010). In contrast, the role of the space of the city in enabling identity-based social movements is relatively understudied, with notable exceptions (see Miller 2000). Within this work, scholars have argued that a deeper engagement with the role of lived space is needed (Mayer and Boudreau 2012; Miller 2000). Different schools of thought lead to different approaches to our understanding of urban space and its relationship to movements (Mayer and Boudreau 2012), either as something that shapes potential political opportunities (Miller 2000; Mitchell and Staeheli, 2005; Schwelder, 2012) or something that is constantly in a state of production through the ways it is socially understood and lived (Lefebvre, 1991; Soja, 2010).

Existing empirical and theoretical work indicates that the spatial characteristics of the city can and do impact the ability of movements to build inclusive movements. Miller (2000) demonstrates that the characteristics of a town, in terms of education, class, and differences in the political institutions, affected the shape of the Peace Movement in the greater Boston area. In particular, in the more working class Waltham area the movement was more likely to engage with cross movement concerns such as women's rights, housing justice, and the environment when compared to the more moderate movement in upper-middle class Lexington or the more radical and university-oriented Cambridge (Miller 2000). Likewise, Hoskyns (2014) demonstrates how encouraging young people in segregated British housing projects to engage with the architecture in their community facilitated crossing existing geographic and symbolic boundaries tied to race and ethnicity. Furthermore, an extensive literature on environmental justice (Pastor, 2007) and spatial justice (Soja, 2010) indicates how organizing around claims to physical space can lead to more diverse and inclusive coalitions. Likewise, there is evidence that activists who feel a

particular affinity to their city or town will be more likely to mobilize (Miller 2000) and that the inclusive political identities needed to support networked movements are built by activists who move across established borders, such as transnational activists (Featherstone, 2008; Tufekci 2017).

The role of the space of the city in promoting or enabling the development of inclusive movements is relatively understudied within political science. In contrast, there is a long history of addressing the role of space when addressing whether or not descriptive representatives run and win political office in local politics (Ondercin and Welch, 2009; Smith et al., 2011; Swain and Lien, 2017). Likewise, there is increasing interest in understanding how the space of the city, particularly the role of segregation, impacts local policy (Trounstein, 2018). Work on the role of districts as being more or less friendly to Black, Hispanic, and women candidates running and winning political office indicates that local context matters (Crowder-Meyer, Gadarian, and Trounstein 2015; Enos, 2017; Palmer and Simon, 2008). This work provides a starting point for developing measures for quantitatively testing the relationship between the space of the city and movement inclusion.

In the following section, I address why I expect the space of the city matters in determining whether or not local Women's Marches were able to develop inclusive movement goals and diverse leadership teams. Drawing on spatial theory, democratic theory, and interviews conducted with organizers in Boston and San Antonio, I make the case for why we should expect that the space of the city will impact the organizers capacity for building diverse teams and set an agenda that addresses the concerns of multiple sub-groups of women.

### **Creating Space for Inclusion in Social Movements**

Understanding when movements will be inclusive, and how inclusive movements shape local democracy, is important for scholars of contemporary social movements (Einwohner et al., 2019; Fisher et al., 2018; Heaney, 2019; Terriquez, 2015; Tormos, 2017; Townsend-Bell, 2011; Weldon, 2006, 2012). Measuring inclusion within social movements presents potential challenges. In this section, I focus on two possible measures: inclusion within leadership teams and professed movement goals.

Inclusion within leadership, indicates whether or not descriptive representatives are present within the leadership team who represent people who have typically been excluded from leadership roles. This representation is necessary due to the effects of these exclusions, for example, within

the feminist movement white women have typically dominated leadership, leading to a lack of attention to Black women's experiences with oppression that is both raced and gendered (hooks 1981). Empirical work has demonstrated that descriptive representation within movements is important as a way to facilitate inclusion in social movements (Weldon, 2006, 2012). Likewise, movement goals reflect what issues are valued by the movement. When the movement chooses, for example, to limit their goals to demands based on universal claims (whether based on race or gender) they limit their potential to address the particular concerns of people who experience multiple forms of oppression (hooks 1981). In this way, both inclusion in leadership and inclusion in movement goals provide a potential picture of who is valued by the movement and whose concerns are centered within the movement.

Importantly, these two possible measures of inclusion, representation in leadership and movement goals, are likely linked. Extant work on inclusion in social movements demonstrates the importance of inclusive leadership, and particularly the inclusion of participants who come from dispossessed sub-groups in positions of power within the movement, when developing and pursuing inclusive movement goals (Terriquez 2015; Weldon, 2006, 2012). While there is evidence, that movements with inclusive leadership teams are likely to profess inclusive movement goals, the development of inclusive leadership teams is relatively understudied. In order to understand where women's marches are more likely to include women from diverse backgrounds and present a platform that recognizes intersectional issues — such as the connections between issues such as immigration and reproductive justice (for example), I argue we must understand the spatial structure of the city.

The spatial structure of the city matters for whether or not the Women's Marches were able to achieve inclusion, in terms of the members of their leadership teams and when developing their movement goals. I aim to build on approaches to understanding how the spatial structure of the city enables or limits efforts to bring together citizens from diverse backgrounds to build more democratic futures. In order to synthesize these two different approaches, it is necessary to address the relationship between the built environment of the city, and how that built environment influences daily life.

Both spatial theorists and democratic theorists are concerned with how the city governed and planned, and what this means for democratic governance (Harvey, 2013; Jacobs, 1992; Lefebvre, 1990; Young, 2011). Scholars disagree about whether the typical features of city life

facilitate or limit the possibilities for change. Where scholars such as Young (2011) and Jacobs (1992) focus on the possibilities of city life as a space where people from differing backgrounds are able to interact in ways that foster understanding and inclusion, theorists such as Lefebvre (1990), Harvey (2013), and Soja (2010) focus how existing spatial arrangements privilege some over others and present obstacles to more democratic governance. The Women's March provides a window into understanding how these two truths about the space of the city can be held simultaneously.

Cities in the United States privilege particular groups over others. For example, white middle- and upper-class neighborhoods have better public services and do not suffer the same environmental hazards that working class neighborhoods of color experience (Pastor, 2007; Slater, 2013; Trounstein, 2018). Furthermore, existing empirical work demonstrates that these experiences have meaningful impacts on the quality of life for residents of segregated neighborhoods (Pastor, 2007; Slater, 2013; Wolch et al., 2014). Importantly, segregated cities create incentives for citizens to support policies that maintain their segregation (Enos, 2017; Trounstein, 2018). For example, Enos (2017) finds through a series of field experiments in the Greater Boston-Cambridge that whites on a Red Line subway platform are more likely to support stricter immigration policies when a Spanish speaker is present on the same platform than when they are not (Enos, 2017). Likewise, Trounstein (2018) demonstrates that white neighborhoods are more likely to be provided public goods, attracting more white residents, and maintaining an unvirtuous cycle of segregation (despite efforts to end practices such as redlining). The political processes that structure the city reinforce the social privilege of the advantaged. The privileges of white middle- and upper- class neighborhoods are maintained by the space of the city, creating hurdles for efforts to develop new forms of political life (Harvey, 2013; Lefebvre, 1991; Soja, 2010). As more inclusive democracy would be a new form of political life, we can expect that it would be difficult to develop within the current, segregated U.S. cities.

Jacobs (1992) and Young (2011) are more optimistic about the capacity of the city to develop inclusive forms of democracy. Where Lefebvre (1990) is concerned with how the city is controlled by the state limiting its radical potential, Jacobs (1992) and Young (2011) are convinced that the way the city is lived and the experiences facilitated by the city creates opportunities for connection across difference. For both Jacobs (1992) and Young (2011) the focus is on how the experience, particularly of city neighborhoods, is one where differences are understood as adding

to the pleasures available in the city. Whether this is having neighborhood characters who bridge communities and build mutual trust (Jacobs, 1992) or the experience of diverse architectures and cuisines (Young, 2011), the experience of difference in the city is overwhelmingly positive promoting deeper understanding and recognition of the value of diversity within a democracy. Importantly, within cities both of these aspects, the presence of diversity as adding to the value of lived city life and the pressures of the state and capital to control the city (oftentimes in ways that marginalize already marginalized populations) exist simultaneously. Many of the arguments and conflicts surrounding gentrification reflect these tensions, as the vibrancy of neighborhoods where marginalized communities are co-opted by capital interests leading to increased property values and the pushing out of the very vibrant communities that made the neighborhood of interest for investors (Jacobs, 1992; Wolch et al., 2014).

In this way, cities are Janus faced, they both maintain the power of the privileged through policies that maintain segregation (Trounstine, 2018), and facilitate breaking down these barriers by enabling citizens to see and recognize each other by bringing together citizens from differing backgrounds through their daily life on city sidewalks, buses, subways, parks etc (Jacobs, 1992; Young, 2011). However, the question remains, what particular aspects of the city do we expect will bring together activists from differing backgrounds? Grounding in the theory that views the city as a possible space for bridging social difference, more diverse cities will be more likely to support inclusive organizing teams (Jacobs, 1992; Young, 2011). Likewise, we should expect that while this diversity is necessary it is not sufficient as extant work demonstrates that segregation limits the contact between individuals from different racial backgrounds and creates support for policies that maintain white privilege, therefore I expect that diverse and less segregated cities will have more inclusive leadership teams. Leading to my first hypothesis:

**H1:** Women's Marches that occur in more diverse and less segregated U.S. cities are more likely to have diverse leadership teams than marches that occur in less diverse and more segregated U.S. cities.

Inclusive leadership teams are only one measure of inclusion within a protest or movement. A more inclusive Women's March will recognize and address the concerns not only of universal womanhood, for example access to reproductive healthcare and domestic violence, but will also recognize a more expansive feminist movement that addresses the concerns of women who experience multiple forms of oppression (Weldon, 2006, 2012). Movement goals that reflect for

example, the need to address racial injustices and in particular black women's experiences with raced-gendered oppression can be an indication of inclusion (Einwohner et al., 2019). Therefore, I also test the relationship between the lived and material space of the city and the movement goals of the Women's March. Leading to my second hypothesis:

**H2:** Women's Marches that occur in more diverse and less segregated U.S. cities will have more diverse movement goals (ex. economic, racial, immigration justice) when compared to Women's Marches that occur in U.S. cities which are less diverse and more segregated.

### **Testing the role of Space and Inclusion in Movements**

In order to test my hypotheses concerning the relationship between the spatial characteristics of the city, and the inclusion of diverse leaders and movement goals I use an original dataset which covers the 330 cities which had competitive mayoral elections between the 2017 and 2018 Women's Marches. The same dataset used in the previous chapter to address the relationship between the presence or absence of a Women's March and the number of women running for local office. Within this dataset, 84 cities held Women's Marches in 2017. Unlike previous work, which has been able to canvas participants concerning their professed reasons for being involved with Women's Marches in order to address whether participants were motivated by efforts develop intersectional movements (Fisher et al., 2018; Heaney, 2019), I focus on the whether leadership teams reflect the diversity of womanhood and the professed goals of the March.

### **Measuring Movement Inclusion: Leadership and Goals**

The presence of diverse leaders is one possible measure for addressing inclusion within social movements. Similarly, to how descriptive representation within formal politics potentially enables more just policy outcomes by bringing a larger range of voices into the deliberative decision-making process, diverse leadership within social movements enables a larger number of concerns are addressed and deepens inclusion within the movement (Weldon, 2006, 2012). Leaders within movements have the power to craft the platform, influence who is invited to speak, and make critical decisions concerning how open and inclusive the protest space for example by ensuring accommodations for people with disabilities or building solidarity with similarly oriented movements. As I discuss in more depth in the next two chapters (5 and 6), in the case of the Boston Women's March, women of color on the organizing team played a key role in ensuring the protest

was an inclusive experience. In this way, inclusion in leadership, is one possible way to address inclusion within a movement or protest.

Unlike canvassing participants, measuring inclusion by focusing on movement leadership offers an observational as opposed to subject measure of inclusivity which is important given that we have distorted views of our own accomplishments. In order to develop my measure of inclusion within leadership, I used social and news media reports on the protests and their leaders to identify who was publicly recognized as being involved in planning the protests. The groups involved in planning the Women's March vary significantly, with differences in terms of the number of leaders and the model of leadership. Furthermore, through my interviews with organizers in Boston, San Antonio, and Pittsburgh, it is clear that many of the leaders involved in planning the Women's March were not interviewed or recognized in the press despite putting in a great deal of work behind the scenes. The gaps between media coverage concerning who was involved in the planning process and the real number of people involved in organizing these marches made it impossible to get reliable counts of both the number of people in the organizing teams and the number of women of color in the organizing teams.

Due to the difficulty of gaining an accurate measure for the number of people and the number of women of color involved in each March, I use a binary coding. With 1 indicating the presence of women from diverse backgrounds, women of color, lesbian women, trans women, immigrant women etc, and 0 indicating the complete absence of such women. This crude coding enabled me to get a reliable and comparable measure when measuring the complex and fuzzy concept of inclusion within leadership in social movements. To create this measure, I first collected data on the diversity of the leadership teams by first doing counts of the number of women involved in organizing the Women's Marches<sup>4</sup> who have identities that are associated with secondary marginalization, such as women of color, immigrant women, lesbian women, disabled women, and trans women. For example, news coverage of Boston indicated that there were three women of color included within the leadership team (Sweeney 2017). I coded this measure as a presence or absence of diversity due to my interviews with organizers in Boston, who indicated that the media reports on the organizing team inflated the potential presence of the number of women of

<sup>4</sup> Women were defined as being involved in organizing the Women's Marches if they publicly made statements concerning their work to put the event together, were recognized as one of the leaders by the press were a member of the formal organizing committee when one existed, or if they were a sponsor or co-sponsor of the event on the Marches own social media pages.

color in their organizing team making the use of counts or measures of the percentage of organizers who have identities with secondary marginalization inflated the Boston case and in similar cases. Therefore, in order to create a measure that was comparable and accurate, I use a binary coding for the presence or absence of diversity within the Women's March leadership team. Of the 84 Women's Marches, 76 Marches had enough media coverage to code the measure for presence of diversity in the leadership team. Of these 76 Marches, 23 are coded as having diversity in their leadership team and 53 are coded as not having diversity within their leadership team (See Appendix D).

Stated movement goals are another avenue for measuring the level of inclusion within social movements. Goals indicate the priorities of protest, and signal symbolically whether or not the organizers of the protest are concerned with addressing for example, the particular concerns immigrant women, or are the organizers primarily concerned with issues that impact a fictional universal woman (Montoya, 2019; Young, 2000). In order to measure the level of inclusion within movement goals for the Women's Marches, I coded the leaders' media statements as well as formal statements of the protest goals to capture the number of issue areas that go beyond of those issues narrowly and conventionally recognized as women's issues (ex. abortion access, maternity leave, the wage gap) and that include a wider range of issues of important for women, but also for broader social justice movements, such as LGBT movement, racial justice movement, immigrant rights movement, and disability rights movement. A point is assigned for each additional goal, for example, protests that copied the national organizations movement goals, were coded as a 6 for inclusive movement goals because the statement includes addressing the concerns of 6 movements in their below statement:

“The rhetoric of the past election cycle has insulted, demonized, and threatened many of us--women, immigrants of all statuses, those with diverse religious faiths particularly Muslim, people who identify as LGBTQIA, Native and Indigenous people, Black and Brown people, people with disabilities, the economically impoverished and survivors of sexual assault. We are confronted with the question of how to move forward in the face of national and international concern and fear” (Women's March on Washington 2016).

The measure for inclusion in movement goals, ranges from 0 to 6. The average score for the 78 Women's Marches where it was possible to code this variable, was between 2 and 3. The modal score was 0, and 31 Marches received this score. 18 Marches were coded as having the high score of 6, and 16 of these Marches adopted the national Women's Marches statement above. The only



two Marches to receive a score of 6 without copying the national platform were, Seattle, Washington, and Erie, Pennsylvania.

### *Measuring the Space of the City: Developing the City Space Index*

Measuring the space of the city is potentially difficult, in order to create an index that captures both the diversity of the city and the how the city is structured to maintain racial inequality, I combine the Women Friendly Municipality index (as discussed in the previous chapter) a measure that captures both the diversity of the city, and the ideological openness to diversity within the city, with a measure for low segregation using Trounstein's (2018) multigroup H-Index which has been demonstrated to be associated with efforts to maintain power and public goods within white communities.

Little literature addresses this question of how to measure the lived and material experience of the city directly, but we can find clues in research on where women and women of color are more likely to run for office. For example, Palmer and Simon (2008) define women-friendly U.S. House districts in order to determine where women and women of color are more likely to run and be elected to political office. In essence, their measure provides insights into the spatial characteristics of districts that are more favorable to women taking on political power. We can adapt their index in order to reflect differences between municipalities which support women candidates and U.S. House districts (see prior chapter for more discussion on the index and how it is adapted).

The benefit of building on the Women Friendly Municipality index is that the index already captures a great deal of information about the local context of the city. It includes measures of urbanization, the whether the city is located in the south, the percent of the population which identifies as black, Hispanic, and foreign born, the percent of the population with a college degree, the percent of the population which is school aged, the percent of the workforce involved in blue collar work, relative median income, and the percent of the vote for the Republican presidential candidate in 2016.<sup>5</sup> A city will get a higher score on the index, if for example it has a higher Black

<sup>5</sup> As discussed in the previous chapter, these measures were drawn from extant data: census measures addressing relevant population characteristics for each city (including race, ethnicity, median income, school age, education, blue collar workers) (U.S. Census Bureau 2010), geographic variables (whether the city is in the south and census measures for urbanization), and county measures for the presidential vote for the Republican candidate in 2016 (MIT Election Data and Science Lab 2018).

population, a higher Hispanic population, and higher foreign born population. Likewise, the index captures whether or not the population is ideologically oriented towards accepting difference as the score for the index increases when the city is more diverse and when the vote for president Trump in 2018 decreases. As Trounstine (2018, p.197) demonstrates, neighborhoods that protected their white dominance in the 1970's are more likely to vote republican at both the aggregate and individual level in the contemporary period. In this way, the measure of vote for president Trump potentially captures some of the history of how white dominated areas continue to support policies and politicians who reject difference. The Women Friendly Municipality Index then allows us to address both the presence of diversity, and potential openness to diversity.

The Women Friendly Municipality Index, does not capture the degree of racial segregation within the city. In order to develop an index that addresses both the diversity of the city, and how that diversity is experienced in daily life I added measures for segregation. To do this I used Trounstine's Multi-Group H-Index (2018, p. 68). Unlike dissimilarity and isolation indices, Theil's H-Index enables addressing multiple ethnic groups making it more effective when addressing differences segregation across US cities (Trounstine, 2016; Trounstine, 2018). Trounstine's (2018) Multi-Group H index uses Theil's H-Index as a measure of segregation within and across U.S. cities, addressing both the segregation based on differences in diversity between neighborhoods within an urban area and segregation based on differences in diversity between the city and its suburbs. This index captures segregation not only between white and black or white and non-white, but captures white (non-Hispanic), Black (non-Hispanic), other (non-Hispanic), and Hispanic/Latino (Trounstine, 2018, p. 147). The value of H varies from 0, indicating that all neighborhoods and suburbs have the same ethnic and racial composition of the entire metro area, to 1 which indicates that each neighborhood contains only one group (Trounstine, 2018).<sup>6</sup> This is important, as segregation has been decreasing within cities the difference between segregation within cities and their suburbs has been increasing (Trounstine, 2018). Furthermore, I expect that these differences in experience between less segregated cities and their more segregated suburbs matter when addressing ability of Women's Marches to develop inclusion, as white women organizers from the suburbs in leadership positions will be at more of a disadvantage than urban

<sup>6</sup> For a more in-depth discussion of the development of the Multi-Group Theil's H-Index as a measure of segregation see Trounstine (2018) Chapter 3.

women of color and white women when working to develop a not only diverse, but inclusive organizing team (as I discuss further in Chapters 5 and 6).

In order to develop a measure that combines the Women Friendly Municipality index with Trounstein's (2018) Multi-Group H-Index, I first develop a binary variable to capture the difference between cities with lower levels of segregation and cities with average to high levels of segregation based on Trounstein's Multi-Group H-Index. To do this, I first determined the lower 25% cut off for the Theil's H-Index for US cities in 2011 within Trounstein's (2018) dataset, a value of .143. I then created a binary variable for Low segregation where cities are coded as 1 where the value of the Multi-Group H-Index is less than .143 and are coded as 0 where the value of Multi-Group H-Index is more than .143. Within the dataset, 217 cities are coded as having high or average levels of segregation, and 82 are coded as having low levels of segregation. I then added this measure for low segregation to the Women Friendly Municipality Index, to create the City Space Index.<sup>7</sup> This index, ranges from 1 to 8, with an average score of 4.9 and a median score of 5.

### **Relevant Controls: Measures of Local Feminist Mobilization and Women's Capital**

I include relevant control variables that are potentially associated with women's and feminist movement mobilization (the presence of formal feminist organizations and women's access to capital) as well as control for city size, using extant data. I include two measures to address possible alternative explanations based on the spatial characteristics of the city, that geographically larger or more dense cities are more likely to encourage inclusion within social movements. City size is measured with city area, which ranges from 1.28 to 606.41 square miles, with an average of 41.22 square miles within the full dataset of 330 cities (U.S. Census Bureau 2010). City density is measured as the number of people per square mile, ranging from 269.3 to 39219.6 people per square mile with an average of 3447.167 people per square mile, within the full dataset of 330 cities (U.S. Census Bureau 2010). In order to address the presence of feminist movement organizing within city, I use the presence or absence of a local chapter of the National Organization of Women. This data was collected using the chapter search by state available through the organization itself (National Organization of Women n.d) if there is a NOW chapter

<sup>7</sup> All pieces of the City Space Index were checked for multicollinearity. There are no issues of multicollinearity between the measures for low segregation and measures for diversity in terms of racial and ethnic diversity.

in the city or county the measure for a the presence of NOW is coded as 1 and if there is not a chapter it is coded as 0. Within the dataset, 82 cities have local NOW chapters and 248 do not have local NOW chapters. To address women's access to capital, I use the number of women owned firms (Smith et al., 2011), which ranges from 342 firms to 413,899 firms, and has fan average of 4985 firms (U.S. Census Bureau 2010).

### **Analysis: The Space of the City and Inclusion in the Women's March**

In the following section I conduct a series of analyses using logistic regression and ordered logistic regression to address the relationship between the space of the city and inclusion within the Women's March, in terms of the diversity of the leadership team and the diversity of movement goals. Within my models addressing the relationship between the material and lived space of the city and the presence of diversity within Women's March leadership teams I use logistic regression, due to the binary coding of the dependent variable as presence or absence of diversity. Due to the measurement of the dependent variable, it is appropriate to use a model that addresses the probability of there being diversity within the leadership team.

Within my models addressing the relationship between the space of the city and the diversity of movement goals, I used ordered logistic regression because while the values can be viewed as increasing in value with each additional issue area addressed within the platform or by the leadership team within their public statements the distances between these values are not necessarily uniform. For example, the distance between a value of 0 which indicates a March platform that only addresses issues associated with a universal understanding of womanhood such as abortion rights or domestic violence and the value of 1 representing for example a March platform that addresses both women's rights and racial justice may be a much larger than the distance between a platform that has a value of 5 and one that has a value of 6. Likewise, the variable for the Women's March platforms is not normally distributed, and is almost bi modal with the greatest number of Marches falling either at 0 or 6. In the following two tables, I address the relationship between diversity of leadership and the material and lived space of the city and the relationship between diversity of movement goals and the material and lived space of the city.

Table 7: Presence of Diversity in Leadership in the Women's March and the Space of the City

		<b>Model 1</b>	<b>Model 2</b>	<b>Model 3</b>	<b>Model 4</b>	<b>Model 5</b>
		Presence of Diversity within the Leadership of Local Women's Marches	Presence of Diversity within the Leadership of Local Women's Marches	Presence of Diversity within the Leadership of Local Women's Marches	Presence of Diversity within the Leadership of Local Women's Marches	Presence of Diversity within the Leadership of Local Women's Marches
		Odds Ratio	Odds Ratio	Odds Ratio	Odds Ratio	Odds Ratio
City Space Index		0.711**	0.655*	0.509	0.513	0.517
City Area			0.006*	0.008*	0.008*	0.009*
City Density				0.0002*	0.0002*	0.0002*
Presence of a NOW Chapter					-0.170	-0.142
Number of Women Owned Firms						-0.000
Constant		-5.072**	-5.314***	-5.539***	-5.524***	-5.618**
N		75	75	75	75	74
McFadden's R <sup>2</sup>		0.111	0.178	0.243	0.244	0.241
* p<0.05		** p<0.01	*** p<0.001			

Within the first five models (Table 7), I address my first hypothesis that diverse cities and less segregated cities facilitate connection across racial and ethnic difference and will be more likely to support diverse leadership teams. The first model includes only the City Space Index which combines the women friendly municipality index with measures for low segregation both within and across the cities within each metro area. Models 2-5 expand upon this analysis by bringing in my control variables, of city area, city density, the presence of a local National Organization of Women chapter (capturing the presence of formal feminist movement organizing), and the number of women owned firms (a standard measure for women's access to capital (Smith et al., 2011)). Within the first two Models, the City Space Index is both significant and positive,

indicating that as we move up the index the odds of there being the presence of diversity within the leadership team increase by a factor of 0.711 (Model 1) and 0.655 (Model 2) respectively. City size, as measured by city area, is significant in models 2-5, with increases in city size by one square mile increasing the odds of Women's Marches having the presence of diversity within their leadership teams by factors of 0.006 (Model 2), 0.008 (Model 3 and 5), and 0.009 (Model 5). However, once the measure for city density is included within models 3-5, the City Space Index ceases to be significant. Within Models 3-5, city density is significant and increases in city density by one person per square mile increases the odds of there being the presence of diversity within leadership teams by a factor of 0.0002 (in all models).




Figure 2: City Space Index and Presence of Diversity in Women's March Leadership




Figure 3: City Density and Presence of Diversity in Women's March Leadership




Figure 4: City Area and Presence of Diversity in Women's March Leadership

The significant variables within the five models presented each represent different material and lived spatial characteristics of the city within at least one of the models, the City Space Index, city area, and city density. Figure 1, presents the predicted probabilities for the Presence of Diversity in Leadership for the Women's March and 95% confidence interval, with each significant spatial variable with all other variables held constant at their averages. As we can see, in when moving up the City Space Index, there predicted probability of there being diversity in leadership increases with a maximum values of 0.8. Likewise we see a positive relationship between increases in city density (Figure 2), and the predicted probability for there being diversity in leadership with a maximum value of 1. Similarly, city area (Figure 3) has a positive relationship with the predicted probability of there being diversity in leadership with a maximum value of 1.

Of the 5 models, Model 4 appears to best fit the data based on having the highest McFadden's  $R^2$ , of 0.244. The inclusion then of the number of women owned firms in model 5, not only is not significant but also may be negatively impacting the fit between the model and the data. However, even the highest value of McFadden's  $H$  within the models is still rather low, indicating that the model may require more variables to fully capture the variation in the presence and absence of diversity within the Women's March or an increase in the number of cases will enable more statistically significant findings.

Within this analysis, I find support for my claim that the spatial characteristics of the city are associated with more inclusive movements, as measured by the presence of diversity within the leadership team, however it is not necessarily only the spatial characteristics I focus on with my City Space Index. I cannot reject my hypothesis, that both the lived and material space influence whether or not Women's March organizers are able to develop diverse organizing teams. In fact, I find strong evidence that there is an association between being likely to have the presence of diversity within the leadership team and the size and density of the city. While not included within my City Space Index, both the density of the city and the geographic size of the city theoretically influence how the city is lived. For example, more dense cities are more likely to have dense neighborhoods, where neighbors are more likely to see each other in their daily lives (Jacobs, 1992), and cities that are larger geographically may be more likely to have the diverse food and architectures that Young (2011) argues facilitate positive interactions across difference.



Table 8: Diversity in Movement Goals and the Space of the City

	<b>Model 6</b>	<b>Model 7</b>	<b>Model 8</b>	<b>Model 9</b>	<b>Model 10</b>
	Diversity of Movement Goals	Diversity of Movement Goals	Diversity of Movement Goals	Diversity of Movement Goals	Diversity of Movement Goals
	Odds Ratio	Odds Ratio	Odds Ratio	Odds Ratio	Odds Ratio
City Space Index	0.454**	0.413*	0.441*	0.416*	0.390*
City Area		0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003
City Density			-0.000	-0.000	-0.000
Presence of NOW Chapter				0.766	0.744
Number of Women Owned Firms					-0.000
cut1	2.168*	2.198*	2.253*	2.272*	2.206*
cut2	2.411*	2.449*	2.502*	2.525*	2.461*
cut3	2.591*	2.634*	2.687**	2.717**	2.654*
cut4	3.050**	3.110**	3.163**	3.214**	3.154**
cut5	3.594***	3.664***	3.721***	3.795***	3.738***
cut6	3.871***	3.944***	4.002***	4.086***	4.029***
N	77	77	77	77	76
McFadden's R <sup>2</sup>	0.029	0.040	0.040	0.051	0.048
*p<0.05	** p<0.01	*** p<0.001			

In Models 6 through 10 (Table 8), I use ordered logistic regression to test my hypothesis that Women's Marches which occur in more diverse cities with lower levels of segregation will be more likely to have more diverse movement goals. The City Space Index, is significant in every model. In Model 6, when the City Space Index increases by 1, the odds of having a more diverse platform (score of 6) when compared to less diverse platforms (scores 0-5) the odds are 0.454 times greater. In Model 7, when City Space Index increases by 1, the odds of having more diverse platform (score of 6) when compared to less diverse platforms (scores 0-5) the odds are 0.413

times greater. In Model 8, when City Space Index increases by 1, the odds having more diverse platform (score of 6) when compared to less diverse platforms (scores 0-5) are 0.441 times greater. In Model 9, an increase City Space Index by 1, the odds of having a more diverse platform (score of 6) when compared to a less diverse platform (scores 0-5) are 0.416 times greater when all other values are held constant. when all other values are held at constant. In Model 10, an increase of City Space Index by 1, the odds of having a more diverse platform (score of 6) when compared to a less diverse platform (scores 0-5) are 0.39 times greater.

These findings indicate some support for the hypothesis that more diverse cities with low levels of segregation. However, there are indications that the models are not perfectly specified as McFadden's  $R^2$  in all Models are very low ranging 0.029 to 0.051. Based on these values, Model 9 is the best specified, as it has the highest McFadden's  $R^2$  (0.051). Addressing the predicted probabilities for each value of Diversity of Movement Goals based on the City Space Index, provides some insight into how to develop better specified models in the future.




Figure 5: Predicted Probabilities for Diversity of Movement Goals and City Space Index

Figure 4 continued




Figure 2 presents the predicted probabilities for each score of Diversity of Movement Goals. These graphs show that the strongest association is the negative association between increasing values of the City Space Index and the predicted probability of getting a score of 0 for Diversity of Movement Goals. Likewise, we see a clear positive association between increasing values of the City Space Index and an increased probability of getting a score of 6 for Diversity of movement goals. As discussed previously, Diversity of Movement Goals has an almost bi-modal distribution. Of the 77 cases where this variable is coded, there are 31 cases where the value of the variable is 0 and 18 cases where the value of the variable is 6. Some of the difficulty in predicting the probability of getting scores of 1-5 may in part be due to the small number of cases for each value. With a larger number of cases, it may be more possible to address the differences between lower and higher values for Diversity in Movement Goals. Likewise, a binary coding of the Movement Goals variable, could be beneficial for future research.

Even with the limitations of these models, I find some support for my hypothesis that the more diverse and less segregated cities are associated with greater inclusiveness within the Women's Marches, as measured by diversity of Movement Goals. I find some support for both of my primary claims that the space of the city, both how it is lived and how it is materially organized, impact movements ability to develop inclusion.

### **Discussion: Looking Forward**

These analyses suggest support for my hypotheses that more diverse and less segregated cities are associated with increased diversity in movement leadership and goals, two possible

measures of inclusion within the Women's March. Importantly, this indicates that the cities themselves matter when we are trying to understand inclusion within protest organization. However, there are clear limitations to my findings. The small numbers of Women's Marches, limit the possible analyses. However, with 674 Women's Marches held in 2017, developing more robust models are possible.

Beyond the support I find for my hypotheses, I also find that more dense cities are associated with the presence of diversity within Women's March Leadership Teams. Theoretically, there are multiple explanations for why more dense cities are associated with diversity within Women's March Leadership teams. For example, Jacobs (1992) argues that denser cities potentially enable working women to more efficiently manage their child-care and work responsibilities when compared to the less dense suburbs enabling women from differing economic backgrounds to take the time to be involved in movement organizing. Likewise, denser cities may enable more diverse organizing due to the increased likelihood of women from differing background interacting with each other in their daily lives. Finally, denser cities may also attract more a more diverse population, as dense cities and neighborhoods (such as San Francisco and New York City ect) have historically been refuges for LGBT youth leaving less dense and more conservative hometowns. This association provides some indication that the space of the city matters, but many questions remain on exactly why city density is associated with the presence of diversity in Women's March Leadership.

Future research addressing the relationship between the space of the city and inclusion within social movements should take into account the history of organizing for racial, spatial, and environmental justice within U.S. cities. For example, the history of efforts to address spatial justice (particularly increasing the access to public services on the West Side) by the Chicano Movement in San Antonio played an important role in the development of the Chicana Feminist Movement that established the diverse and inclusive institutions that supported the development of both an inclusive leadership team and inclusive movement goals for the 2017 Women's March (Chapter 6). Importantly, spatial and environmental justice movements aim to make cities more inclusive (Soja, 2010; Pastor, 2007), ultimately creating cities that are more open to difference. Likewise, as demonstrated by Trounstein's (2018) measures that address the history of efforts to protect white neighborhoods in the 1970's may be a better measure for addressing which cities are less open to difference. Importantly, addressing both efforts to develop more just cities and efforts

to maintain injustice within the material structure of the city, may provide more precise insight into how the space of the city influences inclusion within feminist movements.

Beyond the role of spatial justice and environmental justice movements in creating cities that are structured in ways that support diversity, it is also possible that we are more likely to have more inclusive feminist movements in cities where there is a history of protesting other forms of injustice. For example, in interviews with Women's March organizers in San Antonio, the Immigration protests of 2006 were consistently pointed to as a pivotal moment for organizing in the city. Just as we may expect that segregation and suburbanization may be relevant in understanding how the city impacts women's capacity to organize, we might also expect that the history of protest and movement organizing in the city may impact the capacity for movement organizers to put together diverse and inclusive teams. Based on the different organizing teams, we could expect that cities which experienced immigration protest in 2006 or Black Lives Matter protests may be more likely to include organizers with experience in these movements. Furthermore, it is possible that digging into the recent history of organizing and protest in the city may improve the analysis for understanding movement goals. For example, you may be more likely to find Women's Marches with platforms that recognize a number of movements in cities where those movements are active even when the leadership team does not include organizers active within the racial justice or immigration justice movement due to the recognition of the importance of that work.

### **Conclusion: Inclusion in the Women's March**

Within the larger scholarly conversation concerning the Women's March (Boothroyd et al., 2017; Fisher et al., 2018; Gokriksel and Smith, 2017; Heaney, 2019; Moss and Maddrell, 2017; Rose-Redwood and Rose-Redwood, 2017) one of the primary questions is whether or not the March was inclusive of women from diverse backgrounds or whether it was an inclusive protest. The data in this paper provides a lens into understanding how the Women's March may have been both an event which reflected "white feminism" and an example of what inclusive protest could be, by raising the question of which Women's March protests were more inclusive and why some were more inclusive than others? Much of the current scholarly attention aimed at understanding the protestors (Fisher et al., 2018; Heaney, 2019), while some of the early pieces reflecting on scholars' experiences of the March (Rose-Redwood and Rose-Redwood, 2017) in an effort to

address the question of inclusion within the Women's March. By comparing the local Women's Marches, we are able to get a deeper understanding of where and why some Marches potentially failed to fully understand the need to address the many issues facing women from differing backgrounds. Within this chapter, I find evidence that when comparing the local Women's Marches, there is evidence that the lived and material aspects of the city (in terms of diversity and segregation) are associated with inclusion within the Women's March. Furthermore, while the current measures may be imperfect, there is evidence that the space of the city, from the diversity of the city to segregation to city density, influence inclusion within feminist movements. Within the next chapter, I use the case of the Boston Women's March I further develop how the structure of the city, and the organizers position within the city, influenced the organizers ability to not only develop a diverse leadership team but to develop inclusion within that team.

## **CHAPTER 5: THIS IS BOSTON, NOT D.C.: THE CHALLENGES OF DEVELOPING INCLUSION IN THE BOSTON WOMEN'S MARCH**

Within this chapter I use the case of the Boston Women's March to discuss how the spatial structure of the city impacted the organizer's ability to develop inclusion. As demonstrated in the previous chapter, the spatial structure of the city, in terms of both the diversity of the city and the level of segregation within and across city and its suburbs, is associated with the degree of diversity within the leadership of the Women's March and the diversity of movement goals. While the presence of diversity provide insight into whether or not inclusion was achieved within local Women's Marches, my quantitative analyses are not sufficient to demonstrate a causal link between the spatial structure of the city and inclusion within the Women's March. Therefore, the question remains: What are the possible causal mechanisms that underlying the associations I found in the prior chapter? How does the spatial structure of the city support or hinder the development of inclusion within the Women's March?

Importantly, while diverse leadership and diverse movement goals are measurable indications of development of inclusion (Weldon, 2006), diversity and true inclusion are not synonymous. For example, while women from diverse backgrounds may be on a leadership team, the true measure of inclusion is whether or not they have the power to influence the agenda of the movement (Einwohner et al., 2019; Herring and Henderson 2012). In order to understand how the spatial structure of the city shapes inclusion within the Women's March, we must address how the lived experience of segregation shapes interactions between white women and women of color. Previous research indicates that the experience of living within segregated neighborhoods and suburbs creates support among white residents for policies that maintain their privileged position within the city, and white politicians (Enos, 2017; Hajnal and Trounstone, 2014; Trounstone, 2016, 2018). Raising the question: how do white suburbs impact efforts to develop inclusion in social movements? For example, how do white women from white suburbs respond to critiques leveled by Black, Latina, and Asian women when organizing a Women's March?

The Boston Women's March case enables us to answer these questions. I first provide a brief overview of the city of Boston, with special attention paid to segregation, efforts to maintain white protected suburbs, and efforts to push back against spatial injustice. I then use process tracing (George and Bennett 2004) to develop a narrative on how and why the Boston Women's March



organizers struggled to develop inclusion within their team. I show how the interpersonal networks of the original organizers were shaped both by their social position and physical location within the city. These networks, in turn, shaped their propensity to develop a diverse organizing team for the march. As the Boston experience demonstrates, the difficulties in building a diverse organizing team, especially a team with connections to grassroots organizing in the city of Boston, created challenges for ensuring inclusion of diverse perspectives. Organizers' social locations gave them "blind spots" that prevented them from even seeing the problems of exclusion that bedeviled their efforts until it was too late. It also shows, however, that women of color involved in leadership positions in the organizing process were able to leverage their professional and personal expertise to repair relationships with the Massachusetts indigenous community. I conclude by pointing out that while the segregated spatial arrangements of our cities create barriers to inclusive organizing, these are not insuperable, and women of color's presence in the leadership of the organizing process facilitates greater inclusion.

### **Building the Boston Case: The City and Inclusion in Social Movements**

In order to assess my expectations concerning the causal relationship between the spatial structure of the city and inclusion within social movements, I use process tracing to develop a case study of the Boston Women's March. Unlike statistical analyses, process tracing enables us to examine the causal process or mechanism that leads to the association between the spatial structure of the city and inclusion in the Women's March (George and Bennet 2004). However, in order to use process tracing to test hypotheses regarding the causal links between the differences in the spatial structure of the city and inclusion within the Women's March, these hypotheses must be well specified (George and Bennet 2004). In order to specify how I expect the spatial structure of the city influences inclusion within the Women's March, it is necessary to review my theoretical account for why the space of the city matters.

As discussed in the previous chapters (1 and 4), I expect that the material structure of the city and the way the city is lived will shape opportunities for developing inclusive movements. In the Gezi case (chapter 1), we see this in how the location of the protest in the diverse neighborhood of Beyoglu and the symbolic importance of the park for a range of social groups, from the LGBT community to football fan clubs, brought together activists from a range of backgrounds. Through the occupation of this shared space, activists were able to develop an inclusive protest through

deliberation over their shared goals (the protection of the park, creating a more democratic Turkey) and contestation over the need to address for example, sexism, homophobia and Turkish nationalism. Based on this case, I expect that movements that use spaces within diverse neighborhoods enabling productive deliberation and dissent between activists from multiple social positions will be more successful in their efforts to address power differentials between activists and develop inclusion.

When adapting this theoretical argument to U.S. cities, I argue that segregation as well as diversity structures the city in ways that can encourage the connection across difference that is necessary for developing inclusion (Chapter 4). Leading to my expectation, that movements that hold meetings and protests neighborhoods that are more diverse and less segregated will be more successful in their efforts to develop inclusion, because these spaces enable bringing together diverse groups of people into the organizing process and facilitate productive deliberation and dissent around questions of internal power dynamics etc.

However, it is not only the spaces where meetings and protests are held that I expect shape activists' ability to develop inclusion within movements. Based on contemporary work on segregation and political behavior (Enos, 2017; Trounstein, 2018). I also expect that the neighborhoods where Boston Women's March leaders live influence how they interact with each other. In this way, the lived experience of the city influences movements ability to develop inclusion by impacting the quality of deliberation among activists. In particular, I expect that white women from white protected suburbs will be more likely to devalue the perspectives of women of color, leading to possible conflict and challenges for developing inclusion.

When assessing these the spaces where activists live and where meetings and protests are held impact the ability to develop inclusion, we must first address the characteristics of these spaces. For example, what is the class breakdown of the neighborhood? Is the neighborhood a historically white protected neighborhood (Trounstein, 2018)? Likewise, have urban planning policies been put in place to exclude, in particular, lower income people of color from the neighborhood? What is the history of movement organizing around spatial and environmental injustice within the neighborhood?

When assessing inclusion, it is important to note, that while diversity can be used as an indicator of inclusion within the quantitative analyses presented in Chapter 4, diversity and inclusion are not synonymous. While activists involved in organizing an event may come from

differing backgrounds, when addressing whether or not inclusion has been achieved, we must ask whether the activists formally address the power dynamics between them (Einwohner et al, 2019). For example, as in the Gezi protests, do straight activists change their behavior when critiqued by queer activists? Or in the Women's March, do white women change their behavior when critiqued by Black women? Likewise, who within the organization has the power to shape the agenda of the movement? How do the activists engage with communities they wish to ally with, such as the indigenous community or the LGBT community? Within an inclusive movement, we should expect that issues raised by activists who experience secondary marginalization (Cohen, 1999) will be addressed and importantly, these activists will not only be able to speak within the planning process but that they will be heard (Einwohner et al., 2019; Weldon, 2006; Young, 2000).

Importantly, in order to test my expectations it is necessary to address what forms of evidence would indicate my theoretical account requires revision or rejection. Based on my expectations, we should expect that meetings held in white protected suburbs will hinder efforts to develop inclusion within the Women's March. Likewise, white activists from white protected suburbs will be more likely to reject or push back when women and men of color raise critiques during the organizing process. If the opposite appears to be true when assessing the story of the Boston Women's March, and for example a meeting within a white protected suburb is described as providing a foundation for an agenda that centered the concerns of Black Women, this would indicate the need to revise or reject my hypotheses. I also expect, that meetings held in more diverse and less segregated neighborhoods will support the development of inclusion by bringing together diverse groups within an environment where the participants are on more equal footing to claim space and provide critique. If for example, I found that a meeting held in such a neighborhood led to the development of a march agenda that centered the need to protect white women, this would indicate a need to reject or revise my hypotheses.

In order to answer the question of how the spatial structure of Boston influenced the development of Inclusion within the Women's March, and test my expectations concerning the importance of diversity and segregation, I develop a detail case study of the Boston Women's March. The following case study is based on: relevant secondary data (news articles, reports on the city of Boston, and relevant academic literature) covering the Women's March, the history of women's organizing in Boston, the history of the Boston's physical development, and historic and contemporary efforts to address spatial and environmental injustice in Boston; interviews with

activists involved in planning the 2017 Boston Women's March; site visits to the location of the 2017 protest and the protest route; and results of my participant-observation as an activist living in Boston (see Appendix B).

In the following case study, I aim to demonstrate the challenges these organizers faced in the short time frame they had to organize the March. As I will show, organizers worked hard to ensure that they were attending to questions of diversity and inclusion despite the challenges of addressing these issues in a segregated city.

### **The Boston Women's March: Highlighting the Contradictions in the City on the Hill**

On January 21, 2017 the Boston Common was flooded with 1,750,000 protestors (Pressman and Chenoweth, 2017). The weather was mild, making the warming stations planned by organizers almost obsolete and the mood was high. On stage, politicians, and seasoned activists gave speeches and choirs and dancers entertained the crowd while Rev. Mariama White-Hammond presided over the proceedings keeping the energy up even while marchers were delayed in starting the two mile route due to the large crowd sizes. With the short route and large crowd sizes, marchers who finished their route while others were just beginning stayed back at the finish to cheer on their peers and add their signs to a growing pile that would later be archived at Northeastern University. The T (local subway) was crowded with marchers, and participants felt a sense of comradeship and hope for the future of politics in Boston. Overall, the day was a success and a reminder of the kinds of feats that can be pulled off by dedicated organizers working non-stop to pull something together out of almost nothing in only three months time.

### **Activism in Boston: Organizing in an Inequitable City**

Boston is a city of contradictions. On one side it has a history of being linked to elite progressive politics, as part of a state that has led on issues such as the abolition of slavery, same sex marriage, and marijuana decriminalization. However, the city also has a long history of efforts to maintain elite control, from Boston Brahmins efforts to maintain control of the city (despite the rise of Irish working class in city politics) through the State Legislature to the 42 antibusing riots held in the 1970's in an effort to maintain racial segregation (Deutsch, 2000; Domosh, 1996; Tager,

<sup>8</sup> Protestant anglo-american upper-class, usually descended from early colonists.

2001). Importantly, this history continues to inform the present political landscape in Boston. In order to address how the spatial structure of the city plays a role in movement organizing it is vital to first briefly address the city of Boston, the space where the protest itself was held – the Boston Common, and the neighborhoods where the Women’s March leadership held their in-person meetings, Lexington, an upper class suburb, and Jamaica Plain, a neighborhood within the city of Boston.

Segregation continues to be a major issue in Boston. Neighborhoods in Boston continue to have many of the same racial characteristics they had in the early 1900’s, for example Roxbury continues to be the heart of Black life in Boston (Deutsch, 2000; McArdle, 2003). Throughout the 1990’s the city itself became more integrated, with many neighborhoods becoming multi-ethnic and multi-racial (McArdle, 2003). However, as this has occurred white residents have increasingly moved to white suburbs (McArdle, 2003), following similar trends to the majority of U.S. cities (Trounstone, 2018). Importantly, increased suburbanization is one of the primary ways that segregation has been maintained in the Boston area, as the formal city of Boston becomes more multi-ethnic and multi-racial, while the city lost white residents to the suburbs (McArdle, 2003).<sup>9</sup> Likewise, the school-aged population has become more segregated and as expected the schools in Boston remained highly segregated with whiter suburban schools and lower-income minority schools within the city of Boston (Lee, 2004; McArdle, 2003). For example, in 2000, while the Boston Metro area was still 80% white the city itself was 49.5% white (McArdle, 2003). Furthermore, while dissimilarity measures for segregation within the city fell during the 1990’s, McArdle (2003) finds these same measures increased in the suburbs particularly when addressing segregation between whites and Latinos.

The racial segregation within Boston effects the daily lived experience of Bostonians. As expected based on extant research addressing the relationship between segregation and the provision of public goods within the city, from environmental goods such as clean air to access to schooling (Pastor, 2007; Trounstone, 2018). Boston has a long history of spatial and environmental injustice, from the development of Back Bay to contemporary decisions concerning public transit and highway development (Domosh, 1996; Techagumthorn, 2019). Boston residents in lower-

<sup>9</sup> McArdle (2003) notes that in suburbs where there has been a strong increase in the Black and Latino community this cannot necessarily be taken as evidence of increasing black population because the data available does not distinguish between the population that has moved there by choice and the population within the correctional facilities in these areas.

income and racially segregated neighborhoods are still more likely to have poor air quality (Orvis, 2016) and have inequitable access to public transit (Foster et al., 2017; Techagumthorn, 2019). For residents in these areas this means that the lived experience of being a Bostonian in these neighborhoods means seeing the inequitable treatment by local governance in daily life, as noted by Technagumthorn (2019) residents who rely on the “rapid bus transit” of the silver line still call it the “Silver Lie” due to the clear evidence that the city was unwilling to address their concerns.

Importantly, there is also a long history of organizing and activism around these concerns. These actions include the work of the Greater Boston Committee on the Transportation Crisis in the 1960’s to stop highways and promote public transit (Geismer, 2015; Technagumthorn, 2019); and efforts to address the air quality in Roxbury that led to the disproportionate number of young people with asthma in the neighborhood (Orvis, 2016). Likewise, contemporary organizing efforts by the T Riders Union and City Councilor Michelle Wu to address access to Public Transit (Alternatives for Community and Environment n.d.; Prignano 2019); by the Boston Tenant Coalition and City Life/Vida Urbana to ensure access to affordable housing (Boston Tenant Coalition n.d.; City Life/Vida Urbana n.d.); and the Vision Zero coalition to address the need for safer streets in Roxbury and Dorchester (Massachusetts Vision Zero Coalition n.d.). This history is reflected in the spatial structure of the city, and this shapes the organizing community in Boston. This can be seen in how the Women’s March organizers in 2017 struggled to develop inclusion within their organizing team.

In order to better understand how and why this is the case, it is necessary to address the three physical spaces where the organizers met, their first in-person meeting at a private home in Lexington, their public meeting with existing community organizations in Jamaica Plain, and their meeting to walk through the March route along the Boston Common and the day of the March itself. Each location, the suburb of Lexington, Jamaica Plain, and the Boston Common have their own relationships with the history of organizing in greater Boston. As a wealthier white suburb, Lexington has pushed against efforts to connect the suburb to the city. Alternatively, despite being a predominately white neighborhood, Jamaica Plain is home to Boston Latin Quarter, residents have a history of organizing with their neighbors in Roxbury in the Southwest Quarter Project, and the neighborhood is home to many left-wing institutions (ex. The Lucy Parsons bookstore and City Life/Vida Urbana). While the Common has long been at the center of symbolic contestations over who has the right to city, and who has claims on public space including but not limited to the

telephone operator strikes of 1919 to People before Highways Protest in 1969 to the Women’s March of 2017 (Deutsch 2000; Geismer, 2015). Importantly, these histories have both symbolic and physical impacts on the space which I argue shape the way Boston residents understand and live within these spaces.

The first meeting for the Boston Women’s March, was held in Lexington. When compared to the metro area of Boston using data from the 2010 census (Table 9), Lexington has a higher white and Asian population, higher property values, higher median income, and a larger percent of population with college degrees. While in 2010, 52.8% of Boston’s population was white, while 68.3% of Lexington’s population was white. The largest differences occur when looking at the Black and Latino population, where the city of Boston’s population is 28.3% Black, Lexington’s population is only 0.8% Black and where Boston’s population is 19.4% Latino, Lexington’s population is only 2.10% Latino. Furthermore, despite increases in the Black population since 2000, Lexington public schools experienced a decrease in the number of Black students enrolled (20/20 Vision Committee 2015). Likewise, the percent of the population in poverty in Boston (20.5%) is much higher than Lexington (3.6%) and in Lexington the median income of residents (\$162,083) is around 100,000 dollars more than the median income in Boston (\$62,021). Likewise, the median owner-occupied home in Lexington (\$816,100) is almost twice the value of the median home in Boston (\$455,100), as is the percent of the population who owns their own home in Lexington (80.80%) when compared to Boston (35.30%).

Table 9: Demographics, Lexington and Boston

	Boston	Lexington
White alone, percent	52.80%	68.30%
Black or African American alone, percent	24.90%	0.80%
American Indian and Alaska Native alone, percent	0.40%	0.10%
Asian alone, percent	9.50%	27.30%
Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander alone, percent	0.00%	0.00%
Two or More Races, percent	4.90%	3.00%

Table 9 Continued

Hispanic or Latino, percent	19.40%	2.10%
White alone, not Hispanic or Latino, percent	44.90%	67.00%
Foreign born persons, percent, 2013-2017	28.30%	25.90%
High school graduate or higher, percent of persons age 25 years+, 2013-2017	86.10%	97.90%
Bachelor's degree or higher, percent of persons age 25 years+, 2013-2017	47.40%	81.60%
In civilian labor force, female, percent of population age 16 years+, 2013-2017	66.20%	56.10%
Median household income (in 2017 dollars), 2013-2017	\$62,021	\$162,083
Owner-occupied housing unit rate, 2013-2017	35.30%	80.80%
Median value of owner-occupied housing units, 2013-2017	\$455,100	\$816,100
Persons in poverty, percent	20.50%	3.60%

While this demographic data gives us a picture of who lives in Lexington as compared to Boston, it is important to address what it means for a Boston resident for Lexington to be the location of the first meeting for the organizing of the Boston Women's March. As mentioned previously, Lexington is around 10 miles northwest from the center of Boston. This means that for a resident in the southern parts of Boston, such as Roxbury, Jamaica Plain, or Dorchester, attending this first meeting in Lexington requires significant travel. Traveling to Lexington from the southern neighborhoods of Boston by public transit requires multiple trains and buses to get to Lexington and then the walk from the bus into the suburbs to reach the private home where the meeting was held. Under ideal circumstances the non-walking portions of this trip will take between 1 and 2 hours. In contrast, a resident with a car may make the trip in 30 minutes to 45 minutes with no traffic, which is unlikely due to increasing numbers of residents traveling by car in the Boston area (The Globe Spotlight Team, 2019). Furthermore, the difficulty of connecting to Lexington from the city of Boston is not coincidental.

After organizers with the Boston Committee on the Transportation Crisis succeeded in gaining the support of Governor Frank Sargent in their efforts to invest in public transit as opposed to highways as the means to connect the city of Boston to the outer suburbs, Governor Sargent took the fight to the national level (Geismer, 2015). Leading to a lobbying effort to free money set



aside from gasoline taxes in the Federal Highway Trust Fund for mass transit facilities, leading to the Federal Highway Act of 1973 (Geismer, 2015). With the Federal Highway Act of 1973 and the National Mass Transportation Assistance Act of 1974, Massachusetts set out to expand the subway system. As part of this process, the state decided to expand the Red Line of the subway past Harvard Square and into the Northern suburbs using existing rail lines through Cambridge, Somerville, Arlington, and Lexington (Geismer, 2015). While Somerville and Cambridge supported the expansion, leading to the present day Red Line which terminates at Alewife, residents of Lexington and Arlington were less supportive (Geismer, 2015). In the end, the voices that won were the voices of those that opposed extending the Red Line into these Northern suburbs.

When analyzing the complaints and concerns voiced by those opposed to the extension of the Red Line, Geismer (2015, p. 117) argues that these anti-growth positions were clearly raced and classed. Residents were worried about losing the “new England charm” of their towns, and did not want to become “citified” while others opined that the subway would bring “roving gangs” and low income residents into their towns lowering their property values (Geismer, 2015, p. 117). Leading to the formation of organizations such as the Arlington Red Line Action Movement which was viewed by the transportation official Fred Salvucci as using “racial fear and blatant mistruths” to campaign against the extension (Geismer, 2015, p. 117). Furthermore, despite the Lexington study committee finding no evidence of negative effects on the town, residents continued to use the concept of the need to protect the local at the expense of addressing regional inequalities (Geismer, 2015). Today, the space where the proposed extension would have been is a popular cycling trail, the Minuteman Rail to Trail.

Geismer’s (2015) account of how the participation of local residents in the planning process killed the Red Line extension demonstrates that the difficulties faced by possible organizers attending the first Women’s March meeting are not an accident, but instead reflect decisions by the residents of these neighborhoods to actively prevent engaging with the residents of Boston. This account of the efforts to expand the Red Line reflect national trends of white protected suburbs intentionally blocking public works projects that lead to a more equitable city (Trounstein, 2018). As indicated, these decisions on whether or not to extend the rail line are political, not technical, and embed divisions based on race and class into the fabric of the city (Trounstein, 2018; Winner, 1980).

By holding the first meeting in the town of Lexington, the Women's March Organizers began from a necessarily exclusionary position. This decision had meaningful consequences for their efforts to develop an inclusive organizing team. As one attendee from one of the southern Boston neighborhoods noted, she arrived at a beautiful expensive house that she felt in awe of and found the one other woman she recognized from a southern Boston neighborhood and said "I'm not sure why *I* am here" implying that she didn't fit in to which the other woman responded "me neither" despite having a prominent position in local Boston politics. Even the women who were able to make the trek out to the suburbs felt that the location symbolically reminded them that they were Other.

The organizers were not blind to the limitations of their original leadership team, which was made up primarily of white upper middle-class women within the same social networks. One way the organizers tried to reach out to the larger community was by holding a meeting for local organizations in Jamaica Plain. In many ways, Jamaica Plain is similar to Lexington. Jamaica Plain is whiter and affluent than its neighbors, Roxbury and Dorchester (Boston Planning and Development Agency Research Division, 2018; Policy Development and Research Division, n.d.). Some of this is due to growth in Jamaica Plain, between 2000 and 2010 Jamaica Plain experienced increases in the number of households making over \$75,000 a year and decreases in the Hispanic population. When compared to the entire city of Boston in 2016, Jamaica Plain has a high percent of owner-occupied housing, with 45.1% of the units owned by the occupant, when compared to Boston where 35% of the housing was owned by occupants (Boston Planning and Development Agency Research Division, 2018). Unlike, Lexington, it is more difficult to get an accurate comparison concerning the basic demographics of the city due to the relationship between the neighborhood boundaries and census tracts.

Table 10: Demographics, Jamaica Plain and Boston (Policy Development and Research Division, n.d.)

	Boston	Jamaica Plain
White alone, percent	47.0%	53.6%
Black or African American alone, percent	22.4%	13.5%
American Indian and Alaska Native alone, percent	0.2%	0.2%
Asian alone, percent	8.9%	7.9%
Native Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander alone, percent	0.00%	0.0%
Two or More Races, percent	2.4%	2.4%

While the city was planning the Red Line extension, they were also working on the Orange Line relocation through Roxbury and Jamaica Plain. However, where the process in Lexington ended with a rail trail, the process in Jamaica Plain ended with a subway, and a linear park and bikeway the Southwest Corridor (Crewe, 2007; Geismer, 2015; Hellman, et al., 1989; Mann, 1991). Organizers in Jamaica Plain were supportive of the efforts to expand transit, and were involved in organizing efforts by the Boston Council for the Transportation Crisis that enabled the movement of funds from highways to public transit (Mann, 1991). Likewise, the neighborhood has an organizing culture, many local and national organizations have offices within the neighborhood, including but not limited to, local activists working on housing inequality, City Life/Vida Urbana; youth organizing to address inequality in Boston, the Hyde Square taskforce; national organizations working on labor rights, Jobs With Justice; and the Lucy Parsons Center, an anarchist book store and community center (City Live/Vida Urbana n.d.; Hyde Square Task Force 2018; Massachusetts Jobs with Justice 2017; Lucy Parsons Center n.d.).

This does not mean that Jamaica Plain is an urban utopia. There is evidence that the neighborhood has become increasingly white and affluent (McArdle, 2003; Technagumthorn, 2019) raising concerns that the neighborhood is experiencing gentrification. With these shifts there have been prolonged intra-neighborhood debates concerning issues such as the closure of a local Latino grocery, Hi-Lo, and its replacement with a Whole Foods (Irons, 2011). Overall, there is a sense that in Jamaica Plain there are “two JPs”: There is the Latin Quarter and there are the increasing number of higher income white residents. When organizing the Jamaica Plain Occupy

Movement, organizers highlighted their desire to bring together both parts of Jamaica Plain in order to better address the neighborhoods concerns while using the Whole Foods issue to signal their position (Ruch, 2011). Living and organizing within Jamaica Plain during this study, it was clear that organizers in the neighborhood are still conscious of these divisions. For example, within the local chapter of the Boston Cyclist Union plans to begin a campaign addressing Centre Street, which runs through the Latin Quarter into the more affluent portion of the neighborhood, began with a review of the past conflicts surrounding gentrification in the neighborhood.

This environment means that daily life in Jamaica Plain can be characterized as having a culture of organizing, and this culture influences how the neighborhood is lived. Living in Jamaica Plain during the process of conducting this research, it was impossible to ignore the work of groups such as City Life/Vita Urbana and the T Riders Union. Coffee shop cork boards, the doors of local businesses, telephone polls, and sometimes the roundabout at the intersection of Centre Street, Day Street, and Perkins Street were regularly covered in flyers and banners calling on the neighborhood to get involved in a number of events and campaigns. Living near the North American Indian Center the sidewalk would occasionally fill with organizers wearing name tags networking after an event. Likewise, community social events, such as the annual Kite festival in Franklin Park were filled with families from throughout Jamaica Plain, Roxbury, and Dorchester as well as organizations tabling on issues including but not limited to, cycling advocacy, the environment, and racial justice. Within this environment the work being done by women of color, queer women, and working class women to organize and improve the community was visible, whether through tenant councils, flyers for the annual queer Halloween, or the annual children's bike parade. As noted by one of the Women's March organizers who lives and works in Jamaica Plain, she shies away from calling herself an organizer despite being involved in multiple communities working for social justice due to her social circle including many people who earn their living working professionally as community organizers and advocates.

In contrast to Lexington, Jamaica Plain is accessible for most of the surrounding neighborhoods. The Orange line runs through the neighborhood, its northernmost tip is accessible via the Green Line, and the 39 bus runs the length of the neighborhood. It is difficult to take a bus from Dorchester or Allston into the center of JP due to the transit networks focus on moving commuters to Downtown Boston, unlike, Lexington, this is not the product of active efforts to prevent buses. With respect to the meeting held in Jamaica Plain, many of the meeting attendees

were invited due to their connections to local non-profits and organizing groups, most of which are located in downtown Boston or Cambridge making their movement to the neighborhood easier.

The meeting in Jamaica Plain was universally characterized by attendees as contentious. For many attendees who were involved in local non-profits, and social justice organizations, the meeting felt as if the Women's March Organizers were coming into their space and informing them that they needed to get in line with an agenda they had no say in forming. Likewise, as indicated by one attendee, she was not aware that this was not the first meeting for the Women's March. The approach of the organizers contrasted with established social norms where a first meeting would include discussions of the Marches goals and mission statement. Yet, these decisions had already been made by the existing organizing team, who instead were focused on getting the existing organizing community on-board and ready to bring their people to the March. For one attendee who decided to attend the D.C. March instead, the meeting led her to believe that the organizers had not fully thought through how they would develop inclusion within the March and she knew as woman of color working to address these issues in her current position that agreeing to become a part of the process would mean taking on that work. While for two newer organizers, they could feel the tension in the room between the different groups due in part to the way the meeting was being run but also due to the Women's March leaders not understanding some of the longer running dynamics between organizations in the Boston organizing community.

The Boston Common was the final location where organizers met in person, both for the site walk through and the March itself. The Common is one of the most accessible parts of the city. As the location of some of the cities oldest subway lines, the Red and Green subway lines, stop within the park itself. It is also accessible by the Orange line at the Downtown Crossing Station. The Common has its own history as a space that was originally dominated by the Boston elite, or the Brahmins, and was democratized as the city itself was democratized, becoming a space for working-class immigrants enjoying a day off and protestors calling for better working conditions (Domosh 1996; Deutsch 2000; Geismer, 2015). Today, it continues in that legacy, as a space for protest, summer concerts and plays, people from every social class enjoying good company, tourists buying tee shirts and starting on the Freedom Trail or the Black Heritage Trail, and downtown workers picking up lunch from food trucks.

The route for the Women's March was a loop of two miles that started and ended back at the Boston Common. The route goes down Commonwealth avenue which has a linear park that

ends at the Boston public garden. For the organizers, this route was ideal as there are benches every few feet for those who may need to rest or want to watch the March as it passed. The park includes both monuments to local leaders and the occasional sidewalk chalk drawing. It was during the organizers review of the route that it became clear that they had a problem. During the review they were informed that the indigenous community in Boston felt their concerns were not being heard or met by the organizers, and they were planning to potentially counter march the event.

Table 11: Space, Deliberation, and Outcomes for Boston Women's March Meetings

<b>Meeting Space</b>	<b>Neighborhood Characteristics</b>	<b>Quality of Deliberation</b>	<b>Outcome</b>	<b>Expected Outcome</b>
Home in Lexington, MA	Historically White Protected Neighborhood  Lower levels of diversity when compared to Boston	Reports of feeling out of place by women from Boston proper	Difficulty in bringing together a diverse leadership team, recognition that additional efforts would be needed	Low levels of inclusion due to inaccessibility
Jamaica Plain, Boston, MA	More diverse when compared to Lexington  Less diverse when compared to neighboring Roxbury and Dorchester  History of organizing oriented towards addressing spatial and environmental injustice	Contentious  Working group approach by Women's March organizers conflicts with expectations of organizations present	Mixed:  Indications that some activists involved in the meeting reject becoming involved in Women's March, and difficulty bringing in organizations present  Women's March organizers as a whole recognize that they need to change tactics as opposed to allowing "the platform" to bring people into the process	Increased inclusion as a result of productive deliberation among activists from differing social positions

Table 11 continued

Boston Common	Downtown Boston	Contentious	Woman of color on the leadership team	Increased inclusion as a
	Accessible to multiple social groups	Women's March organizers presented with the possibility of counter-march by	begins process for deliberation between the Women's March and the Boston indigenous	result of productive deliberation among activists from differing
	Historic space for protest	the indigenous community	community	social positions

Due to these differences between Lexington, and Jamaica Plain, we can reasonably raise the counterfactual with respect to this missed opportunity of the first meeting (George and Bennet, p. 232). What might have gone differently if the first meeting was held not in inaccessible Lexington but in Jamaica Plain? It is likely, that the first meeting would still have been contentious as the group worked through what the mission of the March was and pulled together a team to work on the actual organizing. Would for example, the organizers face the same concerns from the indigenous community if representatives of the North American Indian Center were in attendance of the first meeting? Would some of the difficulties the organizers faced in terms of recruitment of diverse women may have looked different if the meeting was advertised by flyering Jamaica Plain, Roxbury, and Dorchester? This counter-factual also raises the important role played by time in facilitating inclusion, despite the choice of a more promising space for the second meeting held by the Women's March organizers, the benefits of holding a meeting in Jamaica Plain were potentially limited because the Lexington meeting had already established the leadership and agenda for the March. It is important to note, the geography is not destiny, but that the spaces where the leading organizers chose to hold meetings matters. In the following section I discuss how these choices were compounded through the organizer's dependence on interpersonal networks.

### **Congratulations You've Been Drafted: Building a Team through Interpersonal Networks**

In the beginning, there were almost two Women's Marches. In the northern suburbs an organizer with experience organizing political events for the Obama campaign got a message from a professional contact saying that he had heard she was organizing a Boston March, to her surprise. After getting the message, she decided to put her professional skills to good use and began connecting with her contacts to organize a planning meeting for the March, held at a professional

contacts home in Lexington. On the other side of the city, a woman in Jamaica Plain decided that there should be a March in Boston, for everyone who couldn't drive all night, didn't have friends to crash with, or couldn't afford a hotel. She talked with her friends about what it would take to start a March, created a facebook page, and got a permit from the city of Boston. When the Lexington group went to the city for a permit, they discovered the permit had already been obtained, and began the process of merging the two groups by inviting the organizer from Jamaica Plain to their first meeting. The consensus among the Lexington group is that they potentially saved this group with their technical expertise, despite the Jamaica Plain organizers existing ties to the local organizing community. The Lexington group felt they had the right contacts in order to fundraise for the event and successfully attend to the logistics of holding an event with a large crowd, despite many of these organizers never having attended a March.

Beyond the permit-holding organizer from Jamaica Plain, the group which attended the first meeting was recruited using professional networks. Many of the team members had experience organizing the 2012 Democratic Party Convention, working within state democratic politics, and had connections within both state and city government. Attendees who would go on to become involved in the organizing process were pulled into the event through professional networks, with one organizer reflecting that she attended at the suggestion of her professional mentor while another was recruited by a grad school colleague. It was at this meeting that the hints of the difficulties that the organizers would have in terms of recruiting a diverse organizing team first became apparent, as the organizer of the meeting mentioned to me at least one woman of color she knew decided not to be involved in organizing the event after the meeting.

Where the original team had strengths in their connections to City Hall and their experiences with large events, they struggled more with recruiting women of color into their team. When asked to reflect on the efforts of team to develop a diverse leadership team, white organizers would mention the same handful of women profiled in the Boston Globe, Sonya Khan, Yordanos Eyoel, and Shelley Yen-Ewert (Sweeney 2017), as well as, Natalie Sanchez who continues to be involved in the Women's March through March On and March Forward Massachusetts (Becker and Jackson 2019; March On 2018). Most of these women were recruited into the organizing team through their professional networks (encouraged to join the team by mentors and colleagues), two were at the original Lexington meeting while the other two were brought into the team later on in the organizing process. Shelley Yen-Ewert, remains the outlier in terms of the recruitment strategy



for the team, in the Boston Globe profiles she indicates that she became involved in the organizing process after asking the organizers about efforts to ensure accessibility for the deaf community.

Overall, women of color and queer women made up a small minority of the larger organizing team. When asked to reflect on the team as a whole, organizers recognized that the team was primarily made up of white upper middle-class women from the suburbs. Many of these women were well connected, politically active, and either had flexible schedules within their jobs or were stay at home moms. Likewise, they recognized that while they tried to ensure a diverse organizing team and ideally their team would have been more diverse they also indicated some blind spots concerning why women of color may not have been involved in the process.

When asking organizers what they did to address concerns of diversity and inclusion within the organizing team, white organizers tended to point to two concerns: interpersonal networks and time. With the tight time frame, three months to plan both a stage event and a March, organizers felt they needed to rely on people they knew could do the job. This meant “drafting” people from their interpersonal networks with the experience, connections, and time to do this work. One outlier noted that some of this difficulty was also due to what she viewed as some elitism and emphasis on women’s credentials which privileged women from a particular background. Due to these women’s own positions within the suburbs of Boston and within the Massachusetts Democratic party the people they tended to tap to get involved in the project tended to be women much like themselves. Likewise, women of color involved in the project noted that they too tended to be from more privileged positions. For example, one interviewee noted that she was involved in the project because a colleague she knew from her time at Harvard where she got her Masters degree. Likewise she noted, that despite her background in organizing back in her home state she may not have been recruited if it wasn’t for the “fluke” that her colleague had become so well-networked through her own professional career.

Within these discussions of the difficulty of developing a diverse organizing team, white organizers in particular indicated some key assumptions about who has time and who does not have time to organize a political event in Boston. One organizer articulated that she felt that white upper middle-class women doing the work of organizing the event was a way that they could use their privilege to support less privileged women, in particular working single mothers who might not have the time to be on phone calls at all hours due to their responsibilities. Despite the presence of working women within the organizing team, especially working women of color, the assumption

was that taking on the project was a way for white upper-middle class women to use their privilege for good. Leveraging their connections and networks in order to put on a large event highlighting the issues women face. Interrogating this assumption enables us to see how the space of the city enables this potentially limiting perspective on the capacity that women of color, working class women, and single mothers have for organizing in Boston.

When articulating this perspective, women of color are conflated with working-class single mothers, essentializing women of color, working class women, and single mothers as the same group. White organizers recognized that these women may not have access to the same resources when doing organizing work, but failed to recognize that these barriers do not necessarily mean that women from these positions were not *already* doing organizing work in the city of Boston through organizations such as, City Life/Vida Urbana, Hyde Square Task Force, New Roots AME and Bethel AME congregations (Bethel AME Church 2020; New Roots AME Church n.d.), Black Lives Matter Boston (Black Lives Matter n.d.), and the North American Indian Center of Boston (North American Indian Center 2020). This list is in no way exhaustive, the organizing community in Boston particularly in the Dorchester, West Roxbury, and Jamaica Plain neighborhoods are home to organizations working to address the concerns of the black, Latinx, immigrant, and working class residents of Boston. However, these organizations, as well as established feminist organizations such as the Boston Women's Fund, and the people within them were not a part of the networks of the organizers of the 2017 Women's March.

Part of the reason for this disconnect between networks is location. As discussed previously, many of the organizers were pulling in people from their well-connected social networks. Many of these people lived in the suburbs of Boston: Lexington, Arlington, Winchester, etc. Furthermore, as discussed previously the first meeting held to bring together a potential organizing team was held in Lexington. Yet, organizers did not recognize how choosing to hold their original meeting in this space created potential barriers, with the long commute and history of trying to prevent working class people of color from entering the neighborhood, for the women who they believed they were supporting by taking the lead in organizing the March. When discussing the difficulties of working through questions of inclusion and diversity, one interviewee noted the experiments done by Enos (2018) on the Red Line. She noted that the problem was not that organizers were not progressive it was that when faced with the reality of a woman of color disagreeing with their positions, they struggled. Similar to how Enos (2018) finds that in white neighborhoods in Boston

white residents are more favorable of less punitive immigration policy when there are no Spanish speakers on the train platform and are more favorable of punitive immigration policy when there are Spanish speakers on the train platform. Similarly, the organizer felt that while the white organizers indicated that they were in favor of supporting women of color, when faced with her voice they were less accommodating.

The reliance on existing social networks, and the location of leading organizers in Boston suburbs potentially hindered efforts to build an inclusive organizing team. Within this story it is important to note, that there were organizers who were women of color and organizers with ties to diverse neighborhoods such as Dorchester and Jamaica Plain. However, these organizers were in the minority.

### **A Seat at the Table- So What: Being Heard**

When discussing the concrete steps they took to ensure inclusion at the March as well as when being asked to reflect on their experiences organizing, women of color indicated a distinct experience when compared to white organizers. Where white suburban organizers focused primarily on the transformative experience of the organizing or on the intensity of putting together an event in a short time.<sup>10</sup> Women of color reflected both on how important the organizing the March was and the ways they found the experience frustrating.<sup>11</sup> As noted in the previous section, white organizers had blind spots when interacting with the women of color they were working with, multiple women noted that they felt frustrated in particular when they were trying to get their fellow organizers to hear their contributions. In most of the examples presented, where the women felt their voices were not being heard or were being devalued, were when they were discussing the issues within their nominal purview within the leadership team.

When discussing these moments, women of color within the organizing team would first note that the women they were working with had good intentions but also reflected that they had limited experiences. For them, the same experiences that made it difficult for white organizers to understand the difficulties they were having with community and grassroots organizations made it

<sup>10</sup> One white non-suburban organizer is an outlier, noting her own frustrations with the hierarchical structure of the organizing team and the need to address the problem of class within the organizing team.

<sup>11</sup> More than one woman indicated that she would not have shared these frustrations with me, without assurances of confidentiality. In this section I will discuss what these critiques were, separate from the events they are tied to in order to try to ensure these women's privacy.

difficult for them to see and hear women of color within the organizing team. At times this was deeply frustrating, on one side the organizers agreed to a platform that emphasized the importance of addressing the concerns of women of color, disabled women, and queer women yet white organizers would at times dismiss them when they raised issue with a planning decision that failed to address their concerns. One organizer, even noted that she felt at times that the white organizers valued her voice as a woman of color in theory but when faced with the reality of her disagreement on an issue she felt they were not willing to listen.

Within these discussions of their experiences, many of the women agreed that having a seat at the table was not sufficient. While they were at the table, they had to fight harder than they would have expected based on the mission of the March to ensure that the needs of their communities and the communities they serve were met. In a way this was an experience of cognitive dissonance, on one side they were valued, and even placed front and center to indicate the teams commitment to diversity and on the other hand they were not heard. This raises the question of whether the organizing team was inclusive or diverse. In contrast to organizers interviewed in San Antonio, who were more concerned with vetting me as a white academic and ensuring that my interviews reflected the many perspectives of their diverse collective, these women were more concerned with the potential backlash they could face from professional and personal contacts if their critiques were visible (see Table 12). This reads to me, as an example of what it means to have diversity as opposed to inclusion. When inclusion is achieved, all members should be able to voice critique of those with more power than them, and be heard (Einwohner et al., 2019). These concerns reflect the reasons for why women of color may need autonomous organizations in order to voice their concerns, as without an autonomous base to draw from many of the women involved in the Boston Women's March felt they could not publicly voice their critiques of their white co-organizers (Weldon, 2006, 2012).

Table 12: Diversity and Inclusion within Women’s March Leadership Teams, Boston and San Antonio

March City	Leadership Team Structure		Outcome	Expected Outcome
	Diversity	Decision-making		
Boston, MA	Majority White Suburban Women	Hierarchical model of decision-making	Less inclusive  Women of color wary of possible backlash for public critique	Less inclusive
San Antonio, TX	Majority women of color, immigrant women, and queer women	Flat Deliberative model of decision-making	More inclusive  Interviewees express commitment to ensuring diverse perspectives on the process are heard, no concerns regarding retribution for voicing their critiques	More inclusive

In the following section I will address some of the difficulties the team had in ensuring an inclusive event and the role of women of color, queer women, and non-suburban women in pushing for inclusion within the March and serving as diplomats between the Women’s March organizers and established organizing communities.

### Challenges for Inclusive Planning

Holding a large event is a challenge in and of itself, ensuring that the event is inclusive for women from a range of backgrounds and experiences presents its own challenges. Existing work on diversity in social movements indicates that diversity, in this case in terms of the presence of women from a range of backgrounds, is not the same as inclusion (Einwohner et al., 2019; Herring and Henderson, 2012). In order to understand whether or not the organizers of the Boston Women’s March were able to succeed in developing an inclusive March, I asked organizers both about the concrete steps they took in order to ensure the event itself was inclusive as well asked the women involved for their reflection on their experiences as members of the organizing team. In the following account I address the process of ensuring inclusion, both the challenges and

successes faced by the Boston team and why inclusive platforms are insufficient without women of color in leadership positions.

### **Successes: Creating “Common” Space**

Before addressing the process through which the team built an inclusive event, it is important to first address where they succeeded. For the organizers the day of the March was exhausting, exhilarating, and overall a success. On stage, various speakers and acts were introduced from many organizations all MC'd by Rev. Mariama White-Hammond. Great care and attention was paid to ensuring the physical space was not a hurdle for participants, there was space for participants who couldn't stand for long periods of time to sit during the stage show, the route itself had a number of benches every few feet in order to ensure that if someone needed to sit down they could, there was a ramp to the stage, sign language interpreters, and a drop off point for buses. Furthermore, volunteers with the accessibility team were prepped to welcome attendees and help them find the resources they needed. Lead organizers ensured that volunteers were properly trained to respect participants wishes when offering accessibility options. Volunteers were also charged with maintaining space for bicycle parking, helping buses unload and park, maintaining paths between the press risers and the backstage, protecting the space for participants with mobility issues, and the space for dancers and musicians to prepare before taking the stage. At times, the accessibility of the event posed new challenges for the organizers, as one of the organizers noted a man in a wheel chair staged a small sit in on the ramp to the stage while she was working to get a group of politicians to the stage for their time slot. When the crowd struggled to get started marching due the large crowd and short route, the Honk Band and Rev. Mariama White-Hammond kept the marchers happy with music, dancing, and sing-a-longs.

Reflecting on the event organizers also noted where they had fallen short. In the lead up to the event, a decision to add a screen for the stage show (in part due to the growing crowd) meant that the organizing team had to work to get Communication Access Real-Time Translation (CART) for participants with hearing impairments that didn't use sign-language. Due to high demand for these services, the organizers had difficulty finding someone who was able to do this for the event at the last minute. One of the organizers on the accessibility team noted that she was calling everyone who did CART captioning in the greater Boston area, even going so far as to offer to fly a retired captioner up to Boston for the weekend days before the event. Eventually, the organizers

decided as a group that flying up a captioner was more than they could do for the event and held the event without CART. Similarly, while on the ground as a march marshall on the day of the event another organizer had an experience helping a woman who had become claustrophobic. In his words, the crowd was great and everyone pitched in to make sure she was able to get space but the moment reminded him that they needed to have more options for people who might want to participate.

Organizers own positions and professional experiences influenced how they processed these moments where the team could have done more to ensure the accessibility of the event. As a younger and newer organizer the organizer who acted as a marshall on the day of the March was next was involved in organizing a major march, March for Our Lives on March 24, 2018, he notes that they included spaces for marchers who may feel overwhelmed by the crowds to unwind. For him this was a learning experience. In contrast, members of the accessibility team were more frustrated. As professionals with experience working on ensuring accessibility, they knew that getting CART services was a difficult task that had to be done months in advance, and they had tried to make sure the other organizers understood this but with the last minute addition of the screen they were faced with a steep challenge. This paired with other day of mistakes, such as placing the screen in front of the seating for those with mobility issues invoking the history of institutionalization, highlighted the issues they faced while advocating for inclusion at the event.

Developing an inclusive event, was not necessarily an easy or simple process. In the lead up to the event organizers discussed their ideas on how to create a successful Women's March within their own limits. The organizers connections as well as due to the widespread support for the action in Boston meant fundraising was not an issue. This made addressing financial hurdles imposed by the city easy, such as ensuring the appropriate insurance. Likewise, the funding meant that the organizers were able to ensure access to porta-potties and pay sign language interpreters. While some issues, such as access to porta-potties may seem inconsequential, with large crowds ranging in age from children to elderly people, access to restrooms is an important issue. Particularly in downtown Boston where public restrooms are limited, in the area surrounding the Common there are two spaces with a large number of public restrooms at the Common itself there are restrooms near the ice skating/wading pool while the next closest restrooms are at the Boston Public Library. In this way, the connections that organizers were able to leverage and access to donors did have a positive impact on their ability to put on a physically accessible event.

Inclusion and accessibility are not only questions of how many sign language interpreters are present, and how many bathrooms there are, these are also questions of whether or not participants from under-represented groups feel the space is for them. For the Boston organizers this was the more difficult task for organizers to address than questions of where do we place the seating area and where there are curb cuts. Within the Boston Women's March organizing team, being able to address this question meant thinking about how they were engaging with communities, and whose voices they were privileging on stage. This is also where the activists struggled the most, as discussed previously organizers agreed that their meeting with organizers in Jamaica Plain was a "disaster," working through disagreements among the organizing team concerning who would MC the event or in the programming lead's words "who would be the voice of god," and the possibility of a counter march by the indigenous community and their allies. While this story is not only one of challenges, organizers in the accessibility team were able to ensure participants felt welcomed in the lead up to the event by fielding questions from a range of participants with questions concerning their ability to participate personally (even when the information was already available) and trained volunteers to welcome participants and help them find accommodations on the day of the event. In the following section I will focus primarily on the challenge of ensuring symbolic inclusion when the organizing team is primarily made up of white women.

### **Challenges: Community Buy-in and Trust**

When discussing this project with experienced grassroots organizers in Boston, one theme that comes up is the general wariness of the Boston Women's March as a white women's march or a "Democratic Party" machine event. As discussed, in many ways this perception is accurate. The event was mostly organized by white women with close ties to the Massachusetts Democratic party, however experienced organizers who attended the event note that seeing Rev. Mariama White-Hammond as the events' MC potentially shifted their perspective on the event. For them, the willingness of Rev. Mariama White-Hammond to lend her well-earned legitimacy as an activist for racial and environmental justice indicated that the organizers may have done better at achieving real inclusion and listening to critique than these organizers expected. In order to understand why seasoned organizers were wary of the event, as well as understand why it was important that the



Women's March was able to present the image of inclusion through their choice in MC, it is necessary to address how the organizers failed while reaching for inclusion.

In order to understand how the organizers failed while reaching for inclusion and why it was significant that they were able to put together an inclusive stage show it is important to start with their recruitment process. In terms of their process, the team had multiple groups reaching out to organizations for the event. The programming director was reaching out to organizations, politicians, musicians, and dancers about being involved in the stage show. The lead organizer and two other members of the team were reaching out to every organization they could find in Boston in order to get them to either bring their people to the event or become involved in the planning process. Simultaneously, a college student led team was reaching out to student groups encouraging them to get involved and attend the march. As part of this process of onboarding existing organizations in Boston, the team planned the Jamaica Plain meeting where they invited every organization, they could think of to become involved in the planning process. Organizers who attended the meeting in Jamaica Plain agree that the event did not go according to planned, and potentially negatively impacted their ability to onboard grassroots organizations. Interrogating the lead up to the Jamaica Plain meeting, and the experience of the event itself highlights some of the challenges in developing an inclusive event when the organizing team does not have pre-existing ties to grassroots organizing.

In order to better understand what the Jamaica Plain meeting tells us about the difficulty of inclusive organizing it is necessary to first address the organizing team's own reflections on their relationship with the organizing community in Boston. As discussed previously, many of the organizers had experience primarily with the democratic party and many came from business backgrounds. Overall, this team was fairly elite. As one interviewee mentioned when reflecting on her work doing outreach to Latinx community organizations, most of the women of color who were recruited were similarly elite women. She was recruited to the team by another woman of color who she met through her graduate education at the Harvard Kennedy School. After graduate school, her friend had become involved in work with venture capital and as a result became well connected with powerful players in Boston. Despite her own experiences with organizing back in Texas, this interviewee noted that she did not have close ties to grassroots organizing in Boston and this created challenges. In many ways, the challenges of recruiting organizations without existing ties came to a head during the Jamaica Plain meeting.

When discussing the planning process, three organizers discussed their experiences at the Jamaica Plain meeting. One organizer, as previously mentioned, was involved in outreach to community organizations. The other two organizers were involved in the accessibility team, and for one of these organizers this meeting was her entry into the organizing process. In the following account of the meeting, I focus on these three different perspectives on the March and what they show us about the challenges of inclusive organizing.

The meeting was planned for two weeks before the Women's March date, and was held in Jamaica Plain. In the lead up to the event, organizers invited every relevant organization they could think of for the meeting, and per the organizer involved in outreach, some of the organizations showed up and others did not. She notes that the meeting was intended to be run as a working meeting, where organizations could come and find out how they fit into the process and what they could do. As noted previously, the original planning meetings had already occurred in Lexington, but many of the organizations present at the Jamaica Plain meeting had not been involved in this process, nor did many of them know that this was not the first meeting. At this point, the main organizing group of around 50 people were primarily working together through phone calls, facebook, and email. They would not meet in person until a week later at the March walk through.

For most of the organizations and attendees present at the Jamaica Plain meeting, this was their introduction to the Women's March planning process. Due to the Women's March organizers approach to the meeting as a working meeting, this introduction was focused on what the organizers needed from community organizations in order to put together the event as opposed to a discussion of what the March should or could be. For the organizer doing outreach and the organizer leading the meeting, this approach failed because they did not have the necessary relationships with these organizations and attendees in order to make the ask.

For one of the women of color on the organizing team, this issue of the lack of a relationship between the Women's March organizers and the existing organizing communities should be viewed in the context of the history of Boston. She notes that one of the blind spots for the primarily white organizing team, was the idea that if they had the right platform they would be able to get buy in from existing organizations in Boston. For her, this ignored the history of racism in the city. In particular, they needed to take into account how feminist activism in Boston has not historically been inclusive of women of color, particularly black women in Roxbury or Latina women in Jamaica Plain (Deutsch, 2000). Furthermore, white women's activism in Boston has oftentimes

been for white women's benefit alone, as seen through the busing riots (Tager, 2001), and telephone operators strikes of 1913 and 1919 (Deutsch, 2000). Likewise, the contemporary experience of many communities of color in Boston is one of gentrification and displacement by white progressives moving into their communities (ex. Whole Foods in Jamaica Plain etc).

In order to more successfully get buy in from community organizations, the Women's March needed more than a platform or relationships, they needed to build trust in a context where communities of color have legitimate reasons to distrust white women and elite women's organizing. Furthermore, going into the community and taking an approach that the Women's March organizers were there to tell existing organizations how to become involved in the March without space for critique and discussion did not enable the Women's March to build trust.

In contrast other members of the team felt that the meeting failed due to the social dynamics at the meeting. For one first time organizer, there was a clear disconnect between how Women's March organizers and how the attendees at the event viewed what they were there to accomplish. Where the Women's March leadership had an agenda focused on getting concrete buy in from community organizations, this agenda was quickly abandoned as the attendees were more concerned with addressing the process of developing the event. This created difficulties for the moderator of the event, who felt trapped between needing to perform well for the leadership team and the clear rejection of this more hierarchical approach to gaining buy in by the attendees. For many attendees from community organizations, this was their first planning meeting but they were not aware that much of the work that is usually done in an early planning meeting had already been done.

While to scholars of social movements, contention over how to run a meeting and the process of organizing is not new (Blee, 2012), for these participants it was their first experience with organizing. From where one organizer sat as a new but interested participant, she noted that despite the facilitators efforts the meeting was quickly derailed. While for the organizer facilitating, she felt overwhelmed as a new organizer leading a meeting where many of the participants had years of experience on her. There were disagreements between participants coming from different generations of organizing on how the meeting should be run. Likewise, there were many questions concerning the process through which the March was being organized, and the general perception among the participants was that the process had been exclusionary due to the speed with which the event had been put on and the lack of input from community organizations throughout the process.

The Jamaica Plain meeting is a clear example the organizers themselves recognized that this was a space where they had failed to achieve inclusion. They recognized that in order for this meeting to be a success they needed to have begun building relationships and trust with community organizations earlier. However, this was a struggle, due to the limitations of the organizer's networks and early decisions such as holding the first meeting in Lexington. Likewise, the organizers recognize that they took the wrong approach when coming to the meeting itself. Coming into the space of Jamaica Plain, which as previously noted has an active organizing community, without listening to the community was a recipe for failure. For one organizer, the failure of the meeting also had very tangible effects on their ability to put together an inclusive event, all of her efforts to reach out one-on-one to organizations at that event failed and in her words, it led to rumors about the Women's March Organizers. When discussing the difficulties faced following the Jamaica Plain meeting, one of the women interviewed noted that while they had failed to get the ask through the meeting another organizer had much more success with her work putting together the stage show for the event because she was able to both identify who to talk with as well as get the ask.

With the difficulties the team had, in recruiting women of color onto the organizing team and building trust with community and grassroots organizers it becomes all the more impressive that the team was able to put together a stage show that reflected the diversity of Boston. However, much like the process of getting accessibility support for attendees, this was not a simple feat. Within the process of putting together the program, organizers had disagreements about who should be included in the program.

One of the main questions when organizing a stage show for a March is who will be on the program, why, and how long will they speak. For the Boston March, the organizers recognized that by including politicians the stage show would be more white than they would potentially hope for because Massachusetts politics is dominated by white politicians. While organizers noted, they were able to get key women involved in the event such as Ayanna Pressley during her days on Boston City Council and Elizabeth Warren was one of the first politicians to agree to be involved in the event, they still had to address questions of who would be given time to speak when addressing the white men in Massachusetts politics. Likewise, there were disagreements concerning the need to limit the presence of men on the program, both in terms of questions of who would represent the environmentalist movement and who would MC the event. Through these

conversations about who would be a part of the stage show, organizers worked through their positions on what the space was for men at the event. With some organizers noting that it was important to them that, for this event, men should “pass the mic” or step back and recognize that the program should center women.

Much like with the issues the organizers faced at the Jamaica Plain meeting, many of the organizers, while well meaning, struggled to understand why it would be symbolically important and potentially damage their credibility to have a white man represent the environmentalist community or MC the event. In the end, one organizer noted that this was an issue where she decided it was important for her to pick this battle and she pushed her fellow organizers to think about the optics particularly in the face of the criticisms they were already facing from the grassroots and community organizations in Boston. An organizer who knew of Mariama White-Hammond due to her work on the West Roxbury Pipeline issue (Blanding 2017; Cohen n.d.; Levenson 2016) reached out to her and she agreed to become involved in the organizing process and to MC the event. Organizers noted that White-Hammond served as more than just an MC, after agreeing to be involved in the March, she also served as a key mentor for women of color navigating their relationships with their fellow organizers and brought her expertise to the organizing process as someone with longstanding ties to organizing in Boston.

In the following section, I discuss how these challenge of inclusion came to a head when the organizers discovered the possibility of a counter-march organized by the indigenous community and their allies. This possibility arose in part, many of the organizers agreed, due to the lack of representation of the indigenous community in the organizing team and their own blind spots concerning the presence of the community in Boston.

### **Crisis: Leadership and Mediation**

With the days numbered, the organizers met in person for the first time a week before the Women’s March in order to do a walk-through of the protest route with the city of Boston. For many of the organizers, this was their first time seeing each other in person. During the process of the walkthrough, many of the organizers became aware of the possibility of a counter march by the indigenous community and their allies. While the organizers were cryptic about the source of the conflict, they all agreed that — while there had been efforts to conduct outreach with the Boston indigenous communities — they had failed to fully understand their concerns. During the walk

through with the police and stakeholders they discovered that there was a problem. One of the organizers was eavesdropping on the discussion of what the problem was, and with her expertise in negotiation, her position as a woman of color, and her recognition of the need to address these concerns due to her previous experiences with indigenous communities from growing up in her home state, she decided to take the lead and find a way to address these concerns.

For the organizers this moment was a wake up call concerning their need to address the concerns of the indigenous community as well as their own blind spots. As one organizer noted, before the March she had been entirely ignorant of the presence of an indigenous community in Boston. In order to begin the mediation process, one of the organizers first attended a Standing Rock fundraiser event in order to demonstrate that she was an ally for the indigenous community and to demonstrate with her physical presence as a woman of color that the organizing team was not entirely white. After discussing with leaders in the community, they established a mediation process using their connections to the Governor's office (due to the existing institutions within this office aimed at addressing the indigenous community), Mayor's office, local organizers, and the indigenous community leaders. Likewise, other women of color within the organizing team who had better relationships with the organizing community also helped to facilitate these meetings. Through this deliberative process the organizing team was able to bring in the indigenous community and they believe adequately address their concerns. Ensuring that there was not a counter march.

### **Inclusion in the Aftermath: Does She Persist?**

Overall, the organizers were able to develop an inclusive event despite their difficulties in developing inclusion within the organizing team. However, in the aftermath of the event these tensions around inclusion came to a head when determining how to spend or use the leftover funds they had raised during the event. As noted by many of the organizers, different members of the team came into the organizing process with different goals. For some of the organizers, they were more interested in developing the national movement while for others they were interested in supporting existing local organizations. In the end, the team decided to create a new organization with the funds and the email list they had left over from the March, March Forward Massachusetts. While other members of the organizing team also went on to found the national organization March On, as a way to continue support for Sister Marches in the following years. March On and March

Forward Massachusetts demonstrate the ways the organizers were both successful and unsuccessful in developing inclusion.

In the case of March On, multiple organizers who had been involved in the Boston Women's March had simultaneously been involved in working to develop the Sister March networks beyond Boston. As part of this process, they had been involved in national calls with organizers in other cities sharing their experiences with the organizing process. For these organizers, these calls had been an important space of helping each other with learning the logistics of how to put together an event, learning how other groups on-boarded community organizations, and ensuring that diverse voices were included in their events. This work grew into March On, which focuses on supporting local organizers in the process of putting together Women's Marches in 2018 and 2019 without dictating their goals or agenda. As discussed by one of the women who went on to become involved in March On, they do not want the name to be trademarked as "any group of five women should be a Women's March" or limit whether the groups working with them can work with other organizations in organizing their Marches. March On reflects some of the successes of the Boston Women's March team in terms of the learning process of grasping towards inclusion by building support networks for organizers for working through challenges, whether that means providing suggestions on how to address for example the prospect of a counter march by a group you hope to ally with or navigating your local governments permit process. While this has led to some disagreements with Women's March Inc., the organizers involved in March On believe that this model enables them to empower local organizations by providing support without dictating the message.

In contrast, March On Massachusetts reflected the limitations of organizing when it is dependent on interpersonal networks and elite vetting processes. Organizers involved in the Boston Women's March, overall indicated apathy or frustration with the process of developing March On Massachusetts. One organizer felt that the woman chosen to head the organization was only chosen due to her connections, and that the process of determining the board was overly focused on where potential board members went to school at the expense of looking at where potential board members worked within the organizing community. Likewise, others indicated that they felt the organization had in some ways fizzled due to disagreements on how to support youth organizing and the problem of anti-semitism associated with the Women's March leaders at the national level associating with Louis Farrakan. Where in the lead up to organizing the March, organizers had

found ways to work through these issues for the sake of putting together the event, when building an institution these disagreements became of higher importance leading to many dropping away from the organization.

Despite the lack of persistence in terms of maintaining their ties to the Boston Women's March, or even the Women's March, many of the organizers continue to be involved in political organizing or political work. Members joined neighborhood huddles, and coffee klatches following the March. Likewise, two organizers indicated that their experiences with the organizing team led to shifts in their professional careers. For one it meant changing jobs to return to working on public health related projects within a political office while for the other it meant developing projects that support local efforts to improve democratic life within her current job. While for others, they were already involved in work that was closely aligned with their ideals, and they continue to do that work, in universities, churches, and non-profits.

### **Conclusion: Grasping for Inclusion and Learning in the Process**

When reflecting on the Boston Women's March, and the Women's Marches as a whole, one organizer reminded me "A lot of people feel like it was a missed moment. And we wanted it to be more, we have to continue to unpack some of these things, and one event may be a catalyst it may not." She contended that the effects may not be what we expected from the women's march. Likewise, that we need to sit with and struggle through these issues of sexism, racism, and injustice, but that a March is not always the space for that work. With the present barriers between people, from the inequitable city to entrenched partisanship in U.S. politics, what is necessary is spaces for productive interactions across difference. The Women's March did create some spaces for deliberation through the struggles the organizers had with each other over how to create an inclusive program, and what they should be aiming to accomplish once the process was over. But that process was limited in important ways by the inequitable city.

Organizers' own social networks are limited by the spaces where they live, work, and play. Living in suburban white neighborhoods limits who organizers may recruit to become involved in the process of putting together a March, and where they hold their meetings. Even when they are aiming for inclusion. In order to develop inclusion within movements and organizations it is necessary to ask: how am I potentially being limited by my social location, not only as an elite white woman but also as a suburban white woman? Where in the city are the people involved in



organizing? Where organizers hold a meeting can support efforts towards inclusion by being physically accessible and potentially even symbolically accessible. Holding a meeting in an expensive home in the Northern part of the city indicated to organizers from the city of Boston that maybe they didn't belong in the Boston Women's March organizing team.

However, choosing the correct space and inviting diverse women is never enough. Women of color, in particular, need more than a seat at the table in order to ensure inclusion within a leadership team. This is particularly vital, because in the case of the Boston Women's March it was the women of color on the organizing team who were able to act as brokers when there was the chance of a counter March by the local indigenous community by developing a plan and creating the space for a mediation process. In the following chapter, I will address why this process is so important by comparing the experience of the Boston Women's March to the Pittsburgh Women's March where organizers failed to fully take on critique leading to a counter march.

## **CHAPTER 6: SPACE, SOLIDARITY, AND A SEAT AT THE TABLE: COMPARING 2017 SISTER MARCHES IN AMERICAN CITIES**

As discussed in Chapter 1, creating new inclusive solidarities in the Gezi case required the protestors actively engaging with the physical space of the park and creating a new space which rejected the previous inequalities embedded within the space itself. Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter 2 these efforts enabled the strengthening of the LGBT movement, and the efforts by activists, such as Asya Elmas, to claim full citizenship by running for office. However, the question remains, is this only possible in cases where the central struggle is centered on control of public space, through efforts to create spatial justice (Soja, 2010); claim the right to city (Harvey, 2013; Kuymulu, 2013); or challenge environmental injustices (Pastor, 2007)? Can identity-based movements, such as women's and feminist movements, create "counter spaces" through their protest activities (Lefebvre, 1991)? Can these counter spaces become inclusive *agons*, or counter publics, where new subjectivities are constructed and new solidarities formed (Mouffe, 2013; Fraser 1990)?

In this chapter I deploy a comparative case study of the Women's Marches of 2017 in San Antonio, Boston, and Pittsburgh to explore these questions. Through this discussion I demonstrate that in the case where organizers were able to bring together diverse participants and develop a counter space they were able to nurture new intersectional solidarities within their communities. However, I also demonstrate possible challenges for my thesis through a discussion of the relationship between cases where organizers developed inclusive solidarities and the increase in the number of women running for public office. These findings indicate that while the case may hold in Turkey, where left-wing parties may be more inclined to try to build on new intersectional solidarities, in the United States the association I find in Chapter 3 between the presence of the Women's March and more women and women of color running for Mayor may be more closely linked to the successful cultivation of a counter space (or a space where taken for granted assumptions about who has power based on existing hierarchies has been challenged), as opposed to requiring both the development of counter space and the bringing together of diverse participants (as in the Gezi case).

### **Theory: Defining the Cases: Diversity and Counter Space**

I have argued that the “production of space” matters when addressing whether and how social movements are able to develop inclusive or intersectional solidarities (Lefebvre, 1991; Einwohner et al., 2019; Tormos, 2017). In order to develop intersectional solidarities, movements must bring together diverse participants and address the power differences between activists (Einwohner et al., 2019). In the case of Gezi, this was achieved through the symbolic and practical importance of the park: the urgency of protecting the Park appealed to many different social groups within Istanbul, from Kemalists to the LGBT community. The Women’s Marches are different from the Gezi case because their claims are primarily identity-based, which could seem to make solidarity across difference more challenging. Does space play a role even in these more identity-based movements?

#### *Disrupting the Status Quo: Counter Space*

Symbolically, the Women’s Marches aim to remind those in power that women can control public space and have political power. However, each organizing team had their own approach to claiming public space. These differences between the Women’s Marches and Gezi create an opportunity to theorize the distinct pathways involved in the creation of a counter spaces in different contexts. In the previous chapter (Chapter 5), I demonstrated how the spatial structure of the city influenced efforts to develop inclusion within the leadership of the Boston Women’s March. Within this chapter, I use the cases of Boston, Pittsburgh, San Antonio, and Amarillo to elaborate the processes that led to the development of counter publics, or *agonistic spaces*, on the day of the March that included diverse participants and create opportunities for critical deliberation, leading to new inclusive solidarities and new claims for representation.

In order to delineate these processes, it is necessary to first clearly lay out an understanding of what a counter space is and how it can be recognized. Physical space is not value-neutral, and the physical space of the city encourages social relations that support the political status quo, whether this is capitalism or residential segregation (Lefebvre, 1991). The *social* space supports the continuation of a particular ordering of *physical* space (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 349). For example, as discussed in the previous chapters, white residents of historically white protected suburbs support policies and political candidates that maintain residential segregation (Trounstine, 2018). However, there are opportunities to challenge this process opening up new forms of action by developing counter spaces (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 349, pp. 383-385). Such opportunities likely stem

from the lived experiences of urban space which highlight the possibility that another reality is possible, one that is not structured around economic productivity, racism, or sexism (Lefebvre, 1991: 385). For example, a group of skateboarders doing tricks on concrete plaza or the mix of people from all walks of life and diverse racial and ethnic backgrounds enjoying a day at a local Kite festival together.

The body, and body politics, are central to both the reproduction of spatial meanings as well as to their contestation: exploiting the political meaning of the body is an avenue for breaking with taken for granted assumptions about how a space should be used (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 384). The embodied experiences of the city, and how space is open or closed to an individual based on their gender performance, skin-color, class-signifiers, and capacity for movement are shaped by who is valued as a person (Lefebvre, 1991; Young, 2005). When people whose bodies are excluded or punished for taking up physical and public space claim the right to space and public visibility through protest they create a counter space (Lefebvre, 1991; Beltrán, 2009).

While protest itself is the creation of a counter space, protests vary in terms of their ability to disrupt everyday life. For example, even if there is only a small group on the sidewalk holding signs, such as in Midland Texas, this action may modestly disrupt daily life and remind other citizens that there may be new ways of thinking about their social world. However, while protestors on a sidewalk may disrupt the view from the windshield, when protestors step off the sidewalk and into the street impeding the flow of traffic they challenge the taken for granted assumptions about what and whom streets are *for*. Are streets spaces for cars to move people as efficiently as possible or do they belong to the people? To women? One indication of the degree to which a protest developed a more disruptive counter space would be the Women's Marches' ability to take over the streets and disrupt traffic flow. For example, a March that takes over the streets disrupts space more than a March that remained on the sidewalks.

However, such efforts to contest space and the status quo do not go unanswered. Bureaucracy can be a means for the state, and those with political power, to maintain control over who has access to public space, including who is able to organize a protest (Mitchell and Staeheli, 2005). Permitting processes are one way that the state works to manage or control protestors. Depending on the city or state, permitting processes vary and at times require prohibitively high fees in an effort to discourage marches, as in the case of San Antonio's march ordinance (Mitchell and Staeheli, 2005). Beyond permitting, March organizers in Boston also indicated that the city

required the organizers obtain terrorism insurance. Through these processes, the state works to ensure that the protest is not “too disruptive” by bringing itself into the planning process and providing possible limitations on organizers. Therefore, another possible sign for the degree to which counter space has been developed could be the organizers position on permitting and their willingness to adhere to city bureaucracy.

Another possible sign of the relationship between the protest and the state can be seen through the relationship between the protest and political parties. For example, in Gezi, the protestors worked hard to ensure that political parties were not in control of the protest despite welcoming politicians to the park (Onbasi, 2016). These efforts ensured that the protestors were able to set their own agenda, and avoid being coopted by any political parties specific agenda. In this way, their autonomy from political parties enabled the pressure placed on political parties aligned with the movement to address their demands and concerns (see Chapter 2). Protests that are autonomous of political parties, will be more likely to be able to develop a more disruptive counter space.

I use these questions — do the marchers stay on the sidewalk, is the March permitted, and is the protest autonomous of political parties? As criteria to assess the degree to which the Women’s Marches developed more or less disruptive counter spaces. Here it is important to note that I am not claiming that organizers should or should not make decisions around permitting, where they protest, or how to engage with politicians based on these criteria. Instead, I am aiming to develop a set of criteria that will allow me to compare my cases: San Antonio, Boston, and Pittsburgh, and Amarillo on this issue of disruptiveness .

### **Assessing Diversity in the Women’s March**

Just as the development of a counter space is important, so too is the inclusion of diverse participants. Developing intersectional solidarity requires reaching across social groups and building shared goals while taking conscious action to address power imbalances between participants (Einwohner et al., 2019; Tormos, 2017; Herring and Henderson, 2012). However, there are many axes of politically salient difference within the US context, including sexuality, race, disability, ethnicity, religion, immigration status, and gender, making the presence of protest without diversity potentially rare unless the protest is actively promoting exclusionary ideological agendas (ex. Straight Pride, Proud Boys, Charlottesville, etc).

In the case of the Women's Marches, the national March organizers developed a platform that explicitly valued diversity. Yet, as noted by a local organizer in Boston, simply holding a platform is not the same as being able to develop a diverse coalition. Therefore, when assessing whether or not a local March has succeeded in drawing in diverse participants it is necessary to look beyond their platform and assess the evidence of whether or not diverse participants are present within the March. Due to the scale of the Marches, it is not possible to gain information on every participant's identity. Therefore, we must instead look into other forms of evidence of diversity; such as the diversity of the organizing team; the organizations that co-sponsored the event; the protest signs present at the March; if there is a stage show, who is included on the stage; and finally is there evidence that the organizers potentially failed to address critiques from women who experience multiple forms of oppression, such as indigenous or black women. As indicated in the previous chapter, there are cases such as Boston and Pittsburgh where indigenous women, in the former, and Black women, in the latter, critiqued organizers – leading to very different responses from the organizing team in the 2 cities.

As discussed within Chapter 2, I expect that in cases where diverse protestors develop a counter space we will see the development of an *agon*, or a democratic public where protestors can productively challenge each other to address how structural inequalities continue to shape social relations even within protests aimed at addressing these inequalities. Through this contestation and deliberation concerning the need to challenge inequality both within and outside the protest space will facilitate the development of intersectional solidarities within the protest space that have longer term impacts on representation for dispossessed subgroups. For example the challenges posed by trans activists at Gezi to their fellow organizers, enabled the development of increased solidarity between cis and trans Istanbul residents and Asya Elmas's campaign for Mayor of Kadikoy (Chapters 3 and 4). However, while I find evidence to support my claim that inclusive protest is associated with increasing numbers of women running for local office in U.S. cities (Chapter 4), the question still remains as to whether this process occurs in the Women's March. Does the development of a counter space by a diverse group of protestors, or an *agon*, enable the contestation and deliberation necessary for developing inclusive solidarities and therefore create opportunities for women from dispossessed subgroups (such as trans women, lesbian women, and women of color) to run for local office in U.S. cities?

### **Case Selection: San Antonio, Boston, Pittsburgh, and Amarillo**

In order to address whether or not the theoretical causal process identified using the Gezi case can be applied to the Women's March in U.S. cities, I use structured, focused comparison to develop case studies of San Antonio, TX; Boston, MA; Pittsburgh, PA; and Amarillo, TX. These cases were chosen to allow for variation in terms of the degree to which the protestors were able to develop an *agonistic space* (an independent variable), an arena or forum for contestation of inequalities. As discussed previously, the development of an *agonistic space* requires both the disruption of space (the development of a counter space) and a diverse participants within the protest (Chapter 1). As summarized in Table 13, each of my four cases varies in terms of their degree of disruption of public space and their ability to bring together diverse participants. At one extreme, San Antonio represents a case where organizers achieved both a high level of disruption and diversity among their participants, and at the other Pittsburgh represents a case with a low level of disruption and diversity of participants. While Boston was able to bring together diverse participants, the organizers did not achieve a high level of disruption of public space (despite the large crowd), while in contrast in Amarillo organizers were not able to achieve the same levels of diversity but succeeded in achieving a high degree of disruption of public space.

Table 13: Women's March Cases, from protest to the campaign trail

City	Development of Agonistic Space		Deliberation	Evidence of New Inclusive Solidarities	Expected Outcome
	Diversity of Participants	Degree of Spatial Disruption			
San Antonio, TX	High	High	Established norms of deliberation within <i>Mujeres Marcharan</i>	Yes	Increased number of women running for public office, other things being equal
Boston, MA	High	Low	Women of color within the organizing team indicate they must "pick their battles"  Formal deliberation process established with the indigenous community after threat of possible counter protest	No	Less likely to see an increase in the number of women running for public office
Amarillo, TX	Low	High	No evidence	Yes	Less likely to see an increase in the number of women running for public office
Pittsburgh, PA	Low	Low	Rejection by leadership of critiques presented by black women	No	Less likely to see an increase in the number of women running for public office



In order to build these cases, I draw on a wide range of relevant data sources. To build my accounts of the organizing process of each March I draw on a range of sources including interviews with organizers and politicians in Boston, Pittsburgh, and San Antonio; news coverage of the each Women’s March; archives of protest signs in Boston and San Antonio; Women’s March social media; and electoral data from 2016-2018. In order to contextualize these accounts, I use academic and non-academic texts on the history and lived experience of the four cities; archival data on feminist organizations in San Antonio; and relevant census and electoral data. (See Tables 2 and 3 for demographic comparisons and support for republican presidential candidate comparisons).

Table 14: Case City Demographics

City	% African American Residents	% Hispanic Residents	% Foreign Born Residents
Amarillo	6.40%	31.10%	11.20%
Boston	25.40%	19.00%	27.60%
Pittsburgh	24.30%	2.80%	8.50%
San Antonio	7.10%	63.60%	14.20%

Table 15: Percent Presidential for Vote for Trump

City	Majority County	% Presidential Vote for Trump by County
Amarillo	Potter County	68.5%
Boston	Suffolk County	16.3%
Pittsburgh	Allegheny County	39.9 %
San Antonio	Bexar County	40.7%

I structure my cases around questions concerning how the Women’s Marches in terms of the degree to which they disrupted public space, and the degree to which they encouraged diverse participants to become involved in the protest. When discussing the ability degree to which movements disrupt space, I will first address whether the presence of a protest could itself be an example of a high level of disruption. From Table 15, we gain insight into how likely a protest Women’s March on its own is likely to indicate a high disruption of public space. For example, in the Amarillo cases there is a high level of support for President Trump in the 2016 election (68.5%) while in Boston there is a very low level of support for President Trump in the 2016 election (16.3%). Furthermore, Amarillo’s vote for Trump is above the state level of support for Trump in

Texas (52.23%). Therefore, when protestors gather to critique Trump in Boston, this fact alone would not challenge the average Bostonian's understanding of the city as a space where progressive politics is valued. In contrast, in Amarillo the very presence of a protest critiquing conservative politics will challenge the average Amarilloan's understanding of the city as a space where conservative politics is valued. In cases where the presence of protest alone does not indicate a clear break with the political culture of the city, Boston, San Antonio, and Pittsburgh, I interrogate where the March was held; if there were speakers, who was invited to speak; whether the march was permitted, why those decisions were made; and how the organizers engage with the space where they held the protest. For example, did the organizers choose to hold a protest in a particular location because it holds symbolic significance in some way? Why was the route that was followed developed? Likewise, how did the protestors engage with the city when determining the route? For example, do they work with local police departments or do they distance themselves from law enforcement? Similarly, do the organizers take advice from city officials when determining their march location?

When assessing the degree of diversity within the Women's March, it is important to note that in all four Marches there is some evidence of diversity of causes or participants due to the ideological orientation of the Women's March. When assessing the degree to which these four Marches were able to bring together diverse participants, I assess whether there was a diverse organizing team, what issues were raised by protest signs, and whether and how the organizers worked to ensure that they were bringing in diverse participants. The most difficult case to determine and find is the case where organizers succeeded a high degree of disruption of public space, but failed to bring together diverse participants, due to the stated goals of the March. I make the case, that Amarillo, TX can be seen as an tentative example of these cases due to the presence of a March despite the dominance of conservative politics.

### **Comparing Local Marches: San Antonio, Boston, Pittsburgh and Amarillo**

In order to draw comparisons between the four cases in terms of the expected outcomes, from the development of inclusive solidarities to the increasing number of women running for local office, it is necessary to first establish how and why each cases either succeeded or struggled to in develop a high degree of disruption of public space and bring together protestors from diverse backgrounds. In the following four sections, I address each March on its own, presenting the case

for why I have characterized it as having a high or low degree of disruption of public space and having a high or low level of diversity.

### **San Antonio: High Diversity and High Disruption of Public Space**

In the winter of 2017, during their annual planning meetings for the International Women's Day March, organizers within *Mujeres Marcharan* decided that they should not allow Austin to be the only Women's March in central Texas. As organizers noted, despite some misgivings concerning the Women's March, the organizers did not want the voices of women of color in Texas to be erased during this national event and they felt that the Austin Women's March would be organized by white women who would not address their concerns.<sup>12</sup> For this reason they organized their own event which actively centered the voices of women of color. In the end, *Mujeres Marcharan* succeeded. Their protest disrupted the space of the city, through their strategy of rejecting permitting and decision to bring the protestors through the city's West Side highlighting, and they brought together diverse participants by drawing on their existing strengths and educating new activists both before and during the March.

In the case of San Antonio, the simple presence of a protest does not necessarily constitute a high degree of disruption of public space, due to the history of protest in the city, with the annual International Women's Day protests, recent protests on issues such as immigration rights (Bayard, 2006; Barreto et al., 2009; Chacón 2018; Estrada n.d.; Tressler, 2018). This makes it necessary to address how the action engaged with the city's control of space, in terms of permitting, and how the March itself aimed to disrupt public space.

In 2017, San Antonio's parade ordinance was still in effect despite efforts by the International Women's Day March Coordinators and the Free Speech Coalition's efforts to bring an end to the ordinance through the courts with *International Women's Day March Planning Committee et al. vs. City of San Antonio* (2010) in the 5<sup>th</sup> circuit (Wolff, 2009). This ordinance established in 2007, and amended in 2008, requires both protests and processions to cover all expenses over 3,000\$ for expenses such as police protection and the deployment of barricades.

<sup>12</sup> Much of this comes from longstanding dynamics between Austin and San Antonio, as two cities that are close geographically they are often compared and San Antonio tends to get a short shrift in the view of San Antonians. Austin is nationally viewed as a "progressive bastion" but this experience is different depending on residents race as it is highly segregated and gentrification processes have been pushing out people of color.

International Women's Day organizers reported in 2010 that these additional costs for a protest or procession range from an additional 2,000-4,000 dollars to be covered by local organizers (Baugh, 2018; *International Women's Day March Planning Committee et al. vs. City of San Antonio*, 2010). However, the city voluntarily foots the bill for a select number of events (such as the annual MLK March and annual Fiesta events) (Baugh, 2018; Piedad, 2018; *International Women's Day March Planning Committee et al. vs. City of San Antonio*, 2010). Members of *Mujeres Marcharan* note that the city has offered to waive the fees for the International Women's Day Marches, however they have refused to accept the city's offer due to their belief that accepting this fee waiver would support a policy they cannot accept. As a former organizer of the International Women's Day march and member of the Free Speech Coalition noted, the streets belong to everyone and the city's parade ordinance not only limits protest but also traditional church processions. In order to protest the existence of the fees and claim the right to the streets for everyone, the organizers refuse both to pay the fees and to accept a fee waiver.

In order to maintain their official position against the parade ordinance and hold protests, *Mujeres Marcharan* have established policies and practices that enable them to organize their Marches without permitting. To do this, organizers do not share their March route until the day of the event, never speak to the police one on one, and train designated police liaisons to handle the police in the lead up to and on the day of the event.

When organizing the Women's March, the organizers used the same procedure they would for their International Women's Day protests. In the lead up to the event the organizers received a call from a police lieutenant pressuring them to release their route, and they called back as a group to let the police know they would not release the route. For the organizers, this was both an act of protest against the parade ordinance and practical measure to ensure their route would not be blocked by the police on the day of the event. Likewise, the organizers had a prepared statement for participants concerned about permitting addressing why they would not be getting a permit and the history of the parade ordinance.

On the day of the event, the organizers designated a police liaison let the police know what the route would be that day. When determining who will be the police liaison, organizers actively choose the "most privileged organizer" ensuring that the organizer chosen is a citizen and as one

of the organizer's noted in our interview, as an white (or anglo)<sup>13</sup> woman I would likely have been tapped as a police liaison if I had been in San Antonio on the day of the March. By not only refusing a permit, but also engaging with potential participants about why the organizers were choosing to push back against the city's efforts to control protest, the organizers both worked to create a space where participants would challenge the city's control of public space and educate newer participants on why this was necessary.

Beyond the choice to push against the city's parade ordinance, the organizers consciously chose their march route in order to address what they call "points of oppression." This is a standard practice for the collective and is rooted in the decisions made by the founder of the International Women's Day March to address both the local and transnational concerns of women. On the day of the Women's March, the organizers began the March at City Hall and passed the GEO building on their way to the West Side of San Antonio, ending the March at Estela's Mexican Restaurant, a woman owned business. For the organizers this route enabled them to bring attention the GEO's relationship with ICE, as well as address the historic and continued lack of investment in the West Side by the city of San Antonio.

Walking the approximate route in 2019, the route includes examples of how the community on the west side has been underserved by the city as well as examples of historic wins for the community. Estela's the restaurant where the March ended is now gone along with a mural that the organizers of the 2017 Women's March noted was an important cultural monument in the neighborhood. Around the central bus station there is a mix of local non-profits and a clear central hub for many of the population that is unhoused. Milam Park, or Plaza del Zacate as San Antonio activists have tried to rename it, a historic space for Chicano organizing, and contemporary space for protest in San Antonio holds monuments both to Emma Tenayuca a communist Chicana organizer and the anglo colonizer Ben Milam (Ayala, 2011; Tressler 2013). Crossing under I-10, University of Texas San Antonio's Downtown Campus rises up to your left, a reminder of the struggles of activists to address unequal funding for education at the state level. While along

<sup>13</sup> I use anglo because this is the term used often by San Antonians to distinguish when someone is white and not Hispanic. Growing up in San Antonio and Austin, I would also note that I am not only Anglo but also when reaching out I am read as an anglo Austinite (due to my cell phone's area code) which adds another layer due to Austin's (potentially unearned) reputation as the "progressive city" which is interpreted by many San Antonians (myself included) as raced since the city of Austin has been losing its diversity due to gentrification and San Antonio's organizing history has been erased in popular media due to its origins in working class Chicano neighborhoods.

Commerce Street just past the Bexar County Adult Detention Center stands a mural commemorating San Antonio music history, David Blancas' *La Música de San Anto* (Images 15 and 16).



Image 15: *La Música de San Anto* (photo by Kaitlin Kelly-Thompson)



Image 16: *La Música de San Anto* (photo by Kaitlin Kelly-Thompson)

The route chosen highlights the many contradictions within the experience of the city of San Antonio, as the route begins you see both the GEO building which symbolizes contemporary efforts to police the border and the Historic Market Square where San Antonio's Mexican-American history is a source of revenue. Along the route you also see the history of struggle that has worked to improve the position of the city, including the monument to Emma Tenayuca's efforts for unionization and the improvement of her community which led to her temporary exile to California in Plaza del Zacate. By bringing March participants through the West Side, organizers also challenged the anglo participants of the march to see the disparity between the West Side and their own neighborhoods. Likewise, organizers noted that on the day of the March they felt strong solidarity from the neighborhood as residents came out into their lawns to cheer the Marchers on and shared in their chants.

The organizing team for the San Antonio Women's March did not have to actively recruit in order to diversify their leadership team. Due to their historic efforts to diversify their organization after the establishment of the annual International Women's Day Marches in San Antonio by queer Chicana women, in 2017 *Mujeres Marcharan* was already a diverse group, with women from different social positions in terms of immigration, race, ethnicity, disability, and sexuality. In line with the norms established with the founding of the International Women's Day March, organizers invited speakers for before and after the March, the floor is open to womxn, women identified, non-binary, and femmes except for politicians who are not allowed to speak whether in office or running for office. Throughout the process of organizing, the team maintained their commitment to deliberation and consensus in order to ensure that all voices were heard during their decision process. As noted by a lead organizer, this process enables new views to come forward and has helped her as an she put it "understand that not all spaces where she feels comfortable as a brown woman feel comfortable for a black woman" in the past. This use of deliberation as a tool to ensure that diverse views and perspectives are taken into account indicate that the organizing team puts intersectional theory into practice within their decision making process (Townsend-Bell, 2011; Einwohner et al., 2019).

Beyond valuing diversity in their organizing process, the organizers also worked to ensure that their March was as accessible as possible for participants. Similarly, to with the International Women's Day Marches, the organizers ensured that there was translation for both English and Spanish for the speakers. Likewise, the route was planned at under 2 miles, and at the start of the



March all marchers who require assistance with their mobility, walkers, wheelchairs, and strollers, were moved to the front in order to make sure that the slowest marchers were the ones setting the pace. Likewise, in order to assist marchers who may not be able to walk back to the starting point of the March, organizers borrowed a school bus from the Martinez St. Women's Shelter and an organizer's family member with the appropriate license drove marchers from Estela's back downtown San Antonio at the end of the March.

In the case of the San Antonio Women's March, this process bore fruit. Organizers noted that in contrast to their International Women's Day Marches, the Women's March drew in more anglo women than they usually had in attendance of their annual marches. This presented some new opportunities to work through divisions within the city, through the discussion of why the March was not permitted as well as discussions concerning the chants the organizers taught newer activists. Likewise, the signs produced by protestors and deposited in the archives at the University of Texas San Antonio reflect this. With signs produced in both English and Spanish, calling on the state to respect women's rights, addressing local concerns in terms: with signs proclaiming "Mujeres for Choice," "Stop the Neoliberal Attack on Public Goods," "Water is Not a Commodity It's a Human Right!," "Las Calles No Se Callan! Our Streets Will Not be Silenced," and "Muxerista Existe y Resiste" (Activism Signs and Ephemera Collection, 2017). The organizers efforts to address not only diversity but inclusion in their organizing process, as well as their apparent success in gathering a larger and more diverse crowd than their annual International Women's Day march indicates that they succeeded not only in disrupting the space of the city, but bringing together a diverse activists. In short, *Mujeres Marcharan* succeeded in developing an *agonistic space*.

### **Boston: High Diversity and Low Disruption of Public Space**

As discussed in Chapter 5, the Boston Women's March was in many ways shaped by the unequal spatial structure of the city. However, despite the challenges faced by the activists, they were able to develop an inclusive event and bring women from diverse backgrounds into the leadership team. However, despite these successes in terms of the March organizers efforts to create a diverse protest, they were less successful in terms of their disruption of public space, particularly when compared to San Antonio.

In order to understand why I argue that the Boston March did not achieve a high degree of disruption it is important to address the relationship between the March and the city government. In contrast to the San Antonio March, the Boston March organizers decided they would hold a permitted march. Simply gaining a permit is not evidence enough to declare that the Boston Women's March did not achieve a high degree of disruption of public space. Permitting can be evidence of efforts to ensure the March was inclusive to new activists, for example the Atlanta Women's March organizers also chose to obtain a permit in order to ensure they were inclusive for new activists and in the San Antonio case the choice not to obtain a permit was based on resistance against a law that the community views as anti-democratic. In the Boston case, permitting does not hold the same symbolic importance as in San Antonio, and as the organizer who obtained the permit explained it was not prohibitively expensive or difficult for her as a single person to obtain a permit for the March before even the first planning meeting.

Beyond permitting, the Boston Women's March maintained a close relationship with the city during the planning process. When discussing the planning process multiple interviewees would name dropped prominent politicians and their staff, indicating that they had the support of the city throughout the organizing process. One interviewee noted, multiple times, that many of the organizers had networks that included high powered political actors within Massachusetts politics and many had a history of working within the Democratic party at the state and national level. For this organizer these connections indicated the strength of their team. Their connections enabled the leadership team to gain the attention of politicians and get local, state, and national political leaders on their stage. Due to these experiences with politicians, the organizers also were adept at handling both the politicians and their staff. Likewise, due to the elite background of many of the organizers and their networks they were able to fundraise a significant amount. In contrast to San Antonio, they did not struggle to address possible financial hurdles, such as terrorism insurance and paying for porta-potties, when planning their event.

Beyond their differing positions vis-à-vis city government and politicians, starkest differences between the San Antonio and Boston organizers appear when discussing the choices organizers made in terms of public space. Where the San Antonio organizers discussed their rationale for their route, when asked, the Boston organizers agreed that they picked the Common because "that's where you hold a protest" and that is where there was space for the event. One organizer noted that she had even considered Fenway Park but fortunately did not because the park

would not have held the protestors. Part of this speaks to the history of the Common as a space for protest, yet the organizers did not indicate the same degree of engagement with the space of the city as their San Antonio counterparts. When choosing the route, they did not choose to highlight particular injustices or engage with the space itself despite proximity to the Black Heritage Trail in Beacon Hill (Gebhard 1991) and the march just missing the Boston Women's Memorial (City of Boston n.d.). Instead, decisions on the protest route were based on technical calculations such as how long is the route and how many people can fit in the park.

In many ways the space of the March reflected the contradictions of Boston, and Massachusetts, as spaces where progressive politics are palatable as long as they do not go too far against elite interests (Geismer, 2015). Held in a park that has grown from a space for the elite into a space for the people, on the edge of an elite neighborhood, a stage of diverse Bostonians indicated their support for women's rights but did not engage with the history of inequality represented by the space or the continued inequality in the space around them. Therefore, despite symbolically taking up space, the March itself seems to reflect the existing contradictions of Boston without actively pushing against them. In fact, the most disruptive action of the day may have been the lone man in a wheel chair who delayed some of the politicians from entering the stage by holding his own sit in on the ramp to the stage for reasons unknown to the organizers.

The Boston Women's March was more successful in its efforts to bring together diverse participants on the day of the March. Organizers actively worked to create a diverse organizing team (see Chapter 5). While the eventual team was primarily made up of white women, women of color held leadership positions within the team and were able to actively push their fellow organizers to ensure the program for the day reflected the diversity of women in Boston (Chapter 5). When faced with the possibility of a counter march due to the organizers' lack of knowledge concerning the local indigenous community, the organizers successfully developed a plan for deliberation between the organizing team and local tribal leaders in order to address their concerns about the March. Here it is important to note that this process was successful because one of the organizers, a woman of color with experience working with indigenous groups, took the initiative to take the critique seriously and actively reach out to those who critiqued the March in order to address their concerns.

The experience of the day of the March reflects the organizers' efforts to ensure that the event was accessible to diverse participants. In particular, the accessibility team was successful

ensuring the space of the protest was welcoming for those with mobility issues and those who require sign language interpretation. By working to ensure that they had bus parking the March was accessible to elderly participants who stayed on after they finished marching to cheer on their fellow activists. Likewise, the signs produced by the Marchers reflect the diverse perspectives of the organizers, including but not limited to feminism, racial justice, civil rights, wealth inequality, immigration, trans rights, disability justice, and the environment in the 5949 signs collected by Art of the March (2017). Examples of how protestors presented their claims include both signs declaring the marchers concern with a range of issues such as “NO TO: Xenophobia, Queerphobia, Racism, Sexism, Hatred” (Image 17), signs challenging their fellow participants to address the concerns of women from marginalized subgroups such as “Sisters – no – just Cis-TERS” (Image 18), and signs indicating that the marcher claims a gendered position on another issues such as “W2O Women Working for Oceans” (Image 19).



Image 17: NO TO (Art of the March, 2017)




Image 18: Sisters Not Just Cis-Ters! (Art of the March, 2017)



Image 19: W2O Women for Oceans (Art of the March, 2017)

The Boston march may not have been the most disruptive protest on the day of the 2017 Women's March, but it was a space that was welcoming to diverse participants. Importantly, this is a success that should be recognized. As one organizer noted as a woman of color in Boston seeing the crowd that day made her feel less alone and hopeful as the large crowd was full of people who were her potential allies after feeling fearful of her fellow Bostonians after the Trump election.

### **Pittsburgh: Low Diversity and Low Disruption of Public Space**

In terms of the Women's March, the Pittsburgh case is the quintessential case where the tensions between the Marches goals, and the actions of organizers inhibited the organizers ability to bring together diverse participants for the March. The story of how and why the organizers failed to attract a diverse crowd for their March is centered on the organizers failure to respond to critiques presented by black women organizers in Pittsburgh who questioned why the organizing team was originally all white, and why the March was scheduled to conflict with the annual Pittsburgh Racial Justice summit which was always held on the same weekend (see Pittsburgh Racial Justice Summit 2018). This failure, led to the creation of a counter march against the Women's March, entitled Our Feminism Must Be Intersectional Rally, which was led by Black femme queer women and centered Black women. In order to understand both why the Pittsburgh Women's March disrupted public space to a lesser degree and why it failed to attract diverse participants it is necessary to address the contrast between the Pittsburgh Women's March, the Boston Women's March, and the Our Feminism Must Be Intersectional March.

Addressing the failure to bring together diverse participants begins with how the counter march came into being, beginning with the initial moment when Pittsburgh Women's March organizers demonstrated that they would not address the critiques posed by Black women. The story begins with Celeste Smith raising the question "Is this a White Feminism Thing" on the public facebook page for the Pittsburgh Women's March (Young 2017a; 2017b). The original organizing team for the Pittsburgh March had little organizing experience, and was not able to respond to the critiques in a productive way (Young 2017a; 2017b).

Recall that in Boston, organizers intentionally sought out their critics and developed a process of deliberation to address the concerns of the indigenous community: In contrast, in Pittsburgh, the organizers rejected their critics. It is important to note that unlike the Boston March

which included key women of color in leadership positions, the original leadership team for the Pittsburgh Women's March was perceived to be made up of suburban white women. As expected, based on their social and spatial position within the city, these women were less open to the critique presented by Black women (see Chapter 5) (deleted account 2017; Salvadeo 2017). Jess Kimball, the moderator for the facebook page of the Pittsburgh Women's March, responded negatively to the Smith's critique, while another member of the organizing team, Anna Marie Petrarca Gire, recognized that the organizing team was made up of white women (due to the limitations of her own social circle) and invited Smith, and other women of color, to join their organizing team to address these concerns (Salvadeo 2017). In response to the initial rejection of Smith's critique, more women began to question the March's position on addressing in particular the concerns of black and queer women. In response, the moderator for the facebook page began to place restrictions on who could comment, effectively silencing critiques of the March from Black women and queer women critics (Young 2017a; Young 2017b). While the original facebook page where these debates occurred were removed, these debates are well maintained on reddit threads addressing whether or not the Women's March would occur, providing some insight into why this split occurred (kesi 2017). Those supporting the Pittsburgh Women's March, argue for example that the split between the two marches is due to "big egos" (pebbles837 2017), and view the critiques presented by women of color and queer women as examples of "hatred for white women" who they view as well-meaning (jlizard6 2017).

When it became clear that the March was in jeopardy, the organizers of the Pittsburgh Women's March agreed to meet with their critics. Within this meeting on January 13, the activists who would later organize the Our Feminism Must Be Intersectional Rally presented the changes they wanted the Pittsburgh Women's March to make: to diversify the leadership team (particularly bringing in local black activists), and to formally remove Kimbell from the leadership team due to her racist response to Smith and her role in censoring women of color (kesi 2017; Salvadeo 2017). However, the Pittsburgh Women's March organizers refused to make these changes.

For the women who organized the Our Feminism Must be Intersectional March, the Pittsburgh Women's March organizers had demonstrated that they could not and would not create an event that would center the experiences of Black women, queer women, non-binary people, and trans women (Young 2017a; Young 2017b). The fall out from the conflict between these two groups led to significant changes in the Pittsburgh Women's March. The March was temporarily

suspended from its association with the national Women's March. The Pennsylvania Women's March team intervened, taking control of the March, and the team was reorganized with Tracy Baton, an experienced organizer and a Black woman, taking over control of the March's planning from the original organizing team (Deppen 2017; Salvadeo 2017; Young 2017a; Young 2017b). However, by the time these changes were made much of the damage had already been done, and the organizers for Our Feminist Must be Intersectional March planned their own event centering the experiences of Black, trans, non-binary, and queer women identified people (Young 2017a). Likewise, the Our Feminism Must be Intersectional March tied their event to the annual Pittsburgh Racial Justice Summit, ensuring that participants who were interested in attending both events would be able to seamlessly connect to the Summit and potentially bringing new participants to an important annual event aimed at addressing racial justice in Pittsburgh.

In the end, despite efforts to address the issue through leadership change, the Pittsburgh Women's March was limited in its ability to bring together diverse participants due to the presence of a counter march which actively centered Black women, trans women, queer women, and non-binary women identified people and connected to a long standing institution working to address racial justice in Pittsburgh limited the Marches ability to bring together diverse participants.

When planning the March route, organizers for the Pittsburgh Women's March took a similar approach to the Boston Women's March, holding the event downtown. The benefits of this space are the accessibility by public transit, and the possible visibility. However, organizers were not able to achieve a high degree of disruption of space. When suggestions were made to enable the March to engage with the spatial inequality of the city by relocating the March to East Liberty, and connect with the Pittsburgh Racial Justice Summit, they were rejected on the premise that a permit had already been obtained (Salvadeo 2017). This failure to critically disrupt the space of the city is all the more apparent when contrasted with the conscious decision to hold the Our Feminism Must be Intersectional Rally in East Liberty, a neighborhood that is at the center of contemporary gentrification debates, and end at the Pittsburgh Racial Justice Summit. Instead it ends at Market Square, a busy and vibrant meeting space downtown. In this way, the organizers of the Pittsburgh Women's March not only failed to bring a diverse group of participants but they struggled to create a highly disruptive protest.

### **Amarillo: Low Diversity and High Disruption of Public Space**

Within the Women's March cases, there are not many cases where the organizers completely eschewed diversity due in part to the ideological commitments of the March, as led by the National Organizers. Due to this commitment to diversity, it is difficult to find Marches where the organizers were able to achieve a high level of disruption of public space with less diverse participants. However, there are cases where Marches occurred in more homogenous cities and towns, leading to less diverse Marches than for example the diverse Marches in Boston and San Antonio. Furthermore, while many of these marches held in smaller more homogenous towns tended to limit their disruptive potential by for example, calling on their participants to stay on the sidewalks, there are examples of protests disrupting space through the simple act of protest, such as Amarillo, TX. Similar to many of the smaller Marches, in Amarillo the organizers in 2017 appear to be a group of individuals who came together to hold the March. As one organizer noted in her comments to the press, she thought the event would only be two people holding signs but instead it grew to around 500-700 marchers on the day of the event (Martin 2017). With these low expectations, the organizers even noted on their action network page "We will go eat some pancakes afterwards (optional)" (*Women's March-Amarillo, TX* n.d.). The differences between the organizers' expectations and the reality of their protest suggests that they may have achieved a high degree of spatial disruption, or disruption of expectations around who controls public space in Amarillo.

As discussed above, it is difficult to find a case where a protest has a high degree of disruption of public space without diversity within the Women's Marches. In Amarillo diversity was not achieved, partly because of the lack of racial and ethnic diversity within Amarillo. As demonstrated in Table 17, while Amarillo has a high Hispanic population when compared to the United States, the city does not have a high Hispanic population when compared to the state of Texas. Likewise, it has a low African American population and low foreign-born population when compared to the State. In this way, the city itself is quite similar to the state in terms of its demographics. However, this does not mean that the organizers necessarily were intentionally exclusionary, nor did they not take adequate steps to ensure diversity within their participants. Therefore, it is important to address the protests themselves to determine whether or not they succeeded in bringing together diverse participants.



Table 16: Demographics Comparison, Texas

	Amarillo	San Antonio	Texas	United States
% White (Alone, Non-Hispanic)	64.4%	36%	45.2%	63.7%
% African American Residents	6.40%	7.10%	12.5%	12.3%
% Hispanic Residents	31.10%	63.60%	37.7%	16.4%
% Foreign Born Residents	11.20%	14.20%	16.39%	12.91%

As discussed previously, evidence of diverse participants can be found in the presence of support from diverse organizations, the signs produced by the protestors, the diversity within the leadership of the organizing team, and the protestors themselves where possible. On both their action network and facebook pages, the organizers did not note any co-sponsoring organizations. Likewise, their public statements primarily address the importance of non-partisanship, and women’s equality. For example, the Marches Mission and Vision on their action network site is stated as “We stand together in solidarity with our partners and children for the protection of our rights, our safety, our health, and our families – recognizing that our vibrant and diverse communities are the strength of our country” (*Women’s March-Amarillo, TX* n.d.). Likewise, in a media interview, one of the organizers Jen Brooks states that the march is “pro-women, pro-equality for all groups and its pro-communication, pro-dignity, pro-respect, let’s be kind to one another and that’s what this is about” (Smalzel 2017). Furthermore, while this is likely also attributable to local news coverage bias, the only mention of intersecting experiences of oppression comes from one participant interviewed notes that her experience as a lesbian, a mother, and a person of Mexican descent pushed her to the March as she feels personally at risk due to the Trump administration (Smalzel 2017). Within the media coverage of the Women’s March, there is evidence of diversity of symbols employed on signs: Participants hold pride flags, carry signs indicating their support for racial and economic justice, climate change, and against the possible border wall (Martin 2017). Likewise, Marchers carry signs aimed at more universal understandings of women’s rights, such as feminism equals equality (Martin 2017; Smalzel 2017). Overall, this indicates that the dominant message of the Amarillo Women’s March was the need to address women’s rights from a more universal perspective.

Here it is important to note, that there is not evidence of the exclusion of difference within the Women's March in Amarillo. Indeed, there is evidence that individual Marchers did show up for more than a universal approach to women's rights and addressed the way women's rights intersect with issues such as racial justice, economic justice, and climate justice. However, when compared to events in Boston and San Antonio, this March appears to be less diverse. Furthermore, as I will discuss in the following section Amarillo has fewer resources to draw on in terms of a history of organizing when compared to San Antonio, creating barriers for organizers to bring together a diverse organizing team and diverse participants. For these reasons, I use Amarillo as a case where the protestors were able to achieve a high degree of spatial disruption with less diversity, when compared to my other cases.

### **We Marched, Now What?: Evidence of new inclusive solidarities**

Comparing these four cases provides an opportunity to address why I expect that Women's Marches that bring together diverse women and engage in a high degree of disrupting public space will lead to increasing numbers of women in public office. Based on my theoretical account, I expect that protests that bring together diverse participants and are highly disruptive of public space will facilitate deliberation enabling activists to address the power differences between them leading to new inclusive solidarities (Einwohner et al., 2019). The development of these new inclusive solidarities will empower women and provide possible support for women, particularly women from dispossessed subgroups (such as Black women, Latina women, trans women, queer women, and non-binary women) running for local political offices.

In the following section, I compare my cases with regards to the evidence that the Women's Marches in these cities facilitated deliberation to address existing power inequalities within the movement, the evidence that new inclusive solidarities were formed, and assess whether we see the expected outcomes in terms of increases in the number of women running for public office. I find evidence that complicates my proposed causal story concerning the connection between protest and increased number of women candidates for local office. For example, in the San Antonio cases there is evidence that the U.S. immigration law potentially dampens the effects of protest on increasing representation, particularly for immigrant and undocumented women. Likewise, the San Antonio case demonstrates the importance of distinguishing between women running for office and feminists running for office (Dovi, 2002). While the Boston case

demonstrates the continued importance of treating the theoretical interventions made within this dissertation as supplementary to established work demonstrating the importance of role models for women running for office.

### **More Than a Platform: Bringing together Diverse Participants**

When addressing diversity in the Women's March, the first piece of evidence is National March's platform and policy platform calling for everything from equal pay to public funding for abortion, while paying homage to previous movements including, the civil rights movement, Black Lives Matter, the American Indian Movement, and the feminist movement (Cauterucci, 2017; Women's March on Washington, 2017). However, as evidenced by the Pittsburgh case, the national organizers efforts to ensure inclusion across movements did not necessarily mean the local Women's Marches were inclusive. As articulated by an organizer of the Our Feminism Must be Intersectional March, Sueño Del Mar, their counter event recognized the need for an event that "not only welcomes people of varying intersections verbally, but takes actions to make space for people from those various intersections" (Young 2017a).

Within the cases where organizers succeeded to bring together diverse participants, Boston and San Antonio, we see two different approaches to ensuring that the organizers were not only verbally welcoming but actively making space for a diverse group of women through the Women's March. In San Antonio, organizers were able to bring together a diverse group of women by ensuring that their March by building on their organizations continued commitment to a deliberative decision-making model that ensures that all women not only are able to speak, but also be heard, grounded in a commitment to putting intersectional theory into practice (Townsend-Bell, 2011). In Boston, organizers engaged in a formal deliberation process with the indigenous community after it became clear that they did not fully understand the concerns and needs of the indigenous community in Boston (Einwohner et al., 2019). These two different approaches indicate the benefits of valuing existing organizing institutions led by women of color, and the importance of deliberative processes in developing inclusive solidarities (Einwohner et al., 2019).

In San Antonio, organizers were able to build on a history of organizing by drawing on organizers with a history of involvement with the International Women's Day protests. It is important to note, that this history is grounded in a model of organizing that explicitly centers the experiences of queer Chicana and Tejana women in San Antonio. The original International

Women's Day March in 1985, was held in Plaza del Zacate and included prominent San Antonio labor organizer Emma Tenayuca in one of her last speaking engagements. For the original organizer, the International Women's Day March in San Antonio and the Esperanza Peach and Justice Center were and are spaces that center women and women's ways of organizing, centering process, deliberation, consensus-building, and as opposed to hierarchical leadership structures. In the lead up to the International Women's Day march, organizers would discuss their local, national, and international context. Through this discussion they would identify key issues and develop a yearly theme, from this theme they would determine a list of speakers. As the March grew, the organizers recognized that their original group was originally all Latina Women and they worked to bring in more Black and white women.

The organizers for the 2017 women's march and for the contemporary International Women's Day Marches in San Antonio are not synonymous with this original team but the practices and orientations live on. When discussing the process of organizing the 2017 Women's March and the International Women's Day Marches, one of the lead organizers noted that they continue to work through their process in the same style as described by the original organizer in order to ensure that their process includes the concerns of all women particularly women who exist at varying intersections. When addressing how the organizers approach inclusion within their planning process, the organizers noted the importance of intersectionality in terms of the need to center the experiences of marginalized women in order to push for social justice citing key texts such as *A Bridge Called My Back* as guiding their approach to deliberative decision-making.

In this way, *Mujeres Marcharan* ground their work in intersectional praxis (Townsend-Bell 2011). Substantively, for the women working as organizers this means continuing to learn, as one organizer noted it is on her to take action to change her behavior when critiqued by women from different social positions in order to develop a more welcoming space. In practice, this grounding in intersectional approaches to organizing influenced both how the organizers work and how they engaged with me as a researcher. As one organizer noted in our interview, she hoped that her voice would not be the only one heard within this dissertation as she felt her position as a middle class straight woman of color should not be the story centered in the discussion of the organization but she recognized that some of her co-organizers may be more hesitant to speak with me, an anglo academic. Likewise, as noted by the original organizer of the San Antonio International Women's Day March, centering the experiences of women of color does not mean excluding white (anglo)

organizers. Historically, the San Antonio International Women's Day March has had ties with white progressive institutions in San Antonio, which have connected white activists to the organization, as well as, in some cases such as the Circle School, provided space for organizers to make signs. However, white activists' voices are not centered, and white activists may be called on to use their whiteness to protect their fellow organizers, by for example being police liaisons on the day of a March.

In contrast, the organizers in Boston did not have access to the same established inclusive norms of deliberation developed over 20 years of women's organizing when planning the Boston Women's March. Instead, organizers started from scratch with a group that was primarily drawn from the networks of women who had previous experience working within the Democratic Party, whether on campaigns or working with the Democratic National Convention. As multiple organizers noted in interviews, the team was predominately made up of white upper middle-class women from the suburbs. Likewise, as noted by many of the women of color on the organizing team, most of the women of color within the team were likewise upper middle class or upwardly mobile with post-graduate degrees from elite institutions. As discussed in the previous chapter, these women's backgrounds presented challenges when they tried to reach out and engage with local organizations in Boston.

In contrast to San Antonio, the Boston organizers planning process was more hierarchical leading to less internal deliberation. As discussed in the previous chapter, due to the more hierarchical approach to decision-making, women of color within the leadership team chose to pick their battles. One of these battles, was over who would MC the event. Women of color on the organizing team critiqued the organizing team when the team wanted to recruit a well-known white man to be the "voice of god" or MC of the event. In response to the critique, and the presentation of a preferable alternative MC, Mariama White-Hammond, the organizers were able to ensure that the face of the March was not a white man. Likewise, this hierarchical approach and lack of experience with deliberation created tensions between the Women's March organizers and the local organizing community during their meeting in Jamaica Plain.

When faced with the possibility of a counter march by the Boston Indigenous Community and their allies, the Boston Women's March organizers established a formal deliberation process in order to address their concerns. In contrast to the Pittsburgh Women's March, in Boston organizers took this opportunity to reach out to the Boston indigenous Community by first showing

support for local efforts to support the Standing Rock Protests and then developing a formal deliberation process relying on established institutions such as the Commission on Indian Affairs, in order to ensure that they were able to prevent a counter march and ensure they were properly addressing the concerns of the Boston indigenous community. Through this process, the organizers ensured the March was not protested, but did not necessarily succeed in developing more inclusive solidarities in the long run.

These two approaches to developing inclusion through deliberation led to different results in terms of the presence of inclusive solidarity after the March was over. When discussing the aftermath of the Women's March, organizers in Boston and San Antonio both indicated that they experienced and saw their communities crossing established boundaries within the organizing community. In the San Antonio case, the Women's March was much larger than their annual International Women's Day Marches, and in particular more anglo women were present at the March. As a result of this increased attendance at the Women's March, *Mujeres Marcharan* also saw an increase in attendance for their 2017 International Women's Day March. While in Boston, one organizer noted that due to her involvement in the Women's March she found that other groups were more likely to reach out to her to become involved in events such as the 2017 Climate March. However, the results of these solidarities differ in the long term.

In San Antonio the Women's March provided an opportunity to re-vitalize the conflict with the city over the march ordinance (leading to its reform in 2018) (Baugh 2018). In interviews with the press, organizers for the free speech coalition pointed to the San Antonio Women's March in contrast to Marches in other large cities, noting that if the March had been permitted it would have cost organizers 7,000\$ to 10,000\$ an exorbitant fee for grassroots organizers (Garcia 2017). Here it is important to note, that the March itself did not develop the relationships necessary to bring the free speech coalition together, but the event provided support for their continued efforts to address this problem *because* the organizers both rejected the city's control over the streets and educated their participants about the parade ordinance.

In Boston, the organizers struggled to build upon their success while developing a new organization. However, in the process of building their new group, the organizers had to face the fact that their existing relationships were premised around the March. Through the process of developing a board and once the group was established, multiple organizers noted that they dropped out from the group. As one organizer noted, during the development of the board she felt

particularly alienated because while she was presenting possible board members with ties to the organizing community the other members were focused on finding women from similarly elite backgrounds. In particular she noted how the room would respond to Ivy league credentials, as opposed to a possible board member organizing credentials. While for another organizer, he felt that continuing to work with the established organization when planning youth protest and events was frustrating due to their more top down approach to young organizers. As one organizer noted from her position, her experience within this team led her to ensure that in the future she would work with groups that are more similar to *Mujeres Marcharan*, noting that she prefers to work in groups that are led by women of color. So, while in the moment, the Boston organizers were able to develop new solidarities in support of the Women's March without a central event these solidarities crumbled.

My proposed explanation for the differences between San Antonio and Boston in terms of their ability to develop longer lasting inclusive solidarities, is the different approaches each group took vis-à-vis public space. Boston organizers chose their protest location based on technical concerns and the suggestions of their allies in city government. In contrast, San Antonio Women's March, used their protest route to challenge the cities parade ordinance and to educate their fellow protestors about "points of oppression" within San Antonio highlighting, for example, the issue of ICE's detention of migrants as a feminist issue and the inequitable distribution of public goods within the city by bringing white suburban activists through the West Side. By connecting these issues, and also opening up lines of communication with potential activists through the dissemination of information about San Antonio's parade ordinance when asked about permitting for the event, the San Antonio Women's march organizers laid the foundation for new solidarities in the fight to remove or reform San Antonio's parade ordinance.

### **Diversity and Disruption of Public Space: Is one enough?**

The differences between the San Antonio and Boston cases provide support for my claim that in order to create new inclusive solidarities protests must bring together diverse participants and engage in a high degree of disruption of public space. However, these findings are complicated by the Amarillo Texas Case. While I expect the presence of diverse participants is important and necessary in order to develop new inclusive solidarities. The potentially less diverse Amarillo case may demonstrate that sometimes the disruption of public space may be more important for longer

term organizing. As discussed previously, the Amarillo March route includes Ellwood Park which has within it a monument to the Confederacy, a statue of William A. Miller which was placed there in 1931 by the Daughters of the Confederacy (Egel 2017; Indivisible Amarillo 2017; Lester 2017). In Summer 2017, I find evidence of new inclusive solidarities in the conflicts between Indivisible Amarillo and the Amarillo Freedom Riders over whether or not this monument should be removed from Ellwood Park.

After the events in Charlottesville, organizers in Amarillo, Texas joined the efforts to remove confederate monuments (Barajas 2017). The conflict over the statue begins with a petition to remove the monument to William A. Miller, by Indivisible Amarillo, the same organization that would take over the Amarillo Women's March in 2018 (Egel 2017; Indivisible Amarillo 2017; Lester 2017). Within their petition, Indivisible Amarillo states:

“The monument to Confederate soldiers in Ellwood park was erected in 1931 at the height of Jim Crowe and decades after the Civil War. With hate crimes and white nationalism on the rise it is important that we, as a city, take symbolic steps toward the unification of citizens and the denouncement of white supremacy. Amarilloans of color should not be asked to find shade and leisure in a park which contains a monument to those who fought for their continued enslavement. Such monuments belong in museums and textbooks where their lessons can be learned in the proper context, not glorified in our most publicly shared spaces” (Indivisible Amarillo, 2017).

This petition leads to a counter petition by the oddly named Amarillo Freedom Riders in support of maintaining the confederate monument (Egel, 2017; Lester, 2017). Likewise, the supporters of the confederate monument hold their own protest in support of the monument (Lester 2017). The efforts to remove the statue, culminated in a tense city council meeting where members of the NAACP and Indivisible Amarillo argued for the removal of the statue from the park (Egel 2017).

The case of Amarillo indicates that even in fairly homogenous and conservative communities the act of protesting against the dominant culture may open opportunities for continued efforts to push for inclusion of the marginalized. Unlike the link between San Antonio the Women's March and the reform of the parade ordinance, the link between the Women's March and the petition to remove the confederate monument is more tenuous. It is clear that Jerri Glover, who launched the campaign to remove the confederate monument was in attendance at the Women's March (Barajas 2017; Martin 2017). Glover is also a member of the Indivisible Steering committee, the Potter-Randal Democratic Club, and the NAACP (Warren 2018). Taking this into account, it is also important to note that Women's March exceeded all expectations, and in the



immediate aftermath the event page became a space where activists shared information about organizations to get involved with (such as the new Indivisible Amarillo) and about upcoming political events (from candidate forums to events in support of Standing Rock) (Coffee n.d.). This indicates, that the Women's March potentially enabled the development of a counter public within Amarillo, where citizens were able to find peers with similar interests concerning making a more inclusive city. In this way holding a protest potentially emboldened and connected those who may have previously felt isolated in a conservative city, creating the foundation for future actions to openly challenge the white supremacist monument in their public space despite a well-organized opposition.

When developing new solidarities, I believe these cases demonstrate that while diversity is important, we must address both how diversity is addressed and the degree to which protests disrupt public space. In cases such as San Antonio, where women from dispossessed subgroups were centered, the organizers were more adept at using the support they got for the Women's March to fuel continued struggles to re-open the public space after a March ordinance that was established to limit protest after the May Day Immigration Protests of 2006 (Bayard, 2006). Where in Boston organizers succeeded in bringing together diverse groups, these efforts did not appear to culminate in continued efforts to address inclusion. Instead, within the group itself, in the long term the need to critically engage with the organizers own elite status led to fracturing and difficulties ensuring the longevity of the organization. However, there is some evidence that the disruption of public space on its own may be able to create a foundation for new inclusive solidarities to come into shape. In cases, such as Amarillo, the March also potentially opened up new opportunities to challenge the dominant culture by demonstrating that there are people in Amarillo who are willing to show up, enabling the development of new political organizations and strengthening old ones enabling future action (such as the petition to remove the confederate monument).

### **From new solidarities to public office?**

My second expectation is that in cities where the activists successfully created an *agonistic space* by bringing together diverse participants and engaging in a high degree of disruption of public space, we should see increases in the number of women and women of color running for local office. My findings indicate that the story may be more complicated than I originally expected.

In order to discuss how and why this expectation has been complicated and what that means for my theory, I will first discuss the following tables summarizing changes in the number of women and women of color running for local office in Amarillo, Boston, Pittsburgh, and San Antonio and contextualize these tables with my previous finding that the presence of a Women's March is associated with more women and women of color running for office (Chapter 3). Following this discussion, I address some of the reasons why in the context of San Antonio, we find organizers from the women's march joining local government committees as opposed to running for office. I close by discussing the continued salience of women not only as descriptive representatives but preferable descriptive representatives (Dovi, 2002).

Beginning with Tables 18-21 provide a truncated view of the relationship between women running for local political office but provide an important starting point for better understanding why, how, and when protest can contribute to candidate emergence. As demonstrated, in the case of Pittsburgh where organizers did not engage in a high degree of disruption of public space or bring together diverse participants through the Women's March we see what we expect based on my theory, no increase in the number of women or women of color running for Mayor or city council. Instead, in all cases where there is a change we see decreases in the number of women and women of color running for Mayor and City Council. However, in the cases of Boston, San Antonio, and Amarillo we see patterns that do not fit my expectations in terms of the need to have both diversity and a high degree of disruption of public space, as each case succeeds in developing one of these characteristics and each case sees an increasing number of women running for city council. In order to better understand why we see these deviations from the expected pattern, I will first discuss these three cases with respect to the number of women and women of color running for Mayor.

Table 17: Women Running for Mayor

	<b>Number of Women Running for Mayor in Previous Election</b>	<b>Number of Women Running for Mayor in 2017 Election</b>
Amarillo	0	2
Boston	1	0
Pittsburgh	1	0
San Antonio	4	2

Table 18: Women of Color Running for Mayor

	<b>Number of Women of Color<sup>14</sup> Running for Mayor in Previous Election</b>	<b>Number of Women or Color Running for Mayor in 2017 Election</b>
Amarillo	0	0
Boston	1	0
Pittsburgh	0	0
San Antonio	2	1

Despite the expectation that protests which brought together diverse participants and achieve a high level of disruption of public space would lead to increases in the number of women and women of color running for local office, in the case of San Antonio's mayoral election we see the opposite pattern. The number of women running decreases from four women running for Mayor in the 2015 municipal election to two women running for Mayor in the 2017 municipal elections. Likewise, when looking that the number of women of color running for Mayor we see a similar pattern, with two women running in 2015, incumbent Ivy Taylor and State Senator Leticia Van De Putte, and one woman, incumbent Ivy Taylor, running in 2017. Likewise, in Boston we see a similar pattern, with one woman of color running for Mayor in 2013, Charlotte Golar Richie, and no women running in 2017. In contrast, in Amarillo we see an increase in the number of women candidates with two women running in 2017, and one of those women, Ginger Nelson winning the race. When addressing these three cases together they demonstrate evidence for one of the key limitations of this theory, incumbency.

In Amarillo in 2017, the space for a new Mayor was relatively open as the previous Mayor, Paul Harpole, was not running after holding the seat since 2011. Likewise, in the 2013 Boston election and 2015 San Antonio election, there was potentially more room for new candidates to enter the field. In Boston, incumbent Thomas Menino did not run for re-election, while in San Antonio, incumbent Ivy Taylor was appointed to the position of Mayor when former Mayor Julian Castro joined the Obama Administration. In 2017 in both Boston and San Antonio possible mayoral candidates were faced with incumbents, Ivy Taylor and Marty Walsh respectively.

As discussed in Chapter 3, the presence of a Women's March is associated with an increased number of women and women of color running for mayor, yet it the evidence from the San Antonio, Amarillo, and Boston cases indicate that in cases where there was a Women's March

<sup>14</sup> See Chapter 3, women are coded as women of color if there is evidence of them actively claiming that identity. For example, Leticia Van De Putte actively claims her Tejana identity (Tressler 2013).

we may be more likely to see that effect in cases where an incumbent Mayor is not running in 2017. Likewise, these cases demonstrate that the degree to which the protests disrupted public space may be more important than the combination of a high degree of disruption of public space and diverse participants.

Table 19: Women Running for City Council

	<b>Number of Women Running for City Council in Previous Election</b>	<b>Number of Women Running for City Council in 2017 Election</b>
Amarillo	3	3
Boston	5	14
Pittsburgh	6	2
San Antonio	7	18

Table 20: Women of Color Running for City Council

	<b>Number of Women of Color Running for City Council in Previous Election</b>	<b>Number of Women of Color Running for City Council in 2017 Election</b>
Amarillo	0	1
Boston	4	9
Pittsburgh	3	0
San Antonio	6	12

When addressing the number of women running for city council, we see a different pattern. Where in Amarillo the number of women running for city council remains stable and the number of women of color running for city council increases, in Boston and San Antonio we see large increases in the number of women and women of color running for city council. In the case of Amarillo, the one woman of color running for a city council seat, Freda Powell, was the first Black woman to win a council seat in Amarillo (Carr 2018). Based on the theory, we would expect these increases to primarily be happening in San Antonio, yet we are also seeing these increases in Boston. So, the question is why? The answer comes from thinking about the theory presented on how and why protest can lead to increasing women's representation, as a supplement to existing work on women's representation.

In contrast to Amarillo, both Boston and San Antonio have histories of women of color holding city council seats. In Boston, now Representative Ayanna Pressley became the first black

woman to hold a council seat in 2010. However, she was not the first black woman to run for a council seat as Althea Garrison has previously run for city council, mayor, and state representative. Likewise, in San Antonio, Maria Berriozábal became the first Latina city councilor in 1981 (Davis 2015). Berriozábal was not the first or only Latina woman to run for city council, likewise noted organizers with the Raza Unida Party, Rosie Castro and Gloria Cabrerra ran for city council in 1971 under the slate of candidates associated with the Committee for Barrio Betterment (Rosales 2000). Therefore, unlike the case of Amarillo, both cities have a history of women not only running for office but winning their seats indicating that there are possible role models for women in local politics present.

However, despite the clear importance of the role model effect in place, it is also clear that these the number of women and women of color approximately doubles between 2015 and 2017. In the Boston city council election of 2011 four women ran for city council, and in the election of 2013 twelve women ran for city council. Indicating that while about twice as many woman ran in 2017 when compared to 2015 this may be part of a general shift towards more women running that is not necessarily stable year to year. In contrast, in San Antonio in 2013 seven women ran for city council, and in 2011 eleven women ran for city council. This indicates a possible stable trend before 2017, with a sharp increase in the number of women running in 2017. Indicating that for San Antonio, the Women's March may have indeed increased the number of women running for public office while in the case of Boston there is less evidence for this. Importantly, Boston has struggled for much longer than San Antonio to get women of color on the city council, in 2010 Rep. Pressley became the first Black woman on council, in 2014 Michelle Wu became the first Asian-American Woman on Council (and later the first woman of color to serve as the council president) (Allen 2019), and in 2020 Julia Mejia became the first Afro-Latina on council (Ebbert 2020). Mejia herself has been quoted in multiple publications both before and after her election crediting Representative Pressley's 2018 election to Congress as an inspiration for her candidacy (Markos 2018).

These findings from Amarillo, Boston, and San Antonio indicate that if there is a March effect we should expect that it will be more pronounced in cases where there is either a long history of women running for office or in cases such as Amarillo where not many women run for office. In cases such as Boston where the role-model effect is potentially still playing a role due to the

recent increases in particularly women of color running for office we should expect less effect from the presence of a March.

Based on my theory and my previous work on Gezi, I expect that cases such as San Antonio where activists succeed in achieving a high level of disruption of public space and in bringing together diverse participants we should see participants running for local office. There is evidence that this did occur in San Antonio City Council races. Furthermore, in Pittsburgh where organizers failed to bring together diverse participants and disrupt public space, I find evidence of decreasing numbers of women and women of color running for local office. Beyond the role of protest in creating increased space for women to run for local office, I also find evidence that organizers involved in the San Antonio Women's March built on their experiences to improve their representation through local boards and committees.

In San Antonio in 2017, Ivy Taylor was not re-elected and was replaced by Ron Nirenberg in a run-off election. While the change could be seen as a potential blow for Black women's representation in the state of Texas, for the activists involved in developing the San Antonio Women's March Taylor's loss was viewed a positive step within San Antonio politics. As the organizers indicated, originally, they had planned on calling their March "From Taylor to Trump: SA Women's March Against Hate" and eventually backed down from the name after the name began to get more attention due to Ivy Taylor's gender (Chasnoff 2017). For the organizers of the March, Ivy Taylor's policy positions in local politics reflect the national positions of President Trump. For instance, her refusal to reject the State of Texas's attempts to prevent cities from becoming sanctuary cities (Guenther 2017), her position that the non-discrimination ordinance for LGBT San Antonians was "inconvenient political correctness" (Baugh 2015; Sanchez 2015), and her comments that poverty is a result of godlessness (Zorthian 2017). For the organizers involved in putting together the San Antonio Women's March, simply being a descriptive representative is not enough, and for them Taylor failed to address the concerns of San Antononian women, particularly queer and immigrant women. Furthermore, she indicated time and time again with her relationship with the LGBT community that she was not willing to work with dispossessed sub-groups within her community or the San Antonio community (Dovi, 2002).

The election of Nirenburg created new opportunities to work with the city government. As one of the key organizers noted that after the change in local administration, they decided to move from a position that was focused on pressuring the local government from the outside into working

within the city government. To do this they applied for Mayor Nirenburg's LGBTQ+ Advisory Committee, which was established in order to develop policy proposals for the Mayor on issues of concern for the LGBTQ+ community in San Antonio (Dimmick, 2018). For the organizer interviewed, it was important for them to join the committee because they knew that there would likely not be many applicants who had experience being undocumented or who embodied what they called "radical bodies." After being selected to join the committee through the blind review process with over 100 applicants, this organizer is "loud and intentional about taking space as a queer, non-binary, fat person" within the committee and works to ensure that their radical perspective is included in the policy process. Therefore, while this organizer may not have made the direct jump from holding protests to running for office, they did take action to claim space within local government.

Beyond the other avenues that activists can take to claim space within local governments, it is important to note, that in the San Antonio case those who experience a lack of representation are more likely to be undocumented or formerly undocumented, including many of the organizers for the 2017 Women's March. This potentially dampens the positive effects of protest on efforts to improve representation by running for local office, leading organizers to find other ways to ensure their representation particularly through continued work with social movements.

Overall, the cases demonstrate the messy relationship between movements and formal representation. There is preliminary evidence, that protest that has a high level of disruption of public space potentially creates political openings in Amarillo and San Antonio, not just for women running for local office but for organizers leveraging their position to join the policy making process from within government. Likewise, there is evidence that the presence of new women representatives such as Ayanna Pressley as role models are, as expected by the current literature (Gilardi, 2015), a powerful force for encouraging women to run for office.

### **Concluding: Counter Space Alone? Why Diverse Participants are Normatively Preferable.**

Theoretically, I argue that Women's Marches that create *agonistic space*, by achieve a high level of disruption of public space and bringing together diverse participants, enable the development of new inclusive solidarities and encourage an increased number of women and women of color candidates for local office. Through my four cases, I further flesh out this causal story. As expected, in the case of Pittsburgh, where neither diversity or a high degree of disruption

of public space is achieved, we find neither inclusive solidarities nor increases in representation. In contrast, in cases such as Amarillo and San Antonio, where organizers successfully achieve a high level of disruption of public space, we have evidence of long lasting inclusive solidarities and increased claims for representation by women and women of color running for office and joining advisory councils, despite differing degrees to which these Marches were able to bring together diverse participants. While in the case of Boston, the presence of diverse participants without the achievement of inclusion within the organizing team and the lower level of disruption of public space led to more tenuous post-March solidarities and the role-model effect of City Councilor and now Representative Ayanna Pressley, makes it difficult to parse the effects of the Women's March on women's representation.

The important impact of protest is to disrupt public space. It is in cases where activists achieve a high degree of disruption that we seem to gain the new solidarities and see the effects on representation. However, I would argue that disrupting space alone is not sufficient for ensuring that those new solidarities are inclusive or that those from marginalized subgroups are encouraged to claim representation (either through continued movement activity or moving into formal government). As discussed previously, Amarillo was chosen because it is located in a republican bastion, and was less likely to succeed in bringing together diverse participants. Yet even so, the Marchers did support a wide array of causes and organizers went on to work with the NAACP when working on their campaign against local confederate monuments. The ideological position of the protest matters when assessing whether or not a protest will empower inclusive solidarities and increased representation by those at the intersections for those at the intersections.

The disruption of public space does not necessarily have to be linked to progressive politics. In fact, right wing organizers also consciously disrupt space and make strategic choices about how they are going to use that space, as in the cases of Charlottesville and Boston's Straight Pride. However, the solidarities built within these spaces are necessarily exclusionary based on the ideology of white supremacy, patriarchy, and heteronormativity. Such exclusionary identities are far more troublesome for progressive movements.

This work suggests rich directions for future research. The history of the International Women's Day March and the Esperanza Peace and Justice Center as a center for organizing played a significant role in ensuring the diversity of the Women's March in San Antonio due to their established inclusive norms and relationships with San Antonio institutions. The comparison



between San Antonio and Boston, particular with regard to their differing outcomes in terms of the development of inclusive solidarities, raising questions concerning how a history of organizing within a city supports intersectional organizing, but also shows (especially in contrast with Pittsburgh) how organizers can learn and at least partially overcome such issues. Likewise, the concerns about whether or not a woman representative was a preferable descriptive representative (Dovi, 2002) voiced by organizers in San Antonio indicate the continued importance of social movements as a pathway towards improved substantive representation for marginalized communities (Weldon, 2012).

## **CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION: A PATH FOR FUTURE RESEARCH ON FEMINIST MOVEMENTS, REPRESENTATION, AND SPATIAL POLITICS**

Through this dissertation I have demonstrated how the spatial structure of the city shapes movements' ability to develop solidarity across difference and achieve greater inclusion, and how these movements can open up new opportunities for the representation of women in local government. My findings hold both theoretical and practical lessons for those interested in spatial politics, democracy and social movements, illuminating new pathways to deeper democracy and greater inclusion (Hammond 2013; Hoskyns 2014; Ingram 2015; Puwar 2014; Rai 2014). By highlighting the importance of the spaces where deliberation occurs, this study contributes to our understanding of how to develop more inclusive movements and the long term effects these movements have on local democracy (Beckwith 2000; Weldon, 2006; Tormos, 2017). Furthermore, by demonstrating a link between protest and increases in the number of women running for local office, I contribute to our understanding of the role of social movements in deepening democratic governance (Dryzek, 2010; Mansbridge, 1999; Young, 2000; Wain and Lien, 2017; Weldon, 2002).

Through the Gezi park case, I develop a theoretical account for how the spatial structure of the city and protestors engagement with the space enabled the development of longer lasting inclusive solidarities, and supporting the emergence of candidates, such as Asya Elmas the first trans woman to run for local office in Istanbul. In chapter 1, I demonstrate how the development of *agonistic space* through the disruption of public space by a diverse group of activists enabled the development of inclusive solidarities. In chapter 2, I show how the Gezi protests strengthened the Turkish LGBT movement, empowered activists such as Elmas, and created pressure on Turkish Political parties (both the HDP and CHP) to run and support LGBT candidates. In order to determine whether or not this theoretical account can be generalized outside of the Turkish context, I apply my theory to U.S. Women's Marches using both quantitative statistical analyses and qualitative case studies.

Through my study of the Women's March, I demonstrate that the theory I develop offers insight beyond the Turkish case, both quantitatively and qualitatively. In chapter 3, using an original dataset, I find that the presence of a Women's March is associated with increases in the number of women and women of color running for Mayor and City Council in local elections held

after the 2017 Marches. Likewise, I find in chapter 4, that the spatial structure of the city is associated with inclusion within the Women's March, in terms of presence of women from diverse backgrounds within the leadership teams of these protests and increasing diversity in terms of the Marches platforms. Using established case-study techniques of process-tracing and structured, focused comparison, I then develop case studies of Boston, San Antonio, Pittsburgh, and Amarillo (chapters 5 and 6) to assess whether the same processes can account for the associations I find in my quantitative analyses. Through these cases, I find support for my claim that the spatial structure of the city matters. In Chapter 5, I find that struggles to develop inclusion within the Boston case can be explained partially by the decision to hold the first in-person planning meeting in a white protected suburb and the limitations of white suburban women's social networks. Likewise, in Chapter 6, I find that Marches that engage in a high level of spatial disruption (San Antonio and Amarillo), were more successful than cities with lower levels of spatial disruption (Boston) in developing inclusive solidarities. Likewise, I find that all three of these cases (San Antonio, Amarillo, and Boston) are more successful in developing solidarities and opening space for women within local politics than the exclusionary Pittsburgh Women's March.

Beyond the cases addressed within my dissertation, there is evidence that my theoretical account may be useful beyond local elections. For example, in Miami, two women involved in the Women's March, Stephanie Myers and Emma Collum, run for Florida House District 93. Likewise, women candidates for Congress, such as Kathy Ellis a 2020 candidate in Missouri, continue to credit their experiences with the Women's Marches. These cases indicate that there should be continued research into the role of the Women's March in emergence of women candidates, that by limiting this analysis only to local elections we may be missing the full effects of the March. Indeed, some observers suggested that the Women's March was one reason for the record number of women running for Congress in 2018.

### **Limitations and Avenues for Future Research**

My case studies provide support for my theoretical argument for addressing both the spatial structure of the city and the degree to which protestors disrupt public space. However, they also indicate the limitations of this theory and suggest new areas for research. In the Boston case, it is clear that while the organizers social and spatial positions potentially limited their ability to build a diverse organizing team initially their commitment to diversity ensured that organizers actively

sought out ways to diversify their team: from encouraging women of color to recruit women within their own networks to drafting a woman when she asked questions concerning accessibility they had not thought to address yet. Furthermore, the women of color within the Boston organizing team played a key role responding to critiques from the Boston indigenous community, and in advocating for ensuring that the stage show reflected their ideological commitment to centering women, particularly women of color. Similarly, the Boston case demonstrates that role models matter a great deal in local politics (Gilardi, 2015), with Ayanna Pressley's continued political rise inspiring more women of color to seek local office. Furthermore, the San Antonio case demonstrates that while protest may be a pathway towards increased engagement with formal local politics, this can take the shape of seeing to join committees and boards as opposed to running for local office.

My findings indicate that it may be fruitful to use these cases to address a range of new and old questions on the relationship between social movement organizing, representation, and policy change. For example, Asya Elmas does not only run for local office she also is a founding member in establishing Hevi LGBT, an organization that centers the experiences of Kurdish members of the LGBT movement that comes out of the networking between gay, lesbian, and trans Kurds during the Gezi park protest. Her position both as a possible representative and as an organizer raises the question: are representatives with a history of social movement organizing better able to maintain the mutual relationships with dispossessed subgroups that are necessary in order to be a preferable descriptive representative (Dovi, 2002)? Likewise, the San Antonio case reminds us that not all women are preferable descriptive representatives (Dovi, 2002), indicating that future research should address whether we should expect to see an increase in the number of women candidates or an increase in the number of feminist candidates after inclusive protests. Likewise, my findings concerning the relationship between *Mujeres Marcharan* organizers, the Nirenburg administration, and efforts to repeal the protest ordinance suggest new angles on research showing the relationship between autonomous women's movements and local policy change (Weldon, 2012).

Beyond the questions raised concerning women's representation, the findings within this dissertation raise new questions and potential paths of inquiry when addressing inclusion in social movements. As discussed, in the San Antonio case the organizers were able to build on existing institutions for inclusive organizing, from the *Mujeres Marcharan* group with its roots in the

annual International Women's Day Protests, and in local feminist organizations such as the Esperanza Peace and Justice Center to the Martinez Street Women's Shelter. These organizations are grounded in the history of Chicano movement and Chicana feminist organizing in San Antonio that dates back to the early 1900's. Much of this historic organizing has been spatially engaged, from the work of COPS around the lack of city services for the Westside to the work of the Committee for Barrio Betterment to elect representatives from the Westside and pressure the city to adopt a district based city council system. Likewise, the organizers ground their work in intersectional praxis, drawing on the work of Chicana feminists (e.g. *Bridge Called my Back*) to inform their practice. These histories matter, and raise questions concerning how the institutionalization of intersectional praxis (Townsend-Bell, 2011), as well as the presence of a physical spaces for this organizing, such as the Esperanza Peace and Justice Center, lower the barriers for inclusive protest.

Furthermore, my approach has clear implications for making sense of the implications of contemporary protests, from the efforts across the globe to remove monuments to supporters of the confederacy, colonialism, and the slave trade, to occupations in Seattle and New York protesting police violence against Black people. Based on my theoretical account, we should expect that where protestors are critically engaging with monuments to oppression, whether through graffiti, occupation, or removal, that we should see deepening inclusive solidarities and, in the future, more diverse candidates for local political office. Likewise, as evidenced by the Amarillo case we should not expect to see these effects only within traditionally progressive cities, protests within cities and towns that otherwise strongly support conservative politicians can be changed by a group of protestors challenging this dominance with long lasting impacts on local politics.

### **Paths for Future Research on Protest**

Connecting struggles for social equity with spatial equity may be more productive spaces for developing inclusive organizing both in the present and in the future, due to the connecting force of the shared experience of physical space (Soja, 2010). This dissertation provides a starting point for addressing how and why the spatial structure of the city impacts the ability to develop inclusive solidarities within social movements. In the following section, I present two approaches to continued research into how space influences movements and their outcomes.

### ***Future Research on the City: From the Women's March to George Floyd***

The most recent wave of protests started by the death of George Floyd on May 25, 2020, and the actions these protests have taken to disrupt and engage with public space present a new opportunity to test and refine the theory presented within my dissertation. The Women's Marches enabled testing how the spatial structure of the city and how protests disruption of public space influenced inclusion and representation within an identity-based movement (that was not at its core making claims on public space). Unlike the Women's March, the recent black lives matter protests have varied in terms of how the protestors have engaged with public space, in ways that are more similar to the Gezi protests of 2013. For example, protestors have critically disrupted public space through the use of graffiti, the forcible removal of confederate monuments, and the development of occupations in Seattle and New York City (Ebrahimji et al., 2020; Golden, 2020; McCammon, 2020; Rose, 2020). Seattle may be a particularly interesting case for bringing together these two protest waves, as it is one of the two cases where activists achieved one of the highest scores for inclusion in movement goals within the Women's March without copying the national platform, indicating that there may be a longer history of cross movement organizing within the city supporting both the inclusion we find within the Women's March and the occupation in 2020. Based on my theoretical account, I would expect that in cities that see protests where activists remove or change confederate monuments or establish occupations, will be more likely to develop new lasting inclusive solidarities when compared to cities where protest is either less disruptive of public space or where protest does not occur. Likewise, these protests should be associated in the future with more diverse candidates emerging in future local elections.

Furthermore, research into these protests will enable a further refinement of the theory, as the cities where protest is occurring vary both in terms of the form protest takes but also the history of Black Lives Matter organizing within these cities. As indicated by my San Antonio case study, the history of organizing within a city may play an important role in enabling the development of alliances between movements and organizers within cities with this history will be able to draw on already established inclusive norms. A comparative study of these protests, and their outcomes, would enable clarifying the theory and provide further insight into how the space of the city influences local democracy.

### *Beyond the Space of the City: Transnational Feminisms*

Spatial inequality is not limited to how the city is structured. There is a significant body of literature within transnational feminist theory, that points to the importance of national borders in structuring who has power within global feminist movements (Mohanty, 2003; Hughes et al, 2018). Likewise, there have been calls within the study of urban social movements to address how transnational and local movements shape one another (Mayer, 2013). One of the more surprising findings within my interviews with organizers of the Women's March in San Antonio, was the importance of transnational feminisms both within the individual experiences of these organizers and within their work, re-opening questions concerning the role of the trans-local in feminist organizing.

Three of the organizers interviewed involved in either the development of the annual International Women's Day March or the 2017 Women's March discussed the role of their experiences in Mexico, El Salvador, and Cuba as informing their approaches to organizing in San Antonio. For two of the organizers, their experiences working with organizers outside of the United States informed their reasons for organizing in San Antonio, whether through ecumenical work in El Salvador or the Dyke March in Mexico City. While for the founder of the International Women's Day March, the march has always been intended to highlight the connection between global and local injustices. Furthermore, this orientation towards transnational feminisms informed the organizers decisions re-center their organizing on International Women's Day in 2018, and cede what they viewed as a national event, the Women's March, to organizers involved with Texas Indivisible.

For the San Antonio organizers, a major form of spatial injustice that shapes daily life is the U.S. - Mexico border, and the policy regimes that punish those who cross the border. Similarly, the border played an important role in the El Paso case where organizers involved in developing the 2017 Women's March explicitly centered the experience of the border and organized the Braids Across Borders event which physically connected women on both sides of the Texas-Mexico border indicating the possible importance of transnational organizing within these local contexts. Importantly, transnational organizing in Texas is a form of intersectional praxis (Townsend-Bell,

2011) and by centering the border within the process of organizing organizers highlight a salient vector of oppression within the United States, Texas, and their own cities.

## **APPENDIX A: ADDITIONAL MATERIALS FOR CHAPTER 3**

In Table 22 below, I provide descriptive statistics for key independent variables. From these tables it is clear that most of the relevant variables are highly skewed. When addressing the number of women running for mayor, in a majority of cases there are no women running for mayor. Likewise, in most cases very few women run for city council, with an average of 2-3 women running for city council despite the variable ranging from 0 to 60 women. The number of women of color running for Mayor and city council are also quite low, with a maximum of three women of color running for Mayor and 40 women of color. In a majority of cities no women of color run for Mayor and city council in the election held before the Women's March. For comparison in the election before the Women's March, the number of mayoral candidates regardless of gender ranges from 1 to 35, with a mean of 3 candidates, and the number of city council candidates regardless of gender ranges from 1 to 218, with a mean of 10 candidates. Indicating that women make up a very small number of candidates in the elections before the Women's March.

Table A.1: Values of Independent Variables

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Min</b>	<b>Max</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>St. Dev.</b>	<b>Median</b>
Presence of a Women's March in 2017	0	1	0.25	0.43	0
Women Friendly Municipality Index	0	8	4.50	1.35	5
Number of Women Running for Mayor in the previous election	0	6	0.52	0.82	0
Number of Women Running for City Council in the previous election	0	60	2.80	4.39	2
Number of Women of Color Running for Mayor in the Previous election	0	3	0.13	0.41	0
Number of Women of Color running for city council in the previous election	0	40	0.87	2.89	0



Number of Women Owned Firms	203	413899	4985.817	23493.58	1727
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When addressing the key dependent variables, the number of women and women of color running for Mayor and City Council in the election directly following the 2017 Women's March and before the 2018 Women's March we see similar variation as with the previous elections. In 2017, the total number of Mayoral candidates regardless of gender ranges from 1 to 21, with an average of 3 candidates, and the total number of City Council candidates regardless of gender ranges from 2 to 193, with an average of 10 candidates. There is not much change in the range of the number of women candidates in the election directly following the women's march, with a minimum 0 women candidates and a maximum 6 women candidates. There is however a distinct increase in the number of women of color candidates running for mayor with an increase from a max of 3 candidates before the Women's March, to a max of 6 candidates in the election following the Women's March. When addressing city council races, the maximum number of women running decreases from 60 to 53, and the maximum number of women of color running decreases from 40 to 34. There are slight increases in the average number of women and women of color running for office across the board. However, over all there is little difference between the previous elections and the elections held after the 2017 Women's March.

Table A.2: Values of Dependent Variables for local elections with declaration deadlines between 2017 and 2018 Women's Marches

<b>Variable</b>	<b>Min</b>	<b>Max</b>	<b>Mean</b>	<b>Std. Dev.</b>	<b>Median</b>
Number of Women Running for Mayor	0	6	0.69	0.94	0
Number of Women Running for City Council	0	53	3.17	4.20	2
Number of Women of Color Running for Mayor	0	6	0.20	0.57	0
Number of Women of Color Running for City Council	0	34	1.03	2.86	0

## **APPENDIX B: DATA COLLECTION FOR BOSTON, SAN ANTONIO, AND PITTSBURGH CASE STUDIES**

When building the cases developed in this dissertation, I rely on a range of data sources which cover both what is reported about the case (from interviews conducted by myself as well as the press to academic literature on the cases) and how the space where the protests and meeting were held are experienced by the participant. Within this appendix, I will address the process of collecting my interview data, and my ethnographic observations. The data associated with my interviews and ethnographic observations encompass 88 pages of typed notes, one 4.5 inch by 6.9 inch unlined classic moleskin notebook of handwritten notes, and 133 photos. Throughout this discussion, I will address how my positionality as an upwardly mobile cis white woman shaped my interactions both with my interviewees and the space of each city.

### **Interviews**

In order to gain the first-person perspective of the activists involved in organizing the Women's March, I conducted semi-structured interviews with 15 activists. 11 of the interviews were held with activists in Boston, 4 of the interviews were held with activists in San Antonio, and 1 interview was held with an activist in Pittsburgh. The first round of interviewees were identified through news accounts covering the Women's March, and through March social media such as facebook events and actionnetwork. The sample of interviewees was then expanded by asking activists if they could identify and connect me with other activists involved in the process. While conducting these interviews I was much more successful with expanding the number of interviewees in Boston, as opposed to San Antonio and Pittsburgh for a number of reasons. First, most of the interviewees in Boston viewed me as a peer, as an educated and upper-middle class presenting woman. Second, new norms within activists' communities which recognize the need to compensate women of color for their labor were at odds with my IRB protocols which did not allow me to compensate women for their labor. In the San Antonio case, these norms were more softly enforced in part due to the presence of an academic within the organizing collective, while in Pittsburgh I was unable to interview women involved with the Our March Must Be

Intersectional due to my inability to compensate women for their labor. In the future, academics seeking to conduct research on grassroots organizations should ensure they are able to compensate women of color appropriately for their labor when conducting similar projects.

When conducting these interviews, I began with the same set of questions concerning the activist's position in the organizing process, and their continued work within their communities (see Appendix C). I asked the activists to pick a space for the interview where they felt comfortable. The vast majority of interviews, nine, were held at activist's workplaces. Three interviews were held in public spaces where the activists felt comfortable, one of the interviews occurred in a restaurant and the other two occurred in coffee shops. Due to time and location constraints three interviews were conducted over the phone. During the interviews, I took notes on the activist's answers to each question during our interview, and after the meetings I wrote up my analysis of the conversation addressing what was said, unsaid, and my own notes on where we met, and how they approached the conversation. When addressing what was unsaid, I paid close attention to the body language, the tone of the conversation, and where their style of language shifted. For example, did the interviewee shift from concrete examples to vague statements when particular questions were raised, or did the interviewee appear to become more tense when particular questions were raised. One piece of important information was which interviewees appeared relaxed and viewed me as the researcher as someone they could be free with their observations, which interviewees vetted me before answering my questions, and which interviewees appeared anxious about even providing an interview on the subject. In the following section, I will address why the location of these meetings was included within my ethnographic observations.

### **Ethnographic Observations**

I will primarily address how I collected data on the experience of these spaces, in Boston, San Antonio, and Pittsburgh. In order to address this data collection process, I have to first address my own positionality within each of these cities. I have lived in three of the cities included within this dissertation, San Antonio, Istanbul, and Boston. I lived in San Antonio part time after my parents' divorce between the years of 2000-2009 and full time while attending Trinity University from 2009 to 2013, except for the period from January to June 2012 when I lived in Istanbul while attending Koc University. I first lived in Boston from August 2013 to August 2014 when I moved

to Lafayette, IN to pursue my Ph.D. I returned to Boston in July 2018 and continue to live in Boston at the time of defense. As with my research participants, my experiences of these cities were shaped in many ways by the neighborhoods where I lived, and where I “come from” in terms of where I consider home and what I consider to *feel* like home. In the following sections, I address my position vis-à-vis this research and data collection process for each city.

### **Positionality: A Tale of Two Cities**

My approach to the questions presented within this dissertation are fundamentally tied to how I perceive and experience the world as a upwardly mobile white cis woman from a precariously lower middle class family who grew up going between two different cities. In 1998, my family moved to Alamo Heights, Texas from Austin, TX. Alamo Heights is a primarily upper middle class white protected suburb surrounded by San Antonio on all sides, and we moved there when my father left graduate school for a job in San Antonio due to the “good public schools.” A decision that will be unsurprising to readers familiar with the literature on the relationship between segregation across cities and public schooling (Trounstein, 2018). Within these “good public schools” I learned a great deal about my class position from my peers and was pleased when my mother decided to move my sister and I back to Austin after my parents’ divorce. With his location no longer tied to my sister and my education, my father soon moved to the more ethnically and economically diverse Highlands in the south east of San Antonio (where according to my father “everyone’s grandmother lived”) and later to the Lavaca neighborhood, in the Southtown district. While living in these neighborhoods, I quickly learned that it was not San Antonio that I disliked but instead Alamo Heights. Moving back and forth between Austin and San Antonio, my childhood and adolescents were a constant comparative case study as I had to make sense of why the kids who were interested in the same music in Austin and in San Antonio seemed to pull from different aesthetic traditions, my sister and I attended public schools in Austin but my atheist step-mother sent her children to Catholic school, and why was the bus so much less reliable in my father’s neighborhood than in my mother’s neighborhood?

Beyond shaping my interest in how the space of the city influences the lived experience of the city, living in San Antonio particularly Southtown, provided insight into how the colonial past both shaped the lived experience of the city and my own anglo privilege. During my adolescence, we lived across the street from Teresa A. Ybáñez’s mural of Emma Tenayuca. The mural, funded

by the Southtown neighborhood association and started in 1995, by Ybáñez with the support of members of the community depicts Tenayuca surrounded by fellow workers and pecans (in reference to the pecan sheller's strike) with the words Civil Rights Leader and Labor Leader flanking her name (Ybáñez, 2003). Every day we left the house, I was reminded that the San Antonio I knew was made possible by the work and activism by Tenayuca and women like her. This image, and my father's regular reminder that San Antonio (and Texas) were only a part of the United States because of an unjust and colonial war with the words "we live in occupied Mexico," shaped how I understood the other monuments and the tourist attractions I encountered during my father's favorite activity of walking all over downtown. These lessons were compounded when I attended Trinity University, where I met anglo San Antonians from the suburbs for the first time and learned that we had vastly different maps of and relationships with the city.

### **Process of Observation: Site Visits, and Participant Observation**

Throughout the process of conducting this research I lived in Boston, within Jamaica Plain where the neighborhood intersections with both the wealthier town of Brookline and the less wealthy Mission Hill neighborhood. While living in Jamaica Plain, I became involved in the local activist community through the Boston Cyclist Union. Through my involvement with the Boston Cyclist Union I attended a number of events, including rides organized with city councilors, monthly activist meetings, meetings with local Jamaica Plain cyclist groups, and the annual children's bike parade. Likewise, I manned the Boston Cyclist Union parking space for 12 hours on Centre Street for "parking day" on September 20, 2019, during which I observed the street as community members went about their work days and traveled to and from the Climate Strike, and spoke with my neighbors about why they liked living in Jamaica Plain and how they wanted their neighborhood to change in the future. As a participant within the organizing community, I informally discussed my dissertation project with activists, neighbors, and policymakers. This process, as well as my own larger social circle within Boston which included activists and attendees of the March, led me to find potential formal interviewees, and enabled me to get a larger sense of how the Boston Women's March was viewed by the larger activist community within Boston, but more particularly within Jamaica Plain.

In order to better understand the role of the city in shaping both my interviewees understanding of the city, and the organizing process I conducted site visits to the March locations

and had my interviewees decide where we should meet for our interviews when possible. My site visits and interviews in San Antonio were conducted over two one-week trips during which I stayed with family in the Government Hill Neighborhood. My interviews and site visits in Pittsburgh were conducted over one week during which I stayed with a friend in the borough of Brentwood. When conducting my site visits and when meeting with interviewees I aimed to do all of my transportation using either public transit or a bicycle. Using these means of transportation to meet with interviewees and gain access to sites that were used by organizers provided important data concerning the accessibility of these spaces when they were connected to the larger city. For example, I took it as meaningful that an organizer from the suburbs did not want to either force me to try to come to meet her in her neighborhood or face Boston traffic herself. I was unable to rely on public transit in two instances, the first was when it was pouring rain and there was no bus route to an interviewees place of work and the second was when plane issues required me to go straight from the airport to an interview.

I conducted site visits for March locations in San Antonio, Boston, and Pittsburgh. When conducting these site visits, I first used media and interviews with participants to reconstruct the March for the San Antonio Women's March, the Boston Women's March, the Pittsburgh Women's March, and the Our Feminism Must be Intersectional March. Following this reconstruction, I then would map a route to get to the March routes from where I was staying during my field visits to each city using either a bicycle or public transit in order to assess both the accessibility of the trip and gain insight into how the site itself links to the larger city. For example, in the case of the Boston, Pittsburgh, and San Antonio Women's Marches, the starting locations are downtown and all transit options support the movement of people to these spaces. Walking from the transit stop to the starting point to the Our Feminism Must be Intersectional March, the issue of gentrification in East Liberty was visible within the built environment from the mix of older housing stock and businesses with newer condos and luxury businesses catering to my upper-middle class and upwardly mobile peers. Finally, I walked the March routes taking note of who was present on the street; whose experiences of the street were prioritized; if there were monuments, who and what did they represent; and was there evidence of counter-narratives about who had control of the street presented through street-art or graffiti.

Beyond my site visits to march locations, in Boston, I also did a site visit to Lexington and lived in Jamaica Plain for the entirety of the research process. For the site visit to Lexington, I

compared the time it would take to go to the neighborhood using public transit versus a bicycle and chose the bicycle. While I did not have the ability to find the exact location of the original meeting, I rode through the town and again made note of who was present, and who was absent. Likewise, as a Boston resident I rode the Minuteman Rail Trail at different points in the year, during these rides I noted who else was using the Minuteman Rail Trail to move between Lexington and Boston, and was able to informally discuss the trail with fellow cyclists I met while using the trail as a starting point for longer rides.

Living in Jamaica Plain, meant that I did not need to organize a specific site visit to the neighborhood and instead I used my daily lived experience in the neighborhood as data when I learned it was one of the sites where Boston Women's March organizers held one of their meetings. I took notes on the role of activist organizing in the daily life of the community, from the discussions about how best to strategize building solidarity within the two Jamaica Plains while developing a campaign to improve Centre street to noting the flyers and stickers used to promote organizations, events, and campaigns within the neighborhood. Likewise, I took notes on the political stickers and paid close attention to the graffiti on the main streets on the neighborhood. Importantly, these reflect not only the activities being promoted but also those being rejected, as when right wing stickers appeared along S. Huntington Ave. they were quickly removed, in contrast to 617 antifa stickers which show no evidence of being removed anytime soon.

## **APPENDIX C: INTERVIEW QUESTIONS**

How did you become involved in the organizing process?

What was your specific role during the organizing process?

Within your role, did you play any part in ensuring the inclusion of diverse perspectives, people, and issues within the organizing process?

How would you characterize your experience as a part of the organizing team?

Were you involved in making decisions about the physical space of the event?  
If so, what where you involved in?

What was your role on the day of the event?

How would you describe your experience on the Day of the March?

Have you continued to be involved in political organizing (for example, organizing protests, being involved in local community organizing groups, political campaigns etc)?

How would you characterize your involvement?

Is there anything I haven't asked about that you think I should know about the event?

Is there anyone you think I should talk to about the event?



## APPENDIX D: PRESENCE OF DIVERSITY IN LEADERSHIP FOR WOMEN’S MARCHES

City	Presence of Diversity in Leadership
Abilene, TX	0
Albany, NY	1
Albuquerque, NM	1
Amarillo, TX	0
Annapolis, MD	0
Asheville, NC	0
Atlanta, GA	1
Beaumont, TX	0
Bethlehem, PA	0
Binghamton, NY	0
Birmingham, AL	1
Boston, MA	1
Broomfield, CO	0
Buffalo, NY	0
Charlotte, NC	0
Cincinnati, OH	0
Cleveland, OH	0
Columbia, SC	1
Corpus Christi, TX	0
Dayton, OH	0
Detroit, MI	0
Dubuque, IA	0
Eagle Pass, TX	0
El Paso, TX	1
Erie, PA	0
Fort Collins, CO	0
Fort Worth, TX	0
Frederick, MD	0
Gloucester Township, NJ	1
Greensboro, NC	0
Greenville, NC	1
Grosse Pointe Woods, MI	0

Gulfport, MS	1
Harrisburg, PA	0
Helena, MT	0
Idaho Falls, ID	0
Kalamazoo, MI	0
La Crosse, WI	1
Lancaster, PA	0
Lansing, MI	0
Miami Beach, FL	1
Miami, FL	1
Milford, CT	0
Minneapolis, MN	0
Mobile, AL	0
Mooreville, NC	0
New Bern, NC	0
New Haven, CT	1
New York, NY	1
Ocala, FL	0
Oklahoma City, OK	1
Omaha, NE	0
Panama City, FL	0
Pierre, SD	0
Pittsburgh, PA	0
Pocatello, ID	0
Prescott, AZ	0
Raleigh, NC	1
Rapid City, SD	0
Rochester, NY	0
San Antonio, TX	1
San Francisco, CA	1
Santa Barbara, CA	0
Santa Fe, NM	0
Seattle, WA	1
St. George, UT	0
St. Paul, MN	0
St. Petersburg, FL	0
Stamford, CT	1
Syracuse, NY	0
Toledo, OH	1

Topeka, KS	0
Vancouver, WA	0
Westfield, NJ	0
Wilmington, NC	0
Yuma, AZ	1

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